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PrudentBear - 0 views

prudentbear.com/...featuredcommentaryview GEP com nytimes nytimes com global europe GDP crisis syndicate euro
shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German exporters were major beneficiaries of this growth. German banks and financial institutions helped finance the growth.
  • Exports have provided the majority of Germany’s growth in recent years. Germany is heavily reliant on a narrowly based industrial sector, focused on investment goods—automobiles, industrial machinery, chemicals, electronics and medical devices. These sectors make up a quarter of its GDP and the bulk of exports.
  • Germany’s service sector is weak with lower productivity than comparable countries. While it argues that Greece should deregulate professions, many professions in Germany remain highly regulated. Trades and professions are regulated by complex technical rules and standards rooted in the medieval guild systems. Foreign entrants frequently find these rules difficult and expensive to navigate.
  • ...18 more annotations...
  • Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.
  • Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.
  • While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.
  • Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.
  • German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.
  • For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.
  • Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.
  • Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.
  • In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”
  • Political will for integration
  • In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.
  • A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.
  • Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)
  • A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.
  • Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.
  • For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.
  • But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.
  • by Satyajit Das
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Eurozone crisis will last for 20 years - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...97-11e1-963a-00144feabdc0.html
shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • They agreed that there shall be no common bank recapitalisation until a full banking union is established. And the Bundesbank has reminded us that the latter is not possible without a political union. The logical implication is that we won’t solve the crisis for the next 20 years.
  • What we know now is that Germany will not agree to mutualised deposit insurance. It cannot even agree to give the European Stability Mechanism a banking licence so that it can leverage itself.
  • A narrow majority is still in favour of the euro, but a majority is against further rescues.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • The banking union that is required is the one Germany will not accept: central regulation and supervision, a common restructuring fund and common deposit insurance. It would take years to create.
  • With interest rates on 10-year government bonds over 6 per cent, neither Italy nor Spain can sustain their membership in the eurozone. This is what Mario Monti and Mariano Rajoy should have made clear to Angela Merkel at the summit.
  • The message I took away from the summit is that the eurozone will not resolve the crisis. In that sense, it was indeed a “historic” meeting.
  • Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12
     
    Wolfgang Munchau article
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Euro crisis deepens as time starts to run out for Spain's banks and regions | Business ... - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...spain-crisis-eurozone-valencia
shared by Gene Ellis on 21 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • But the shortcomings of the agreement have once again undermined renewed confidence in the eurozone and sent the bond yields of several countries higher, including Spain and Italy.
  • The Spanish government said a predicted rise in GDP next year of 0.4% had proved optimistic, and the economy would suffer another year of recession.
  • Regional governments deliver the key parts of the welfare state, including health, education and social services.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • Eastern Valencia said it was asking for central government help as it could not refinance loans that must be paid off this year.
  • Valencia, which has long been run by Rajoy's PP, is emblematic of Spain's current crisis. A property crash has hit both regional government income and the region's banks, with its three main banks having to be rescued. Local politicians, meanwhile, have a growing reputation for corruption and frivolous spending.
  • Valencia mopped up a quarter of the €17bn (£13.2bn) of extra money made available by central government in April to pay a backlog of regional government bills.
  • Last year the regions not only failed to meet government-set deficit reduction targets, but actually increased their joint deficit.
  • Analysts believe most regions will miss this year's 1.5 percent deficit target. The government last week asked at least eight of them to revise their 2012 budgets, threatening to take over the finances of some of them.
  • it was startling to see international investors fearful of getting their money back from members of the single currency.
  • He said the eurozone's total public sector debt will reach 90% at the end of the year compared to 106% in the US and 235% in Japan.
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One more summit: The crisis rolls on | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...one-more-summit-crisis-rolls summit crisis rolls vox
shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Reading the official documents from the June 28 summit requires linguistic and divination skills.
  • The clearest result is that EFSF/ESM funds can be used directly to support banks.
  • The summit attendees seem to have successfully drawn the conclusion that this was necessary from the disastrous impact of their mid-June decision on new lending to Spanish authorities to shore up their banks. Within hours, the main conclusion drawn by the markets was that the Spanish public debt had grown by €100 billion, bringing Spain closer to the fate of Ireland (bad bank debt dragging down a government with an otherwise healthy fiscal position).
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • The new agreement suggests that in the future, banks will be bailed out by the collective effort of Eurozone countries.
  • First, this arrangement is to be finalised by the end of the year. This means that, in the end, the Spanish debt will rise by €100 billion (the market participants who enthusiastically celebrated the decision by raising the price of Spanish bonds will eventually understand that). Ditto in the not unlikely case that some Italian or French banks wobble before December.
  • Second, conditions will be attached to such a rescue. These recommendations could be clever if they require “Swedish-style” bank restructuring whereby shareholders and other major stakeholders are made to absorb first the losses, and if a new clearly untainted management replaces the previous one. Such interventions limit the costs to taxpayers; they can even turn a profit. Of course, the conditions could also be silly, raising the costs to taxpayers to huge levels.
  • Third, the arrangement is linked to the establishment of a “single supervisory mechanism involving the ECB”. This could be a single Eurozone supervisor built inside the ECB, which would go a long way to plugging one the worst mistakes in the Maastricht Treaty (lack of a joint regulation and resolution regime for banks).
  • But this is not what the official text says, which makes one suspect that policymakers have not agreed to something simple and clean. Most likely, they will keep negotiating and come with the usual 17-headed monster that exhausted diplomats are wont to invent.
  • This is important because a contagious banking crisis that hits several large banks would require much more money than is available in the EFSF-EMS facilities.
  • Light conditionality, as they requested, is bound to collapse at the foot of the Bundestag, which must approve every single loan.
  • There was no knock-out winner in this summit, but on points I’d have to say that the winner is the crisis.
  • There was nothing on collapsing Greece, nothing on unsustainable public debts in several countries, and no end in sight to recession in an increasing number of countries.
  • Charles Wyplosz
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The delicate balance of fixing the eurozone | Martin Wolf's Exchange - 0 views

blogs.ft.com/...balance-of-fixing-the-eurozone
shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • The euro itself was a leading cause of this crisis by ushering in a remarkably swift convergence in interest rates, which had the effect of directing too much capital into countries that formerly had had to pay high interest rates. This undermined the competitiveness of these countries through inflation and gave rise to huge deficits in their current accounts.
  • The euro is not suffering from a mere confidence crisis that can be resolved by assuaging the markets; it is experiencing a profound balance‐of‐payment crisis that is being prolonged by the expansion of public financial aid.
  • Since autumn 2007, long before the official bail‐out initiatives began, some of the crisis‐hit countries have replaced dwindling private capital imports and capital flight with their money‐printing presses (Target credits).
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  • 5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,
  • 6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.
  • 7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.
  • 8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.
  • 9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.
  • ) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.
  • g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”
  • I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.
  • More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.
  • mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of
  • competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12
     
    The second major article on Professor Hans-Werner Sinn's attack on the premises of the eurozone. TARGET 2 analysis, plus...
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The Nation: Who Will Avert A Euro Collapse? : NPR - 0 views

www.npr.org/...who-will-avert-a-euro-collapse
shared by Gene Ellis on 16 May 12 - No Cached
  • Even as the mainstream media warned that Hollande's populism would be punished by the bond markets, the IMF's chief economist, Frenchman Olivier Blanchard — who is closer to Hollande's heterodoxy than might be expected — confessed that "schizophrenic" investors are now as scared by the impact of austerity on growth as they are of fiscal largesse.
  • "With zero growth and rising interest costs in Spain and Italy, no debt is sustainable," Fitoussi said. "Even France will be challenged if it goes into recession."
  • which, despite their recently elected conservative governments, are aware that only pan-European investment, eurobonds and the full support of the ECB can save the eurozone.
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Crippled eurozone to face fresh debt crisis this year, warns ex-ECB strongman Axel Webe... - 0 views

www.telegraph.co.uk/...-ECB-strongman-Axel-Weber.html
shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Crippled eurozone to face fresh debt crisis this year, warns ex-ECB strongman Axel Weber
  • Harvard professor Kenneth Rogoff said the launch of the euro had been a "giant historic mistake, done to soon" that now requires a degree of fiscal union and a common bank resolution fund to make it work, but EMU leaders are still refusing to take these steps.
  • "People are no longer talking about the euro falling apart but youth unemployment is really horrific. They can't leave this twisting in wind for another five years," he said.
  • ...8 more annotations...
  • Mr Rogoff said Europe is squandering the "scarce resource" of its youth, badly needed to fortify an ageing society as the demographic crunch sets in.
  • "If these latent technologies are not realised, Europe will wake up like Rip Van Winkel from a long Japan-like slumber to find itself a much smaller part of the world economy, and a lot less important."
  • Mr Rogoff said debt write-downs across the EMU periphery "will eventually happen" but the longer leaders let the crisis fester with half-measures, the worse damage this will do to European society in the end.
  • Mr Weber, who resigned from the Bundesbank and the ECB in a dispute over euro debt crisis strategy, said new "bail-in" rules for bond-holders of eurozone banks will cause investors to act pre-emptively, aiming to avoid large losses before the ECB issues its test verdicts. "We may see that speculators do not wait until November, but bet on winners and losers before that," he said.
  • Sir Martin said the eurozone is pursuing a reverse "Phillips Curve" - the trade off between jobs and inflation - as if it were testing "what level of unemployment it is prepared to tolerate for zero inflation".
  • Pierre Nanterme, chairman and chief executive officer of Accenture, said Europe is losing the great battle for competitiveness, and risks a perma-slump where debt burdens of 100pc of GDP prevent governments breaking free by investing in skills and technology.
  • He said Europe is falling further behind as the US basks in cheap energy and pours funds into cutting-edge technology. "A lot is at stake. If in 12 to 24 months no radical steps are taken to break the curse, we might have not just five, ten, but twenty years of a low-growth sluggish situation in Europe," he said.
  • "People are no longer talking about the euro falling apart but youth unemployment is really horrific. They can't leave this twisting in wind for another five years," he said
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Euro crisis could return this fall | Europe | DW.DE | 17.09.2013 - 0 views

www.dw.de/...a-17096250
shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • “But on the other, we still haven't seen a reform breakthrough on a broad front and particularly not in the largest crisis country - Italy.”
  • Slovenia also threatens to become a problem child because of its banks, which are sitting on a mountain of bad debt.
  • Does all of this mean that Europe is headed toward a rocky fall and a return of the euro crisis? Commerzbank's Krämer doesn't rule out the possibility. For him, the causes of the crisis are far from resolved. “We have not seen reform efforts on a broad scale, and in the background we have the European Central Bank, which is camouflaging the crisis through its policy of cheap money and the prospect of government bond purchases.”
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The Greek package: Eurozone rescue or seeds of an unravelled monetary union? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...eeds-unravelled-monetary-union
shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • The plan will not work.
  • The IMF has the option of suspending its disbursements and forcing a default, as it did with Argentina.
  • Once the markets realise this, they will further raise the interest that they request to roll over the maturing debt or simply refuse to refinance the debt.
  • ...7 more annotations...
  • At least, this will clarify the situation: the plan is about bailing out a Eurozone government, in direct violation of Art. 125 of the European Treaty, the so-called no-bail-out clause.
  • The next headache should be contagion.
  • What has been offered to Greece cannot be refused to other Eurozone governments
  • So, one more time, a (dwindling) group of deficit-stricken countries will have to provide money to increasingly large debtors. In fact, this process means that ultimately there is no national debt anymore, at least for the next few years.
  • An alternative to spreading mutual underwriting is debt monetisation.
  • The ECB does not buy assets outright, so the loss would be borne by the banks that used the Greek bonds as collateral for repo operations with the ECB. But banks are the ECB’s counterparties; if they default, the loss is the ECB’s.
  • Was there no other way? It would have been very easy to let Greece go straight to the IMF months ago and reschedule its debt with IMF’s assistance. This would have been a partial default, and the haircut could have been quite small. Most banks that are exposed to the Greek debt should have been able to withstand such losses. With a grace period of, say, three years, Greece would have had the breathing space that the latest plan tries so hard to organise
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Soros: German elections mean euro crisis over, but EU might not survive - The Tell - Ma... - 0 views

blogs.marketwatch.com/...-over-but-eu-might-not-survive
shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • The euro crisis has already transformed the European Union into something radically different from what was originally intended. The EU was meant to be a voluntary association of sovereign and equal states that surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good. It has turned into a relationship between creditors and debtors that is by its nature compulsory and unequal. When a debtor country gets into difficulties the creditor countries gain the upper hand.
  • Only the creditors are in a position to prevent this outcome but they do not seem to show any inclination to do so.
  • In the end, it’s up to Germany to take the initiative to provide a fix, said Soros, who has advocated some form of joint debt liability, or euro bonds.
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Eurozone crisis: can the centre hold? | Nouriel Roubini | Business | theguardian.com - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...eurozone-crisis-euro-european
shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Several developments helped to restore calm. The European Central Bank (ECB) president, Mario Draghi, vowed to do "whatever it takes" to save the euro, and quickly institutionalised that pledge by establishing the ECB's "outright monetary transactions" programme to buy distressed eurozone members' sovereign bonds.
  • And, even if such adjustment is not occurring as fast as Germany and other core eurozone countries would like, they remain willing to provide financing, and governments committed to adjustment are still in power.
  • For starters, potential growth is still too low in most of the periphery, given ageing populations and low productivity growth, while actual growth – even once the periphery exits the recession, in 2014 – will remain below 1% for the next few years, implying that unemployment rates will remain very high.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • levels of private and public debt, domestic and foreign, are still too high, and continue to rise as a share of GDP, owing to slow or negative output growth. This means that the issue of medium-term sustainability remains unresolved.
  • At the same time, the loss of competitiveness has been only partly reversed, with most of the improvement in external balances being cyclical rather than structural.
  • The euro is still too strong, severely limiting the improvement in competitiveness that is needed to boost net exports in the face of weak domestic demand.
  • a continuing credit crunch, as undercapitalised banks deleverage by selling assets and shrinking their loan portfolios.
  • The larger problem, of course, is that progress toward banking, fiscal, economic and political union, all of which are essential to the eurozone's long-term viability, has been too slow.
  • all imply that banks will have to focus on raising capital at the expense of providing the financing needed for economic growth.
  • Moreover the ECB, in contrast to the Bank of England, is unwilling to be creative in pursuing policies that would ameliorate the credit crunch.
  • Meanwhile, austerity fatigue is rising in the eurozone periphery.
  • And bailout fatigue is emerging in the eurozone's core.
  • But the eurozone's political strains may soon reach a breaking point,
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EUobserver / Former ECB chief blames governments for euro-crisis - 1 views

euobserver.com/122721
shared by Gene Ellis on 27 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Former ECB chief blames governments for euro-crisis
  • But the 71-year-old French banker said he had warned EU governments of growing economic divergences in the euro area as far back as 2005 and that he had criticised member states, notably France and Germany, for ignoring the deficit and debt rules which underpin the common currency.
  • Trichet noted that the ECB intervened on bond markets and bought up Greek debt as early as May 2010, when he was still chief and when the first-ever EU bailout was still being drafted. It interevened again in 2011 to buy Italian and Spanish debt when investors started to bet against the larger euro-states.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • "If we wouldn't have bought Spanish and Italian debt - a move which was highly criticised at the time - we would be in a totally different situation now," he added.
  • Turning to Ireland, where the government first used taxpayers’ money to guarnatee all deposits in Irish banks and then had to seek a painful rescue package, Trichet said "nobody advised them to do so."
  • Back in 2010, the IMF said Greece could never repay its debt and should write off some of its private and public liabilities. But the EU, under a deal by the French and German leaders, wanted the private sector to take the hit alone in what it called “private sector involvement [PSI],” putting Trichet in a tough spot.
  • Despite his actions, PSI came back in a vengeance in Cyprus in 2013, when it was renamed a “bail-in,” and when it saw lenders snatch the savings of well-to-do private depositors on top of private bondholders.
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Waiting for the Markets to Blink - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...-for-the-markets-to-blink.html
shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • “You get these occasional disconnects and start asking who’s right and who’s wrong,” said Daniel Morris, global investment strategist at TIAA-CREF.
  • “We think the equity market is right,” he said. “If that’s the case, bond yields are too low.”
  • “We’re constructive about the future and think all this intervention is going to work, but how much is priced in” to the stock market? So much, in his view, that “we’ve been selling into the strength,” he said.
  • ...13 more annotations...
  • “Do you believe that things are going to get better? If you do, you don’t want to be in Treasuries at 2.5 percent,” he said. “Some things don’t make sense to me. It’s frustrating.”
  • He says it doesn’t make sense that the stock market has held up as well as it has amid the Fed’s debt purchases and its policy of maintaining short-term interest rates near zero, a measure taken in a crisis that is supposed to be over.
  • “How do you know there has been an economic recovery and the patient is breathing normally when it’s in an oxygen tent?”
  • For all of 2013, gross domestic product increased by 1.9 percent, compared with 2.8 percent for 2012.
  • Orders and shipments of durable goods
  • were flat in 2013, and housing has weakened. February was the eighth consecutive month of declines in pending home sales, leaving them down 10.2 percent from 12 months earlier.
  • “It will be extremely difficult for the U.S. economy to escape its Great Recession hangover with this poor profits backdrop,” Mr. Edwards wrote. “Indeed it leaves the economy extremely vulnerable to adverse shocks,” like declining growth in Asia.
  • “We’re keeping a very close eye on China,” Ms. Patterson said. “If there are signs that it’s slowing more than we expect, that would hurt our view of emerging markets and worsen the outlook for developed markets due to contagion” because of the increasing importance of China in the global economy.
  • American real estate companies and European banks, for instance — but he is keeping 13 percent of his fund in cash because of a dearth of attractive investment choices.
  • Mr. Morris finds a wider array of opportunities. He likes shares of consumer-discretionary companies, which provide the products and services that people want but do not need. The sector includes businesses as diverse as hotels, carmakers and clothing stores.
  • the industrial sector, which includes manufacturers of business equipment. Another preferred segment is banks; he expects them to flourish as interest rates rise and the gap widens between what they charge in interest and what they pay.
  • Mr. Morris encourages stock investors to buy American.
  • “You can’t just unwind quantitative easing, with all of its distortions, and achieve stability without some pain along the way,” he warned. “What that pain is, when it happens, that’s where the uncertainties lie. The margin to maneuver is getting less and less with the passage of time.”
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Irish Charm With Germans Leads Nation Out of Bailout Wilderness - Bloomberg - 0 views

www.bloomberg.com/...-german-love-ends-bailout.html
shared by Gene Ellis on 13 Dec 13 - No Cached
  • Before the new government could go on the offensive, it needed to play defense. It fended off an attack on Ireland’s 12.5 percent corporate tax rate, the cornerstone of an economic policy that transformed Ireland from a financial backwater into a European hub for companies such as Pfizer Inc., the maker of Viagra, and Google Inc.
  • Two days after commencing his premiership, Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny, 62, became embroiled in what he called a Gallic spat with French President Nicolas Sarkozy after refusing to raise the tax rate in return for an interest-rate cut on aid.
  • “The attitude was: ‘You misbehaved and here’s what you have to do’,’”
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Within months, the central bank injected more than 1 trillion euros of three-year loans into the region’s banking system
  • The economy emerged from recession in the second quarter, unemployment dropped for six months in a row, and house prices in Dublin are rising again. The yield on 10-year bonds is down to 3.5 percent, lower than Italy and Spain.
  • Noonan then ramped up his efforts to broker a deal on banking debt. He had a consistent line: it was payback time. The government hadn’t imposed losses on senior bank bondholders, preventing contagion spreading across the euro region from the Irish banking crisis.
  • Banks used the cash to buy sovereign debt
  • “The Germans disagree all the time until the very end, and then they agree,” he said. “Once you realize that, you keep talking, you keep chipping away.”
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