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Gene Ellis

Big trouble from little Cyprus - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...e5-11e2-ae9e-00144feabdc0.html

little cyprus trouble

shared by Gene Ellis on 20 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • The banks stand on the edge of collapse. But it is the European Central Bank that has pulled the plug by threatening not to accept Cypriot government debt as collateral against liquidity support.
  • A restructuring of public debt is still likely. As Hamlet advises: If it be not now, yet it will come.
  • Is there no alternative to the bail-ins? Yes: direct bank recapitalisation by the eurozone, for which the sum required is a small matter. If the banking union had been up and running, that would have happened. It is not, presumably because core countries do not want to bail out mismanaged banking systems,
  • ...6 more annotations...
  • A big question is why ordinary Cypriot taxpayers should rescue banks at all?
  • The first concern is the deal itself. The decision to impose losses on insured deposits is indeed a big error. (Yes, it is a default, not a tax.)
  • Banks have so little loss-absorbing capacity that they stand permanently on the edge of disaster.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 20 Mar 13
       
      Very good point.  
  • The eurozone must either make the industry far more robust, by hugely increasing equity capital, or consolidate fiscal capacity and tighten regulation, to ensure adequate eurozone-wide oversight and fiscal support.
  • Banking is dangerous everywhere. But it still threatens the eurozone’s survival. This has to change – and very soon.
Gene Ellis

George Soros: how to save the EU from the euro crisis - the speech in full | Business | guardian.co.uk - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...ave-eu-from-euro-crisis-speech

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • The crisis has also transformed the European Union into something radically different from what was originally intended. The EU was meant to be a voluntary association of equal states but the crisis has turned it into a hierarchy with Germany and other creditors in charge and the heavily indebted countries relegated to second-class status. While in theory Germany cannot dictate policy, in practice no policy can be proposed without obtaining Germany's permission first.
  • Italy now has a majority opposed to the euro and the trend is likely to grow. There is now a real danger that the euro crisis may end up destroying the European Union.
  • The answer to the first question is extremely complicated because the euro crisis is extremely complex. It has both a political and a financial dimension. And the financial dimension can be divided into at least three components: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis, as well as divergences in competitiveness
  • ...37 more annotations...
  • The crisis is almost entirely self-inflicted. It has the quality of a nightmare.
  • My interpretation of the euro crisis is very different from the views prevailing in Germany. I hope that by offering you a different perspective I may get you to reconsider your position before more damage is done. That is my goal in coming here.
  • I regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states who surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.
  • The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who recognised that perfection was unattainable and practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set themselves limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilised the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Excellent point!
  • Unfortunately, the Maastricht treaty was fundamentally flawed. The architects of the euro recognised that it was an incomplete construct: a currency union without a political union. The architects had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the political will to take the next step forward could be mobilized. After all, that was how the process of integration had worked until then.
  • For instance, the Maastricht Treaty took it for granted that only the public sector could produce chronic deficits because the private sector would always correct its own excesses. The financial crisis of 2007-8 proved that wrong.
  • When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany's leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining, they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.
  • The financial crisis also revealed a near fatal defect in the construction of the euro: by creating an independent central bank, member countries became indebted in a currency they did not control. This exposed them to the risk of default.
  • Developed countries have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically nonexistent. By contrast, less developed countries that have to borrow in a foreign currency run the risk of default. To make matters worse, financial markets can actually drive such countries into default through bear raids. The risk of default relegated some member countries to the status of a third world country that became over-indebted in a foreign currency. 
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Again, another excellent point!
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Not quite... Maggie Thatcher, a Conservative; and Gordon Brown, of Labour, both recognized this possible loss of sovereignty (and economic policy weapons they might use to keep the UK afloat), and refused to join the euro.
  • The emphasis placed on sovereign credit revealed the hitherto ignored feature of the euro, namely that by creating an independent central bank the euro member countries signed away part of their sovereign status.
  • Only at the end of 2009, when the extent of the Greek deficit was revealed, did the financial markets realize that a member country could actually default. But then the markets raised the risk premiums on the weaker countries with a vengeance.
  • Then the IMF and the international banking authorities saved the international banking system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default but at the cost of pushing them into a lasting depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.
  • In effect, however, the euro had turned their government bonds into bonds of third world countries that carry the risk of default.
  • In retrospect, that was the root cause of the euro crisis.
  • The burden of responsibility falls mainly on Germany. The Bundesbank helped design the blueprint for the euro whose defects put Germany into the driver's seat.
  • he fact that Greece blatantly broke the rules has helped to support this attitude. But other countries like Spain and Ireland had played by the rules;
  • the misfortunes of the heavily indebted countries are largely caused by the rules that govern the euro.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Well, yes, but this is an extremely big point.  If, instead of convergence, we continue to see growth patterns growing apart, what then?
  • Germany did not seek the dominant position into which it has been thrust and it is unwilling to accept the obligations and liabilities that go with it.
  • Austerity doesn't work.
  • As soon as the pressure from the financial markets abated, Germany started to whittle down the promises it had made at the height of the crisis.
  • What happened in Cyprus undermined the business model of European banks, which relies heavily on deposits. Until now the authorities went out of their way to protect depositors
  • Banks will have to pay risk premiums that will fall more heavily on weaker banks and the banks of weaker countries. The insidious link between the cost of sovereign debt and bank debt will be reinforced.
  • In this context the German word "Schuld" plays a key role. As you know it means both debt and responsibility or guilt.
  • If countries that abide by the fiscal compact were allowed to convert their entire existing stock of government debt into eurobonds, the positive impact would be little short of the miraculous.
  • Only the divergences in competitiveness would remain unresolved.
  • Germany is opposed to eurobonds on the grounds that once they are introduced there can be no assurance that the so-called periphery countries would not break the rules once again. I believe these fears are misplaced.
  • Losing the privilege of issuing eurobonds and having to pay stiff risk premiums would be a powerful inducement to stay in compliance.
  • There are also widespread fears that eurobonds would ruin Germany's credit rating. eurobonds are often compared with the Marshall Plan.
  • It is up to Germany to decide whether it is willing to authorise eurobonds or not. But it has no right to prevent the heavily indebted countries from escaping their misery by banding together and issuing eurobonds. In other words, if Germany is opposed to eurobonds it should consider leaving the euro and letting the others introduce them.
  • Individual countries would still need to undertake structural reforms. Those that fail to do so would turn into permanent pockets of poverty and dependency similar to the ones that persist in many rich countries.
  • They would survive on limited support from European Structural Funds and remittances
  • Second, the European Union also needs a banking union and eventually a political union.
  • If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness. Their debt would diminish in real terms and, if they issued eurobonds, the threat of default would disappear. 
Gene Ellis

Why Do Americans Stink at Math? - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...o-americans-stink-at-math.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Why Do Americans Stink at Math?
  • The Americans might have invented the world’s best methods for teaching math to children, but it was difficult to find anyone actually using them.
  • In fact, efforts to introduce a better way of teaching math stretch back to the 1800s. The story is the same every time: a big, excited push, followed by mass confusion and then a return to conventional practices.
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  • Carefully taught, the assignments can help make math more concrete. Students don’t just memorize their times tables and addition facts but also understand how arithmetic works and how to apply it to real-life situations. But in practice, most teachers are unprepared and children are baffled, leaving parents furious.
  • On national tests, nearly two-thirds of fourth graders and eighth graders are not proficient in math. More than half of fourth graders taking the 2013 National Assessment of Educational Progress could not accurately read the temperature on a neatly drawn thermometer.
  • On the same multiple-choice test, three-quarters of fourth graders could not translate a simple word problem about a girl who sold 15 cups of lemonade on Saturday and twice as many on Sunday into the expression “15 + (2×15).” Even in Massachusetts, one of the country’s highest-performing states, math students are more than two years behind their counterparts in Shanghai.
  • A 2012 study comparing 16-to-65-year-olds in 20 countries found that Americans rank in the bottom five in numeracy.
  • On a scale of 1 to 5, 29 percent of them scored at Level 1 or below, meaning they could do basic arithmetic but not computations requiring two or more steps.
  • One study that examined medical prescriptions gone awry found that 17 percent of errors were caused by math mistakes on the part of doctors or pharmacists.
  • “I’m just not a math person,” Lampert says her education students would say with an apologetic shrug.
  • In the 1970s and the 1980s, cognitive scientists studied a population known as the unschooled, people with little or no formal education.
  • For instance, many of the workers charged with loading quarts and gallons of milk into crates had no more than a sixth-grade education. But they were able to do math, in order to assemble their loads efficiently, that was “equivalent to shifting between different base systems of numbers.”
  • Studies of children in Brazil, who helped support their families by roaming the streets selling roasted peanuts and coconuts, showed that the children routinely solved complex problems in their heads to calculate a bill or make change.
  • The cognitive-science research suggested a startling cause of Americans’ innumeracy: school.
  • The answer-getting strategies may serve them well for a class period of practice problems, but after a week, they forget. And students often can’t figure out how to apply the strategy for a particular problem to new problems.
  • In the process, she gave them an opportunity to realize, on their own, why their answers were wrong.
  • At most education schools, the professors with the research budgets and deanships have little interest in the science of teaching
  • Only when the company held customer focus groups did it become clear why. The Third Pounder presented the American public with a test in fractions. And we failed. Misunderstanding the value of one-third, customers believed they were being overcharged. Why, they asked the researchers, should they pay the same amount for a third of a pound of meat as they did for a quarter-pound of meat at McDonald’s. The “4” in “¼,” larger than the “3” in “⅓,” led them astray.
  • Some of the failure could be explained by active resistance.
  • A year after he got to Chicago, he went to a one-day conference of teachers and mathematicians and was perplexed by the fact that the gathering occurred only twice a year.
  • More distressing to Takahashi was that American teachers had almost no opportunities to watch one another teach.
  • In Japan, teachers had always depended on jugyokenkyu, which translates literally as “lesson study,” a set of practices that Japanese teachers use to hone their craft. A teacher first plans lessons, then teaches in front of an audience of students and other teachers along with at least one university observer. Then the observers talk with the teacher about what has just taken place. Each public lesson poses a hypothesis, a new idea about how to help children learn.
  • The research showed that Japanese students initiated the method for solving a problem in 40 percent of the lessons; Americans initiated 9 percent of the time.
  • Similarly, 96 percent of American students’ work fell into the category of “practice,” while Japanese students spent only 41 percent of their time practicing.
  • Finland, meanwhile, made the shift by carving out time for teachers to spend learning. There, as in Japan, teachers teach for 600 or fewer hours each school year, leaving them ample time to prepare, revise and learn. By contrast, American teachers spend nearly 1,100 hours with little feedback.
  • “Sit on a stone for three years to accomplish anything.”
  • In one experiment in which more than 200 American teachers took part in lesson study, student achievement rose, as did teachers’ math knowledge — two rare accomplishments.
  • Examining nearly 3,000 teachers in six school districts, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation recently found that nearly two-thirds scored less than “proficient” in the areas of “intellectual challenge” and “classroom discourse.”
Gene Ellis

Will bank supervision in Ohio and Austria be similar? A transatlantic view of the Single Supervisory Mechanism | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...w-single-supervisory-mechanism

bank supervision ohio austria single mechanism

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • At the inception of the euro, it was thought possible to have a centralised monetary authority and decentralised bank supervision, but the inability to separate sovereign-debt problems from those of bank stability has led the leaders of the member states of the EU to agree to centralise supervision in the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
  • The states retained their powers to supervise the small number of state-chartered banks that seemed little threat to the stability of the new more tightly regulated national system.
  • What was not anticipated was that the more stable national banks would fail to adequately supply credit to the economy.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • States, not the federal government, regulated securities markets and insurance, leaving little oversight for interstate business.
  • The 1930s New Deal reforms added more agencies, including the Securities Exchange Commission and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, complicating political oversight by giving them distinctive missions,
  • Yet, it was the trust companies, lacking access to emergency liquidity that caused the 1907 crisis to erupt and spread to the banks.
  • To remedy these defects, the Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, was to act as a lender of last resort, bringing all systemically important institutions – national banks , large state banks and trust companies – under the federal supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve banks.
  • Consequently, when onerous rules, such as the prohibition on branch banking prevented banks from financing the emerging giant corporations, markets, assisted by more lightly regulated trust and insurance companies, stepped in.
  • But, they have not converged, especially with regard to state banks that often pressure state regulators.
  • Surveillance of a bank is not dependent on the geographic scope of its operations, as in the US, but on its systemic significance measured in several dimensions and whether it receives financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism.
  • the ECB’s direct authority is more encompassing.
  • The ECB will not be directly involved in crisis management and bank resolution, which will be the responsibility of the national authorities. This autonomy will not be incentive compatible until EU directives are adopted for a unified deposit insurance system and a funded single resolution authority.
Gene Ellis

"The Euro's Latest Reprieve" by Joseph E. Stiglitz | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...the-euro-s-latest-reprieve

shared by Gene Ellis on 10 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Like an inmate on death row, the euro has received another last-minute stay of execution. It will survive a little longer. The markets are celebrating, as they have after each of the four previous “euro crisis” summits – until they come to understand that the fundamental problems have yet to be addressed.
  • Europe’s leaders did not recognize this rising danger, which could easily be averted by a common guarantee, which would simultaneously correct the market distortion arising from the differential implicit subsidy.
  • Likewise, they now recognize that bailout loans that give the new lender seniority over other creditors worsen the position of private investors, who will simply demand even higher interest rates.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
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  • It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious
  • What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.
  • Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis. Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.
  • Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.
  • Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work.
  • The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.
  • Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.
  • Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The down
  • turn caused the deficits, not the other way around.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked.
  • Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.
  • While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
Gene Ellis

The Economist explains: Why airlines make such meagre profits | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...economist-explains-5

shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Why airlines make such meagre profits
  • In those six decades passenger kilometres (the number of flyers multiplied by the distance they travel) have gone from almost zero to more than 5 trillion a year. But though the industry has done much to connect the world, it has done little to line the pockets of the airlines themselves. Despite incredible growth, airlines have not come close to returning the cost of capital, with profit margins of less than 1% on average over that period. In 2012 they made profits of only $4 for every passenger carried. Why has a booming business failed to prosper?
  • Airlines were state-owned beasts in receipt of juicy handouts from state coffers. These “flag carriers” were regarded as important strategic businesses with monopoly powers that conferred national pride and international prestige. But they rapidly turned into bloated nationalised industries that regarded profit as a dirty word.
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  • Air travel was governed by inter-governmental deals that dictated which airlines could fly where, how many seats they could offer and, in many cases, what fares they could charge. The result was inefficiency and losses.
  • Low-cost carriers, such as SouthWest and Ryanair, introduced cut-throat rivalry on short-haul routes. Former flag-carriers struggled with the legacy of older fleets, large networks, uppity unionised workforces and vast pension liabilities. Low-cost carriers devastated their model of feeding short-haul passengers onto more lucrative long-haul services.
  • As well as stiff competition from their rivals, airlines face the problem that there is little competition in the industries that supply them. Two firms—Airbus and Boeing—provide the majority of the planes, and airports and air-traffic control are monopolies
Gene Ellis

Robert Samuelson: A dishonest budget debate - The Washington Post - 0 views

www.washingtonpost.com/...2-9f54-f3fdd70acad2_story.html

budget debate washington

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • t’s the math: In fiscal 2012, Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid and civil service and military retirement cost $1.7 trillion, about half the budget.
  • As a share of national income, defense spending ($670 billion in 2012) is headed toward its lowest level since 1940.
  • States’ Medicaid costs will increase with the number of aged and disabled, which represent two-thirds of Medicaid spending. All this will force higher taxes or reduce traditional state and local spending on schools, police, roads and parks.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • Almost everything is being subordinated to protect retirees.
  • “for how long will we continue to sacrifice investments in our nation’s children and youth ... to spend more and more on the aged?”
  • In a Pew poll, 87 percent of respondents favored present or greater Social Security spending; only 10 percent backed cuts. Results were similar for 18 of 19 programs, foreign aid being the exception.
  • an aging America needs a new social compact: one recognizing that longer life expectancies justify gradual increases in Social Security’s and Medicare’s eligibility ages; one accepting that sizable numbers of well-off retirees can afford to pay more for their benefits or receive less; one that improves generational fairness by concentrating help for the elderly more on the needy and poor to lighten the burdens — in higher taxes and fewer public services — on workers; and one that limits health costs.
  • Government is being slowly transformed into a vast old-age home, with everything else devalued and degraded.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone: Looking for growth | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...eurozone-looking-growth

looking growth vox

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • Empirical evidence suggests deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing crisis will take on average five and a half years across high-income OECD countries (or seven years when accompanied by a banking crisis (Aspachs-Bracon et al. 2011, IMF 2012).
  • Little resolution of banking-sector difficulties in the Eurozone suggests that deleveraging and credit will probably remain slow and impaired for much longer than previously thought. Recoveries that happen without credit are, on average, a third longer than recovery episodes with credit (Darvas 2013).
  • Damages to trend growth are notoriously difficult to assess,
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • In addition, observed GDP growth tends to be revised until several years after the first estimate
  • Our work is based on a simple Solow growth-accounting methodology.
  • A common feature of all economies is a collapse in productivity, which is typical of a big recession. In addition, Spain and Italy also underwent a very sharp labour contraction.
  • The additional effect of ageing.
  • A downside risk is that investment growth does not recover fully (for example, because banks fail to provide the necessary funding). In this case, we assume investment growth is only half what it was before the onset of economic turmoil.
  • We also estimate productivity through a convergence equation, which would slightly lift productivity in peripheral countries in the future.
  • This exercise suggests that in the absence of policy reforms, trend growth will have been damaged significantly, by at least one percentage point, post-crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels,
  • In the event that investment fails to recover quickly
  •  or unemployment levels take longer to fall than in previous recovery episodes, then trend growth would be significantly lower for longer. Trend growth might well remain negative in Spain and Italy, and may fail to increase for Germany or France.
  • this exercise shows the damage will indeed be long lasting, permanently impairing growth in a context of an ageing population that needs higher growth capacity than ever before.
Gene Ellis

Cyprus adds to Europe's confusion - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...4a-11e2-a4fa-00144feabdc0.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • First, the eurozone does indeed have the capacity to do the right thing in the end, though not before first exhausting all the alternatives.
  • It protects the small deposits and imposes a rational resolution process.
  • Second, a euro is indeed not a euro everywhere.
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  • A consensus on the principle that creditors, not taxpayers, should pay if a bank becomes insolvent does not yet exist across the eurozone. Does anybody imagine the German government would not rescue Deutsche Bank if it were in trouble? Of course it would.
  • Yet, as Guntram Wolff of Bruegel notes, a currency union with internal exchange controls is a contradiction in terms. Only the willingness of the European Central Bank to finance Cypriot banks without limit could end these controls in the near future. Will it be willing to act soon?
  • The outcome in Cyprus underlines the fact that the value of a euro of bank liabilities depends on the solvency of the bank itself and the solvency of the government standing behind the bank. If both bank and state are insolvent, lenders are likely not only to lose a big proportion of their money outright, but to find that the rest is frozen behind controls,
  • The ideal conclusion from the Cypriot imbroglio would be that all eurozone banks should have more capital.
  • A final lesson of this crisis is that what I have called the “bad marriage” that binds the eurozone members together has become worse.
  • Thus the eurozone limps on through crisis after crisis. Can – or will – this continue indefinitely? I do not know.
Gene Ellis

Sasol Betting Big on Gas-to-Liquid Plant in U.S. - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...gas-to-liquid-plant-in-us.html

betting plant natural gas

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Dec 12 - No Cached
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 17 Dec 12
       
      These are areas with lots of natural gas, and little chance of getting it to market, save for liquefication, but even then lacking access to ports.
  • The process is challenging and complex. First a synthetic gas is made from pure oxygen and methane, the main component of natural gas, which is cleansed of sulfur, metals and other impurities, under intense pressure and heat. Then the synthetic gas is put in giant reactors that make a synthetic crude through the Fischer-Tropsch process. The process essentially forces heated synthetic gas to react with a catalyst, typically cobalt, to convert into a liquid hydrocarbon. Finally that liquid is refined into one fuel or another. The process is far more complex than that at a typical refinery, so the plant is much more expensive to build and operate. Alfred Luaces, a refining specialist at the consultancy IHS, said a conventional oil refinery could be built for $50,000 per barrel of capacity, less than half of what Sasol says it is willing to spend on the proposed Louisiana plant.
  • Sasol is building a gas-to-liquids plant in Uzbekistan with the Malaysian oil company Petronas. It is working with Chevron to build another plant in Nigeria.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Rick Manner, a vice president at consultancy KBC Advanced Technologies who has contributed to gas-to-liquids studies for Sasol and other companies, estimated that the projects must keep capital costs at $100,000 for every barrel a day of production capacity to be worthwhile economically at current prices of about $100 a barrel for oil and $4 per thousand cubic feet for natural gas.
  • Mr. Louw, Sasol’s Qatar president, said that the Oryx plant was designed to be profitable with oil at $25 a barrel. That implies a very low long-term price for the natural gas feedstock. He would not specify what Sasol pays its Qatari partner for gas, but he said it was “not zero.”
  • Gene Ellis on 17 Dec 12
     
    The potential, or lack thereof, of natural gas to diesel conversion.
Gene Ellis

Foreign Banks in U.S. Face Greater Restrictions - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...face-greater-restrictions.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • As for equity levels, in many cases a foreign bank might simply have to convert loans it had made to the American operation into equity investments. Suddenly the American operation would appear to be better capitalized.
  • European regulators who trusted Iceland to regulate its own banks wound up paying off depositors even though there is little hope Iceland will ever reimburse those payments.
  • It turns out that in the financial crisis, big banks with high leverage ratios — that is, more capital relative to assets — were significantly more likely to survive without needing bailouts.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • “The current rules can be very easily gamed,”
  • thinks that regulators would be better off to seek simplicity through measures like leverage ratios, rather than allow banks to make calculations that depend on thousands of estimates to determine how much capital they need.
Gene Ellis

What If We Never Run Out of Oil? - Charles C. Mann - The Atlantic - 1 views

www.theatlantic.com/...5

shared by Gene Ellis on 01 May 13 - No Cached
  • Walking around town, my friend and I had noticed that almost every home had a pile of coal outside, soft dark chunks that people shoveled into stoves for cooking and heating. Thousands upon thousands of coal fires were loading the air with tiny dots of soot. Scientists have taken to calling these dots “black carbon,” and have steadily ratcheted up their assessments of its harm. In March, for instance, a research team led by a Mumbai environmental group estimated that black carbon and other particulate matter from India’s coal-fired power plants cause about 100,000 deaths a year.
  • A 31-scientist team from nine nations released a comprehensive, four-year assessment in January arguing that planetary black-carbon output is the second-biggest driver of anthropogenic (human-caused) climate change; the little black specks I found on my glasses and clothes have roughly two-thirds the impact of carbon dioxide.
  • The rule of thumb is that if a well leaks more than about 3 percent” of its methane production into the air, “natural gas actually becomes dirtier than coal, from a climate-change perspective,
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  • Worse still, the aging natural-gas infrastructure is riddled with holes and seeps; early this year, a survey of gas mains along Boston’s 785 miles of road, the first-ever such examination, found 3,356 leaks.
  • What we can’t do, or at least not readily, is overcome the laws of economics.
  • As an example, typical solar cells today have an EROEI of about 10—better than tar sands but worse than most oil and gas.
  • One recent estimate put the EROEI of Spain’s extensive solar-power network at less than 3.
  • When renewables supply 20 to 30 percent of all electricity, many utility-energy engineers predict, the system will no longer be able to balance supply and demand. Brownouts will ripple across the landscape
  • To ask utilities to take in large amounts of solar power
  • is like asking a shipping firm to replace its huge, professionally staffed container ships with squadrons of canoes paddled by random adolescents.
  • But even if such techniques work in the way researchers hope, the infrastructure transformation ahead is daunting in scale and scope. It’s like setting up a second Industrial Revolution, only all over the world and in one-third the time.
Gene Ellis

Europe's work is far from over - The Washington Post - 0 views

www.washingtonpost.com/...2-9f54-f3fdd70acad2_story.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 04 May 13 - No Cached
  • Perhaps it should not be surprising that Europe still looks to be in serious trouble. Growth has been dismal; the euro-zone gross domestic product has been below its 2007 level for six years, and little growth is forecast this year.
Gene Ellis

European Union Leaders Gather in Brussels Over Budget - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...r-in-brussels-over-budget.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 13 - No Cached
  • He has threatened to veto any new budget that does not at least freeze spending,
  • “Europeans who are attached to the European Union are now in a minority.” Fifty-two percent of those surveyed said they felt little or no attachment, up seven percentage points since 2010. In Britain, only 27 percent felt attached to the union.
  • Ahead of this week’s negotiations, at least seven countries, mostly those that contribute more to Europe’s coffers than they get back in farm subsidies and other payments, have already warned that they may veto a budget that does not give them a better deal. Among these is Austria, where, according to Mr. Ehrenhauser, who sits on the European Parliament’s budgetary control committee, “there is a critical mass building against the European Union.”
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  • The rethink, which would have scrapped spending on agricultural subsidies, ran into heavy opposition and stalled
  • All long-term budget decisions require unanimous approval by the member states, a rule first established when the grouping, then known as the European Economic Community, had just six members, not 27. The power of veto makes any major change to spending all but impossible and entrenches the status quo, no matter how unworkable or unpopular.
  • “It is extremely difficult to change anything,” Mr. Sapir said. “Everyone is always fighting at the margins over narrow national interests. They try to make sure they get money for their own countries and that cuts go to other countries.”
  • After months of arguments, two broad alliances have emerged. The first comprises countries like Britain, Germany and Sweden that are big net contributors and want to keep a tighter rein on spending. The second, known as the “Friends of Cohesion,” after a class of development grants aimed at less wealthy areas, includes Poland, Spain, Portugal and others that want to make sure the union’s largess does not dry up.
  • The European Commission, however, has been far less forthcoming. It told Mr. Ehrenhauser that it could not give a breakdown of spending in recent years on wine because that would require “lengthy research” and “it cannot consider doing this at the present time because of other priorities.”
Gene Ellis

Five lessons from the Spanish cajas debacle for a new euro-wide supervisor | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...bacle-new-euro-wide-supervisor

lessons spanish debacle supervisor vox

shared by Gene Ellis on 23 Oct 12 - No Cached
  • just the three most problematic Spanish cajas (Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa and Novagalicia) have had capital deficits (to be covered partly or fully by the taxpayer) of €54 billion – over 5% of Spanish GDP, a larger amount than what Spain will have to request from the European rescue funds.
  • Already the first entity that was intervened (CCM) as far back as March 2009, showed that the real NPL levels post intervention (17.6%) were more than twice as large as the reported ones. This should have been the point for the Banco de España to get ahead of the curve by ordering an audit of the whole sector
  • There is no intimation by anyone of outright corruption in the Banco de España supervisory role, and given the professionalism of the institution it is unlikely that there was any.
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  • not surprisingly, Banco de España supervisors had little interest in discovering that Spain’s vaunted regulator had in fact missed the largest financial crisis in the history of the country
  • Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.
  • Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.
  • Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator
  • Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time
  • governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.
  • More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).
  • Even more important was the role of these political connections in diluting the role of the supervisor after the crisis started, in what was meant to be the crisis resolution stage but which was in fact a crisis cover up stage.
  • What are the takeaways
  • I would suggest five.
  • Second, career concerns of supervisors are crucial.
  • Third, dynamic provisioning is a good idea, but the supervisor must be mindful it may delay decision making in problem cases
  • Fifth, supervision and an appropriately tough resolution regime must go hand in hand.
Gene Ellis

Germany May Not Offer Best Lessons for Weaker Euro-Zone States - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...4543904577396391401884860.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 11 May 12 - No Cached
  • In fact, some economists view the German reform narrative as a myth
  • Wage restraint was instead a function of weak demand after the collapse of the reunification-fueled construction boom in the mid-1990s.
  • Even if one accepts the story, economists also point out that Germany undertook its labor-market reforms when the winds of the world economy were extremely favorable. The global economy was growing, and China and other emerging economies were sucking in machine tools and other capital goods in which German manufacturers excelled.
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  • While German interest rates remained little changed, rates in Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy tumbled, fueling consumption and swelling their imports of German cars and other products.
  • Now, budget stringency is being accompanied by labor-market reforms across Southern Europe.
  • At best, these adjustments yield benefits only after several years,
  • "The ECB was created with the mission to avoid the inflation of the 1970s and 1980s, when there was global inflation. Now we have global deflationary pressure, we need a different point of view," he says.
  • They say it's arithmetically impossible for every economy in the world to build growth on the German model of export success; and if every country in the euro zone is to do it, they need to find others willing to run big deficits in the rest of the world.
Gene Ellis

Why We Lie - WSJ.com - 0 views

online.wsj.com/...4840904577422090013997320.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 30 May 12 - No Cached
  • "I was amazed at how quickly and easily this guy was able to open the door," Peter said. The locksmith told him that locks are on doors only to keep honest people honest. One percent of people will always be honest and never steal. Another 1% will always be dishonest and always try to pick your lock and steal your television; locks won't do much to protect you from the hardened thieves, who can get into your house if they really want to. The purpose of locks, the locksmith said, is to protect you from the 98% of mostly honest people who might be tempted to try your door if it had no lock.
  • What we have found, in a nutshell: Everybody has the capacity to be dishonest, and almost everybody cheats—just by a little. Except for a few outliers at the top and bottom, the behavior of almost everyone is driven by two opposing motivations. On the one hand, we want to benefit from cheating and get as much money and glory as possible; on the other hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people. Sadly, it is this kind of small-scale mass cheating, not the high-profile cases, that is most corrosive to society.
  • It has shown rather conclusively that cheating does not correspond to the traditional, rational model of human behavior—that is, the idea that people simply weigh the benefits (say, money) against the costs (the possibility of getting caught and punished) and act accordingly.
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  • All of this means that, although it is obviously important to pay attention to flagrant misbehaviors, it is probably even more important to discourage the small and more ubiquitous forms of dishonesty—the misbehavior that affects all of us, as both perpetrators and victims.
Gene Ellis

Ireland's Debt to Foreign Banks Is Still Unknown - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...24banks.html

ireland debt banks unknown nytimes nytimes com com

shared by Gene Ellis on 11 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Mr. Weber, who is also a member of the European Central Bank’s governing council, said that the statistics reflected Ireland’s status as a financial center: much of what is recorded as claims on Ireland is in fact money funneled through Irish subsidiaries of German banks, and ultimately bound for elsewhere, Mr. Weber said. He said total German exposure was closer to $30 billion.
  • In both cases more than half of the exposure was to Ireland’s private sector, rather than lending to the government or Ireland’s beleaguered banks.
  • In Germany, Hypo Real Estate, a property and public sector lender owned by the government after a bailout, owed its near collapse largely to problems at Depfa, its subsidiary in Dublin. Last month Hypo transferred most of its troubled assets to a so-called bad bank that will slowly wind down the investments.
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  • Taxpayers will bear the cost, but they may never find out how much. The bad bank, known as FMS Wertmanagement, has no plans to release financial statements, according to Soffin, the German government organization that oversees bank rescues.
  • The latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements put total European bank exposure to Portugal and Spain at $853 billion, with Germany, France and Britain the biggest creditors.
  • That worst-case forecast highlights another potential hidden risk. Credit-default swaps are typically sold over the counter by investment banks, with little information available publicly about the financial strength of the sellers. “Only then will we know for sure if the institutions that wrote the credit-default swaps have the liquidity and the financial strength to perform as contracted,” Mr. Weinberg wrote in a note last week.
Gene Ellis

"Europe's Divided Visionaries" by Barry Eichengreen | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...europe-s-divided-visionaries

europe barry project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Europe’s leaders now agree on a vision of what the EU should become: an economic and monetary union complemented by a banking union, a fiscal union, and a political union. The trouble starts as soon as the discussion moves on to how – and especially when – the last three should be established.
  • The 1992 exchange-rate crisis then tipped the balance. Once Europe’s exchange-rate system blew up, the southerners’ argument that Europe could not afford to postpone creating the euro carried the day.
  • The consequences have not been happy. Monetary union without banking, fiscal, and political union has been a disaster.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
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  • But disaster does not wait.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12
       
      'disaster does not wait' is a fairly ambiguous phrase.  The euro zone has had a decade to work on institutions, with little result, and with proposals which had often made things worse.
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