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The graduation rate issued by the National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) – widely regarded as the official rate – shows that U.S. students responded to the increasing demand for skill by completing high school at increasingly higher rates. By this measure, U.S. schools now graduate nearly 88 percent of students and black graduation rates have converged to those of non-Hispanic whites over the past four decades.

Depending on the data sources, definitions, and methods used, the U.S. graduation rate has been estimated to be anywhere from 66 to 88 percent in recent years—an astonishingly wide range for such a basic statistic. The range of estimated minority rates is even greater—from 50 to 85 percent.

A significant portion of the racial convergence reported in the official statistics is due to black males obtaining GED credentials in prison. Research by Tyler and Kling (2007) and Tyler and Lofstrom (2008) shows that, when released, prison GEDs earn at the same rate as non-prison GEDs, and the GED does not reduce recidivism.

In the period from 2000 to 2007, the paper says the average potential growth rate of G.D.P. was 2.6 per cent.

Over the last year, more than 40 percent of job growth has been in low-paying sectors including retail, leisure/hospitality (hotels and restaurants) and temporary help agencies.

The economy’s growth rate has been less than half the rate of previous recoveries and the employment losses in the Great Recession were more than twice as large as those in previous recessions.

It’s hard to see how providing politicians in troubled countries with unlimited credit will increase the likelihood of real reform of any kind.

Further complicating the picture, the Venezuelan government has not allowed companies to repatriate profits for the last five years.

The government has also failed to pay companies the hard currency it had promised them for imports bought on credit from suppliers, and in many cases suppliers are now refusing to ship more goods to Venezuela until they receive payment.

The second element of the debt-relief package would be more innovative: If Greece’s economy performs well, the generous extension of maturities can be clawed back or the interest rate raised. A formula for this could be linked to the debt/GDP ratio

Why bother? Because the very premise of the current deal and the expectations it sets out are wrong. First, the notion that there is a smooth transition path for the debt/GDP ratio from 200% to 124% is fanciful. Second, even if, by some miracle, Greece did reach the 124% mark by 2020, the claim that its debt will then be “sustainable” is absurd.

Make no mistake: policymakers’ track record on forecasting Greek economic performance during the crisis has been an embarrassment. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected – presumably in concurrence with its European partners – that Greece’s annual GDP growth would exceed 1% in 2012. Instead, the Greek economy will shrink by 6%. The unemployment rate, expected to peak this year at 15%, is now above 25% – and is still rising. The debt/GDP ratio was expected to top out at 150%; absent the substantial write-down of privately held debt, which was deemed unnecessary, the ratio would have been close to 250%.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn September 2010, four months after the official Greek bailout was put in place, the IMF issued a pamphlet asserting that “default in today’s advanced economies is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.” The conclusion was that official financing would carry Greece past its short-term liquidity problems. Calls for immediate debt restructuring went unheeded. Six months later, after substantial official funds had been used to pay private creditors, the outstanding private debt was substantially restructured.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSuch were the errors committed over short time horizons.

And, again, even if Greece somehow did achieve the 124% milestone, its debt would still not be sustainable.

Staying the course, as Summers warns, will lead only to “needless suffering” before that course inevitably collapses, bringing Greece – and much else –­ crashing down.

Europe, of course, has no significant centralized tax authority, so this key automatic stabilizer is essentially absent.

Many Germans today rightly feel that any system of fiscal transfers will morph into a permanent feeding tube, much the way that northern Italy has been propping up southern Italy for the last century. Indeed, more than 20 years on, Western Germans still see no end in sight for the bills from German unification.

A logical corollary of the criteria set forth by Kenen and Obstfeld, and even of Mundell’s labor-mobility criterion, is that currency unions cannot survive without political legitimacy,

European policymakers today often complain that, were it not for the US financial crisis, the eurozone would be doing just fine. Perhaps they are right. But any financial system must be able to withstand shocks, including big ones.

the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.

In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.

Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.

Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.

Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.

It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious

What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.

Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work.

The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.

Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.

Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The down

turn caused the deficits, not the other way around.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph

The answer might prove surprising. The German public might suddenly realize that the euro area confers on Germany not one but two “exorbitant privileges”: low interest rates as the haven for European capital and a competitive exchange rate by being hitched to weaker partners. In that case, Germany would have to offer its partners a much more attractive deal to keep them in the euro area.

It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.

The banks have to be recapped, and they have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on the agenda. I don’t think they can make it without help to the banks.

If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates

And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.

We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. The footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. The countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain

There’s no question, the periphery countries have to improve their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at the level of the euro or fiscal policy can do. This they have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.

It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.

And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.

At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.

Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.

The second element of the decision taken by heads of states was to instruct the EBA to do a so- called capital exercise that marked to market sovereign debt and effectively raised abruptly capital requirements. The exercise required banks to have a core tier-1 ratio of 9%, and on top of that a buffer to make up for differences in market and book value of government debt. That famous capital exercise created the capital crunch in the euro area which is the cause of the recession we've had in the euro area for the last 2 years.

Nigerian commercial banks have already issued international bonds; in Zambia, the power utility, railway operator, and road builder are planning to issue as much as $4.5 billion in international bonds.

Within months, the central bank injected more than 1 trillion euros of three-year loans into the region’s banking system