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Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

federal statutes Honorable Dirk Kempthorne , James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior ... - 0 views

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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

Illinois Pro Bono | Senior Citizens Handbook - Protection from Abuse and Neglect - 0 views

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    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
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    PrintPrint EmailEmail Share Author: Prairie State Legal Services Last updated: March 2009 (Chapter 8 Section 1 of Senior Citizens Handbook) * The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act * The Illinois Domestic Violence Act * Self Neglect * Criminal Laws * Where to Get Help In this section, we discuss laws intended to protect our elder citizens from abuse, neglect, and exploitation by family members, caregivers, and others. These laws provide protection through the Court, including Orders of Protection and criminal prosecution. Each county in Illinois has a designated agency to investigate reports of abuse, neglect, and/or exploitation of persons age 60 or older. These agencies also assist persons in obtaining needed services. The Elder Abuse and Neglect Act The Purpose of the Act This statute assures that local agencies will be funded by the Illinois Department on Aging in order to offer help to persons age 60 and older who may be abused, neglected, or exploited by family, household members, or caregivers. Any person who suspects the abuse, neglect, or financial exploitation of such a person may report this suspicion to the designated local agency. Any person making a report under the belief that it is in the senior's best interests is immune from any criminal or civil liability, or professional disciplinary action on account of making the report. The identity of a person making a report cannot be disclosed by the agency or by the Department on Aging to anyone else unless it is with that person's consent or by court order. Certain kinds of persons are required by law to make reports if they suspect abuse of a senior and have reason to believe that the senior is unable to seek assistance for himself or herself. They are called mandated reporters. Examples: Social workers, policemen, teachers, and doctors are mandated reporters. Note: The law exempts attorneys, legal service providers and bankers from mandatory reporting. The Procedure When A
Nye Frank

Metropolitan Police Department main page - 0 views

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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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    Metropolitan Police Department Main Page Home Bibliography Calendar Columns Dorothy Brizill Bonnie Cain Jim Dougherty Gary Imhoff Phil Mendelson Mark David Richards Sandra Seegars DCPSWatch DCWatch Archives Council Period 12 Council Period 13 Council Period 14 Election 1998 Election 2000 Election 2002 Elections Election 2004 Election 2006 Government and People ANC's Anacostia Waterfront Corporation Auditor Boards and Com BusRegRefCom Campaign Finance Chief Financial Officer Chief Management Officer City Council Congress Control Board Corporation Counsel Courts DC2000 DC Agenda Elections and Ethics Fire Department FOI Officers Inspector General Health Housing and Community Dev. Human Services Legislation Mayor's Office Mental Health Motor Vehicles Neighborhood Action National Capital Revitalization Corp. Planning and Econ. Dev. Planning, Office of Police Department Property Management Public Advocate Public Libraries Public Schools Public Service Commission Public Works Regional Mobility Panel Sports and Entertainment Com. Taxi Commission Telephone Directory University of DC Water and Sewer Administration Youth Rehabilitation Services Zoning Commission Issues in DC Politics Budget issues DC Flag DC General, PBC Gun issues Health issues Housing initiatives Mayor's mansion Public Benefit Corporation Regional Mobility Reservation 13 Tax Rev Comm Term limits repeal Voting rights, statehood Williams's Fundraising Scandals Links Organizations Appleseed Center Cardozo Shaw Neigh.Assoc. Committee of 100 Fed of Citizens Assocs League of Women Voters Parents United Shaw Coalition Photos Search What Is DCWatch? themail archives Materials from the Metropolitan Police Department: Citizen Complaint Report Form, PD-99 Materials on the Metropolitan Police Department. Neighborhood Safety Zone Initiative Mayor Adrian Fenty, MPD Chief Cathy
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
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    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

Crime Compensation Program Directory Overview - 0 views

  • Most programs process claims through a staff centralized in one office in the state capital, but a few states have branch or regional offices or make use of locally based individuals in other agencies to perform preliminary work on applications, such as gathering documents. Typically, states request and analyze police reports to confirm that a crime took place and to determine whether the victim was involved in any illegal or contributory activity when victimized. Information from service providers like hospitals, doctors, counselors, and funeral homes, as well as employers if work loss is claimed, forms the basis for benefit determinations. Decision-making authority varies from state to state, with about a third of the states using part-time boards or commissions to determine eligibility and awards, and the rest authorizing full-time administrative staff (usually program directors) to make determinations. In three court-based programs, judges or court officials decide claims.
  • All of the programs are authorized to deny or reduce benefits to people who are injured while committing crimes or engaging in substantial misconduct contributing to their victimization. Programs rely primarily on police reports to make these determinations, and expend considerable effort to make careful and appropriate decisions on these issues. Five state compensation laws also authorize denial based on prior criminal activity unrelated to the current victimization. The eligibility of a victim's dependents or other secondary victims generally hinges on the eligibility of the "direct" victim (the one who suffered the injury or death). For example, if a homicide victim was engaged in criminal activity, the family generally would be ineligible for any benefits. Each state operates under its own law, rules, policies and procedures, and while all of the programs share broadly similar eligibility requirements, it's important for those accessing any program to check with the individual state to learn exactly how it operates.
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    While for most programs fund recovery is a minor source of total income , a few programs are beginning to recover close to 10% of their awards. VOCA . Federal funds provide about 20-25% of the state compensation programs' total budgets, through grants authorized by the Victims of Crime Act of 1984 (VOCA). Under VOCA, for every $100 a state awards to victims, it gets $40 in federal funds to spend; this results in a 72%-to-28% split in state-federal dollars spent each year (of every $140 awarded to victims, $100 is state money and $40 is federal funds). States also must bear all or nearly all of the administrative costs for operating their programs (only 5% of each state's VOCA grant is available for administrative purposes). While the large majority of funds spent in operating the programs and paying victims comes from state budgets, VOCA grants have enabled many states to expand coverage, and they make a significant difference in ensuring that there is enough money available to cover all eligible victims that may apply. VOCA will provide about $70 million to state compensation programs in federal fiscal year 1999. To be eligible for a federal grant, certain conditions must be met. Programs must cover medical expenses, mental health counseling, and lost wages for victims, as well as funeral expenses and lost support for families of homicide victims. They must consider drunk driving and domestic violence as compensable crimes, and must not categorically exclude domestic violence victims on the basis of their being related to or living with the offender. (Programs may deny claims when an award to the victim would unjustly enrich the offender.) Program must agree to consider for eligibility all U.S. citizens who are victims of crimes within their states, regardless of the residency of the victim . Each state also must offer benefits to its own residents who are victimized in states without compensa
Nye Frank

goverment agency mandates for internal affairs for riverside county sheriff - Google Se... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 19 Apr 09 - Cached
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    Riverside County Sheriff's Department v. Louis Zigman, Astrid ... Real party in interest and appellant Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Astrid Megan ... for writ of administrative mandate filed by the Riverside County Sheriff's .... who is interrogated during a law enforcement agency's internal affairs ... Government Code section 3304, subdivision (b),6 makes it clear that a law ... www.morelaw.com/verdicts/case.asp?n=E043187&s=CA&d=38412 - 46k - Cached - Similar pages - [PDF] 1 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH DISTRICT ... File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML Real party in interest and appellant Riverside County Sheriff's Deputy Astrid ... petition for writ of administrative mandate filed by the Riverside County Sheriff's .... during a law enforcement agency's internal affairs investigation of .... which constitutes the administrative appeal guaranteed by Government ... www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/E043187.PDF - Similar pages - [PDF] SHERIFF-CORONER DEPARTMENT COUNTY OF ORANGE File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML practices, rather than through an external unfunded mandate. The Sheriffs Department is also subject to reviews and audits by many government agencies such as: ... completed internal affairs investigation. The Attorney General's Office ... Riverside and San Diego. Finally, through the Public Records Act. the ... www.ocgrandjury.org/pdfs/ocsd.pdf - Similar pages - About Lackie & Dammeier Michael makes his home in Orange County with his wife. .... Labor Experience: Chief negotiator and labor rep, Riverside Sheriff's Association, ... Mr. Lackie has extensive experience in internal affairs representation, ... including injunctions barring police agencies from violating the Bill of Rights. ... www.policeat
Nye Frank

Search | MercuryNews.com Forums - 0 views

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    Aggressive prosecution clogs Riverside courts ... Duane Gang, staff reporter of the Riverside Press-Enterprise newspaper for researching and reporting his story ... September 12, 2008 edition. The PE reports that Riverside County District Attorney Rod Pacheco is spending at least $500,000 in taxpayer ... Topic - Frank Courser - 3/03/2009 - 08:37 - 1 comment - 0 attachments Overwhelmed Riverside courts dump criminal cases ... isn't a judge to preside over the case. Glad I'm not in Riverside . This grand social experiment that the liberal mined cradle to grave proponents has come around to haunt Riverside County . In due course it will be anarchy and the best armed person is the ... Topic - oldgoat1948 - 8/27/2008 - 09:46 - 0 comments - 0 attachments California prepares to expand 3 prisons ... came down with H-pylori, we were able to convince the Riverside press Enterprise to do an investigation, but they were able to slide ... one at Norco has filed a complaint with the Riverside County Grand Jury so that something will be done about this ignored problem. If ... Topic - Susan1union1 - 4/01/2009 - 19:02 - 2 comments - 0 attachments BUSINESSES that SUPPORTED HATE/DISCRIMINATION/BIGOTRY ... GROUP CARLSBAD CA $300.00 ALTA HOME CARE INC. RIVERSIDE CA $2,500.00 AMADA HOME CARE, INC. COSTA MESA CA $200.00 ... GYMNASTICS, INC. GRANITE BAY CA $5,000.00 TULARE COUNTY INVESTMENTS LLC CAMARILLO CA $5,000.00 TULARE COUNTY INVESTMENTS, ... Topic - NoOnProp8 - 11/21/2008 - 14:49 - 1 comment - 0 attachments California Supreme Court to decide fate of Prop. 8 same-sex marriage ban ... Marriage Index. It's all there. You can even go to the County website and check "grantor/grantee" lists. There are also other ... GROUP CARLSBAD CA $300.00 ALTA HOME CARE INC. RIVERSIDE CA $2,500.00 AMADA HOME CARE, INC. COSTA ME
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
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  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/promoting%20effective%20homicide%20inv... - 0 views

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    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
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    6 - Chapter 1. Introduction Chapter 2. Homicides and Clearance Rates - 7 ACCORDING TO THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION'S (FBI) Annual Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) for 2005, the number of homicides in the United States increased by 4.8 percent compared to 2004-the largest single-year increase for homicides in 14 years. And, for June 2006 the trend continued, with preliminary UCR data showing that homicide increased by 0.3 percent, with a much larger increase of 6.7 percent in cities with populations of 1 million or more. While the number of homicides in the U.S. has fluctuated since the 1960s, the number of homicides being solved has decreased in that time. Homicide clearance rates have decreased by approximately 30 percent since the 1960s.Despite this overall national decrease, however, some jurisdictions have maintained their ability to solve homicides at a high rate. This chapter provides an overview of homicide rates and clearance rates in the United States. It discusses the effect of unsolved homicides on the department and the community. This chapter also highlights trends affecting homicide investigations and investigative factors associated with cleared homicide cases. Strategies for improving homicide clearance rates are examined, as well. OVERVIEW OF HOMICIDE RATES AND CLEARANCE RATES Since 1930, the FBI has annually collected data on the number of crimes reported from more than 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United 2 Homicides and Clearance Rates States and the number of crimes that are cleared by an arrest. The FBI releases this information to the public through its UCRs. For the purposes of the UCR, a crime is considered cleared if at least one person has been 1. arrested, 2. charged with the crime, and 3. handed over to the courts for prosecution.1 The UCR also considers some cases cleared when certain "exceptional means" are met. For a case to be cleared by "exceptional means," the law enforcement agency must have identifi
Nye Frank

In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the Federa... - 0 views

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    Intense feelings of anger, fear, isolation, low self-esteem, helplessness, and depression are common reactions to victimization
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    violence victims that are set forth in its Domestic Abuse Code. VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #22 Victims of crime should have rights at administrative proceedings, including the right to have a person of their choice accompany them to the proceedings, the right to input regarding the sanction, and the right to notification of the sanction. Agencies and institutions that seek to hold their employees or students accountable for their alleged criminal or negligent behavior often do so through administrative proceedings, including disciplinary hearings on college campuses in sexual assault cases and other crimes that violate college rules. Governmental and private sector organizations also conduct administrative hearings when an employee is accused of misconduct, which sometimes also constitutes a criminal act. These hearings are held to determine whether an employee or student should be dismissed or sanctioned. Victims often complain about their lack of rights and protections at these hearings. For example, at disciplinary hearings on college campuses and in schools, as well as administrative proceedings when criminal justice personnel are accused of conduct violations, victims are frequently not allowed such fundamental rights as the right to be accompanied by a person of their choice and the right to submit a victim impact statement before the offender is sanctioned.Agencies and institutions should review their disciplinary codes and ensure that From tribal police intervention to tribal court proceedings, the victims of violent crime in Indian country must have rights available to them. They must be informed of their rights, encouraged to exercise their rights, and be protected from further harm. This is the basic responsibility of a tribal criminal justice system. Joseph Myers, Executive Director, National Indian Justice Center In Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S.Ct. 394 (1994), a suit under the
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    * Substantial numbers of victims in states with both strong and weak protection were not notified of other important rights and services, including the right to be heard at bond hearings, the right to be informed about protection against harassment and intimidation, and the right to discuss the case with the prosecutor.44
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    While the majority of states mandate advance notice to crime victims of criminal proceedings and pretrial release, many have not implemented mechanisms to make such notice a reality.
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    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #6 Victims and witnesses of crime should have the right to reasonable protection, including protection from intimidation. The safety of victims and witnesses should be considered in determining whether offenders should be released from custody prior to completing their full sentence. The right to protection from intimidation, harassment, and retaliation by offenders and the accused is becoming a major focus of public and law enforcement attention. Justice officials report an increase in the harassment and intimidation of witnesses, making it increasingly difficult to obtain convictions because crime victims and witnesses are afraid to testify.63 Legislatures have attempted to address this problem by mandating "no contact" orders as a condition of pretrial or posttrial release. In addition, victims' bills of rights generally require victims to be notified at the outset of the judicial process about legal action they can take to protect themselves from harassment and intimidation.
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    Congress made restitution mandatory in federal criminal cases involving violent crimes with the enactment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act,Title II of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act.73
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    All crime victims should have the right to a full range of services and support to help them recover physically, psychologically, and in practical ways from the effects of crime, whether or not they report the crime or become involved in related criminal prosecutions or juvenile adjudications. In the aftermath of victimization, victims may have many different needs.Victims who report crime need information, assistance and protection when they choose to participate in the criminal and juvenile justice process. Not only should victims have the right to be heard or consulted in decisions that affect them, but they should receive protection if they are witnesses and transportation to and from legal proceedings.
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    Victims should have standing to enforce their rights, and sanctions should be applied to criminal and juvenile justice professionals who deny victims their fundamental rights
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    VICTIMS' RIGHTS RECOMMENDATION FROM THE FIELD #19 States and the federal government should create compliance enforcement programs, sometimes referred to as victim ombudsman programs, to help facilitate the implementation of victims' rights. 29 Chapter 1: Victims' Rights State victims' rights compliance enforcement programs oversee justice officials' and agencies' compliance with crime victims' statutory and constitutional rights and investigate crime victim complaints relevant to those rights being violated.93 A few states have created such programs within an existing agency or have established a new, statelevel oversight authority. In initiating such a program, officials should consider the importance of meaningful remedies and sanctions for noncompliance with victims' rights laws; and ensure that victims, victim service providers, advocacy groups, and victim-sensitive justice professionals are involved in the program planning process. In addition, justice agencies should consider increasing crime or court surcharges to support a compliance enforcement functions, and should evaluate overall compliance enforcement system. Innovative approaches to victims' rights oversight have been implemented in several states: * The Minnesota Office of the Crime Victims Ombudsman (OCVO) protects the rights of victims by investigating statutory violations of victims' rights laws and mistreatment by criminal justice practitioners. OCVO is authorized to initiate its own investigation of alleged violations, recommend corrective action, and make its findings public to both the legislature and the press. * The South Carolina Office of the Crime Victims' Ombudsman is empowered to act as a referral entity for victims in need of services, a liaison between victims and the criminal and juvenile justice systems in the course of their interaction, and a resolver of complaints made by victims against elements of those systems and against victim assistance programs. In
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    The Supreme Court in Owen undertook a textual analysis. By the Court's methodology, broad statutory language -- coupled with silence on the subject of privileges, immunities, and defenses -- means that municipalities are liable in federal court for civil rights violations. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407. Its [the statute's] language is absolute and unqualified; no mention is made of any privileges, immunities, or defenses that may be asserted. Rather, the Act [§ 1983] imposes liability upon "every person" who, under color of state law or custom, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities of the Constitution and laws." And Monell [supra] held that these words were intended to encompass municipal corporations as well as natural "persons."
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    Seminole notwithstanding, these cases do not support the conclusion that a city is immune from suit under federal statutes. To the contrary, the Court has clearly established that municipalities can be amenable to civil rights suits in federal court. Owen, 100 S.Ct. at 1407; Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2035- 2036; Mt. Healthy, 97 S.Ct. at 572. See also Howlett v. Rose, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 2444 (1990) (holding that "Federal law makes governmental defendants that are not arms of the State, such as municipalities, liable for their constitutional violations," but acknowledging that the state and its arms are immune from the reach of § 1983).
Nye Frank

DISTRICT ATTORNEY CORRUPTION?: TWO VIEWS ON DA COOLEY'S RECORD - 0 views

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    Joe Banana So. Cal. Posted: 10:54 pm [PST] on March 22 2009 Another shining example of government at it's most corrupt. www.jail4judges.org Dawn Banning CA Posted: 11:09 pm [PST] on October 14 2008 http://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2I had seen a article about award to Elder Victims Advocate Department in Riverside County. I was shocked and wrote Kim Emmerling the DA advocate we had. She wrote me back that she was leaving that office. I had sent a request for the history of our meetings to her and internal affairs without any reply. Still with internal affairs knowing there was a cover up, proof of it, autopsy corruption along with a laundry list we have had zero help. We just want what the US Constitution says we have a right to. We wrote the attorney general office and gave all the documents. They wrote back that the DA office handles these complaints. There is no where to turn. Nye and Lee Frank both over 65 years old. Adult protective services have been contacted without ever contacting us or even replying to our request. Now the victim has the attacker building a home two doors away. We need help. The following is a letter I wrote the internal Affairshttp://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2pictures pictures of Nye Frank and Ty Reddish. Sheriff and DA office falsely told family that coroner reported heart attack and no injuries. The video of Ty Reddish shows him bending down to avoid being recorded and telling officers how he strangled 68 year old Nye Frank with wrestling moves. The officers laugh, as they are buddies of the Reddish family friends. They did not do a drug test on Ty while on probation for dui and had past drug use, and victim said looked like on drugs. Riverside County Internal Affairs -When I complained they said they can no longer talk to me. Dawn Banning CA Posted: 05:06 am [PST] on October 10 2008 Dawn said: Riverside Judge and DA office stated to Senior no Elder Advocate in Riverside County. When family saw award in paper DA victim advocate quit.
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    Nye Frank Racing Posted: 10:54 pm [PST] on March 22 2009 Another shining example of government at it's most corrupt. www.jail4judges.org Dawn Banning CA Posted: 11:09 pm [PST] on October 14 2008 http://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2I had seen a article about award to Elder Victims Advocate Department in Riverside County. I was shocked and wrote Kim Emmerling the DA advocate we had. She wrote me back that she was leaving that office. I had sent a request for the history of our meetings to her and internal affairs without any reply. Still with internal affairs knowing there was a cover up, proof of it, autopsy corruption along with a laundry list we have had zero help. We just want what the US Constitution says we have a right to. We wrote the attorney general office and gave all the documents. They wrote back that the DA office handles these complaints. There is no where to turn. Nye and Lee Frank both over 65 years old. Adult protective services have been contacted without ever contacting us or even replying to our request. Now the victim has the attacker building a home two doors away. We need help. The following is a letter I wrote the internal Affairshttp://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2pictures pictures of Nye Frank and Ty Reddish. Sheriff and DA office falsely told family that coroner reported heart attack and no injuries. The video of Ty Reddish shows him bending down to avoid being recorded and telling officers how he strangled 68 year old Nye Frank with wrestling moves. The officers laugh, as they are buddies of the Reddish family friends. They did not do a drug test on Ty while on probation for dui and had past drug use, and victim said looked like on drugs. Riverside County Internal Affairs -When I complained they said they can no longer talk to me. Dawn Banning CA Posted: 05:06 am [PST] on October 10 2008 Dawn said: Riverside Judge and DA office stated to Senior no Elder Advocate in Riverside County. When family saw award in paper DA victim advocate quit. feed:/
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