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In addition, observed GDP growth tends to be revised until several years after the first estimate

Our work is based on a simple Solow growth-accounting methodology.

A common feature of all economies is a collapse in productivity, which is typical of a big recession. In addition, Spain and Italy also underwent a very sharp labour contraction.

The additional effect of ageing.

A downside risk is that investment growth does not recover fully (for example, because banks fail to provide the necessary funding). In this case, we assume investment growth is only half what it was before the onset of economic turmoil.

We also estimate productivity through a convergence equation, which would slightly lift productivity in peripheral countries in the future.

This exercise suggests that in the absence of policy reforms, trend growth will have been damaged significantly, by at least one percentage point, post-crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels,

In the event that investment fails to recover quickly

 or unemployment levels take longer to fall than in previous recovery episodes, then trend growth would be significantly lower for longer. Trend growth might well remain negative in Spain and Italy, and may fail to increase for Germany or France.

this exercise shows the damage will indeed be long lasting, permanently impairing growth in a context of an ageing population that needs higher growth capacity than ever before.

but countries like Germany, which were over-saving and running external surpluses, have not been forced to adjust by increasing domestic demand, so their trade surpluses have remained large.

Of course, Germany fails to recognize that successful monetary unions like the United States have a full banking union with significant risk-sharing elements, and a fiscal union whereby idiosyncratic shocks to specific states’ output are absorbed by the federal budget. The US is also a large transfer union, in which richer states permanently subsidize the poorer ones.

But the fundamental crisis of the eurozone has not been resolved, and another year of muddling through could revive these risks in a more virulent form in 2014 and beyond. Unfortunately, the eurozone crisis is likely to remain with us for years to come, sustaining the likelihood of coercive debt restructurings and eurozone exits.

All have flexible exchange rates,

Draghi

a break from the era of missed targets and loose implementation towards a new paradigm of steadfast reform momentum,

Greece, where the euro zone’s debt crisis erupted in late 2009, is the currency area’s most heavily indebted country, despite a big “haircut” this year on privately held bonds.

The key question remains whether Greek debt can become sustainable without euro-zone governments having to write off some of the loans they have made to Athens.

That is the lowest level since 1972.

Its trade deficit has been shrinking — down 28 percent for the first 10 months of this year,

“From 2008, we suddenly realized that we had lost a lot of competitiveness and needed to work very hard to improve things, particularly in terms of labor issues and logistics,

Over all, Spain’s unit labor costs — a measure of productivity — are down 4 percent since 2008, according to Eurostat, the European statistics agency.

In a related measurement, the most recent Eurostat data put Spain’s average hourly labor cost at 20.60 euros which was well below Germany’s 30.10 euros and France’s 34.20 euros.

The car sector employs 280,000 people in Spain, including parts suppliers, and accounts for a tenth of the country’s economic output. About 85 percent of the industry’s workers are on long-term contracts.

"Supertankers" are the largest tankers, including very large crude carriers (VLCC) and ULCCs with capacities over 250,000 DWT. These ships can transport 2,000,000 barrels (320,000 m3) of oil/318 000 metric tons.[46] By way of comparison, the United Kingdom consumed about 1.6 million barrels (250,000 m3) of oil per day in 2009.[47] ULCCs, commissioned in the 1970s, were the largest vessels ever built, but the longest ones have already been scrapped; only a few ULCCs remain in service, none of which are more than 400m long.[48] Because of their great size, supertankers often can not enter port fully loaded.[28] These ships can take on their cargo at off-shore platforms and single-point moorings.[28] On the other end of the journey, they often pump their cargo off to smaller tankers at designated lightering points off-coast.[28] A supertanker's routes are generally long, requiring it to stay at sea for extended periods, up to and beyond seventy days at a time.[28]

As demand grew moderately in the United States and Western Europe, expanding economies such as China fueled exponential growth in demand.[60]

The average one-year time charter rate for a 5-year-old tanker of 280,000 metric tons of deadweight varied from $56,500 per day in December 2005 to $53,000 per day in September 2007 with a high of $64,500 per day in September 2006.[59]

The picture is one in which there are many fewer euros floating around the euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and the distribution of those euros is moving northward.

It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  The overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.

This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.

Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.

Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.

The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.

This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.

as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster

For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.

I regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states who surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.

The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who recognised that perfection was unattainable and practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set themselves limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilised the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step.

Unfortunately, the Maastricht treaty was fundamentally flawed. The architects of the euro recognised that it was an incomplete construct: a currency union without a political union. The architects had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the political will to take the next step forward could be mobilized. After all, that was how the process of integration had worked until then.

When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany's leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining, they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.

The financial crisis also revealed a near fatal defect in the construction of the euro: by creating an independent central bank, member countries became indebted in a currency they did not control. This exposed them to the risk of default.

Developed countries have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically nonexistent. By contrast, less developed countries that have to borrow in a foreign currency run the risk of default. To make matters worse, financial markets can actually drive such countries into default through bear raids. The risk of default relegated some member countries to the status of a third world country that became over-indebted in a foreign currency. 

The emphasis placed on sovereign credit revealed the hitherto ignored feature of the euro, namely that by creating an independent central bank the euro member countries signed away part of their sovereign status.

In retrospect, that was the root cause of the euro crisis.

What happened in Cyprus undermined the business model of European banks, which relies heavily on deposits. Until now the authorities went out of their way to protect depositors

Banks will have to pay risk premiums that will fall more heavily on weaker banks and the banks of weaker countries. The insidious link between the cost of sovereign debt and bank debt will be reinforced.

In this context the German word "Schuld" plays a key role. As you know it means both debt and responsibility or guilt.

If countries that abide by the fiscal compact were allowed to convert their entire existing stock of government debt into eurobonds, the positive impact would be little short of the miraculous.

Only the divergences in competitiveness would remain unresolved.

Germany is opposed to eurobonds on the grounds that once they are introduced there can be no assurance that the so-called periphery countries would not break the rules once again. I believe these fears are misplaced.

It is up to Germany to decide whether it is willing to authorise eurobonds or not. But it has no right to prevent the heavily indebted countries from escaping their misery by banding together and issuing eurobonds. In other words, if Germany is opposed to eurobonds it should consider leaving the euro and letting the others introduce them.

Individual countries would still need to undertake structural reforms. Those that fail to do so would turn into permanent pockets of poverty and dependency similar to the ones that persist in many rich countries.

Second, the European Union also needs a banking union and eventually a political union.

If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness. Their debt would diminish in real terms and, if they issued eurobonds, the threat of default would disappear.