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Nye Frank

we asked for a safe way to report Building A Financial Abuse Case for the Criminal Just... - 0 views

  • Identify other sources of information Health care professionals Paramedics and EMTs Family and friends Who did victim tell first Importance of asking about and documenting the victim's demeanor and reason for making contact Not for police action but for safety, health needs, seek help
  • Crawford v. Washington  Critical importance of witnesses to whom victim and suspect have spoken Identify non governmental witnesses to statements Document spontaneous statements and demeanor Calls for help and medical care
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
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    Page 1 FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES Page 2 110 TH C ONGRESS " COMMITTEE PRINT ! No. 8 2nd Session FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE DECEMBER 1, 2008 UN UM E PLURIBUS Printed for the use of THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES U . S . GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON : 2008 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2250 Mail: Stop SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-0001 Page 3 COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY O NE H UNDRED T ENTH C ONGRESS JOHN CONYERS, J R ., Michigan, Chairman HOWARD L. BERMAN, California RICK BOUCHER, Virginia JERROLD NADLER, New York ROBERT C. ''BOBBY'' SCOTT, Virginia MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina ZOE LOFGREN, California SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas MAXINE WATERS, California WILLIAM D. DELAHUNT, Massachusetts ROBERT WEXLER, Florida LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California STEVE COHEN, Tennessee HANK JOHNSON, Georgia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio LUIS V. GUTIERREZ, Illinois BRAD SHERMAN, California TAMMY BALDWIN, Wisconsin ANTHONY D. WEINER, New York ADAM B. SCHIFF, California ARTUR DAVIS, Alabama DEBBIE WASSERMAN SCHULTZ, Florida KEITH ELLISON, Minnesota LAMAR SMITH, Texas F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, J R ., Wisconsin HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ELTON GALLEGLY, California BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia STEVE CHABOT, Ohio DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California CHRIS CANNON, Utah RIC KELLER, Florida DARRELL ISSA, California MIKE PENCE, Indiana J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia STEVE KING, Iowa TOM FEENEY, Florida TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas JIM JORDAN, Ohio P ERRY A PELBAUM , Staff Director and Chief Counsel S EAN M C L AUGHLIN , Minority Chief of Staff and General Counsel ( II ) Page 4 FOREWORD This document contains the Federal Rules of Evidence, as amended to December 1, 2008. The rules were enacted by Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975) and have be
Nye Frank

Law School Outline - Constitutional Law - NYU School of Law - Pildus - 0 views

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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicia
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
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    1 C ONSTITUTIONAL L AW O UTLINE I. The Building Blocks Marbury v. Madison (1803) Marshall - political struggle between John Adams and Federalists and successor Thomas Jefferson and the Republicans - Commissions for justices signed by Adams but not yet delivered when he left office; Jefferson administration refused to honor appointments for which commissions had not actually been delivered - Marbury : would-be justice of the peace; brought suit directly in S.Ct. sought writ of mandamus compelling Madison to deliver their commissions - Madison : Secretary of State for Jefferson - Which branch shall have final say interpreting the Constitution? Q1: Does Marbury have a RIGHT to commission? Q2: Does he have a REMEDY? Q3: Is remedy a MANDAMUS? Q4: Can a mandamus be issued from THIS COURT? Marshall's Decision: a. Right to Commission: Yes, on facts and law he has a legal right b. Remedy: Yes, judicial remedy will not interfere improperly with executive's constitutional discretion (Marshall acknowledged that there are some Qs which legislature is better equipped to deal with but this is not one of them) c. Mandamus not allowed i. § 13 of Judiciary Act of 1789 allows Court to issue mandamus ii. Article III § 2(2) gives Court original jurisdiction in a few cases and appellate jurisdiction in the rest. Writ of mandamus not among the cases as to which original jurisdiction is conferred on S.Ct. Congressional statute at odds with Constitution d. Supremacy of Constitution: If S.Ct. identifies a conflict between const. provision and congressional statute, the Court has the authority (and the duty) to declare the statute unconstitutional and to refuse to enforce it. i. Constitution is paramount: The very purpose of written constitution is to establish fundamental and paramount law. An act which is repugnant to C cannot become law of the land. ii. Who interprets: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
Nye Frank

Juris Publishing - Fine's Wisconsin Evidence -2nd Edition - 0 views

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    earchable access to it via our online collection of publications. Book Overview Table of Contents Chapter 901 General Provisions 901.01 Scope 901.02 Purpose and Construction 901.03 Rulings on Evidence 901.04 Preliminary Questions (1) Judge Determines Admissibility (2) Admissibility when Relevancy Conditioned on Fact (3) Hearing out of Jury's Presence (4) Testimony by Accused (5) Weight and Credibility 901.05 Admissibility of AIDS Test Results 901.053 Admissibility of Helmet - Wearing Evidence 901.055 Admissibility of Lead-in-Dust Testing Evidence 901.06 Limited Admissibility 901.07 Rule of Completeness Chapter 902 Judicial Notice 902.01 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts 902.02 Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws 902.03 Ordinances and Administrative Rules Chapter 903 Presumptions 903.01 Presumptions in General 903.03 Presumptions in Criminal Cases Chapter 904 Relevancy 904.01 Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 904.02 Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible 904.03 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 904.04 Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct (1) Character Evidence Generally (a) of the Accused (b) of the Victim (c) of the Witness (2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 904.05 Methods of Proving Character (1) Reputation or Opinion (2) Specific Instances of Conduct 904.06 Habit, Routine 904.07 Subsequent Remedial Measures 904.08 Compromise and Offers to Compromise 904.085 Communications in Mediation 904.09 Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses 904.10 Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest; Withdrawn Guilty Pleas 904.11 Liability Insurance 904.12 Statement of Injured Person 904.13 Information Concerning Crime Victims 904.15 Communications in Farmer Assistance Programs Chapter 905 Privileges 905.01 Privileges Recognized Only as Provided 905.015 Use of Interpreter for Privileged Communi
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    earchable access to it via our online collection of publications. Book Overview Table of Contents Chapter 901 General Provisions 901.01 Scope 901.02 Purpose and Construction 901.03 Rulings on Evidence 901.04 Preliminary Questions (1) Judge Determines Admissibility (2) Admissibility when Relevancy Conditioned on Fact (3) Hearing out of Jury's Presence (4) Testimony by Accused (5) Weight and Credibility 901.05 Admissibility of AIDS Test Results 901.053 Admissibility of Helmet - Wearing Evidence 901.055 Admissibility of Lead-in-Dust Testing Evidence 901.06 Limited Admissibility 901.07 Rule of Completeness Chapter 902 Judicial Notice 902.01 Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts 902.02 Judicial Notice of Foreign Laws 902.03 Ordinances and Administrative Rules Chapter 903 Presumptions 903.01 Presumptions in General 903.03 Presumptions in Criminal Cases Chapter 904 Relevancy 904.01 Definition of "Relevant Evidence" 904.02 Relevant Evidence Generally Admissible 904.03 Exclusion of Relevant Evidence 904.04 Character Evidence Not Admissible to Prove Conduct (1) Character Evidence Generally (a) of the Accused (b) of the Victim (c) of the Witness (2) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts 904.05 Methods of Proving Character (1) Reputation or Opinion (2) Specific Instances of Conduct 904.06 Habit, Routine 904.07 Subsequent Remedial Measures 904.08 Compromise and Offers to Compromise 904.085 Communications in Mediation 904.09 Payment of Medical and Similar Expenses 904.10 Offers to Plead Guilty or No Contest; Withdrawn Guilty Pleas 904.11 Liability Insurance 904.12 Statement of Injured Person 904.13 Information Concerning Crime Victims 904.15 Communications in Farmer Assistance Programs Chapter 905 Privileges 905.01 Privileges Recognized Only as Provided 905.015 Use of Interpreter for Privileged Communi
Nye Frank

FindLaw | Cases and Codes - 0 views

  • To sustain a S 1983 civil rights action, a plaintiff must show "(1) that the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) that [such] conduct deprived the plaintiff of a federal constitutional or statutory right." 2 Wood v. Ostrander, 879 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Here, it is undisputed that defendants were acting under color of state law. At issue here is whether Officer Smith, the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department, or Sacramento County engaged in conduct that deprived Lewis of a federally protected righ
  • F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1990) (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985), likely "preserve[d] Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis for those instances in which a free citizen is denied his or her constitutional right to life through means other than a law enforcement official's arrest, investigatory stop or other seizure"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 851 (1990).
  • But when a law enforcement officer arbitrarily acts to deprive a person of life and personal security in the course of pursuing his official duties, constitutional due process rights may be implicated. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 331 ("The touchstone of due process is protection of the individual against arbitrary action of government."). Section 1983 "contains no state-of-mind requirement independent of that necessary to state a violation of the underlying constitutional right." Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 330 . The underlying constitutional rights at issue here are substantive due process rights to life and liberty or personal security. In Daniels, the Supreme Court held that where an official's or government entity's conduct constitutes mere negligence, no substantive due process violation occurs. Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328 . Daniels expressly left open the question whether something less than intentional conduct such as recklessness or gross negligence would suffice "to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause." Id. at 334 n.3. But in City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989), the Court held that nonintentional government conduct can violate the Due Process Clause and thus lead to S 1983 liability. City of Canton held that a municipality may be liable for a failure to train its employees when such failure demonstrates "deliberate indifference to rights of persons with whom police come into contact." Id. at 388.
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  • Five circuits have addressed S 1983 liability in the context of high-speed pursuits. These circuits have applied various labels to the standard of conduct that may lead to liability. See, e.g., Fagan v. City of Vineland, 22 F.3d 1296 (3rd Cir. 1994) (en banc) (overruling previous reckless indifference standard and adopting shocks the conscience standard); Medina v. City and County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1496 (10th Cir. 1992) (reckless disregard); Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 723 (4th Cir. 1991) (shocks the conscience), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1095 (1992); Roach v. City of Fredericktown, 882 F.2d 294, 297 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding gross negligence insufficient but not stating what standard should be applied); Jones v. Sherrill, 827 F.2d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir. 1987) (holding gross negligence or outrageous conduct sufficient in some circumstances). 4
  • In one such due process case, we held that either "gross negligence, recklessness, or `deliberate indifference'" was sufficient to state a substantive due process violation. Wood v. Ostrander, 851 F.2d 1212, 1214 (9th Cir. 1988) ("Wood
  • I"), reh'g granted and opinion modified by, 879 F.2d 583 (9th Cir. 1989) ("Wood II"), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 938 (1990). Relying on the standard set out in Wood I, we later held that "grossly negligent or reckless official conduct that infringes upon an interest protected by the Due Process Clause is actionable under S 1983." Fargo v. City of San Juan Bautista, 857 F.2d 638 (9th Cir. 1988). But Fargo's grossly negligent standard was explicitly based on Wood I, which was modified on rehearing and superseded by Wood II. In Wood II, we stepped back from the grossly negligent standard. We noted that an intervening Supreme Court decision, City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question this standard as set forth in Wood I and Fargo. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588.
  • In Fargo, we defined gross negligence as "`more than ordinary inadvertence or inattention, but less perhaps than conscious indifference to the consequences.'" Fargo, 857 F.2d at 641 (quoting W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts S 34, at 212 (5th ed. 1984)). We also noted that an officer's state of mind is not an issue in a claim based on gross negligence, "although the contrary may be true where the claim involves recklessness." Id. at 642. Although we declined to decide whether an innocent state of mind would negate recklessness or "whether recklessness may be presumed conclusively from conduct," we did note that recklessness and deliberate indifference are equivalent in the sense that they both generally refer to conduct involving "a `conscious disregard' of public safety." Id. at 642 n.7. We also said that, "where state officials have notice of the possibility of harm, `negligence can rise to the level of deliberate indifference to or reckless disregard for' the victim." Id. (quoting Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 357 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). Because we concluded that a triable issue of fact remained as to whether the police officer's conduct might have been grossly negligent, we found it unnecessary to determine whether the officer's conduct might have risen to the more culpable standard of recklessness. Id. at 643
  • In Wood II, we redefined the standard forS 1983 substantive due process violations by police officers. As explained above, we recognized that the Supreme Court's decision in City of Canton, 489 U.S. 378 , had called into question our decisions in Wood I and Fargo that gross negligence was sufficient. Wood II, 879 F.2d at 588. Analyzing the facts in Wood under City of Canton's deliberate indifference standard, we concluded that there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the police officer in Wood had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiff's interest in her personal security. Id. at 588.
  • Wood II makes clear that, in this circuit, an officer can be held liable for a S 1983 claim if that officer's conduct is delib erately indifferent to or in reckless disregard of a person's right to life and personal security.
  • Here, plaintiffs have alleged that Officer Smith violated the Sacramento County Sheriff's Department General Order regarding pursuits ("General Order")6 by instituting and then continuing the pursuit even when a reasonable officer would have known that to do so was in reckless disregard of Lewis's and Willard's safety. A violation of police procedures is relevant to determine whether a substantive due process violation has occurred. Fargo, 857 F.2d at 642. Police procedures are designed, in part, to guide officers when they engage in conduct that poses a serious risk of harm to either a suspect or to the general public. See id.
  • The General Order requires an officer to communicate his intention to pursue a vehicle to the sheriff's department dispatch center. But defendants concede that Smith did not contact the dispatch center. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the seriousness of the offense warrants a chase at speeds in excess of the posted limit. But here, the only apparent "offense" was the boys' refusal to stop when another officer told them to do so. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the need for apprehension justifies the pursuit under existing conditions. Yet Smith apparently only "needed" to apprehend the boys because they refused to stop. The General Order requires an officer to consider whether the pursuit presents unreasonable hazards to life and property. But taking the facts here in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, there existed an unreasonable hazard to Lewis's and Willard's lives. The General Order also directs an officer to discontinue a pursuit when the hazards of continuing outweigh the benefits of immediate apprehension. But here, there was no apparent danger involved in permitting the boys to escape. There certainly was risk of harm to others in continuing the pursuit.
  • In City of Canton the Supreme Court held that deliberate indifference was the minimum standard of culpability necessary to maintain a S 1983 due process action against a municipality for a policy or custom of inadequate training of police officers. City of Canton, 489 U.S. at 388 . The Court reasoned that a municipality's inadequate training of its employees can only constitute a "policy or custom" when such inadequate training "evidences a `deliberate indifference' to the rights of its inhabitants." Id. at 389. But the Court also specified that the deliberate indifference standard "does not turn upon the degree of fault (if any) that a plaintiff must show to make out an underlying claim of a constitutional violation." Id. at 388 n.8. City of Canton thus did not explicitly overrule our decisions in either Wood I or Fargo because they involved claims of substantive due process violations against individual police officers.
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
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    The Supreme Court has held that "[w]here a particular amendment `provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, `that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of `substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these claims." Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 , 114 S. Ct. 807, 813 (1994) (plurality opinion) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)).
Nye Frank

Untitled - 0 views

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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
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    Page 1 Page 2 1 3/8/05 Commentary on The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals 22 NYCRR part 500, Effective September 1, 2005 A. Structure The Rules of Practice of the Court of Appeals apply to civil and noncapital criminal appeals, motions, criminal leave applications and certified questions from the Supreme Court of the United States, United States courts of appeal and state courts of last resort. The Court of Appeals recently rescinded in its entirety 22 NYCRR part 500 and approved a new part 500 which will be effective September 1, 2005. In addition to reflecting substantive changes and additions to the old Rules of Practice, the new Rules are organized into broad categories to eliminate duplication and provide a more logical sequence. New Rules 500.1 through 500.8 set out requirements applicable to all filings under these Rules. New Rules 500.9 through 500.19 relate to civil and noncapital criminal appeals. New Rule 500.20 contains procedures concerning criminal leave applications. Motions are addressed in new Rules 500.21 through 500.24. Orders to show cause, the Primary Election Session and certified questions are addressed in new Rules 500.25, 500.26 and 500.27, respectively. Finally, old Rule 500.13, relating to real property actions, was deleted as unnecessary. Page 3 2 B. General Requirements 500.1 General Requirements [Old Rule 500.1] New Rule 500.1 states the general requirements for papers submitted to the Court of Appeals. The Rule generally applies to "papers filed," which is defined in section 500.1(b) as all briefs, papers filed pursuant to sections 500.10 (Examination of Subject Matter Jurisdiction) and 500.11 (Alternative Procedure for Selected Appeals), motion papers and appendices. The typeface and font requirements match those recently adopted by the Appellate Division Departments following repeal of the portion of CPLR 5529 that set out specifications for such matters. New Rule 500.1(h) informs self-represented litigants that illegibl
Nye Frank

THE CANADIAN INSTITUTE Litigating Personal Injury Damages DAMAGES FOR EMOTIONAL DISTRES... - 0 views

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    Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, 5 ed. (1984), p. 360.th7Linden, Canadian Tort Law, 7th ed., at pp. 389
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable p
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    In addition, the7judicial system has proven time and again the capacityto differentiate between deserving cases andgroundless actions. The appropriate response, when concerned about fraudulent lawsuits, is avigorous pursuit of the truth, not in the abdication of judicial responsibility.8 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 5 Toronto Railway Co. V. Toms (1911), 44 S.C.R. 268 at 274.9See Dulieu v. White & Sons, [1901] 2 K.B. 669.10See Hinz v. Berry [1970] 2 Q.B. 40, where Lord Denning explained thatdamages are11recoverable for "nervous shock, or, to put it in medical terms, for any recognizablepsychiatric illness caused by the breach of duty by the defendant."See Linden, Canadian Tort Law, supra 1, at pp. 389-92.12Eventually, the courts began awarding damages for emotional distress, but onlywhere therewas an accompanying physical injury. The court reasoned that, where a person suffers physicalinjury, however slight, damages could be claimed for the fright occasioned thereby. Subsequently,9the physical injury requirement was discarded when it was decided that damages resulting fromnervous shock generated byfright maybe recoverable in a negligence action, even whereno physicalinjury has occurred.10IV.The Components of a Claim for Emotional DistressA claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psyc
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    A claim for damages for emotional distress can come in a variety of forms. One may beclaiming, in the words of Lord Denning, damages for "nervous shock". Other commonly used11terms are damages for emotional upset, intentional infliction of mental distress, negligent inflictionof emotional distress or negligent infliction of psychiatric damage. The common element to theseclaims is that, under Canadian law, the complainant must establish two components: first, thepsychological injury suffered by the plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant'snegligent conduct, and second, that the psychological injury was so serious that it resulted in arecognizable psychiatric illness.12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 6 McLoughlin v. Arbor Memorial Services Inc. [2004] O.J. No. 5003.13Enunciated by the House of Lords in White v. Chief Constable of South Yorkshire, [1998] 314W.L.R. 1509 (H.L.), and approved by MacPhearson J.A. in Vanek v. Great Atlantic and Pacific Companyof Canada Limited (1999) 48 O.R. (3d) 228 (O.C.A.).Ibid.15A.What is meant by "foreseeable"?Foreseeability has generally been interpreted as what a "reasonable person" would foresee.In thecontext of an accident,foreseeableemotional distress meanspsychiatricinjuryas areasonablyforeseeable consequence of exposure to the trauma of the accident and its aftermath.13In general, the law expects its citizens to be reasonably robust and hesitates to imposeliabilityfor the exceptional frailtyof certain individuals. Before beingheld to be in breach of a dutyto an accident bystander, a defendant must have exposed him to a situation where it was reasonablyforeseeablethat apersonof reasonable robustness andfortitudewouldbelikelyto suffer psychiatricinjury.14The Ontario Court of Appeal addressed this issue in Vanek v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Co.Of Canada Limited ("Vanek"). In this case, an 11-year-old girl consumed a small amount of foul15tasti
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    Even where the plaintiff has suffered a psychiatric illness triggered by the defendant'sinabilityto fulfil adutyofcare, thecourts willsometimes denyliabilityiftheindividual's psychiatricdamage is a result of their own particular "hypersensitivity". The courts like to use, as a baseline,18the ordinary person of reasonable mental fortitude. Where this fictional individual would notnormally suffer psychiatric damage, a uniquely vulnerable person who does suffer damage wouldbe barred from recovery
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    With all due respect to Dr. Herbert Modlin, his thesis does not do justice to the manyinnocent accident victims who suffer pain in silence, with indescribable sadness and with despair.Reactions to traumatic events effect people biologically, psychologically and socially. As23Hoffman, et al., state ,24"At the psychological level, traumatic reactions affect thinking, feeling andbehaviour. In the acute phaseafter a period of shock theremaybe anxiety, insomnia,nightmares,sensitivityto noise, fatigueandpain intrusiverecollectionsofthetraumain thoughts or images, either spontaneously or when reminded of the trauma. In thelong term there may be emotional disability (with or without physical injury) that iscomplicated by depression, irritability, philosophical pessimism, loss of hope anddecreased expectations in life, which eventually lead to personality change."(Underlining mine)According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation
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    According to Hoffman et al., "accident victims may feel uncontrollable anger (similar tovictims of crimes), guilt and self-blame (like victims in child abuse) or passivity, futility anddemoralization (similar to some Holocaust survivors). Unfortunately, the victims of civilianpersonal injuries tend to feel isolated and alone in their pain because there are no group experiencesor social support system to allow them to share their experiences with other victims."25How then, does plaintiff's counsel go about establishing and building a claim for emotionaldistress? -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 11 (1998) 38 O.R. (3d) 651.26[2001] O.J. No. 5756 (S.C.J.).27VII. Building the Claim - The Insurance ActClaims for emotional distress have long been recognized and, since 1994, have beenpermitted bythe various incarnations of the InsuranceAct. It maybeuseful to recall that theOntarioMotorist Protection Plan (the first no-fault legislation which governed motor vehicle accident casesbetween June 22, 1990 and December 31, 1993), allowed compensation only if an injured person'simpairments were physical in nature. Claims for emotional distress unadorned with any physicalcomponent resulted in the claim being dismissed.However, if the emotional distress claim could be characterized as a "chronic pain claim"with both physical and psychological aspects, compensation was permitted (see in this regard,Chrappa v Ohm).During the OMPP era plaintiffs' counsel went to great lengths to meld26psychological distress with a physical component in order to be free of the rigid straightjacket of theOMPP threshold.With Bill 164, which took effect on January 1, 1994 and governed motor vehicle accidentcases until October 31, 1996, there was no impediment to obtaining compensation for a "seriousimpairment of an important physical, mental or psychological function". Bill 59 (which applies tomotor vehicle accidents between November 19
Nye Frank

federal statutes Honorable Dirk Kempthorne , James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior ... - 0 views

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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
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    Page 1 1 June 19, 2006 Honorable Dirk Kempthorne, James E. Cason, Secretary of the Interior Associate Deputy Secretary Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs 1849 C Street NW Department of Interior Washington, D.C. 20240 1849 C Street NW Washington, D.C. 20240 George Skibine, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Philip Hogen, Chairman for Policy and Economic Development Penny Coleman, Director, General Counsel Office of the Assistant Secretary of National Indian Gaming Commission Indian Affairs - Indian Gaming 1441 L Street, NW 1849 C Street NW Suite 9100 Washington, D.C. 20240 Washington, D.C. 20005 Honorable Governor Christine Gregoire Attorney General, Rob McKenna State of Washington State of Washington P.O. Box 40002 1125 Washington St. SE Olympia, WA 98504-0002 Olympia, WA 98504 RE: EMERGENCY REQUEST FOR TEMPORARY SUSPENSION (90 DAYS) OF CONSTRUCTION OF PROPOSED NOOKSACK TRIBAL CLASS II CASINO ON THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, NEAR LYNDEN, WA, PENDING: 1. DUE DILIGENCE OF CRIMINAL BACKGROUND INVESTIGATIONS OF TRIBAL MANAGEMENT AND INVESTORS; 2. DUE DILIGENCE REGARDING FEDERAL SUPERINTENDENCE, TRUST STATUS OF LAND, REGARDING GAMING ELIGIBILITY; AND 3. UNAMBIGUOUS VIOLATIONS OF 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1982, 1983 AND 1985 (CIVIL RIGHTS VIOLATIONS) AFFECTING WHATCOM COUNTY CITIZENS, ADJACENT LANDOWNERS, AND NOOKSACK TRIBAL MEMBERS. Dear Secretary Kempthorne, Governor Gregoire, et al, This letter requests your urgent attention to a project thus far approved by state and federal agencies that combines expansion of tribal governance, Indian gaming and international border vulnerability. The project is scheduled for ceremonial groundbreaking on or about June 18, 2006. As Chair of our national organization, I was invited to inspect the project location, met with several Nooksack tribal members, and community members in Lynden, Washington (Whatcom County). What I have seen and heard, and since researched, is alarming. Background. The project applicant, Nooksack Tribe of Wa
Nye Frank

27. H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing ... - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 29 Jul 09 - Cached
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    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - Simi
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    1. pecialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid ... Latest Major Action: 4/27/2009 Referred to House subcommittee. ... thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 2. View Bill | C-SPAN Congressional Chronicle, Created by Cable ... 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... DEBATE - The House proceeded with forty minutes of debate on H.R. 448 . ... www.c-spanarchives.org/congress/?q=node/77535&id... - Cached - Similar - 3. Search Results - THOMAS (Library of Congress) H.R.448 : To protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs .... Latest Major Action: 1/27/2009 Placed on Senate Legislative Calendar under General Orders. ... www.thomas.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/?&Db=d111... - Cached - Similar - 4. CD2 Trent Franks | Arizona Congress Watch H. R. 448, the Elder Abuse Victims Act, passed the House 397 - 25. The bill seeks to protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities to aid victims of elder abuse, to provide training to prosecutors ... 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 ... www.azcongresswatch.com/?cat=18 - Cached - Similar - 5. [DOC] Intricate File Format: Microsoft Word - View as HTML The Elder Abuse Victims Act of 2009 (H.R.448), sponsored by Representative ... protect seniors in the United States from elder abuse by establishing specialized elder abuse prosecution and research programs and activities .... The amendment was proposed on April 23, 2009, and considered by the Senate on April 27. ... www.ncea.aoa.gov/NCEAroot/Main_Site/.../May_Newsletter.doc - S
Nye Frank

questions documents statement of fact for summary judgement. - 0 views

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    Estate of Coleman v. Casper Concrete Co. 1997 WY 64 939 P.2d 233 Case Number: 96-30 Decided: 05/19/1997 Supreme Court of Wyoming -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Cite as: 1997 WY 64, 939 P.2d 233 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- The ESTATE OF KEITH D. COLEMAN, Deceased, By and Through its Personal Representative, Janice Coleman, Appellant(Plaintiff), v. CASPER CONCRETE COMPANY, a Wyoming Corporation; and Skorcz Electric, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Appellees(Defendants). Appeal from the District Court, Natrona County, The Honorable Dan Spangler, Judge Representing Appellant: Dallas J. Laird, Casper; and Richard R. Jamieson, Casper. Representing Appellee: Richard R. Wilking, Casper; and Earl J. Hanson of Hanson, Roybal, Lee & Todd, P.C., Billings, for Appellee Casper Concrete Company. Rebecca A. Lewis of Lewis & Associates, P.C., Laramie, for Appellee Skorcz Electric, Inc. Before TAYLOR, C.J., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN,* and LEHMAN, JJ. * Chief Justice at time of oral argument. TAYLOR, Chief Justice. [¶1] In 1989, the State of Wyoming contracted with appellees to build a highway intersection and install traffic lights. In June of 1993, during a malfunction of those lights, a young man was killed in a collision with a drunk driver at the intersection. Although the State successfully sought shelter in immunity and the drunk driver eventually settled with the decedent's estate, suit survived against appellees on disparate theories of negligence, strict liability and res ipsa loquitur. From an adverse summary judgment, the decedent's estate prosecutes this appeal. We affirm. I. ISSUES [¶2] The decedent's mother, Janice Coleman, as personal representative of her son's estate (appellant), states the following issues: I. Whether the district court properly granted summary judgmen
Nye Frank

Victim Rights Manual - 0 views

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    A defendant may be released on bail for all offenses except capital crimes. Public safety is the primary consideration in setting the bail amount. The court must conduct a hearing before deviating from the scheduled bail for a violent felony or for threatening a witness in a rape, domestic violence or criminal threat case. The court must state its reasons for deviating from the bail schedule. (Cal.Const Art. 1 Sect. 28, PC 1270.1, and PC 1275.)In violent felony cases, the district attorneys office, Division of Victim Services and the probation department are responsible for notifying victims and witnesses that they can request notification regarding the defendant's release. The Division of Victim Services will provide the forms to those victims and witnesses. (PC 679.03(a).)Inmates convicted of murder, voluntary manslaughter, life cases, stalking or a case where the defendant inflicted great bodily injury, cannot be released on parole within 35 miles of a victim or witness. However, the victim or witness must file the appropriate form with CDCR, and CDCR must find there is a need to protect the safety and well being of the victim or witness. (PC 3003.)Upon request, when a defendant is sent to state prison, the victim or next of kin will be notified of the defendant's release to work furlough or a reentry program at least 60 days prior to placement. If the inmate escapes, the victim must be given immediate notification. The victim should keep his or her request and current address on file using a form that can be obtained through the Division of Victim Services. (PC 679.02(a)(6), PC 11155.)The Right to be Protected13 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Page 17 An employer with more than 25 employees may not discriminate against an employee who has been a victim of a sex crime or domestic violence when that employee seeks medical attention or counseling. (LC 230.1.)Employers must allow crime victims or family members t
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Metropolitan Police Department main page - 0 views

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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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    Metropolitan Police Department Main Page Home Bibliography Calendar Columns Dorothy Brizill Bonnie Cain Jim Dougherty Gary Imhoff Phil Mendelson Mark David Richards Sandra Seegars DCPSWatch DCWatch Archives Council Period 12 Council Period 13 Council Period 14 Election 1998 Election 2000 Election 2002 Elections Election 2004 Election 2006 Government and People ANC's Anacostia Waterfront Corporation Auditor Boards and Com BusRegRefCom Campaign Finance Chief Financial Officer Chief Management Officer City Council Congress Control Board Corporation Counsel Courts DC2000 DC Agenda Elections and Ethics Fire Department FOI Officers Inspector General Health Housing and Community Dev. Human Services Legislation Mayor's Office Mental Health Motor Vehicles Neighborhood Action National Capital Revitalization Corp. Planning and Econ. Dev. Planning, Office of Police Department Property Management Public Advocate Public Libraries Public Schools Public Service Commission Public Works Regional Mobility Panel Sports and Entertainment Com. Taxi Commission Telephone Directory University of DC Water and Sewer Administration Youth Rehabilitation Services Zoning Commission Issues in DC Politics Budget issues DC Flag DC General, PBC Gun issues Health issues Housing initiatives Mayor's mansion Public Benefit Corporation Regional Mobility Reservation 13 Tax Rev Comm Term limits repeal Voting rights, statehood Williams's Fundraising Scandals Links Organizations Appleseed Center Cardozo Shaw Neigh.Assoc. Committee of 100 Fed of Citizens Assocs League of Women Voters Parents United Shaw Coalition Photos Search What Is DCWatch? themail archives Materials from the Metropolitan Police Department: Citizen Complaint Report Form, PD-99 Materials on the Metropolitan Police Department. Neighborhood Safety Zone Initiative Mayor Adrian Fenty, MPD Chief Cathy
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
Nye Frank

538 F2d 10 Torres v. Sachs S Velez | Open Jurist - 0 views

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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
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    Section 402 allows a court, in its discretion, to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party in suits to enforce the voting guarantees of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth amendments, and statutes enacted under those amendments. This section is similar to provisions in Titles II and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibit discrimination in public accommodations and employment, and to Section 403 of this act (the coverage of which is described below). Such a provision is appropriate in voting rights cases because there, as in employment and public accommodations cases, and other civil rights cases, Congress depends heavily upon private citizens to enforce the fundamental rights involved. Fee awards are a necessary means of enabling private citizens to vindicate these Federal rights. It is intended that the standards for awarding fees under sections 402 and 403 be generally the same as under the fee provisions of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. A party seeking to enforce the rights protected by the Constitutional clause or statute under which fees are authorized by these sections, if successful, "should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust." Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968). . . . In several hearings held over a period of years, the Committee has found that fee awards are essential if the Constitutional requirements and Federal statutes to which sections 402 and 403 apply are to be fully enforced. We find that the effects of such fee awards are ancilliary (sic) and incident to securing compliance with these laws, and that fee awards are an integral part of the remedies necessary to obtain such compliance. Fee awards are therefore provided in cases covered by sections 402 and 403 in accordance with Congress' powers under, inter alia, the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 5. As with cases brought under 20 U.S.C. § 1617, the Emergency School Ai
Nye Frank

Position Outline for Elder Abuse Policy (Rough Draft) - 0 views

  • 29 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p. 94. 30 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.3, p. 93. 31 See NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, (2 nd ed. 1991), Standard 26.7, p.92
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    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
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    Page 1 Page 2 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Adopted: March 22, 2003 by the Board of Directors in New Orleans, Louisiana National District Attorneys Association 99 Canal Center Plaza, Suite 510 Alexandria, Virginia 22314 Telephone: 703-549-9222 Facsimile: 703-836-3195 Page 3 i INDEX TOPIC PAGE NO. Magnitude of Elder Abuse …………………………………………….. 1-2 Current Elder Population ……………………………………… 2-3 Projected Increase in the Elder Population …………………… 3 Number of Individuals in Nursing Homes ……………………. 3 Elder Abuse in Domestic Settings ……………………………… 3-4 Elder Abuse in Institutional Settings ………………………...... 4-5 Elder Abuse and the Prosecutor's Office Office Organization ……………………………………………... 5-6 Training Training to Understand Crimes against Elders ……………….. 7-9 Training to Understand the Elder Victim ……………………… 9 Victim's Services ………………………………………………………… 10-13 Funding …………………………………………………………………… 13-14 Multidisciplinary Approach …………………………………………….. 14-15 Public Awareness ………………………………………………………… 15-17 State Legislation State Criminal Laws ………………………………………………. 17 State Mandatory Reporting Laws ………………………………… 18 Special Trial Procedures and Evidentiary Rules ………………… 18-19 Page 4 1 NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION POLICY POSITIONS ON THE PROSECUTION OF ELDER ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION Introduction: Since May of 1986, the National District Attorneys Association has become increasingly concerned about the growing problem of eld
Nye Frank

It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the impo... - 0 views

  • Assuming internal police guidelines are relevant...they are relevant only when one of their purposes is to protect the individual against whom force is used....Both the guidelines at issue here and the context in which they appear in the police manual show they were meant to safeguard the police and other innocent parties, not the suspect....A violation of these guidelines might be deserving of discipline, but it's irrelevant to [plaintiff's] case.16 It is important to note here that the appellate court did not decide that internal police guidelines are relevant in some instances; they only assumed that they might be relevant in the narrow instance described-i.e., when the policy was intended to safeguard the plaintiff.
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    Legal Duties It is no reflection on either the breadth of the United States Constitution or the importance of traditional tort law to say that they do not address the same concerns.4 Thus, while negligence claims against a police officer or the department may be recognized under state law, the Supreme Court has held that simple negligence-or lack of due care-is insufficient to establish the violation of a federal constitutional right. These distinctions between state tort claims and federal constitutional tort claims can have a bearing on the different ways the courts treat allegations of policy violations. The basic formula for any lawsuit is 1) existence of a legal duty owed by one party to another, 2) an alleged breach of that duty, and 3) injury or loss resulting from that breach. Legal duties may arise in a variety of contexts, but most generally are established by custom, statute, or constitutional law. Whatever its source, a legal duty must be owed to the plaintiff by the named defendant in order for a civil suit to be viable. That being the case, a departmental policy must create a legal duty to a potential plaintiff before a violation of that policy can create liability. In reality, whether a policy violation is even relevant to the question of the legal liability of an officer or department depends to a large extent upon the nature of the claim and the forum in which it is brought. For example, policy violations in tort claims brought under state law alleging negligence will generally be treated differently than claims brought under federal law alleging violations of federal constitutional rights. The relevance of departmental policy also can depend upon whether a legal duty, or standard of conduct, is clearly delineated by law, or whether it is determined by reference to custom or practice.
Nye Frank

Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 - 0 views

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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
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    This is the html version of the file http://contracabal.org/NewFiles/711-08-10-06-0317.pdf. Google automatically generates html versions of documents as we crawl the web. Page 1 © Copyright 2006 by Paul Trummel. Contra Cabal #711-08-10/06-0317-2011. Page 1 of 5 Dereliction and Collusion - City of Seattle Contra Cabal 711-08-10 Alleged Dereliction and Unlawful Collusion among Thomas A. Carr, Seattle City Attorney, his assistants Michael J. Finkle and Robert W. Hood, in a consort with Stephen A. M-tch-ll, a Council House administrator, his directors, and their lawyers. Seattle Jewish Mafia (SJM), a faith-based initiative similar to Al Quaeda, has destroyed Contra Cabal web site three times. It attempted to silence the author and to cover up elder abuse by Council House directors using unlawful means to prevent constitutionally protected speech. [Seattle Jewish Mafia] [Kill the Messenger - WIP] With similar intent, Seattle City Attorney Thomas A. Carr, has issued six criminal indictments against the author. He has attempted to intimidate, silence, and return the author to jail on trumped-up charges - charges similar to those used by Judge James A. Doerty to jail and place him in solitary confinement (2002). Doerty's decision now awaits review by Washington Supreme Court. [Supreme Court Review] Carr's behavior, as an elected official, ranks as truly kafkaesque. In an attempt to preempt the Supreme Court decision, he has evidently tried to pervert the course of justice. Fabricating or interfering with evidence and threatening or intimidating witnesses both classify as criminal offenses punishable by a jail sentence. SJM has shown a pattern of racketeering (defined by the Civil Rights Act and RICO statute). A RICO pattern means two or more organized criminal acts which indicate ensuant activity. Those acts include conspiracy to commit crimes of coercion by wrongful use of force or fear. Instead of challenging the perpetrators, Carr and his team of lawyers have collud
Nye Frank

06-ORD-265 - 0 views

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    While it is thus true that this office generally defers to a law enforcement agency's classification of an investigation as active, inactive, or closed, fully recognizing that we have no statutory authority to order the agency to close an investigation for open records purposes , we have had occasion to question an agency's reliance on KRS 61.878(1)(h) and KRS 17.150(2), and its classification of an investigation as open, where several years have elapsed and the agency fails to provide an adequate explanation or otherwise meet its statutory burden of proof. See, e.g., OAG 86-80 (eight years); OAG 90-143 (one and one-half years); 02-ORD-20 (ten years). In so doing, we were guided by the language found in KRS 17.150(3), echoed in KRS 61.878(1)(h), and the statement of legislative policy that appears at KRS 61.871, declaring that "free and open examination of public records is in the public interest" and that the referenced exceptions to public inspection must be "strictly construed" to promote the public's right to know. Underlying these decisions was the recognition that "[s]ecret police activity without some overriding justification is repugnant to the American system of government," OAG 80-54, p. 3, and that when an investigation has been inactive for an inordinate period of time, the public's interest in seeing an offender brought to justice may have to yield to the public's right to review the conduct of the police in discharging their statutory duties
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    While it is thus true that this office generally defers to a law enforcement agency's classification of an investigation as active, inactive, or closed, fully recognizing that we have no statutory authority to order the agency to close an investigation for open records purposes , we have had occasion to question an agency's reliance on KRS 61.878(1)(h) and KRS 17.150(2), and its classification of an investigation as open, where several years have elapsed and the agency fails to provide an adequate explanation or otherwise meet its statutory burden of proof. See, e.g., OAG 86-80 (eight years); OAG 90-143 (one and one-half years); 02-ORD-20 (ten years). In so doing, we were guided by the language found in KRS 17.150(3), echoed in KRS 61.878(1)(h), and the statement of legislative policy that appears at KRS 61.871, declaring that "free and open examination of public records is in the public interest" and that the referenced exceptions to public inspection must be "strictly construed" to promote the public's right to know. Underlying these decisions was the recognition that "[s]ecret police activity without some overriding justification is repugnant to the American system of government," OAG 80-54, p. 3, and that when an investigation has been inactive for an inordinate period of time, the public's interest in seeing an offender brought to justice may have to yield to the public's right to review the conduct of the police in discharging their statutory duties
Nye Frank

California Elder Abuse Act, Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (EADACPA): S... - 0 views

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    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
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    California's Elder Abuse Act California's Elder Abuse Act has been in existence in its current state since 1991 and is officially known as the Elder and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act (hereinafter "EADACPA" or simply, the "Elder Abuse Act"). The Elder Abuse Act, found at Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq., sets forth a very detailed body of law that has since been interpreted by the California Supreme Court as providing for a distinct and recognized cause of action - that being a statutory cause of action for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect under Welfare & Institutions Code §15600 et seq. When properly proven, a claim for Elder Abuse and/or Neglect provides for certain enhanced remedies that are unwise unavailable under other common law causes of action. The Elder Abuse Act was created out of concern that the elderly members of our society are not receiving the care and attention they deserved - and are in fact being abused and neglected. In enacting the Elder Abuse Act, the California Legislature expressly recognized that elders (defined as a person greater than the age of 65) and dependent adults (generally defined as persons between the ages of 18 and 64 who confined to live in 24-hour medical facilities and/or who are not able to care for themselves due to medical disorders) are particularly subjected to abuse, neglect, or abandonment and that the state has a distinct responsibility to protect these persons. In its preamble, the Elder Abuse Act expressly states that the Legislature "desires to direct special attention to the needs and problems of elderly persons, recognizing that these persons constitute a significant and identifiable segment of the population and that they are more subject to risks of abuse, neglect, and abandonment." (See, Welfare & Institutions Code §15600). The statute further states that most elders and dependent adults who are at the greatest risk of abuse or neglect by their caretakers suffer "physical impairment
Nye Frank

Scribd - 0 views

shared by Nye Frank on 24 Jul 09 - Cached
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    Log In or Sign Up X Log In If you already have an account, log in. Username or Email Password Spinner_mac_white Trouble logging in? Log In with OpenID Rightblue_yellow Log In with OpenID Downblue_yellow Sign up for a Free Account It's quick and easy. Why Sign up? A Wealth of Information at Your Fingertips Store and Bookmark Documents Share Documents Privately Reach Millions of People Email Address (Required) Create Username Create Password (Required) Spinner_mac_white We respect your privacy and won't send any unnecessary emails. Read our privacy policy. Login Successful Now bringing you back... Spinner_mac_white Signup Successful Now bringing you back... Spinner_mac_white « Back to Login Reset your password Please enter your email address below to reset your password. We will send you an email with instructions on how to continue. Email address: You need to provide a login for this account as well. Login: X Sign up for a Free Account It's quick and easy. Why Sign up? A Wealth of Information at Your Fingertips Store and Bookmark Documents Share Documents Privately Reach Millions of People Email Address (Required) Create Username Create Password (Required) Spinner_mac_white We respect your privacy and won't send any unnecessary emails. Read our privacy policy. Scribd All | Books | Business | Academic | More Small_white_arrow * Brochures & Catalogs * Creative Writing * How-to-Guides & Manuals * Illustrations & Maps * Magazines & Newspapers * Puzzles & Games * Recipes & Menus * Research * Resumes & CVs * Sheet Music & Lyrics Log In | Sign Up | Help * Home * Explore * Community Transparent * Partners * Store New * Documents * Groups * People Advanced Search Use Classic Search Question Transparent Scribd * About * Press * Scribd Store * Jobs * Contact * Blog Legal * Terms - general * Terms - API * Copyright Help & Tools
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    Log In or Sign Up X Log In If you already have an account, log in. Username or Email Password Spinner_mac_white Trouble logging in? Log In with OpenID Rightblue_yellow Log In with OpenID Downblue_yellow Sign up for a Free Account It's quick and easy. Why Sign up? A Wealth of Information at Your Fingertips Store and Bookmark Documents Share Documents Privately Reach Millions of People Email Address (Required) Create Username Create Password (Required) Spinner_mac_white We respect your privacy and won't send any unnecessary emails. Read our privacy policy. Login Successful Now bringing you back... Spinner_mac_white Signup Successful Now bringing you back... Spinner_mac_white « Back to Login Reset your password Please enter your email address below to reset your password. We will send you an email with instructions on how to continue. Email address: You need to provide a login for this account as well. Login: X Sign up for a Free Account It's quick and easy. Why Sign up? A Wealth of Information at Your Fingertips Store and Bookmark Documents Share Documents Privately Reach Millions of People Email Address (Required) Create Username Create Password (Required) Spinner_mac_white We respect your privacy and won't send any unnecessary emails. Read our privacy policy. Scribd All | Books | Business | Academic | More Small_white_arrow * Brochures & Catalogs * Creative Writing * How-to-Guides & Manuals * Illustrations & Maps * Magazines & Newspapers * Puzzles & Games * Recipes & Menus * Research * Resumes & CVs * Sheet Music & Lyrics Log In | Sign Up | Help * Home * Explore * Community Transparent * Partners * Store New * Documents * Groups * People Advanced Search Use Classic Search Question Transparent Scribd * About * Press * Scribd Store * Jobs * Contact * Blog Legal * Terms - general * Terms - API * Copyright Help & Tools
Nye Frank

DISTRICT ATTORNEY CORRUPTION?: TWO VIEWS ON DA COOLEY'S RECORD - 0 views

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    Joe Banana So. Cal. Posted: 10:54 pm [PST] on March 22 2009 Another shining example of government at it's most corrupt. www.jail4judges.org Dawn Banning CA Posted: 11:09 pm [PST] on October 14 2008 http://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2I had seen a article about award to Elder Victims Advocate Department in Riverside County. I was shocked and wrote Kim Emmerling the DA advocate we had. She wrote me back that she was leaving that office. I had sent a request for the history of our meetings to her and internal affairs without any reply. Still with internal affairs knowing there was a cover up, proof of it, autopsy corruption along with a laundry list we have had zero help. We just want what the US Constitution says we have a right to. We wrote the attorney general office and gave all the documents. They wrote back that the DA office handles these complaints. There is no where to turn. Nye and Lee Frank both over 65 years old. Adult protective services have been contacted without ever contacting us or even replying to our request. Now the victim has the attacker building a home two doors away. We need help. The following is a letter I wrote the internal Affairshttp://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2pictures pictures of Nye Frank and Ty Reddish. Sheriff and DA office falsely told family that coroner reported heart attack and no injuries. The video of Ty Reddish shows him bending down to avoid being recorded and telling officers how he strangled 68 year old Nye Frank with wrestling moves. The officers laugh, as they are buddies of the Reddish family friends. They did not do a drug test on Ty while on probation for dui and had past drug use, and victim said looked like on drugs. Riverside County Internal Affairs -When I complained they said they can no longer talk to me. Dawn Banning CA Posted: 05:06 am [PST] on October 10 2008 Dawn said: Riverside Judge and DA office stated to Senior no Elder Advocate in Riverside County. When family saw award in paper DA victim advocate quit.
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    Nye Frank Racing Posted: 10:54 pm [PST] on March 22 2009 Another shining example of government at it's most corrupt. www.jail4judges.org Dawn Banning CA Posted: 11:09 pm [PST] on October 14 2008 http://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2I had seen a article about award to Elder Victims Advocate Department in Riverside County. I was shocked and wrote Kim Emmerling the DA advocate we had. She wrote me back that she was leaving that office. I had sent a request for the history of our meetings to her and internal affairs without any reply. Still with internal affairs knowing there was a cover up, proof of it, autopsy corruption along with a laundry list we have had zero help. We just want what the US Constitution says we have a right to. We wrote the attorney general office and gave all the documents. They wrote back that the DA office handles these complaints. There is no where to turn. Nye and Lee Frank both over 65 years old. Adult protective services have been contacted without ever contacting us or even replying to our request. Now the victim has the attacker building a home two doors away. We need help. The following is a letter I wrote the internal Affairshttp://tinyurl.com/4vq2k2pictures pictures of Nye Frank and Ty Reddish. Sheriff and DA office falsely told family that coroner reported heart attack and no injuries. The video of Ty Reddish shows him bending down to avoid being recorded and telling officers how he strangled 68 year old Nye Frank with wrestling moves. The officers laugh, as they are buddies of the Reddish family friends. They did not do a drug test on Ty while on probation for dui and had past drug use, and victim said looked like on drugs. Riverside County Internal Affairs -When I complained they said they can no longer talk to me. Dawn Banning CA Posted: 05:06 am [PST] on October 10 2008 Dawn said: Riverside Judge and DA office stated to Senior no Elder Advocate in Riverside County. When family saw award in paper DA victim advocate quit. feed:/
Nye Frank

mickey thompson 1967 - Nye Built cars for Mickey Thompson - 0 views

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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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    Nye Frank homicide, killers dad freinds with Riverside County DA factor in closing case period. Audio and video from sheriff prove point. DA Mike Rushton claimed his privacy and sealed case. Administrative closures occur when a suspect has been identified, but "circumstances exist that prevent the successful prosecution of the offender" and he or she is released, according to a D.C. Office of Inspector General audit of police department homicide closures.
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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    Department of Justice guidelines state that "A law enforcement agency clears a crime by exceptional means when elements beyond its control prevent the placing of formal charges against the offender
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