Skip to main content

Home/ Nyefrank/ Group items tagged reckless

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Alliance: Factsheets: Elder Abuse and the Law - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

elder abuse laws

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Elder Abuse Laws Numerous accounts of maltreatment led policy makers to pass a series of laws intended to protect elderly victim. The passage of the federal Older Americans Act of 1965 (OAA) (3) and the creation of the Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program (4) in 1992 were instrumental in promoting state laws to address the needs and concerns of the elderly. The Vulnerable Elder Rights Protection Program legislation promoted advocacy efforts through ombudsmen offices; abuse, neglect and exploitation prevention programs; and legal assistance on behalf of older Americans. It also offered federal funding incentives which made it possible for states to develop and maintain programs designed to assist the elderly. In many respects, state elder abuse laws are patterned after legislation designed to address the problem of child abuse and neglect, and, like the response to child maltreatment, often involve the combined efforts of both criminal justice officials and social services staff. Criminal Elder Abuse Laws In an effort to deter crimes against elderly victims, and to express society's abhorrence toward such offenses, many state legislatures have created special offenses involving crimes against the elderly. Laws criminalizing abuse of the elderly are in effect in all states and the District of Columbia. Generally, these laws define the conduct which constitutes a specific form of abuse, and may make a distinction between abuse committed in a domestic, as opposed to an institutional, setting. At least two states -- Massachusetts and North Carolina -- have laws which subject anyone over the age of 18 who has sufficient means, but neglects or refuses to support a parent who is unable to support him/herself due to age or disability, to a fine or imprisonment. (5)
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    ivil Remedies A few states have special provisions for the bringing of civil actions by the elderly. If an older person in Nevada suffers personal injury or death caused by abuse or neglect or suffers a loss of money or property by exploitation, the offender may be ordered to pay up to two times the actual damages incurred. If the offender acted with recklessness, oppression, fraud, or malice, the court shall order the person to pay the attorney's fees and costs of the person who initiated the lawsuit. In Georgia, the elderly may recover actual and punitive damages and attorney's fees for injury resulting from unfair or deceptive business practices.
Nye Frank

Illinois Pro Bono | Senior Citizens Handbook - Protection from Abuse and Neglect - 0 views

www.illinoisprobono.org/index.cfm

senior handbood

shared by Nye Frank on 30 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 30 Jul 09
     
    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
  • Nye Frank on 30 Jul 09
     
    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
Nye Frank

California Elder Abuse Act, Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA): S... - 0 views

www.preventelderabuse.com/alifornia-elder-abuse-act.html

elder abuse act legislative

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
  • Nye Frank on 23 Jul 09
     
    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
1 - 5 of 5
Showing 20▼ items per page