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Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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mandamus judicial discretion

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

wyomcases.courts.state.wy.us/...deliverdocument.asp

victim statement of fact for summary judgement

shared by Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 21 Apr 09
     
    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

209.85.173.132/custom

tort emotional pain

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
  • ...4 more comments...
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by... - 0 views

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homicide closure exceptional administratively

shared by Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09 - No Cached
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    In defining case closure, often referred to as case "clearance," the U.S. Department of Justice's Bureau of Justice Statistics has stated that "Law enforcement agencies clear or solve an offense when at least one person is arrested, charged with the commission of the offense, and turned over to the court for prosecution." In addition, cases can be closed through "exceptional" means -- which are often referred to as "administrative" case closures. Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender. In such circumstances, law enforcement must have identified the offender, possess enough evidence to support arrest, and identify the offender's location." Some of the circumstances that may permit exceptional clearances include the death of the offender; the victim's refusal to cooperate with the prosecution after the offender has been identified; the arrest or imprisonment of the offender due to another crime or crimes; or the offender's flight to another jurisdiction where extradition is not possible.[ Reply ] [ Edit ] « Back to Inbox [ Invite Others to this Conversation ] 1 - 1 of 1 ActionsInvite Others to this Conversation Leave This Conversation Message Propagation Path Initiated by Nye Frank People in this conversation (1)Nye Frank Diigo - Highlight and Share the Web!About Diigo| Help| User Forum| Blog| Tools| Contact| Terms of Service| Privacy| © Diigo Inc 2008 -- User-posted content, unless source quoted, is licensed under a Creative Commons Public Domain License
  • Nye Frank on 08 Mar 09
     
    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
Nye Frank

federal statutes Honorable Dirk Kempthorne , James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior ... - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

42 USC civil rights violations

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
Nye Frank

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74.125.155.132/search

appeal motion rule

shared by Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
Nye Frank

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/promoting%20effective%20homicide%20inv... - 0 views

www.cops.usdoj.gov/...0homicide%20investigations.txt

homicide exceptional close case clearance 20homicide 20effective

shared by Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
  • Nye Frank on 02 Aug 09
     
    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
Nye Frank

foia damages, tort No. 03-1395: Doe v. Tenet - Appendix (Petition) - 0 views

www.usdoj.gov/...2003-1395.pet.app.html

tort esstoppel court doctor client privlege

shared by Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09 - Cached
  • While Totten and Reynolds are closely related in that both protect a state secret from disclosure, the rules announced in those cases differ in subtle but important respects. Most importantly, the state secrets privilege in Reynolds permits the government to withhold otherwise relevant discovery from a recognized cause of action (e.g., an FTCA case), while the Totten doctrine permits the dismissal of a lawsuit because it is non-justiciable before such evidentiary questions are ever reached.
  • In Kasza, we relied on the Reynolds rule that "the state secrets privilege is a common law evidentiary privilege that allows the government to deny discovery of military secrets." Id. at 1165. After reviewing the applicable law, we reasoned that the application of the state secrets privilege can have different effects, depending on whether it is used to exclude evidence or to dismiss a cause of action. Id. at 1166. First, we found that the government's invocation of the privilege over particular evidence may completely remove the evidence from the case. Id. If a plaintiff cannot make out her prima facie case without the secret evidence, the court may dismiss her claim. Id. Second, the privilege may deprive a defendant of information that would otherwise give the defendant a valid defense to the claim. Id. In these cases, the court may grant summary judgment to the defendant. Id.
  • Nye Frank on 15 Apr 09
     
    IFurther, Weinberger concerned in the main an explicit statutory exemption to the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA"). See Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 144, 102 S. Ct. 197. FOIA analysis is governed strictly by statute, while the state secrets privilege is governed solely by judge-made law. Also, FOIA cases involve a determination of what information can be released to the public without any restriction on the information's dissemination. In contrast, the state secrets privilege governs what material can be used by individual litigants who need such information to make their cases, under such restrictions of access as may be necessary, including in camera review, closed proceedings, and sealed records. Weinberger therefore dealt principally with the substantive question whether the sensitive material at issue could be made public and only as a subsidiary matter with the handling of that material within the confines of litigation. Weinberger did refer to Totten at the end of the opinion as an explanation, by analogy, concerning why the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") inquiry could not go forward in court. It also referred, however, in the same context, to Reynolds, the seminal state secrets privilege case. Weinberger, 454 U.S. at 147, 102 S. Ct. 197. The brief reference to Totten in Weinberger therefore cannot be read as prescribing the application of Totten without regard to the later-developed state secrets privilege doctrine, and Kasza evidently did not so read it. We therefore conclude that Totten is applicable to the case before us only as applied through the prism of current state secrets doctrine. C. To invoke the state secrets privilege, a formal claim of privilege must be "lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal consideration [of the evidence] by that officer." Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 7-8, 73 S. Ct. 528 (footnotes omitted); see also Kasza, 133 F.3d at 1165. After that, "[t]he court itself
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conspiracy case 99-6050 -- U.S. v. Rahseparian -- 11/07/2000 - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

conspiracy case

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    SEYMOUR , Chief Judge. After a joint jury trial, co-defendants Ardashir (aka Ardie) and Daryoush (aka Steve), along with Jalal (aka Jack) Rahseparian, were convicted of conspiracy to commit mail fraud, mail fraud, and money laundering. All three appealed. Jack's appeal is addressed in the companion opinion, see United States v. Rahseparian, No. 99-6031 (Nov. 7, 2000). Ardie contends on appeal that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. Ardie and Steve contend a new trial is necessary due to the prosecutor's comment on their failure to testify in violation of Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). Steve further claims a new trial is required because of certain incriminating hearsay statements elicited by the prosecutor in violation of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). We affirm. I BACKGROUND Ardie and Steve Rahseparian are the sons of Jack Rahseparian. At the time of the conduct for which they were charged, Steve resided in Altoona, Pennsylvania, Ardie resided in Fort Smith, Arkansas, and Jack resided and worked in Shawnee, Oklahoma. The government contended at trial that Ardie and Steve Rahseparian formed Genesis Marketing, a telemarketing company, through which they and their father conspired to commit and did commit mail fraud from May 1994 to May 1995. The government further successfully argued that Ardie, Steve, and Jack Rahseparian laundered the proceeds from the telemarketing scheme through Jack's business checking accounts. Brad Russell, the company's only employee other than the Rahseparians themselves, testified on behalf of the government. Mr. Russell was a personal friend of Ardie. The two worked out of Ardie's apartment in Fort Smith as the sole telemarketers for Genesis Marketing. Mr. Russell testified that he and Ardie would entice customers over the telephone to buy products, such as water purifiers and "Say No to Drugs" kits, at highly inflated pric
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how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor - Google Search - 0 views

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conspiracy

shared by Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 22 Apr 09
     
    Results 1 - 10 of about 140,000 for how to prove specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor . ( 0.38 seconds) Did you mean: how to provide specific intent of conspiracy of prosecutor Search Results Conspiracy (crime) - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia Conspiracy law usually does not require proof of the specific intent by the ... based on the fact that the prosecutor would be unable to prove beyond a ... en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Conspiracy _(crime) - 54k - Cached - Similar pages - 1. International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda-genocide-conspiracy ... defendant's co-conspirators acted with specific intent would "tend to prove" that the. 40. See Prosecutor v. Bagasora et al., Case Nos. ICTR-98-41-AR93, ... papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SSRN_ID951847_code366348.pdf?abstractid=951847&rulid=263109&mirid=4 - Similar pages - by A Decision E Law: Conspiracy to Commit Genocide: Prosecutor v Jean Kambanda ... [48] In order to prove the existence of a conspiracy, ..... that an accused might have the specific intent required to commit genocide and also to act ... The Trial Chamber held that the Prosecutor relied on the same intent of the two ... www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v8n1/obote-odora81.html - 1k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Where the prosecutor did not charge conspiracy as an offense, but introduced evidence of a conspiracy to prove liability, the court had a sua sponte duty to ... an agreement between two or more people with the specific intent to agree ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/archive/B199059.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] [J-28-99] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENN
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Position Outline for Elder Abuse Policy (Rough Draft) - 0 views

74.125.155.132/search

district attorney elder draft rough

shared by Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09 - Cached
  • 29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
  • Nye Frank on 27 Jul 09
     
    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
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FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/...getcase.pl

1983 indifference minimum in standard case

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • ...1 more comment...
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
  • Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09
     
    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

209.85.173.132/search

crime victims rights disclosure foia manual

shared by Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09 - Cached
  • Nye Frank on 23 Apr 09
     
    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
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