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29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92

Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.

The Sentencing Commission has only issued "advisory policy statements" applicable to revocations of probation and supervised release instead of mandatory guidelines. U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pts. A1, A3(a); see also United States v. George, 184 F.3d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Because the Commission has not yet issued guidelines relating to revocation of supervised release or changed its view that the Chapter 7 policy statements are merely advisory, we see no reason to reduce the flexibility of district courts in sentencing supervised release violators."). We have held that a district court, when revoking supervised release, has discretion to go outside the suggested sentencing range of the policy statements up to the statutory maximum listed in 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3). See George, 184 F.3d at 1122-23 (finding no error where the district court considered the 7to 13-month range in the policy statements of Chapter 7, rejected it, and sentenced the defendant to 23 months imprisonment). The policy statement range for Musa's violation of the conditions of his supervised release is three to nine months, see U.S.S.G. S7B1.4, but the statutory maximum, as previously noted, is three years, see 18 U.S.C. S 3583(e)(3).

Law Enforcement and Adult Protective Services Working Together: A Team Approach to Elder Abuse CasesAge in Action; Vol. 19 (3), Summer 2004.Journal article (scholarship)This article highlights the Central Virginia Task Force on Older Battered Women (OBW Task Force), a regional coalition of aging, domestic violence (DV), law enforcement, and legal services agencies dedicated to raising awareness of the needs of women who experience domestic violence/intimate partner violence and sexual assault in later life. Established in 1998, the project focuses on developing collaborative and interdisciplinary community responses to address violence against older women. A case study is presented from Henrico County that illustrates how adult protective services (APS) and the police department conducted a joint investigation of a sexual assault of a 65 year old assisted living facility resident. The following key elements for successful collaboration were identified: the need for all members to understand and respect the expertise and distinct role of each member; the need for investigators to attempt to conduct joint interviews whenever possible; and to the need to ensure that time and resources are shared effectively. (Note: This article is available online only at:   http://www.vcu.edu/vcoa/ageaction/AGEsu04.htm.) 2003 P5623-25Heisler, C. & Stiegel Enhancing the Justice System's Response to Elder Abuse: Discussions and Recommendations of the "Improving Prosecution" Working Group of The National Policy Summit on Elder Abuse Journal of Elder Abuse and Neglect; Vol. 14 (4), 31-54; 2002.**Journal article (scholarship)This article elaborates upon two of the recommendations identified through the "Improving Prosecution" working group session of the National Policy Summit on Elder Abuse (December 2001, Washington, D.C.): "improving the legal landscape by strengthening elder abuse laws" and "increasing awareness within the justice system." The following topics were considered: the role of the federal and state governments in increasing elder abuse reporting and enhancing prosecution; the need for expert witnesses, support, and technical assistance; the identification of barriers to accessing the criminal justice system; the improvement of outcomes in criminal cases; and the need for training of law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, coroners, court personnel, and advocates. The authors also provide a historical perspective on the response of the criminal justice system to elder abuse, which was initially minimal, based in part upon the underreporting of the problem. P5404-88* Johnson, K., for the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS

To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ

F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).

But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.

While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.

In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.