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The debt-to-GDP ratio is best reduced through sustained nominal GDP growth.

Besides, having been there, no one really wants to unleash inflation anymore. That leaves us with real GDP growth as a necessary condition for bringing the debt-to-GDP down painlessly.

But in today’s world voters are angry at everything that is called Europe and will not back a fiscal union.

In most Eurozone countries, structural reforms are as needed now as they were before the crisis.

Banks are at the heart of a diabolic loop: bank holdings of their national public debts (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).

The long-hoped-for awakening of the ECB has produced several miracles, especially a major relaxation of market anguish.

For that reason, they deleverage, which leads to a credit crunch, which slows growth down.

The ECB is the lender of last resort both to banks and to governments.

Massive forbearance has allowed many banks to not fully account for the losses that they incurred in 2007-8.

A 2011 report to the European Parliament listed a catalog of troubles, noting that Galileo had been particularly blighted in its early years by a familiar problem: political pressure from individual countries to skew the project in favor of their own companies and other immediate interests.

It quoted the OHB chief, Berry Smutny, describing Galileo as doomed to fail without major changes and “a waste of E.U. taxpayers’ money championed by French interests.” Mr. Smutny, who disputed the comments attributed to him, was fired by the company.

Astrium won an initial Galileo contract for four satellites. But contracts worth $1 billion for 22 more satellites have all gone to OHB, now one of the primary corporate beneficiaries of Galileo. British companies have also done well, a boon that has helped erode Britain’s initial hostility to the project.

Washington also asked why, when many European nations were increasingly unable to fulfill their military obligations as members of NATO because of defense cuts, they wanted to splash billions on a project that replicated an existing system paid for by the United States.

They acknowledge that Galileo, most of whose services will be free like those of GPS, will not earn much.

Meanwhile, interest rates may be too low for countries like Germany, helping to fuel a rise in real estate prices, Dirk Schumacher, an economist at Goldman Sachs in Frankfurt, said. “Cutting rates in the current environment of segmented markets is likely to boost growth in those places where it is needed least,” he wrote in a note to clients before the rate decision.

Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.

EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.

Despite the international standing of Deutsche Bank, Germany’s banking system is fragile. Several German banks required government support during the financial crisis. Highly fragmented (in part due to heavy government involvement) and with low profitability, German banks, especially the German Länder (state) owned Landsbanks, face problems. They have large exposures to European sovereign debt, real estate and structured securities.

Prior to 2005, the Landesbanken were able to borrow cheaply, relying on the guarantee of the state governments. The EU ruled these guarantees amounted to subsidies. Before the abolition of the guarantees, the Landesbanks issued large amounts of state-guaranteed loans which mature by December 2015.

While it insists on other countries reducing public debt, German debt levels are high—around 81% of GDP. The Bundesbank, Germany’s central bank, has stated that public debt levels will remain above 60% (the level stipulated by European treaties) for many years.

Germany’s greatest vulnerability is its financial exposures from the current crisis. German exposure to Europe, especially the troubled peripheral economies, is large.

German banks had exposures of around US$500 billion to the debt issues of peripheral nations. While the levels have been reduced, it remains substantial, especially when direct exposures to banks in these countries and indirect exposures via the global financial system are considered. The reduction in risk held by private banks has been offset by the increase in exposure of the German state, which assumed some of this exposure.

For example, the exposure of the ECB to Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy is euro 918 billion as of April 2012. This exposure is also rising rapidly, especially driven by capital flight out of these countries.

Germany is now caught in a trap. Irrespective of the resolution of the debt crisis, Germany will suffer significant losses on its exposure – it will be the biggest loser.

Once the artificial boom ends, voters will discover they were betrayed by Germany’s pro-European political elite. There will be an electoral revolt and, as in the rest of Europe, a strong challenge from radical political forces with unpredictable consequences.

In late May 2012, French President Francois Hollande provided a curious argument in support of eurozone bonds: “Is it acceptable that some sovereigns can borrow at 6% and others at zero in the same monetary union?”

Political will for integration

In the peripheral economies, continued withdrawal of deposits from national banks (a rational choice given currency and confiscation risk) may necessitate either a Europe wide deposit guarantee system or further funding of banks.

A credible deposit insurance scheme would have to cover household deposits (say up to euro 100,000), which is around 72% of all deposits, in the peripheral countries. This would entail an insurance scheme for around euro 1.3 trillion of deposits.

Given that the Spanish Economy Ministry reports that euro 184 billion in loans to developers are “problematic,” the additional recapitalization needs of Spain’s banks may be as high as euro 200-300 billion in additional funds (20-30% of GDP)

A Greek default would result in losses to Germany of up to around euro 90 billion. Germany’s potential losses increase rapidly as more countries default or leave the eurozone.

Austerity or default will force many European economies into recession for a prolonged period. German exports will be affected given Europe is around 60% of its market, including around 40% within the eurozone. In case of a break-up of the euro, estimates of German growth range from -1% to below -10%. It is worth remembering that the German economy fell in size by around 5% in 2008, the worst result since the Second World War, mainly on the back of declining exports.

For example, Greece owes about euro 400 billion to private bondholders but increasingly to public bodies, such as the IMF and ECB, mainly due to the bailouts. If Greece walks away as some political parties have threatened, then the fallout for the lenders, such as Germany, are potentially calamitous.

But the largest single direct German exposure is the Bundesbank’s over euro 700 billion current exposure under the TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) to other central banks in the Eurozone.

by Satyajit Das

Eastern Valencia said it was asking for central government help as it could not refinance loans that must be paid off this year.

Valencia, which has long been run by Rajoy's PP, is emblematic of Spain's current crisis. A property crash has hit both regional government income and the region's banks, with its three main banks having to be rescued. Local politicians, meanwhile, have a growing reputation for corruption and frivolous spending.

Valencia mopped up a quarter of the €17bn (£13.2bn) of extra money made available by central government in April to pay a backlog of regional government bills.

Last year the regions not only failed to meet government-set deficit reduction targets, but actually increased their joint deficit.

Analysts believe most regions will miss this year's 1.5 percent deficit target. The government last week asked at least eight of them to revise their 2012 budgets, threatening to take over the finances of some of them.

Even if they did, he explained, the euro zone's problems are now so acute that few companies seem to want to borrow.

5. Export surpluses create no real value if they translate into claims vis‐à‐vis countries which ultimately cannot pay their debts,

6. The ECB Council overstepped its mandate when it transferred to Eurozone national central banks, primarily the Bundesbank, the task of financing the public and private deficits of other countries.

7. Germany’s liability for the bail‐out initiatives does not total 211 billion euros, as often cited, but is actually now close to 600 billion euros if the far larger bailout initiatives of the ECB are included in this figure.

8. The Target credits and the purchase of government bonds by the ECB system transfer the investment risk of private investors and banks to the taxpayers of economically sound countries, posing a threat to the euro because they offer debtor countries incentives to advocate inflationary policies at the ECB Council which would help them defer their obligation to repay their foreign debts.

9. Eurobonds would undermine debt discipline, lead to much higher interest burdens for the German state, and anew induce capital flows in Europe that would exacerbate the external imbalances.

) Target debts are to be settled on an annual basis with interest‐bearing, marketable assets as in the US.

g) Countries that are not competitive enough to repay their foreign debts should, in their own interest, leave the Monetary Union.”

I also appreciate the fact that the declaration envisages a credit boom in Germany that would ultimately rebalance the eurozone economy. Nevertheless, this rebalancing is likely to prove painfully slow and certainly requires a prolonged period of relatively high inflation in Germany, to offset relatively low inflation in the vulnerable countries. It is far from clear that German public opinion is prepared for such an outcome.

More important, I do not believe a currency union that takes for granted the possibility of sovereign defaults and even exit would prove workable. It is a recipe for extreme financial instability, with huge runs on credit to banks, private non-banks and governments built in.

mechanisms of financing and adjustment. Permanent transfers from some countries to others, merely to offset a lack of

competitiveness (rather than accelerate income convergence), are indeed undesirable. Nevertheless, financing needs to be sufficiently large and generous to give vulnerable countries some chance of managing the adjustment to shocks, without sovereign default, mass private bankruptcies and implosion of financial systems.

If one of five competing labs is alone in finding an effect, that result is the one likely to be published.

The effect is amplified by competition for a shrinking pool of grant money and also by the design of so many experiments — with small sample sizes (cells in a lab dish or people in an epidemiological pool) and weak standards for what passes as statistically significant.

Among them is a paper in which C. Glenn Begley, who is chief scientific officer at TetraLogic Pharmaceuticals, described an experience he had while at Amgen, another drug company. He and his colleagues could not replicate 47 of 53 landmark papers about cancer. Some of the results could not be reproduced even with the help of the original scientists working in their own labs.

Scientists talk about “tacit knowledge,” the years of mastery it can take to perform a technique. The image they convey is of an experiment as unique as a Rembrandt.

The problem stands to get worse. It has been estimated that the corpus of scientific knowledge has doubled in size every 10 to 15 years since the days of Isaac Newton.

G.E. already manages more than 100 million data-gathering “tags” on its products, and foresees putting out far more than that while also collecting sensor data around the surrounding environment.

What G.E. does not yet have nailed is just how its new products will be used.

Cisco Systems is in the middle of an “Internet of Everyhing” strategy that involves selling software and services for a world rich in sensors. This is aimed more at things like traffic and water systems than manufacturing, however.

Phillips is also offering data-gathering connectivity in both its health care and lighting products, hoping to boost the efficiency of things like a patient’s medication adherence, or tuning lights

“Everybody knows they’ll need this technology, but they don’t know exactly what they’ll do with it yet,”

Today, a fifth of U.S. energy consumption is fueled by coal, mainly from Appalachia and the West, a long-term energy source that has provided jobs for millions, a century-old way of life

Roughly speaking, burning coal produces twice as much carbon dioxide as burning the equivalent amount of natural gas. Almost all domestic coal is used to generate electricity—it produces 38 percent of the U.S. power supply. Fracking is swiftly changing this: in 2011, utilities reported plans to shut down 57 of the nation’s 1,287 coal-fired generators the following year. Largely in consequence, U.S. energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions have dropped to figures last seen in 1995. Since 2006, they have fallen more than those from any other nation in the world.

In the sort of development that irresistibly attracts descriptors like ironic, Germany, often touted as an environmental model for its commitment to solar and wind power, has expanded its use of coal, and as a result is steadily increasing its carbon-dioxide output. Unlike Americans, Europeans can’t readily switch to natural gas; Continental nations, which import most of their natural gas, agreed to long-term contracts that tie its price to the price of oil, now quite high.

Several researchers told me that the current towel-snapping between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in the East China Sea is due less to nationalistic posturing than to nearby petroleum deposits.)

What is known, says Timothy Collett, the energy-research director for the USGS program, is that some of the gulf’s more than 3,500 oil and gas wells are in gas-hydrate areas.

In Dutch-disease scenarios, oil weakens all the pillars but one—the petroleum industry, which bloats steroidally.

Because the national petroleum company, with its gush of oil revenues, is the center of national economic power, “the ruler typically puts a loyalist in charge,” says Michael Ross, a UCLA political scientist and the author of The Oil Curse (2012). “The possibilities for corruption are endless.” Governments dip into the oil kitty to reward friends and buy off enemies. Sometimes the money goes to simple bribes; in the early 1990s, hundreds of millions of euros from France’s state oil company, Elf Aquitaine, lined the pockets of businessmen and politicians at home and abroad.

“How will the royal family contain both the mullahs and the unemployed youth without a slush fund?”

It seems fair to say that if autocrats in these places were toppled, most Americans would not mourn. But it seems equally fair to say that they would not necessarily be enthusiastic about their replacements.

The election of 1989 marked the first time in more than 60 years that a civilian president had handed power to an elected successor.

the repeated recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, the hyperinflation of 1989-90, the economic crisis of 2001 and now the possibility of another crisis to come.

But three deep-lying explanations help to illuminate the country’s diminishment. Firstly, Argentina may have been rich 100 years ago but it was not modern. That made adjustment hard when external shocks hit. The second theory stresses the role of trade policy. Third, when it needed to change, Argentina lacked the institutions to create successful policies.

Railways transformed the economics of agriculture and refrigerated shipping made it possible to export meat on an unprecedented scale: between 1900 and 1916 Argentine exports of frozen beef rose from 26,000 tonnes to 411,000 tonnes a year. But Argentina mainly consumed technology from abroad rather than inventing its own.

External shocks duly materialised, which leads to the second theory for Argentine decline: trade policy.

Argentina raised import tariffs from an average of 16.7% in 1930 to 28.7% in 1933. Reliance on Britain, another country in decline, backfired as Argentina’s favoured export market signed preferential deals with Commonwealth countries.

an existing policy of import substitution deepened; the share of trade as a percentage of GDP continued to fall.

High food prices meant big profits for farmers but empty stomachs for ordinary Argentines. Open borders increased farmers’ takings but sharpened competition from abroad for domestic industry.

“One-third of the country—the commodities industry, engineers and regional industries like wine and tourism—is ready to compete,” says Sergio Berensztein, a political analyst. “Two-thirds are not.”

Property rights are insecure

Statistics cannot be trusted: Argentina was due this week to unveil new inflation data in a bid to avoid censure from the IMF for its wildly undercooked previous estimates.

hort-termism is embedded in the system

“We have spent 50 years thinking about maintaining government spending, not about investing to grow,” says Fernando de la Rúa, a former president who resigned during the 2001 crisis.

The country’s Vaca Muerta (“Dead Cow”) shale-oil and gasfield is estimated to be the world’s third-largest. If Argentina can attract foreign capital, the money could start flowing within a decade.

60 percent of the net job losses occurred in middle-income occupations with median hourly wages of $13.84 to $21.13. In contrast, these occupations have accounted for less than a quarter of the net job gains in the recovery, while low-wage occupations with median hourly wages of $7.69 to $13.83 have accounted for more than half of these gains.

Based on history, what’s distinctive about this recovery is its sluggish pace, not the composition of its jobs.

What is distinctive during this recovery relative to earlier ones is the growing disparity in wages across sectors, a trend that was apparent long before the Great Recession.

Since then, however, wage growth has fallen far short of productivity growth, and that’s true for workers regardless of education, occupation, gender or race.

But technological change and the globalization it has enabled have played major roles, and these driving forces have probably strengthened during the recovery.

Jobs that are routine, that do not involve manual tasks and that do not need to be done near the customer are being replaced by computers and automation or are being outsourced to low-cost workers in other countries.

According to another study, the top 1 percent of households captured 65 percent of real family income gains (including realized capital gains) between 2002 and 2007 and 95 percent of the gains between 2009 and 2012. In 2012, the top decile claimed more than 50 percent of income, the highest share ever.

raise its postage prices to help cover costs.

One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.

High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.

Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).

Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.

Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.

The size of the banking sector and exposure to Greece were known risks but at that time there was no banking problem in Cyprus

The containers were part of a shipment going from Iran to Syria that was intercepted in Cypriot waters after a tip from the U.S. The president took the decision to keep the ammunition. [NOTE: An independent prosecutor found that Christofias has ignored repeated warnings and pleas to destroy or safeguard the ammunition, apparently in hopes of one day returning it to Syria or Iran.]

Instead, they started lobbying the Russian government to give them a loan that would help them finance the country for a couple more years, and Russia came through, unfortunately,

I say unfortunately because as a result the government could keep operating and accumulating deficits without taking corrective action.

The next important date was the October 26-27, 2011 meeting of the EU council in Brussels where European leaders decided to wipe out what ended up being about 80% of the value of Greek debt that the private sector held. Every bank operating in Greece, regardless of where it was headquartered, had a lot of Greek debt.

For Cyprus, the writedown of Greek debt was between 4.5 and 5 billion euro, a substantial chunk of capital.

The Basle II framework that governments adopted internationally, and that the EU supervisory framework during this period also incorporated, specifies that holdings of government debt in a states' own currency are a zero-risk-weight asset, that is they are assigned a weight of zero in calculating capital requirements.

the governments should have agreed to make the EFSF/ESM available for direct recapitalization of banks instead of asking each government to be responsible for the capitalization.

Following a downgrading in late June 2012, all three major rating agencies rated the sovereign paper Cyprus below investment grade. According to ECB rules, that made the government debt not eligible as collateral for borrowing from the eurosystem, unless the ECB suspended the rules, as it had done for the cases of Greece, Portugal and Ireland. In the case of Cyprus, the ECB decided not to suspend the eligibility rule.

The governments have created risk in what before last week were considered perfectly safe deposits. This is going to have a chilling effect on deposits in any bank in a country perceived to be weak. This will mean the cost of funding will increase in the periphery of Europe and as a result, the cost of financing for businesses and households will increase. That will add to the divergences we already have and make the recession in the periphery of Europe deeper than it already is. This is really a disaster for European economic management as a whole. 

levels of private and public debt, domestic and foreign, are still too high, and continue to rise as a share of GDP, owing to slow or negative output growth. This means that the issue of medium-term sustainability remains unresolved.

At the same time, the loss of competitiveness has been only partly reversed, with most of the improvement in external balances being cyclical rather than structural.

The euro is still too strong, severely limiting the improvement in competitiveness that is needed to boost net exports in the face of weak domestic demand.

a continuing credit crunch, as undercapitalised banks deleverage by selling assets and shrinking their loan portfolios.

The larger problem, of course, is that progress toward banking, fiscal, economic and political union, all of which are essential to the eurozone's long-term viability, has been too slow.

all imply that banks will have to focus on raising capital at the expense of providing the financing needed for economic growth.

Moreover the ECB, in contrast to the Bank of England, is unwilling to be creative in pursuing policies that would ameliorate the credit crunch.

Meanwhile, austerity fatigue is rising in the eurozone periphery.

And bailout fatigue is emerging in the eurozone's core.

But the eurozone's political strains may soon reach a breaking point,

Italy faces no immediate threat for as long interest rates remain low. The country will be able to muddle through for a while until some political or economic shock will force a decision one way or the other.

Meanwhile, the single largest constraint on the resumption of eurozone growth is not fiscal policy – which is broadly neutral at present across the single currency area – but the continued failure to clean up the banks. The growth rate of loans to the non-financial sector turned negative in 2009, showed some intermittent improvements, only to then deteriorate again last year.

The monetary and banking data are telling us that the economy will teeter on the brink of zero or low growth for the foreseeable future because the financial sector is not supplying the economy with sufficient funds to expand.

Banking union could help, but only if it were to break the relationship between banks and sovereigns and clean up the balance sheets.

they would help inoculate European economies against the adverse effects of energy disruptions in the medium term.

Consideration should be given to invoking GATT Article XXI, which provides exceptions for national security reasons from rights and obligations under the World Trade Organization (WTO), for example. Invoking this WTO exception would allow across-the-board actions against Russia without prior notification or even justification. The national security exception of Article XXI is that broad. In brief, the United States and the European Union could remove in one step all the WTO benefits they accorded Russia when it acceded to the WTO in August 2012. Doing so would disrupt bilateral trade and investment, possibly kicking tariffs back up to Smoot-Hawley levels of the 1930s.