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In an era when the corporate media and the corporate politicians and the corporate military men gang up together and denounce and threaten other countries because of their nuclear related activities, they should spend much of that rhetorical energy by cross-examining themselves in a mirror. North Korea's latest nuclear test received much more attention than its earlier 'possible' test because of its greater power and the strategic message sent by its politically timed Taepodong II rocket launch. Iran has moved a little bit off the radar screen as its elections have proven more interesting than its nuclear 'threat' but it is under increasing scrutiny as it reaches weapons potential. When placed in relation to this "cautionary history", North Korea and Iran are acting only as all other nuclear powers have acted in the past, for the main theme behind In Mortal Hands is that of lies, deceit, deception, cover-ups, and secrecy to cover up the real issues with the nuclear industry. The real issue as reiterated constantly and perceptively by Stephanie Cooke is that of an industry whose central purpose is to create fissile material for weapons production regardless of and in spite of all other attempts to equate nuclear energy with peaceful purposes and with the 'greening' of the energy industry.

Three structural components were procured and installed by the prime contractor at the MOX Facility that did not meet the technical specifications for items relied on for safety. * In six instances, items used in the construction of TEF failed to satisfy quality standards. In one instance, operating procedures had to be modified to ensure that the problem item did not compromise safety; and, * At ISP, one component that did not meet quality standards was procured. The failure of the item could have resulted in a spill of up to 15,000 gallons of high-level radioactive waste. We concluded that these failures were attributable to inadequate attention to quality assurance at Savannah River. Departmental controls were not adequate to prevent and/or detect quality problems. Additionally, management did not effectively communicate quality assurance concerns between the several Departmental program elements operating at Savannah River. The procurement and installation of these nonconforming components resulted in cost increases. The internal control weaknesses we discovered could have permitted, without detection, the procurement and installation of safety critical components that did not meet quality assurance standards. In a worst case scenario, undetected, nonconforming components could fail and injure workers or the public. In certain instances, the Department took steps to ensure that the prime contractors at Savannah River began action to remediate nonconforming components and to strengthen policies and procedures. Accordingly, we made several recommendations designed to strengthen quality assurance at Savannah River. Finally, the matters discussed in this report provide valuable lessons learned as the Department implements the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. The Department will use Recovery Act stimulus funds to initiate new and to accelerate ongoing projects throughout its complex. The Department must maintain a focus on quality assurance issues to ensur