Skip to main content

Home/ Global Economy/ Group items matching "post" in title, tags, annotations or url

Group items matching
in title, tags, annotations or url

Sort By: Relevance | Date Filter: All | Bookmarks | Topics Simple Middle
Gene Ellis

David Ignatius: Mervyn King's hard lessons in Keynesian economics - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • As King struggled with the crisis, he concluded that the biggest vulnerability was the solvency of the banking system itself. The crash wasn’t just a liquidity squeeze caused by toxic assets; the problem was that big banks around the world were undercapitalized and, in many cases, insolvent.
  • King pushed the banks to recapitalize and, later, to accept more regulation. This upset a financial elite that, as King says, was the only sector of the British economy that had escaped the market revolution of the Margaret Thatcher years.
  • For King, the past decade reinforced the lessons Keynes drew from the 1930s: One is the psychological quirkiness of investors, which Keynes described as “animal spirits” on the upside and “extreme liquidity preference” on the down.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Then and now, monetary policy could not persuade frightened people to spend and invest.
  • The second Keynesian lesson was the need for some international structure to balance surplus and deficit nations.
  • Those global institutions are weak, but the real crisis has been within the euro zone, which has no effective internal balancing mechanism: It lacks a federal structure to transfer money from surplus Germany to deficit Greece, and it lacks flexible internal exchange rates that could allow a Greece or Spain to devalue its currency and find its own equilibrium.
  • Europe has responded to the crisis with the very British approach of muddling through, but King predicts it won’t work. Creating a true federal union, while an admirable goal, will be the work of a hundred years; the only quick way for countries to adjust is the breakup of the euro zone. King thinks the euro zone must confront the basic choice between accepting a transfer union or changing the membership of the monetary union. “Muddling through” isn’t a serious option.
Gene Ellis

Europe's work is far from over - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • Perhaps it should not be surprising that Europe still looks to be in serious trouble. Growth has been dismal; the euro-zone gross domestic product has been below its 2007 level for six years, and little growth is forecast this year.
Gene Ellis

Sting operations reveal Mafia involvement in renewable energy - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • But as he attempted to sidestep a push by organized crime to control the renewables sector — eschewing efforts to use mob-connected developers and refusing to make a customary payments of 2 percent of profits — his business came under attack.
  • “It’s not only the criminal infiltration but the corrupt bureaucracy that makes it difficult to do business here,” Moncada said.
  • Indeed, the mafia has targeted legitimate businesses in Sicily beyond renewable energy, with a 2008 probe revealing the island’s largest supermarket chain to be a front for mafia cash.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Citing its poor finances and a mountain of debt, the Italian government is now curbing new subsidies for renewable energies.
Gene Ellis

Euro Zone Interest Rate Remains Unchanged - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • But some analysts warn that the calm could prove temporary because the underlying causes of the crisis remain: too much debt and poorly performing national economies. “The E.C.B. has been very active since Mr. Draghi has been president, and this has been a major factor contributing to stabilize financial markets and thereby avoid much worse outcomes for the euro zone,” Marie Diron, an economist who advises the consulting firm Ernst & Young, said in a note.
  • “But the E.C.B. is not the sole actor and cannot save the euro on its own,” Ms. Diron said. “Ultimately the sustainability of the euro zone is down to structural changes at the country and European levels that are beyond the E.C.B.’s remit.”
  • Banks in the euro zone can borrow unlimited funds from the E.C.B. at the benchmark rate, provided they post collateral. But banks are not obligated to pass that rate on to their customers and might not do so in countries like Spain where banks are already struggling with large numbers of bad loans.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Meanwhile, interest rates may be too low for countries like Germany, helping to fuel a rise in real estate prices, Dirk Schumacher, an economist at Goldman Sachs in Frankfurt, said. “Cutting rates in the current environment of segmented markets is likely to boost growth in those places where it is needed least,” he wrote in a note to clients before the rate decision.
Gene Ellis

Five lessons from the Spanish cajas debacle for a new euro-wide supervisor | vox - 0 views

  • just the three most problematic Spanish cajas (Bankia, CatalunyaCaixa and Novagalicia) have had capital deficits (to be covered partly or fully by the taxpayer) of €54 billion – over 5% of Spanish GDP, a larger amount than what Spain will have to request from the European rescue funds.
  • Already the first entity that was intervened (CCM) as far back as March 2009, showed that the real NPL levels post intervention (17.6%) were more than twice as large as the reported ones. This should have been the point for the Banco de España to get ahead of the curve by ordering an audit of the whole sector
  • There is no intimation by anyone of outright corruption in the Banco de España supervisory role, and given the professionalism of the institution it is unlikely that there was any.
  • ...13 more annotations...
  • not surprisingly, Banco de España supervisors had little interest in discovering that Spain’s vaunted regulator had in fact missed the largest financial crisis in the history of the country
  • Unfortunately, often supervisors in charge of the failing entity in the years of the debt run up were the ones charged with uncovering the problems.
  • Spain was the leader in the introduction of a dynamic provision – a provisioning tool that forces banks to increase provisions without reference to any specific loan. The intention of this tool was twofold: to mitigate the bad times, and to cool the booms in the good times (Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). Dynamic provisions were endorsed as part of the Basel III standards in December 2010, in part on the strength of Spain’s experience. And indeed the existing evidence (Jiménez et al. 2012) shows that the tool worked as intended, dampening the credit boom and softening somewhat the credit crunch. However, it is clear by now that their level was not nearly enough, as their size – 3% of GDP at their highest point (2004) – was simply not of a magnitude commensurate with the credit losses.
  • Without the provisions, the reality of the cajas' accounts would have become much faster a concern, and would have imposed itself on the regulator
  • Had the Banco de España ordered an audit of the system after uncovering numerous irregularities in CCM, it would have not been able to deal with the capital shortfalls uncovered as there was no appropriate resolution regime in Spain at the time
  • governance played a critical role in the development of the Spanish crisis. In the Spanish case, the supervisor, confronted with powerful and well connected ex-politicians decided to look the other way in the face of obvious building trouble.
  • More systematic evidence of the role played by these governance issues is provided in a 2009 paper (Cuñat and Garicano 2009b) where we showed that cajas with chief executives who had no previous banking experience (!), no graduate education, and were politically connected did substantially worse in the run up to the crisis (granting more real estate developer loan, up to half of the entire loan book in some instances) and during the crisis (with higher NPLs).
  • Even more important was the role of these political connections in diluting the role of the supervisor after the crisis started, in what was meant to be the crisis resolution stage but which was in fact a crisis cover up stage.
  • What are the takeaways
  • I would suggest five.
  • Second, career concerns of supervisors are crucial.
  • Third, dynamic provisioning is a good idea, but the supervisor must be mindful it may delay decision making in problem cases
  • Fifth, supervision and an appropriately tough resolution regime must go hand in hand.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone fragmenting too rapidly - The China Post - 0 views

  • Any event that makes a euro exit by Greece — the most heavily indebted member state, which is off track on its second bailout program and in the fifth year of a recession — seems bound to accelerate those flows, despite repeated statements by EU leaders that Greece is a unique case. “If it does occur, a crisis will propagate itself through the TARGET payments system of the European System of Central Banks,” U.S. economist Peter Garber, now a global strategist with Deutsche Bank, wrote in a prophetic 1999 research paper. Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, “and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse,” Garber warned.
Gene Ellis

Op-ed: Greece's Exit May Become the Euro's Envy - 0 views

  • The immediate consequences of Greece leaving or being forced out of the euro area would certainly be devastating. Capital flight would intensify, fuelling depreciation and inflation. All existing contracts would need to be redenominated and renegotiated, creating financial chaos. Perhaps most politically devastating, fiscal austerity might actually need to intensify, since Greece still runs a primary deficit, which it would have to correct if EU and International Monetary Fund financing vanished.
  • But this process would also produce a substantially depreciated exchange rate (50 drachmas to the euro, anyone?) And that would set in motion a process of adjustment that would soon reorient the economy and put it on a path of sustainable growth. In fact, Greek growth would probably surge, possibly for a prolonged period, if it adopted sensible policies to rapidly restore and sustain macroeconomic stability.
  • Just look at what happened to the countries that defaulted and devalued during the financial crises of the 1990s. They all initially suffered severe contractions. But the recessions lasted only one or two years. Then came the rebound. South Korea posted nine years of growth averaging nearly 6 percent. Indonesia, which experienced a wave of defaults that toppled nearly every bank in the entire system, registered growth above 5 percent for a similar period; Argentina close to 8 percent; and Russia above 7 percent. The historical record shows clearly that there is life after financial crises.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • Today, Germany grudgingly does the minimum needed to keep the euro area intact. If exit to emulate Greece becomes an attractive proposition, Germany will be put on the spot—and the magnanimity it shows in place of its current miserliness will be the ultimate test of how much it values the euro area.
  • The answer might prove surprising. The German public might suddenly realize that the euro area confers on Germany not one but two “exorbitant privileges”: low interest rates as the haven for European capital and a competitive exchange rate by being hitched to weaker partners. In that case, Germany would have to offer its partners a much more attractive deal to keep them in the euro area.
Gene Ellis

ECB Raises Pressure on Greece - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • FRANKFURT—The European Central Bank said it would reject Greek government bonds as collateral for its normal lending operations beginning Wednesday,
  • Government bonds and other debt securities backed by Greece "will become for the time being ineligible for use as collateral" in the ECB's monetary policy operations, the bank said in a statement.
  • Greek banks, which are largely shut out of private markets for financing, depend critically on cheap ECB loans to meet their daily funding needs. In June, Greek banks tapped the ECB and Greece's central bank for a combined €136 billion ($166 billion) in loans through normal refinancing operations and emergency credit, an amount roughly equal to two-thirds of the country's gross domestic product.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • Banks can still access emergency funds through the Greek central bank, but at a higher interest rate than normal ECB loans. The credit risk stays on Greece's books and isn't spread throughout the 17-member currency bloc,
  • It is the second time the ECB declined to accept Greek bonds as collateral. The first was in February, after Athens imposed steep losses on private creditors in a debt restructuring. That suspension ended after a little more than an week, when the ECB received guarantees from euro-zone governments that Greek bonds posted to the ECB as collateral would be repaid.
  • For banks, which are already under intense pressure, it means that they will have to resort to emergency liquidity assistance which will lend them with a higher rate.It is bad news and all we can hope for is that it won't last for long," a senior Greek banker said.
Gene Ellis

Tennessee Valley Authority to close 8 coal-fired power units - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • The Tennessee Valley Authority, one of the nation’s five biggest users of coal for electricity generation, said Thursday it would close down eight coal-fired power units with 3,300 megawatts of capacity.
  • Many of the plants were more than 50 years old, and under a consent decree between the TVA, four state governments and the Sierra Club, the authority was required to install additional pollution control equipment known as scrubbers or shut down the plants
  • Johnson said that electricity demand has dropped nearly 10 percent over the past five years., half of that because one company, USEC, which produced and sold enriched uranium for commercial nuclear power plants, ceased its energy-intensive operations.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • “There has been a significant reduction in demand over four or five years, and we don’t see robust demand in the future.”
Gene Ellis

Recasting high school, German firms transplant apprentice model to U.S. - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • Recasting high school, German firms transplant apprentice model to U.S.
  • The apprentices are grouped together for coursework that leads to an associate’s degree in mechatronics, a hybrid discipline pioneered in Japan and Germany that melds the basics of mechanical engineering, electronics and other areas.
  • It produces workers that can program, operate and fix the machines common to the factories run by Siemens and other top companies. There used to be an elective among the 24 courses the students take. That was replaced with a logic class.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • The curriculum as it stands now, he said, is in “lockstep” with how mechatronics is taught in Germany.
Gene Ellis

Ghana Flunks at Math and Science: Analysis (1) - 0 views

  • Since Ghanaian students took the test in English (the so-called official language of Ghana), those whose first language is non-English are at great disadvantage.
  • In some of the participating countries grade eight teachers have university education in mathematics, even some at the post- graduate level; while in others the teachers have an equivalent of two years university education in mathematics. In Ghana, a grade eight mathematics teachers may not have such a background in mathematics.
‹ Previous 21 - 40 of 54 Next ›
Showing 20 items per page