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Gene Ellis

The problem with TTIP | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...problem-ttip

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The problem with TTIP
  • The TPP is a deep international integration arrangement between The US and 11 oTher Pacific states, which would cover 40% of world GDP and over 30% of world trade. It seeks to address as series of issues that 21st century commerce, but arguably its most obvious feature is that it excludes China – The world’s largest international trader and before long The world’s largest economy. There are, of course, The ritual genuflections towards ‘open regionalism’ – China can join if only it will agree to The necessary policy requirements – but this is about as much use as saying The Chief Rabbi can dine with you while insisting that The menu contains pork.
  • By signing TTIP Europe would be tying itself to a static rather than a dynamic part of the world economy and substantially reinforcing the US’s exclusionary policies.
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  • In the areas that are sound, it is mainly that TPP members will probably have to approach the US norms faster than desirable, and possibly faster than they can effectively administer. But there are also areas in which the TPP is not in the interests of most non-US members.
  • However, it is generally accepted that TTIP is more important to Europe than to the US, which greatly strengthens the US’s hand in negotiations.
  • it is widely accepted that the deeper intra-European integration fostered by the Single Market initiative was a major contributor to European prosperity between 1992 and 2007
  • he US has strongly promoted Investor-State Dispute Arbitration in which foreign-owned private firms can seek settlements against governments for taking actions that are not prohibited by the agreements but which reduce the value of investments that the firms have made in member countries.
  • For states that do not have a lot of, say, social or environmental legislation at the time TPP is signed, Investor-State Arbitration threatens to make progress in these dimensions difficult.
  • f China, India or Brazil felt that these disciplines were too arduous or just did not fit, the world trading system would be effectively be split with arguably the most dynamic areas excluded. And given that the TPP would be attractive to smaller economies and that the latter would probably be offered quite accommodating terms, the split would probably deepen rather than the opposite.
  • This reads very much like an agreement to cooperate to make sure that outcomes in the trading system are as the US and EU want them – and with around half of world GDP between them and a further 15% in the rest of TPP, it suggests that the choice facing other will be capitulation vs. exclusion. I fear the latter.
  • Champions of the multilateral system must be much more explicit about its virtues and value – and among these I include Europe (middle-sized countries with a strong belief in negotiated outcomes and order) and China (which has been a massive beneficiary of open markets and non-discrimination to date).
  • urope had better get on with an internally driven liberalisation, especially of services and utilities markets, to stimulate the recovery quite independent of the outside pressures of a trade negotiation;
Gene Ellis

Educated in America: College graduates and high school dropouts | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...uates-and-high-school-dropouts

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • The declining American high school graduation rate: Evidence, sources, and consequences
  • Throughout the first half of the 20th century, each new cohort of Americans was more likely to graduate high school than the preceding one. This upward trend in secondary education increased worker productivity and fueled American economic growth (Goldin and Katz 2003)
  • Contrary to claims based on the official statistics, we find no evidence of convergence in minority-majority graduation rates over the past 35 years. (4) Exclusion of incarcerated populations from the official statistics greatly biases the reported high school graduation rate for blacks.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • The graduation rate issued by The National Center for Educational Statistics (NCES) – widely regarded as The official rate – shows that U.S. students responded to The increasing demand for skill by completing high school at increasingly higher rates. By this measure, U.S. schools now graduate nearly 88 percent of students and black graduation rates have converged to those of non-Hispanic whites over The past four decades.
  • Depending on the data sources, definitions, and methods used, the U.S. graduation rate has been estimated to be anywhere from 66 to 88 percent in recent years—an astonishingly wide range for such a basic statistic. the range of estimated minority rates is even greater—from 50 to 85 percent.
  • After adjusting for multiple sources of bias and differences in sample construction, we establish that (1) the U.S. high school graduation rate peaked at around 80 percent in the late 1960s and then declined by 4-5 percentage points; (2) the actual high school graduation rate is substantially lower than the 88 percent official estimate; (3) about 65 percent of blacks and Hispanics leave school with a high school diploma and minority graduation rates are still substantially below the rates for non-Hispanic whites.
  • Heckman, Lochner, and Todd (2008) show that in recent decades, the internal rate of return to graduating high school compared to dropping out has increased dramatically and is now over 50 percent
  • These trends are for persons born in The United States and exclude immigrants. The recent growth in unskilled migration to The U.S. furTher increases The proportion of unskilled Americans in The workforce apart from The growth due to a rising high school dropout rate.
  • The most significant source of bias in The official statistics comes from including GED (General Educational Development) recipients as high school graduates.
  • A substantial body of scholarship summarised in Heckman and LaFontaine (2008) shows that the GED program does not benefit most participants, and that GEDs perform at the level of dropouts in the U.S. labour market.
  • Men now graduate from high school at significantly lower rates than women
  • A significant portion of the racial convergence reported in the official statistics is due to black males obtaining GED credentials in prison. Research by Tyler and Kling (2007) and Tyler and Lofstrom (2008) shows that, when released, prison GEDs earn at the same rate as non-prison GEDs, and the GED does not reduce recidivism.
  • Evidence suggests a powerful role of the family in shaping educational and adult outcomes. A growing proportion of American children are being raised in disadvantaged families.
Gene Ellis

IMF's Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped By Meta-Uncertainty - WSJ.com - 0 views

stream.wsj.com/...SS-2-33475

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy.
  • This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%.
  • What Europe needs to do:
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  • These countries have to do what They need to do. There’s no question There has to be fiscal consolidation. We can discuss The pace, but it has to happen. The oTher is competitiveness, which I see as much tougher of The two.
  • It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.
  • Take the big two, Italy and Spain. You can always dream of more, but I think they’re serious about doing it, both on the fiscal front and the structural-reforms front. I think it may well be that even if they do everything they can, and do it right, it’s still not enough. they have to have help — I would say when needed rather than if needed.
  • The banks have to be recapped, and They have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on The agenda. I don’t think They can make it without help to The banks.
  • If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates
  • And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.
  • It’s not that I don’t care about the way it’s done. But I care about the result. these countries, if they’re doing the right things, they have to be able to finance themselves.
  • Some people say a euro depreciation would help Europe a lot. I think there is an argument for it, even in a multilateral context. You have to depreciate vis-a-vis somebody, so somebody has to appreciate. My sense is we would like most of the depreciation to be vis-a-vis emerging-market countries. Even if there was a depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar, I still think it would be a good thing.
  • We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. the footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. the countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
  • There’s no question, The periphery countries have to improve Their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at The level of The euro or fiscal policy can do. This They have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.
  • It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.
  • And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.
  • At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.
  • Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.
Gene Ellis

Will bank supervision in Ohio and Austria be similar? A transatlantic view of the Single Supervisory Mechanism | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...w-single-supervisory-mechanism

bank supervision ohio austria single mechanism

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • At the inception of the euro, it was thought possible to have a centralised monetary authority and decentralised bank supervision, but the inability to separate sovereign-debt problems from those of bank stability has led the leaders of the member states of the EU to agree to centralise supervision in the Single Supervisory Mechanism.
  • The states retained Their powers to supervise The small number of state-chartered banks that seemed little threat to The stability of The new more tightly regulated national system.
  • What was not anticipated was that the more stable national banks would fail to adequately supply credit to the economy.
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  • States, not the federal government, regulated securities markets and insurance, leaving little oversight for interstate business.
  • The 1930s New Deal reforms added more agencies, including The Securities Exchange Commission and The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, complicating political oversight by giving Them distinctive missions,
  • Yet, it was the trust companies, lacking access to emergency liquidity that caused the 1907 crisis to erupt and spread to the banks.
  • To remedy these defects, the Federal Reserve System, established in 1913, was to act as a lender of last resort, bringing all systemically important institutions – national banks , large state banks and trust companies – under the federal supervision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency or the Federal Reserve banks.
  • Consequently, when onerous rules, such as the prohibition on branch banking prevented banks from financing the emerging giant corporations, markets, assisted by more lightly regulated trust and insurance companies, stepped in.
  • But, they have not converged, especially with regard to state banks that often pressure state regulators.
  • Surveillance of a bank is not dependent on the geographic scope of its operations, as in the US, but on its systemic significance measured in several dimensions and whether it receives financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism.
  • the ECB’s direct authority is more encompassing.
  • The ECB will not be directly involved in crisis management and bank resolution, which will be The responsibility of The national authorities. This autonomy will not be incentive compatible until EU directives are adopted for a unified deposit insurance system and a funded single resolution authority.
Gene Ellis

TARGET2 as a scapegoat for German errors | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...arget2-scapegoat-german-errors

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • This coincided with the bubble years in peripheral Eurozone countries (2003-07). the effect of this is that Germany accumulated large net claims on Eurozone countries, which at the end of 2011 amounted to €634 billion.
  • These current account surpluses did not lead to TARGET2 claims during The bubble years because The counterpart of These surpluses were increasing claims held by (mainly) German banks against The oTher Eurozone countries.
  • the German banking system was lending the money to other Eurozone countries to allow them to buy surplus German products – a highly risky affair.
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  • This created the illusion that no risk was involved; in fact the risks were increasing every year.
  • It should have been obvious that the debtor countries could get into payment difficulties as they were piling up debt made possible by the loans of German banks.
  • If there is a breakup of the Eurozone, Germany will face the risk that some debtor countries default on their debt. But again this risk is not affected by the size of the TARGET2 claims of Germany.
  • The risk that Germany faces as a result of its net exposure to oTher Eurozone countries is Therefore entirely of The country’s own making.
  • Since 2009, when the TARGET2 balances started to take off, current account deficits of the peripheral countries as a whole declined from 9.1% of their GDP to 4.5%. these declines were mainly due to deep recessions in these countries.
  • Sinn (2012) argues that these deficits would have had to decline even faster had there been no financing through the TARGET2 mechanism. This is certainly true. But this is the same as saying that these countries should have pushed their economies into even deeper recessions.
  • The main reason why German TARGET2 claims have increased so much since 2010 is capital flows. The flows have taken two forms.
  • The first one came about when German banks unloaded Their loans made to peripheral countries into The balance sheet of The Bundesbank.
  • The second one was The result of non-residents shifting Their deposits from Their local banks into The German banking system out of fear of a breakup of The Eurozone.
  • This led German banks to stop their credit lines to southern banks (and other northern EZ banks followed)
  • Thus in the scenario of a breakup, with or without TARGET2 claims, the risk of large losses for the German taxpayer is very similar.
  • the Bundesbank can eliminate the risk of such last minute accumulations of TARGET2 balances by converting euros into new German marks only for German residents.
Gene Ellis

The Two Innovation Economies by William Janeway - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...-innovation-by-william-janeway

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • The strategic technologies that have repeatedly transformed The market economy – from railroads to The Internet – required The construction of networks whose value in use could not be known when They were first deployed.
  • Consequently, innovation at the frontier depends on funding sources that are decoupled from concern for economic value;
  • Financial speculation has been, and remains, one required source of funding. Financial bubbles emerge wherever liquid asset markets exist. Indeed, the objects of such speculation astound the imagination: tulip bulbs, gold and silver mines, real estate, the debt of new nations, corporate securities.
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  • Complementing the role of speculation, activist states have played several roles in encouraging innovation.
  • Occasionally, the object of speculation has been one of those fundamental technologies – canals, railroads, electrification, radio, automobiles, microelectronics, computing, the Internet – for which financial speculators have mobilized capital on a scale far beyond what “rational” investors would provide. From the wreckage that has inevitably followed, a succession of new economies has emerged.
  • In the United States, the government constructed transformational networks (the interstate highway system), massively subsidized their construction (the transcontinental railroads), or played the foundational role in their design and early development (the Internet).
  • For countries following an innovative leader, the path is clear. Mercantilist policies of protection and subsidy have been effective instruments of an economically active state.
  • List noted how Britain’s emergence as “the first industrial nation” at the end of the eighteenth century depended on prior state policies to promote British industry. “Had the English left everything to itself,” he wrote, “the Belgians would be still manufacturing cloth for the English, [and] England would still have been the sheepyard for the [Hanseatic League].”
  • To begin, the “national champions” of the catch-up phase must be rendered accessible to competitive assault. More generally, the state’s role must shift from executing well-defined programs to supporting trial-and-error experimentation and tolerating entrepreneurial failure. And the debilitating “corruption tax” that seems inevitably to accompany economic revolutions must be curbed, as it was in Britain during the nineteenth century and America during the twentieth.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Contributor - The Greek crisis shows why Germany should leave The European Monetary Union. - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...29Starbatty.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - Cached
  • THE European Monetary Union, THE basis of THE euro, began with a grand illusion. On one side were countries — Austria, Finland, Germany and THE NeTHErlands — whose currencies had persistently appreciated, both within Europe and worldwide; THE countries on THE oTHEr side — Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain — had persistently depreciating currencies.
  • Rather than pulling the lagging countries forward, the low interest rates of the European Central Bank have lured governments and households, especially in the southern part of the euro zone, into frivolous budgetary policies and excessive consumption.
  • the solution is clear: the only way to avoid further harm to the global economy is for Germany to lead its fellow stable states out of the euro and into a new and stronger currency bloc.
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  • Unlike their northern neighbors, the countries in the zone’s southern half have difficulty placing bonds — issued to finance their national deficits — with international capital investors. Nor are these countries competitive in the global economy, as shown by their high trade deficits.
  • If Greece were outside the euro zone, for example, it could devalue its currency
  • Instead, the fiscal strictures of the euro zone are forcing the country to curtail public expenditures, raise taxes and cut government employees’ salaries, actions that may push Greece into a deep depression and further undermine its already weak international credit standing.
  • In short, th
  • e euro is headed toward collapse.
  • hat opportunity and pull out of the euro, it wouldn’t be alone. the same calculus would probably lure Austria, Finland and the Netherlands — and perhaps France — to leave behind the high-debt states and join Germany in a new, stable bloc, perhaps even with a new common currency.
  • If Germany were to take t
  • A strong-currency bloc could fulfill the euro’s original purpose. Without having to worry about laggard states, the bloc would be able to follow a reliable and consistent monetary policy that would force the member governments to gradually reduce their national debt. the entire European economy would prosper. And the United States would gain an ally in any future reorganization of the world currency system and the global economy.
Gene Ellis

German and French banks call the shots - European, Business - Independent.ie - 0 views

www.independent.ie/...ks-call-the-shots-2607577.html

german french banks ireland debt

shared by Gene Ellis on 11 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German and French banks call the shots Print Email  NormalLargeExtra Large ShareNew  0  0   Also in European Debt crisis: European shares edge lower and growth worries persist Bank of England's Tucker 'wasn't encouraged to lean on Barclays' Draghi keeps door open to further interest rate cuts Marks and Spencers sales hit by summer deluge Spain's debt tops 7pc danger level as Madrid gets more time European Home "Shocking" 2012 HoroscopeWhat Does 2012 Have In Store For You? Shockingly Accurate. See Free!www.PremiumAstrology.comExpat Health InsuranceQuick, Compare, Trusted Website Expatriate Health Insurance Quoteswww.ExpatFinder.com/Instant-Quoteshttp://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BMEejVeb8T8fDKoSG_QaAhrTCB-q_1OYBmoqphxvAjbcB0NkREAMYAyDgw6kIKAU4AFD4gumFAmCpsL6AzAGgAairsfEDsgESd3d3LmluZGVwZW5kZW50LmllyAEB2gFfaHR0cDovL3d3dy5pbmRlcGVuZGVudC5pZS9idXNpbmVzcy9ldXJvcGVhbi9nZX
  • d, for reasons best
  • known to itself, the ECB -- in clear contravention of both previous market precedent and financial logic -- has insisted that the senior bondholders be repaid in full and has lent the Irish banks, institutions which it must have known were hopelessly insolvent, €70bn to do so.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Top of the list are German banks, to whom we owe €92bn with a further €38bn of other exposures. Does the fact that Irish banks potentially owe their counterparts up to €146bn explain the German government's implacable opposition to any write-down of the Irish banks' debts? After the British and the Germans, it is the French banks -- with total Irish bank loans of almost €32bn and a further €23bn of other exposures -- who have the biggest exposure to Ireland. Does this provide at least a partial explanation for French president Nicolas Sarkozy's truculence when faced with Irish requests that senior bondholders be forced to accept a haircut?
Gene Ellis

David Ignatius: Mervyn King's hard lessons in Keynesian economics - The Washington Post - 0 views

www.washingtonpost.com/...2-b6fd-ba6f5f26d70e_story.html

king lessons economics

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • As King struggled with the crisis, he concluded that the biggest vulnerability was the solvency of the banking system itself. the crash wasn’t just a liquidity squeeze caused by toxic assets; the problem was that big banks around the world were undercapitalized and, in many cases, insolvent.
  • King pushed the banks to recapitalize and, later, to accept more regulation. This upset a financial elite that, as King says, was the only sector of the British economy that had escaped the market revolution of the Margaret Thatcher years.
  • For King, the past decade reinforced the lessons Keynes drew from the 1930s: One is the psychological quirkiness of investors, which Keynes described as “animal spirits” on the upside and “extreme liquidity preference” on the down.
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  • Then and now, monetary policy could not persuade frightened people to spend and invest.
  • The second Keynesian lesson was The need for some international structure to balance surplus and deficit nations.
  • Those global institutions are weak, but the real crisis has been within the euro zone, which has no effective internal balancing mechanism: It lacks a federal structure to transfer money from surplus Germany to deficit Greece, and it lacks flexible internal exchange rates that could allow a Greece or Spain to devalue its currency and find its own equilibrium.
  • Europe has responded to the crisis with the very British approach of muddling through, but King predicts it won’t work. Creating a true federal union, while an admirable goal, will be the work of a hundred years; the only quick way for countries to adjust is the breakup of the euro zone. King thinks the euro zone must confront the basic choice between accepting a transfer union or changing the membership of the monetary union. “Muddling through” isn’t a serious option.
Gene Ellis

The tragedy of Argentina: A century of decline | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...hat-went-wrong-century-decline

shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Feb 14 - No Cached
  • The tragedy of Argentina A century of decline
  • In the 43 years leading up to 1914, GDP had grown at an annual rate of 6%, the fastest recorded in the world.
  • The country ranked among The ten richest in The world, after The likes of Australia, Britain and The United States, but ahead of France, Germany and Italy.
  • ...16 more annotations...
  • Its income per head was 92% of the average of 16 rich economies
  • Its income per head is now 43% of those same 16 rich economies; it trails Chile and Uruguay in its own back yard.
  • The election of 1989 marked The first time in more than 60 years that a civilian president had handed power to an elected successor.
  • the repeated recessions of the 1970s and 1980s, the hyperinflation of 1989-90, the economic crisis of 2001 and now the possibility of another crisis to come.
  • But three deep-lying explanations help to illuminate the country’s diminishment. Firstly, Argentina may have been rich 100 years ago but it was not modern. That made adjustment hard when external shocks hit. the second theory stresses the role of trade policy. Third, when it needed to change, Argentina lacked the institutions to create successful policies.
  • Railways transformed the economics of agriculture and refrigerated shipping made it possible to export meat on an unprecedented scale: between 1900 and 1916 Argentine exports of frozen beef rose from 26,000 tonnes to 411,000 tonnes a year. But Argentina mainly consumed technology from abroad rather than inventing its own.
  • External shocks duly materialised, which leads to the second theory for Argentine decline: trade policy.
  • Argentina raised import tariffs from an average of 16.7% in 1930 to 28.7% in 1933. Reliance on Britain, another country in decline, backfired as Argentina’s favoured export market signed preferential deals with Commonwealth countries.
  • an existing policy of import substitution deepened; the share of trade as a percentage of GDP continued to fall.
  • High food prices meant big profits for farmers but empty stomachs for ordinary Argentines. Open borders increased farmers’ takings but sharpened competition from abroad for domestic industry.
  • “One-third of the country—the commodities industry, engineers and regional industries like wine and tourism—is ready to compete,” says Sergio Berensztein, a political analyst. “Two-thirds are not.”
  • Property rights are insecure
  • Statistics cannot be trusted: Argentina was due this week to unveil new inflation data in a bid to avoid censure from the IMF for its wildly undercooked previous estimates.
  • hort-termism is embedded in the system
  • “We have spent 50 years thinking about maintaining government spending, not about investing to grow,” says Fernando de la Rúa, a former president who resigned during the 2001 crisis.
  • The country’s Vaca Muerta (“Dead Cow”) shale-oil and gasfield is estimated to be The world’s third-largest. If Argentina can attract foreign capital, The money could start flowing within a decade.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: The non-puzzle of peripheral pain | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...euro-crisis-0

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • Mystery mostly solved, then; the rich periphery's riches relative to Germany were largely a short-run phenomenon driven by a dramatic short-run divergence in house price trends.
  • Investors who bet that productivity growth would be much faster in the south were wrong.* All the prices and wages set on the basis of the expectation of faster productivity growth were correspondingly wrong and needed to adjust. Real effective exchange rates were badly out of alignment.
  • Two things began happening in the euro zone in 2007. Growth in the number of euros spent every year began slowing, and the distribution of euro spending within the euro area began shifting back northward.
  • ...11 more annotations...
  • The picture is one in which There are many fewer euros floating around The euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and The distribution of those euros is moving northward.
  • It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  the overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.
  • This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.
  • Where prices were rigid, as in goods and labour markets, fewer euros meant slow disinflation but rapid contraction in output and a big rise in unemployment.
  • Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.
  • Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.
  • If there had been no single currency, the northward capital flight would have depreciated peripheral currencies. Had the periphery borrowed in its own currency, that would have imposed losses on its foreign creditors while also boosting its export industry. Had peripheral economies instead borrowed in dollars or deutschmarks their debt burdens would have ballooned with depreciation, potentially pushing banks and sovereigns into default—but the depreciation boost to competitiveness would have remained. Either way, the depreciation of the currency would effectively shrink the value of wealth in the periphery.
  • The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, Then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.
  • This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.
  • as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster
  • For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.
Gene Ellis

Greece's Bogus Debt Deal by Ashoka Mody - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...-sovereign-debt-by-ashoka-mody

greece debt deal project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 12 Dec 12 - No Cached
  • The economist Larry Summers has invoked The analogy of The Vietnam War to describe European decision-making. “At every juncture They made The minimum commitments necessary to avoid imminent disaster – offering optimistic rhetoric, but never taking The steps that even They believed could offer The prospect of decisive victory.”
  • Instead of driblets of relief, a sizeable package, composed of two elements, is the way forward.
  • A simple structure would be to make all debt payable over 40 years, carrying an interest rate of 2%.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The second element of The debt-relief package would be more innovative: If Greece’s economy performs well, The generous extension of maturities can be clawed back or The interest rate raised. A formula for this could be linked to The debt/GDP ratio
  • Why bother? Because the very premise of the current deal and the expectations it sets out are wrong. First, the notion that there is a smooth transition path for the debt/GDP ratio from 200% to 124% is fanciful. Second, even if, by some miracle, Greece did reach the 124% mark by 2020, the claim that its debt will then be “sustainable” is absurd.
  • Make no mistake: policymakers’ track record on forecasting Greek economic performance during the crisis has been an embarrassment. In May 2010, the International Monetary Fund projected – presumably in concurrence with its European partners – that Greece’s annual GDP growth would exceed 1% in 2012. Instead, the Greek economy will shrink by 6%. the unemployment rate, expected to peak this year at 15%, is now above 25% – and is still rising. the debt/GDP ratio was expected to top out at 150%; absent the substantial write-down of privately held debt, which was deemed unnecessary, the ratio would have been close to 250%.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphIn September 2010, four months after the official Greek bailout was put in place, the IMF issued a pamphlet asserting that “default in today’s advanced economies is unnecessary, undesirable, and unlikely.” the conclusion was that official financing would carry Greece past its short-term liquidity problems. Calls for immediate debt restructuring went unheeded. Six months later, after substantial official funds had been used to pay private creditors, the outstanding private debt was substantially restructured.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphSuch were the errors committed over short time horizons.
  • And, again, even if Greece somehow did achieve the 124% milestone, its debt would still not be sustainable.
  • Staying the course, as Summers warns, will lead only to “needless suffering” before that course inevitably collapses, bringing Greece – and much else –­ crashing down.
Gene Ellis

Profits Vanish in Venezuela After Currency Devaluation - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...fter-currency-devaluation.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Profits Vanish in Venezuela After Currency Devaluation
  • The country’s high inflation — currently around 60 percent a year — has also meant that The prices in bolívares that companies charge for many goods and services have risen sharply.
  • Now companies are feeling the pain from a series of currency devaluations over the last year and a half. Photo
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • But the rosy outlook changed in late March, when Brink’s started calculating its sales using the recently created exchange rate of about 50 bolívares to the dollar
  • Further complicating the picture, the Venezuelan government has not allowed companies to repatriate profits for the last five years.
  • Companies have ways of chipping away at the locked-up profits, including charging higher fees to Venezuelan subsidiaries for goods and services provided by the parent corporation. But many foreign companies are stuck holding vast troves of bolívares that shrink in value each time there is a devaluation.
  • Procter & Gamble said in April that it had the equivalent of about $900 million in cash in this country and that it was taking a $275 million write-down as a result of applying the government’s intermediate exchange rate to its Venezuelan balance sheet. Colgate-Palmolive wrote down $174 million, while Ford wrote down about $316 million.
  • “All the companies knew there would be a loss because everyone knew there wouldn’t be dollars” available at the fixed exchange rate, said an executive with an American company in Venezuela who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “We were trapped because the law here did not give you a way out.”
  • The government has also failed to pay companies The hard currency it had promised Them for imports bought on credit from suppliers, and in many cases suppliers are now refusing to ship more goods to Venezuela until They receive payment.
  • Stores are often out of basic products such as dish soap or corn flour. DirecTV has stopped taking on new customers because it cannot get the dollars to import more dish antennas.
  • Without dollars, car companies cannot import the parts needed to assemble vehicles; Ford and Toyota were forced to temporarily close their factories.
  • In yet another reflection of the currency restrictions, the government has refused to let airlines operating in Venezuela trade the bolívares they receive for ticket sales and other services here for dollars. the International Air Transport Association says that the airlines have more than $4 billion in revenues held up in the country, based on the government’s base exchange rate at the time the tickets were sold.
  • American Airlines says that it is owed $750 million by the country’s government.
Gene Ellis

Europe's Irrelevant Austerity Debate by Daniel Gros - Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...ogoff-in-europe-by-daniel-gros

shared by Gene Ellis on 08 May 13 - No Cached
  • But the debate about austerity and the cost of high public-debt levels misses a key point: Public debt owed to foreigners is different from debt owed to residents.
  • If foreign debt matters more than public debt, the key variable requiring adjustment is the external deficit, not the fiscal deficit. A country that has a balanced current account does not need any additional foreign capital. That is why risk premiums are continuing to fall in the eurozone, despite high political uncertainty in Italy and continuing large fiscal deficits elsewhere. the peripheral countries’ external deficits are falling rapidly, thus diminishing the need for foreign financing.
  • And the evidence confirms that the euro crisis is not really about sovereign debt, but about foreign debt.
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  • By contrast, in the case of debt owed to foreigners, higher interest rates lead to a welfare loss for the country as a whole, because the government must transfer resources abroad, which usually requires a combination of exchange-rate depreciation and a reduction in domestic expenditure.
  • But austerity can never be self-defeating for the external adjustment. On the contrary, the larger the fall in domestic demand in response to a cut in government expenditure, the more imports will fall and the stronger the improvement in the current account – and thus ultimately the reduction in the risk premium – will be.
  • Second, if foreign debt is the real problem, the escalating debate about the Reinhart/Rogoff results is irrelevant for the euro crisis. Countries that have their own currency, like the United Kingdom – and especially the United States, which can borrow from foreigners in dollars – do not face a direct financing constraint.
  • But the eurozone’s peripheral countries simply did not have a choice: they had to reduce their deficits, because the foreign capital on which their economies were so dependent was no longer available.
Gene Ellis

Europe Can't Handle the Euro - 0 views

www.nber.org/...wj020800.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 31 May 12 - No Cached
  • When leaders of the 11 nations that agreed to combine their currencies gathered in January 1999, they predicted great things: the single currency would shift global portfolios to euro assets, depressing the value of the dollar relative to the euro, and the new eurozone would be a strong player in the global economy, reflecting the size of an integrated European market. Instead the euro plummeted, Europes economy remains weak, and unemployment is more than twice the U.S. level.
  • The ECB will eventually be judged not by its words but by wheTher it achieves low inflation and does so without increasing cyclical unemployment. I am not optimistic about eiTher part of this goal.
  • The ECB must make monetary policy for "Europe as a whole," which in practice means doing what is appropriate for Germany, France and Italy, The eurozones three largest countries. Last year demand conditions in those countries were relatively weak, while demand conditions in Spain and Ireland were very strong. That meant a monetary policy that was too expansionary for Spain and Ireland, causing a substantial acceleration of Their inflation and threatening Their competitiveness.
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  • Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.
  • the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.
  • In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.
  • Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.
  • Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.
  • Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.
  • EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.
Gene Ellis

The Quality of Jobs: The New Normal and The Old Normal - NYTimes.com - 0 views

economix.blogs.nytimes.com/...-new-normal-and-the-old-normal

shared by Gene Ellis on 20 Sep 13 - No Cached
  • Despite 42 consecutive months of gains in private-sector employment, the unemployment rate is still at 7.3 percent; in December 2007 it was only 4.6 percent. the current unemployment rate is higher now than in 2007 across all age, education, occupation, gender and ethnic groups.
  • That’s despite the fact that about four million workers have left the labor force, driving the labor force participation rate to a historic low
  • Although the share of the long-term unemployed has fallen from its peak of 45 percent in 2011 to 38 percent today, it is still far above its 2001-7 average. And about eight million people are working part-time for “economic reasons,”
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • 60 percent of the net job losses occurred in middle-income occupations with median hourly wages of $13.84 to $21.13. In contrast, these occupations have accounted for less than a quarter of the net job gains in the recovery, while low-wage occupations with median hourly wages of $7.69 to $13.83 have accounted for more than half of these gains.
  • Over the last year, more than 40 percent of job growth has been in low-paying sectors including retail, leisure/hospitality (hotels and restaurants) and temporary help agencies.
  • Based on history, what’s distinctive about this recovery is its sluggish pace, not the composition of its jobs.
  • The economy’s growth rate has been less than half The rate of previous recoveries and The employment losses in The Great Recession were more than twice as large as those in previous recessions.
  • What is distinctive during this recovery relative to earlier ones is the growing disparity in wages across sectors, a trend that was apparent long before the Great Recession.
  • Since then, however, wage growth has fallen far short of productivity growth, and that’s true for workers regardless of education, occupation, gender or race.
  • But technological change and the globalization it has enabled have played major roles, and these driving forces have probably strengthened during the recovery.
  • Jobs that are routine, that do not involve manual tasks and that do not need to be done near the customer are being replaced by computers and automation or are being outsourced to low-cost workers in other countries.
  • According to another study, the top 1 percent of households captured 65 percent of real family income gains (including realized capital gains) between 2002 and 2007 and 95 percent of the gains between 2009 and 2012. In 2012, the top decile claimed more than 50 percent of income, the highest share ever.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Making of a Euromess - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...15krugman.html

Krugman Euro Spain Greece economics

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Apr 13 - Cached
  • No, the real story behind the euromess lies not in the profligacy of politicians but in the arrogance of elites — specifically, the policy elites who pushed Europe into adopting a single currency well before the continent was ready for such an experiment.
  • Consider the case of Spain, which on the eve of the crisis appeared to be a model fiscal citizen.
  • But with its warm weather and beaches, Spain was also the Florida of Europe — and like Florida, it experienced a huge housing boom. the financing for this boom came largely from outside the country: there were giant inflows of capital from the rest of Europe, Germany in particular.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, The prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to The housing boom.
  • Then The bubble burst.
  • But the flood of red ink
  • was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.
  • The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in The rest of Europe. If Spain still had its old currency, The peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing The value of a peseta by 20 percent against oTher European currencies. But Spain no longer has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.
  • Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks. But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble.
  • None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency.
  • What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.
  • Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready. More Articles in Opinion »
Gene Ellis

Are Germans really poorer than Spaniards, Italians and Greeks? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...-spaniards-italians-and-greeks

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • From this survey it appeared that the median German household had the lowest wealth of all Eurozone countries
  • The median households in countries like Belgium, Spain and Italy appear to be three to four times wealthier than The median German household. Even The median Greek household is twice as wealthy as The German one.
  • mean net wealth of households
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  • A comparison of the median and mean wealth reveals something about the distribution of wealth in each country. If the largest difference is between the mean and the median, the greater is the inequality in the distribution of wealth.
  • In Germany the mean household wealth is almost four times larger than the median.
  • In most other countries this ratio is between 1.5 and 2.
  • We find that in Germany the median household in the top 20% of the income class has 74 times more wealth than the median household in the bottom 20% of the income class. Judged by this criterion Germany has the most unequal distribution of wealth in the Eurozone.
  • Wealth per capita is more than twice as high in northern European countries than in southern countries such as Greece and Portugal.
  • The facts are that Germany is significantly richer than souThern Eurozone countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal. There does seem to be a problem of The distribution of wealth in Germany: First, wealth in Germany is highly concentrated in The upper part of The household-income distribution. Second, a large part of German wealth is not held by households and Therefore must be held by The corporate sector or The government.
Gene Ellis

Even Greece Exports Rise in Europe's 11% Jobless Recovery - Bloomberg - 0 views

www.bloomberg.com/...ope-s-11-jobless-recovery.html

undefined greece exports rise europe recovery bloomberg

shared by Gene Ellis on 21 Mar 13 - No Cached
  • “The current- account deficits of countries that have been under stress diminished over The last years considerably.”
  • Just two of 14 euro-zone government leaders have kept their posts in elections since late 2009 and extremists such as Golden Dawn in Greece are gaining support.
  • “The internal rebalancing in The euro area is progressing,” said Fels. “Some of Them, especially Spain but also Portugal not to speak of Ireland, are regaining competitiveness.”
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    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 21 Mar 13
       
      This is the same sort of response which companies would have made to a depreciation in the local currency without the euro, but with the added problem of deflationary effects on the rest of the economy.
  • Ford Motor Co. (F) (F) said at the end of last year it will increase capacity near Valencia as it shuts plants in the U.K. and Belgium.
  • While a slide in imports accounts for some of the correction, Greece boosted its exports outside the EU by about 30 percent in the fourth quarter of 2012 from the previous year, while Italy’s rose 13 percent in January from a year ago, he said.
  • In Ireland, U.S. companies such as EBay Inc (EBAY) (EBAY)., Google Inc. (GOOG) (GOOG) and Facebook Inc (FB). all have expanded in the past two years, taking advantage of a corporate-tax rate of just 12.5 percent compared to Spain’s 30 percent.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 21 Mar 13
       
      'Beggar thy neighbor' kinds of effects.
  • The metamorphosis is known as internal devaluation
  • Prevented by membership of the euro from driving down currencies, governments and companies are squeezing labor costs to spur productivity.
  • reducing social- security payments
  • aising the retirement age, making it easier to fire workers in downturns and preventing unions from clinging to boom-time wage deals.
  • On average, the periphery is about halfway to eliminating large structural current-account deficits, which allow for declines related to recession-driven weaker import demand, estimates Goldman Sachs (GS).
  • The OECD today published an index showing that relative labor costs in Spain and Portugal have now dropped below Germany’s for The first time since 2005.
  • “It’s potentially good for the economy but only if it results in faster investment,”
  • “If not then there’s a downward spiral risk.”
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 21 Mar 13
       
      An important point.
  • The smaller trade imbalances really reflect a collapse in demand for imports as consumers and companies hunker down,
  • It’s the mirror image of the euro’s first decade, when historically low interest rates in the periphery fueled inflationary spending booms, reflected in credit bubbles and deteriorating current accounts and government budgets.
  • “At this stage it is still demand destruction which has helped current-account deficit countries balance their accounts,” said Mayer. “It’s not a healthy situation.”
  • They also say countries will need to run even healthier current accounts than now if They are to stabilize The debts They owe abroad.
  • Gene Ellis on 21 Mar 13
     
    Good update article, as of March, 2013.
Gene Ellis

EZ crisis and historical trilemmas | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...risis-and-historical-trilemmas

shared by Gene Ellis on 30 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • The big difference in The EZ is that nations cannot go off The euro as They went off The gold standard
  • A major part of Lenin’s analysis, for instance, was devoted to the demonstration that Russia had become a quasi-colony as a result of the large scale capital imports, and that the foreign creditors in effect controlled Russia’s foreign policy.
  • The linkages of These issues can be summarized as a series of impossible trinities or trilemmas.
  • ...5 more annotations...
  • The move in Europe to monetary union for weaker countries was a credibility enhancing mechanism that would lower borrowing costs. For countries that had strong creditor positions, The attractions of monetary union lay in The depoliticizing of The adjustment process (James 2012). The Eurozone worked quite well as a disciplining mechanism before it entered into effect, but much less well afterwards.
  • Banking expanded after the establishment of the euro (Shin 2012). No adequate provision on a European basis existed for banking supervision and regulation, which like fiscal policy, was left to rather diverse national authorities. An explosion of banking activity occurred simultaneously with the transition to monetary union and may well have been stimulated by the new single money.
  • The implicit national government backstop was really only credible because of The international commitment to The European integration project. It was that commitment that led markets to believe that – in spite of The no bailout provisions of The Maastricht Treaty – There were almost no limits to The amount to which debt levels could accumulate both in The private and The public sector.
  • When the democratic/popular backlash occurs, it takes the form of rejection of international/cross-border political commitment mechanism.
  • Opinion poll data shows a major increase in hostility to the EU in peripheral countries, but with no corresponding unpopularity of the common currency.
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