To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right."
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Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 938
(1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
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FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views
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F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
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But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
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Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
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In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
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I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
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In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
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In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
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Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
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Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
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The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
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In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY - 0 views
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Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
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Page 1 Final Report CJ - 1 OFFICE OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY AN IN-DEPTH INVESTIGATION Prepared by 2001-2002 Orange CountyGrand Jury June, 2002 Page 2 CJ - 2 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury COMMENDATIONS There are many men and women: managers, deputy district attorneys, and investigators in the Office of the District Attorney who have demonstrated great professionalism and integrity. They have worked in their offices, entered the courts, and gone into the streets to insure that the criminal justice system in Orange County is held to the highest standards. The 2001-2002 Orange County Grand Jury extends its highest commendation to these dedicated public servants and asks that the electorate of the county join us in this commendation. Page 3 Final Report CJ - 3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page COMMENDATIONS......................................................................................................... 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS.................................................................................................... 3 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ................................................................................................ 5 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 7 Major Accomplishments of the District Attorney's Office under the Current Administration............................................................................................................ 7 INITIATION OF THE INVESTIGATION & METHOD OF STUDY ............................. 9 ORGANIZATIONAL RESTRUCTURE - Attorney Positions ....................................... 11 Factual Background - Post 1998 Campaign............................................................. 11 Findings..................................................................................................................... 15 Recommendations ......................................................................................
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The National Center for State Courts, working alongside the members of the Elder Abuse and the Courts Working Group, is involved in a number of follow-up activities to develop services the courts can use. For more information on the Elder Abuse and the Courts Working Group, con-tact Brenda Uekert, Ph.D. (buekert@ncsc.dni.us) of NCSC's Research and Technol-ogy Division. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 3 3Courts looking for the latest information on ways to improve jury service can turn to a new edition of Jury Trial Innovations (JTI), the National Center for State Courts' best-selling guide to techniques used nationwide to make jury service more appealing to the public and to help jurors become more effective decision makers. This new edition was updated by G. Thomas Munsterman and Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, of NCSC's Center for Jury Studies, and G. Marc White-head, chair of the Jury Initiatives Task Force of the American Bar Association's Section of Litigation, who were editors of the original edition published in 1997.This new edition looks at innova-tions courts have tried in the decade since the first edition was published, especially those involving the model of "the interactive juror"-that is, innovations focused on how jurors organize information, how to keep jurors actively involved in trial proceedings, The new edition of Jury Trial Innovations will be available in July 2006 and can be ordered through NCSC's online bookstore accessible through the "Communications" page on NCSC's Web site (www.ncsconline.org).NCSC Updates Jury Trial Innovationsand how jurors test what they see and hear against their own beliefs and values. After exploring "How Jurors Make Decisions: The Value of Trial Innovations," JTI discusses innovations in six areas:1. Jury Administration and Management 2. Voir Dire3. Pretrial Management4. Trial Procedures5. Jury Instructions and Deliberations6. Post-Verdict Co
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1 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH CENTRAL DIVISION PETER JOSE SMITH... - 0 views
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III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDSummary judgment is proper if the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuineissue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering whether5genuine issues of material fact exist, the Court determines whether a reasonable jury could returna verdict for the nonmoving party in the face of all the evidence presented. The Court is required6to construe all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
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Response to Grand Jury Report: Riverside County Office on Aging That the Board of Super... - 0 views
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Case management is a top priority in the Board of Supervisors approved strategic plan for senior services. Hiring of new case management staff in the Office on Aging is always contingent upon available grant funds from the Older Americans Act and the Older Californians Act. Additional social work case managers will be needed for some time as the senior population ages. Recent increases in Older Americans Act funding will support the creation of two additional social work positions. These positions are being filled. A third social work case manager will be hired on a temporary basis using one year planning grant funds recently approiied by the CA. Dept of Health Services to test a new integrated case management model in partnership with the RCRMC and other community agencies in Riverside County. That position will become permanent if Older Americans Act or Older Californians Act funding is available when the planning grant ends (June 03).
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Case management is a top priority in the Board of Supervisors approved strategic plan for senior services. Hiring of new case management staff in the Office on Aging is always contingent upon available grant funds from the Older Americans Act and the Older Californians Act. Additional social work case managers will be needed for some time as the senior population ages. Recent increases in Older Americans Act funding will support the creation of two additional social work positions. These positions are being filled. A third social work case manager will be hired on a temporary basis using one year planning grant funds recently approiied by the CA. Dept of Health Services to test a new integrated case management model in partnership with the RCRMC and other community agencies in Riverside County. That position will become permanent if Older Americans Act or Older Californians Act funding is available when the planning grant ends (June 03).
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The three CTSA's (Coordinated Transportation Service Agencies) are mandated under federal and state law to develop and implement transportation plans for Riverside County. The Office on Aging conducts community needs assessments and public hearings on the transportation needs of seniors and adults with disabilities, and makes this information available to the CTSAs. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 4 Response to Grand Jury Report Page 3 * - - . The Advisory Council on Aging recently held a public forum on transportation issues affecting seniors and adults with disabilities in Riverside County, and heard extensive testimony from providers and consumers on current transportation programs and resources, and unmet transportation needs. This information was disseminated widely, and also provided a basis for advocating for improved transportation services for seniors and adults with disabilities in the plan that is developed and implemented by the CTSAs. Recommendation #3: Riverside County Transit Authority provides benches, route maps and bus schedules at all public bus stops. Office on Aging agrees with the finding, but has no direct control over Riverside County Transit Authority. This recommendation will be shared with the Advisory Council on Aging to be included in their advocacy efforts for improved and expanded transportation. The Council will ask RCTA to make improvements at bus stops. Recommendation #4: RCOOA immediately hire a minimum of three additional case managers to meet current and expected workloads. The recommendation will be fully implemented within the next 60 days. Case management is a top priority in the Board of Supervisors approved strategic plan for senior services. Hiring of new case management staff in the Office on Aging is always contingent upon available grant funds from the Older Americans Act and the Older Californians Act. Additional social work case managers will be needed for some ti
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Motion (legal) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia - 0 views
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Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is the rule which explains the mechanics of a summary judgment motion. As explained in the notes to this rule, summary judgment procedure is a method for promptly disposing of actions in which there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Prior to its introduction in the US in 1934, it was used in England for more than 50 years. In England motions for summary judgments were used only in cases of liquidated claims, there followed a steady enlargement of the scope of the remedy until it was used in actions to recover land or chattels and in all other actions at law, for liquidated or unliquidated claims, except for a few designated torts and breach of promise of marriage. English Rules Under the Judicature Act (The Annual Practice, 1937) O. 3, r. 6; Orders 14, 14A, and 15; see also O. 32, r. 6, authorizing an application for judgment at any time upon admissions. New York was a leader in the adoption of this rule in the US and the success of the method helps account for its current importance as an almost indispensable tool in administrative actions (especially before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which adjudicates employment discrimination claims and the Merit Systems Protection Board which adjudicates federal employment matters).[2]