"These people have been trained in an authoritarian system. They are at the same time victims of an authoritarian system, but they also behave in an authoritarian way towards others and are incredibly self-righteous," says a Chinese politics professor who asked not to be named.

"We should be more tolerant and respect the right of people to disagree with us but these people do not understand such values."The term fenqinghas been used in each of the past three generations to describe very different kinds of rebel.

There are no indications that the contemporary fenqing are members of the sort of organised nationalist movement seen in places such as Russia, where Nashi, a pro-Kremlin youth group, has had a growing profile.Rather, "since the mid-1990s urban educated youth in China have become much more nationalistic rather than angry at the government", says David Zweig, director of the centre on China's transnational relations at Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. "There is a strong sense that the west, led by the US, is trying to keep China down and stop it from taking its rightful place in the world."

没有了这种天生的好奇，对于信息和idea的好奇与渴望，我认为新闻工作者可以提前退休。 因为，他们的劳动与回报将注定不成正比。对于他们的机构，他们的存在也不会带来太多的经济价值。 只有那些认为经由博客所激发的新鲜的想法和信息，通过发言讨论在网上活得社会资本，本身是对于自己劳动的补偿，是对于个人成长有益的，是会对个人从事的其他事业有整合促进作用的，这些人才能坚持做好本应由职业新闻工作者所做的事情，即对信息价值判断，评论，流通

可悲的是，这些”教授“们热衷的是一套已经过时的”技术“。 就像匠人只懂得一套已经被大机器取代了的手工工种，他们教育的学生只能是未来的下岗工人。那些带有专业方向的新闻学院项目，大概是唯一还有点出路的。但是，根本上，许多包括美国的新闻学院不鼓励独立思想，带着前互联网时代某些特权新闻媒体的短视，自命不凡，势利与浅薄特征，是致命且令人作呕的。

更深层的原因是这些记者们对于自己工作的理解和定位的问题。 反应的是传统新闻媒体信息行业工作逻辑与新经济互联网时代工作逻辑的根本不同。 即：创造价值与获取价值，谁先谁后的问题。 问题核心：思维懒惰。缺乏好奇。 关键词是：intellectual curiosity 的缺失. ( 新闻学院教不了这个，不是每家传统新闻媒体都重视这个， 可恰恰这是关键) 自命不凡的精英主义 过剩。

就专业化程度而论，资本市场权力结构的本质，是由众多投资者和多元化的利益集团组成的“资本共同体”。而“资本共同体”存在的重要前提，则是独立的有学识的专家群体的存在。这些专家群体受过共同的专业训练，他们构成了一个权威的资本市场的“解释共同体”。这是任何一个国家资本市场崛起的专业化基础，而这恰好是中国资本市场的“短板”。

要根本改变中国资本市场话语权被国际投行垄断的现状，光靠炮轰“谢国忠们”远远不够。资本市场“蝴蝶效应”的爆发并不是因为这些乌鸦嘴的存在，“谢国忠们”只是公鸡，不管他们叫不叫，天都会亮。解决问题的真正路径还在于提高本土专家的专业化程度和水平，这是中国资本市场“软起飞”的“话语权”保障，亦是中国资本市场崛起的基本要件。 证监会某副主席说，股市不是任何人可以炒的。我补充一句:股市也不是任何人可以冒充专家指导的。

中金前雇员、现任里昂证券亚洲分部(CLSA)的分析师侯伟(Fraser Howie)表示，自1995年中金公司在北京钓鱼台国宾馆宣布成立以来， “中金公司一直是中国自身的一个缩影。”“它是观察中国的一个镜头”。在中国，将商业和政治区分开，通常是不太可能的。

　站在这样一个角度，我们反思一下这次的事件前后，就会发现，我们听到那么多政府的声音、网民的声音、海外媒体的声音、流亡藏人的声音，惟独不能听到生活于那片土地的那些普通藏人的真实的声音。我相信，他们的感受一定比我们复杂得多，痛苦得多，他们关于自己，一定有许多话要述说。然而，我们大家几无例外，对这种声音的缺席丝毫不以为意。这正常吗？ 　　　　　　作为一个共同体，我们应该创造机会让他们表达他们真实的声音，学会倾听他们，——即使它初听起来可能有点刺耳。因为他们是和我们一样平等的公民，在这个问题上，没有民族界限。而惟有把西藏问题首先看作内部治理问题，我们才会对此予以足够重视。 　　　　　

No matter what China does, these students say, it cannot win in the arena of world opinion. “When we have a billion people, you said we were destroying the planet./ When we tried limiting our numbers, you said it is human rights abuse,” reads a poem posted on the Internet by “a silent, silent Chinese” and cited by some students as an accurate expression of their feelings. “When we were poor, you thought we were dogs./ When we loan you cash, you blame us for your debts./ When we build our industries, you called us polluters./ When we sell you goods, you blame us for global warming.”

Hedge fund managers and other investors are looking to capitalize on the potentially huge market in trading pollution-emission credits.

Central bank purchases of traditional reserve assets still dwarf sovereign wealth fund purchases of riskier assets -- as well as central bank purchases of equities. But over time, it is reasonable to expect that many over-reserved sovereigns will diversify their portfolios. The recent decision to increase the share of the CIC's initial $205-210 billion in capital that it can invest abroad and SAFE's increased willingness to purchase equities as well as bonds are examples.

A far more challenging issue is how the huge increase in financial assets managed by potentially non-economic agents will affect the efficiency of the global capital market and the allocation of risk and resources. ….

And then there is China. China enormous foreign asset growth in the first quarter implies that it might be able to add more to its reserves and sovereign fund in 2008 than all the oil-exporters combined even if oil stays at its current levels.

It would be a good strapline for the 60 Minute interview with Gao Xiqing, president of the Chinese Investment Corporation. Give the man a PhD in giving reasonable responses under hysterically motivated questioning.

He points out that to withdraw funds for political reasons would hurt everyone: the fund, the Chinese government, the US, the company concerned. It’s therefore highly unlikely to happen. In other words, the business and investment ties between the two countries could help to dissipate and moderate political spats rather than exacerbate or be used as a weapon in them.

It is commonly argued that growing economic ties tend to create common interests that will reduce tension between nations (see FT's Alphaville). The enormous amount China has lent to the US -- a total that the US data (which tends to underestimate Chinese holdings) now puts above $1 trillion -- will, according to this view, prevent other sources of conflict from getting out of hand. Alas, relations between creditors and debtors are rarely quite so free of tension. Creditors want to get paid back in full. Debtors would rather pay back at little as possible. Mei Xinyu, a senior researcher under the Chinese commerce ministry writing in a personal capacity for the Shanghai Daily, argues that China needs to put pressure on the US at the Strategic Economic Dialogue to do more defend the dollar. With the dollar at 1.60 against the euro, it isn't hard to see why. Mei goes on to argue that if the US doesn't do more to defend the dollar, it is effectively defaulting on China.

Mei's complaint, in other words, should be directed in part at China's own policy makers. When they bought long-term US dollar-denominated debt they took the risk that the dollar would depreciate over time. They effectively gave the US the option to pay China back in depreciated dollars. What's more, they didn't charge a premium for the option. That was China's own choice. China wanted to keep the RMB down even if that meant over-paying for US assets.

China, for complicated reasons, has decided to lend to the US in US dollars and to lend to Europe in euros and pounds. China's European lending - incidentally -- could prove to be as risky as lending to the US in dollars; SAFE and the CIC are really over paying for euros.

　“我就搞不懂为什么要救市？只有经济产生系统性风险才需要救市，救的目的是为了减少对经济的损害。即便救，也 不是救投机者，而是救金融机构。”

“中国的股市和实体经济两层皮是脱节的，具体原因，我写过《股市南辕北辙之谜》，说得很清楚。股市暴跌了多少 次？哪次导致了经济萧条？你别吓唬领导。”中欧国际工商学院教授许小年对本刊记者说。

在公交车上用我们的母语跟同胞说话时，身边有人问起哪里人，我们回答是藏族的那一刹，全公交的人都吓楞了，就这样我们成了世界上最特殊的嫌疑犯。

We hear that Tibetans suffer “demographic aggression” and “cultural genocide”. But we do not hear those terms applied to Spanish and French policies toward the Basque minority. We do not hear those terms applied to the US annexation of the Kingdom of Hawaii in 1898. And Diego Garcia? In 1973, not so long ago, the UK forcibly deported the entire native Chagossian population from the Indian Ocean island of Diego Garcia. People were allowed one suitcase of clothing. Nothing else. Family pets were gassed, then cremated. Complete ethnic cleansing. Complete cultural destruction. Why? In order to build a big US air base. It has been used to bomb Afghanistan and Iraq, and soon maybe to bomb Iran and Pakistan. Diego Garcia, with nobody there but Brits and Americans, is also a perfect place for rendition, torture and other illegal actions.

The Chinese Context The Chinese government is responsible for the well-being and security of one-fourth of humanity. Race riots and rebellion cannot be tolerated, not even when done by Buddhist monks. Chinese Civilization was already old when the Egyptians began building pyramids. But the last 200 years have not gone well, what with two Opium Wars forcing China to import drugs, and Europeans seizing coastal ports as a step to complete colonial control, then the Boxer Rebellion, the collapse of the Manchu Dynasty, civil war, a brutal invasion and occupation by Japan, more civil war, then Communist consolidation and transformation of society, then Mao’s Cultural Revolution. Such events caused tens of millions of people to die. Thus, China’s recent history has good reasons why social order is a higher priority than individual rights. Race riots and rebellion cannot be tolerated. Considering this context, China’s treatment of its minorities has been exemplary compared to what the Western world has done to its minorities. After thousands of years of Chinese dominance, there still are more than 50 minorities in China. After a few hundred years of European dominance in North and South America, the original minority cultures have been exterminated, damaged, or diminished.

China’s one-child-policy seems oppressive to Westerners, but it has not applied to minorities, only to the Han Chinese. Tibetans can have as many children as they choose. If Han people have more than one child, they are punished. There is a similar preference given to minorities when it comes to admission to universities. For example, Tibetan students enter China’s elite Peking University with lower exam scores than Han Chinese students. China is not a perfect nation, but on matters of minority rights, it has been better than most Western nations. And China achieved this in the historical context of restoring itself and recovering from 200 years of continual crisis and foreign invasion.

北京电影学院教授郝建曾经说过这样一段话，比较深刻地分析出为什么中国大陆的华人甚至没有组织爱国游行的权利。郝教授说：“我们绝对知道在什么时候可以拍案而起作出义正词严状，也绝对知道什么时候必须对自己清楚万分的问题保持沉默、三缄其口。我们还有一个更可怕的表现。这就是柿子专拣软的捏：即在一个最安全的方向上作出好似怒不可遏、仗义执言，实际精打细算、八面玲珑的完美演出。我们也知道什么时候说什么话可以上达天庭得到首肯，什么话会触犯众怒。就我自己而言，这种算计已经高度技巧、出神入化；这种掌握已经进入潜意识层面。

有的人说，西@方@媒@体之所以产生了@虚@假@报@道是因为中@国@政@府的封@闭，但这决不能成为虚@假@报@道的理由，戴志勇认为新@闻@的@底@线@止@于@真@实，在任何时候都是正确的原则。

顺便再谈谈为什么中国政府会选择封@闭@新@闻@渠@道，而不是充@分@开@放。有人会说，用更加开@放的姿@态，让西@媒早点进入现场获取正确的报道，看到实际的@暴@力@行@动，从而用真实的报道来代替错@误的报@道。 这个观点从逻辑上是正确的，西@媒之所以出现大量的不@实@报@道是因为没有报道渠道，不了解发生的真实情况，只好根据猜测和流言编造故事。但人们显然低估了事态的复杂性，政@府面临的困局是：如果过早开@放媒@体，有可能意味着更加混乱。

方媒体之所以总是强调政府操纵，是没有看清楚中国民族主义的根源，他们认为现在的政府可以包办一切，但实际上，中国的民族情绪根源在于儒家文化，每一个中国人都不由自主受到文化的影响，对于权力和民族本身有一种迷恋，自动向民族主义看齐。

（相比较而言，央府的立场已经变得相对务实，本届政府不管是它的民族政策还是台海问题的态度上都有明显的收缩，比如，台海问题而言，在江核心时代军方非常激进，甚至提出了“宁让不长草，也要拿下”等等的说法，这个声音是从高层直接传出的。但本届政府相对务实得多，也灵活得多，从目前的态势看，基本上遵循只要不独就不打的原则，即使已经开打，如果对方能够回到原来立场，也可以再次压下，继续交往而不是强行统一。可以说，本届政府的态度基本上已经接近于底线了，这是非常务实的。如果西媒迟钝到没有看到这种变化，还是一味以以前的思维来压迫，那么一旦社会出现了大的危机，本届政府的这种务实态度一定会受到国内激进者的批评，可能向更加民族情绪化回归，到时很可能是得不偿失、两败俱伤。）

如果从对民族主义考察的角度来看，这次的整个事件可以描述为当“民族主义遇到民族主义”，对于汉人来说，强调自己的民族主义的时候，实际上否定了藏族人的民族主义；而西方鼓励或者纵容DL的民族主义时，却否定和限制中国的民族主义。双方都处在悖论之中，

The price tally in the latest American Farm Bureau market basket survey of 16 basic groceries was $45.03 in the first quarter, up 9% from the same period last year. Many of the price increases are eye-popping -- a five-pound bag of flour cost $2.69, 26% more than last year.

The surge in food costs has been attributed to several factors, including the increasing number of American farmers who now grow corn to supply the ethanol industry instead of food companies. I

Corn prices have soared, hitting $6 a bushel, up 50% from 2007 and triple the price of three years ago.

Wealthy clients of Sotheby's appear to be falling behind on their bills -- and that could signal trouble for the auction house and the art market.

And if you think that China's inflation stems from too much money rather than too few pigs* (or too little rice), that is a problem. The only solution, as Michael Pettis emphasizes, is a big one-off revaluation that changes expectations.

贝尔斯登的倒塌是信贷泡沫开始破灭的里程碑。如果美联储允许清算贝尔斯登，那么标志着熊市已经触底；投资者会清楚大量非流动性债券的真实价格。也许这意味着会有更多的投行破产。但是调整的过程可使信息变得透明，并且重新树立公众对金融体系的信心。相反，美联储使其他投行避免了流动性不足的压力。投行可以逐渐用收入注销坏账，就像日本银行当年采用的方法。每个季度收入报告都会有坏账被注销。危机暂时平息了，但是调整的时间被拉长。 　　风暴将从投行的流动性问题转移到其他领域。美联储可以解决金融机构的流动性问题，但它不能阻止资产价格下降，以及房屋抵押贷款和房地产建设贷款的违约。无论美联储增加多少流动性，金融体系损失了大量资本就意味着银行要收缩信贷——这是大衰退的预兆。美国两千万

　迄今为止，外国投资者，主要是外国的中央银行，正眼睁睁看着他们的资产贬值，却没有采取任何行动。因此，美联储没有动力去改变政策。渐进路线在慢慢挤出信贷泡沫的同时，会留出时间让通货膨胀去减少负债成本。所以，美联储有足够的动力去解救每一个人，并妨碍市场出清。另外，美元走弱会刺激美国出口，那意味着美国将向全世界输出衰退。

美联储在最近一次降息时，又谈到降息对通货膨胀有不利影响，但我仍然确信，美联储是想利用通胀减轻债务，缓解调整带来的痛苦。外国投资者在美国拥有16万亿美元的金融资产，通货膨胀和美元贬值对美国人是十分有利的。特别是那些美国中低收入者，他们处于净负债状况，通货膨胀会改善他们的处境。惟一能阻止美联储的，是外国投资者现在就卖掉美国国债。这样一来，债券收益会上升，从而提高美国长期融资的成本。