JA: How important was the role of technology in distributing Charter 08?ZZ: Thirty-one years ago, in the era of Charter 77, there was no Internet, so it was difficult to spread the document. Yesterday, I "Googled" Charter 08. Right now there are already more than 300,000 links about Charter 08. A lot of young people use blogs or QQ [referring to popular instant message software in China] groups to make friends, and they've also spread this new Charter. The English version of Charter 08 was spread rapidly. So thanks to the Internet, it's impossible to block information from society now.

Australia and Canada got up early to be at the front of the line, and both expressed concerns about the Chinese government's human rights record. The UK and other European governments expressed concern later on. But voices of praise for the Chinese government's human rights record predominated. Overall, the session was considered a victory for the Chinese government's position that it is on the right track when it comes to respecting the rights of its people. Where was the U.S. delegation in this line? U.S. diplomats made no attempt to stand in this line. Much to the outrage of human rights groups, the Obama administration chose to merely sit on the sidelines and quietly take notes.

Thirteen years ago in Beijing, you spoke eloquently about the duty of all governments to respect the fundamental human rights of women and men. Respect for human rights, you said, means “not taking citizens away from their loved ones and jailing them, mistreating them, or denying them their freedom or dignity because of the peaceful expression of their ideas and opinions.” In recent years, however, human rights concerns have been pushed progressively further to the margins of the U.S.-China relationship. The Chinese government’s growing financial, diplomatic, and military strength, coupled with its hostility to reforms that challenge the Chinese Communist Party’s grip on power, make China a difficult country in which to effect change. But the advancement of human rights in, and with, China is arguably more central to U.S. interests than ever before. Press censorship in China makes it possible for toxic food and public health crises to spread globally. Suppression of dissent removes internal checks against environmental damage that has global impact. Abuses of low-wage labor implicate international firms operating inside China and compromise goods that come into the United States. The government’s control of mass media and the internet allow it to stoke nationalist anger against the United States in moments of crisis. The export from China of internet-censoring technologies and its provision of unconditional aid to repressive regimes increases the United States' burdens in fighting censorship and human rights crises worldwide. As much as the Chinese government appears to resist outside pressure to improve its record, experience suggests that it does respond to such pressure.

以打击低俗的名义，关于宗教，道德，意识形态，民主，世界观和政治改革的东西全被打击了。一切低俗小组都是纸老虎。问题是，到底是上面说不许讨论尼采不许看世界名画组织人民群众学习红色娘子军还是豆瓣领会圣旨的意思领会的觉悟的过了头？

The most interesting thesis is the idea that China could use international law as a weapon, or “lawfare” for short. The authors argue that citizens of democracies increasingly demand that their countries uphold international rules, particularly ones that govern human rights and the conduct of war. Governments are, therefore, constrained by regional or worldwide organizations, such as the European Union, ASEAN, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the WTO and the United Nations. The authors argue that China should copy the European model of using international law to pin down the USA: “there are far-sighted big powers which have clearly already begun to borrow the power of supra-national, multinational, and non-state players to redouble and expand their own influence.” They think that China could turn the United Nations and regional organizations into an amplifier of the Chinese worldview – discouraging the USA from using its might in campaigns like the Iraq War.

Beijing has been willing to allow the Organization of Islamic States to take the lead in weakening the new Human Rights Council. This subtle diplomacy has been devastatingly effective – contributing to a massive fall in US influence: in 1995 the USA won 50.6 percent of the votes in the United Nations general assembly; by 2006, the figure had fallen to just 23.6 percent. On human rights, the results are even more dramatic: China’s win-rate has rocketed from 43 percent to 82 percent, while the USA’s has tumbled from 57 per cent to 22 percent. The New York Times’ UN correspondent James Traub has detected a paradigm shift in the United Nations’ operations: “it’s a truism that the Security Council can function only insofar as the United States lets it. The adage may soon be applied to China as well.” Traub may be right. China’s capacity to influence the United Nations is increasing, and soon we may be complaining about Chinese behavior on big policy issues

On the other hand, I’ve seen no one addressing the questions of actual political and bureaucratic process. What comes first? Elections in major urban centers like Shanghai, a sort of Special Democratic Zone? Loosening of Internet controls? Judiciary reform? Privatization of state media? Releasing political prisoners? Local officials already abuse existing structures, how much more will they abuse transitional processes? If you don’t want a revolution, then there has to be some sort of proposed process that the current government can work with and Chinese citizens can feel both moves reform forward and doesn’t threaten to unravel society. If you don’t say anything about how you might accomplish such a thing, but simply describe the end result in which the government becomes something unrecognizable from the existing one, you may not have explicitly called for its overthrow but you sure didn’t call for something else instead. Not to mention its difficult not to see it as just a wish list. Anybody can make a wishlist - who’s going to do the real work?

I think the commenter who asks whether Charter 08 is really calling for a revolution has a point, and it’s not fair to riposte “well, if this all happened it would be revolutionary”. It wouldn’t be if the changes happened gradually or in a controlled and orderly way (as they did in other countries). The party itself, after all, keeps promising political reform, and many of the people who support it so heartily do so on the assumption that it is serious about eventually keeping that promise. The people I spoke to (and quoted) did not think this was a substitute for tackling concrete real life issues, but thought it important to have a framework within which to do so.

Notice, also that I said a “revolution of the system of government”. Not the government, the system. The problems I’m referring to is that when the system, the way things are done, from paying your electricity bill to detemining holders of public office, changes radically, 180 degrees, then there can be terrible consequences. How should one try to avoid those consequences? How can you make the transition smoothly? These are the things that ought to be discussed, and these are the things that will persuade people that your ideals can actually be realized. That might get you a groundswell of demand for change - abstract philosophical manifestos, though, don’t cut it.

我个人更期待既得利益集团中的一部分清醒者，从自身的长远利益和民族的利益出发，能早日接受事实，与其他思潮、力量的代表坐下来，以对话代替对抗，让2009年成为对话时代的起点，20年前我们曾经丧失了一次通过对话解决危机的机会，难道还要无限期地等待下去。争取最好的结果就是争取双赢、多赢，在这个意义上，如果真的要倡导“不折腾”，就应该开放舆论而不是管制舆论，从开放言禁、网禁、报禁入手，把新闻自由提到议事日程，将一切问题诉诸公开、公平、公正的舆论，这才是落实“不折腾”。

中國要变，这是大时代的呼声，如何以较小的代价、较轻的成本和平地完成“变”，这是我们每个负责任的中國人要思考的，无论在朝、在野。

credit card companies and banks gave the same kind of cooperation to the government that phone companies did

in 2006 that the NSA obtained access to financial records in the international SWIFT database

the agency may have obtained bulk data on domestic credit card transactions as well from U.S. financial institutions -- all without a warrant

We have to be aware of the fact that the Internet has given the youth living in controlled societies infinite venues for digital entertainment - without any religious or social censorship - that may not necessarily be enhancing their digital sense of citizenship and civic engagement. Risking the comfort of their bedrooms - with their hard-drives full of digital goodies - for the gloom of a prison cell does not appeal to many of them. The governments are all too happy to promote this new cult of "cyber-hedonism." Whatever keeps these troubled youths from the streets is inherently a good thing.

The fact that existing political activists embraced the Internet as a tool of mobilization is fairly noncontroversial. What's less obvious is how many digital natives the Internet has turned into digital renegades - and how many into digital captives. It's precisely this balance that will determine what the political landscape of Russia, China or Iran will look like in 10 years.

我知道天杀的GFW从奥运开始前就已经屏蔽了我的整个msn space，so what?你能拦得住整个互联网吗？ Zola同学说得好：操GFW请戴Tor~~~

Contrary to Harvard’s reputation that the only smart people on earth live in 02138, Berkman deeply believes that there are lots of smart people out there that aren’t at Berkman, and the instinctive response is to invite them to swing by. Hence Dave’s lunch summary. There is always someone interesting, on a weekly basis, being invited to join the discussion. (And they are discussions, not lectures, as you can see from the extensive Q&A that accompanies every lunch transcript.) And the discussions are open to everyone- you can literally walk in off the street if you want;