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Gene Ellis

Are Germans really poorer than Spaniards, Italians and Greeks? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...-spaniards-italians-and-greeks

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • From this survey it appeared that the median German household had the lowest wealth of all Eurozone countries
  • The median households in countries like Belgium, Spain and Italy appear to be three to four times wealthier than the median German household. Even the median Greek household is twice as wealthy as the German one.
  • mean net wealth of households
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  • A comparison of the median and mean wealth reveals something about the distribution of wealth in each country. If the largest difference is between the mean and the median, the greater is the inequality in the distribution of wealth.
  • In Germany the mean household wealth is almost four times larger than the median.
  • In most other countries this ratio is between 1.5 and 2.
  • We find that in Germany the median household in the top 20% of the income class has 74 times more wealth than the median household in the bottom 20% of the income class. Judged by this criterion Germany has the most unequal distribution of wealth in the Eurozone.
  • Wealth per capita is more than twice as high in northern European countries than in southern countries such as Greece and Portugal.
  • The facts are that Germany is significantly richer than southern Eurozone countries like Spain, Greece and Portugal. There does seem to be a problem of the distribution of wealth in Germany: First, wealth in Germany is highly concentrated in the upper part of the household-income distribution. Second, a large part of German wealth is not held by households and therefore must be held by the corporate sector or the government.
Gene Ellis

European Borders Tested as Money Is Moved to Shield Wealth - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...is-moved-to-shield-wealth.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 04 Nov 13 - No Cached
  • European Borders Tested as Money Is Moved to Shield Wealth
Gene Ellis

Reversing the Flow of Oil - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...eversing-the-flow-of-oil-.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 08 Oct 14 - No Cached
  • Reversing the Flow of Oil
  • “Economically, it means that money that was flowing out of the United States into sovereign wealth funds and treasuries around the world will now stay in the U.S. and be invested in the U.S., creating jobs. It doesn’t change everything, but it certainly provides a new dimension to U.S. influence in the world.”
  • The oil bounty is thanks to modern production techniques including hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which involves injecting water and chemicals into the ground to crack oil-saturated shale.
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  • Domestic oil production has rocketed by roughly 70 percent over the last six years to 8.7 million barrels a day, and imports from members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries have already been cut roughly by half.
  • many oil experts predict that the country’s output will rise to as much as 12 million barrels a day over the nex
  • Shale oil is predominately light, sweet oil, meaning it is low in sulfur content and flows freely at room temperature.
  • United States exports of oil could reach three million to four million barrels a day in a few years, more than most OPEC producers currently provide world markets.
Gene Ellis

BBC News - DR Congo: Cursed by its natural wealth - 0 views

www.bbc.co.uk/...magazine-24396390

shared by Gene Ellis on 04 Nov 13 - No Cached
  • DR Congo: Cursed by its natural wealth
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: The non-puzzle of peripheral pain | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...euro-crisis-0

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • Mystery mostly solved, then; the rich periphery's riches relative to Germany were largely a short-run phenomenon driven by a dramatic short-run divergence in house price trends.
  • Investors who bet that productivity growth would be much faster in the south were wrong.* All the prices and wages set on the basis of the expectation of faster productivity growth were correspondingly wrong and needed to adjust. Real effective exchange rates were badly out of alignment.
  • Two things began happening in the euro zone in 2007. Growth in the number of euros spent every year began slowing, and the distribution of euro spending within the euro area began shifting back northward.
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  • The picture is one in which there are many fewer euros floating around the euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and the distribution of those euros is moving northward.
  • It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  The overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.
  • This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.
  • Where prices were rigid, as in goods and labour markets, fewer euros meant slow disinflation but rapid contraction in output and a big rise in unemployment.
  • Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.
  • Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.
  • If there had been no single currency, the northward capital flight would have depreciated peripheral currencies. Had the periphery borrowed in its own currency, that would have imposed losses on its foreign creditors while also boosting its export industry. Had peripheral economies instead borrowed in dollars or deutschmarks their debt burdens would have ballooned with depreciation, potentially pushing banks and sovereigns into default—but the depreciation boost to competitiveness would have remained. Either way, the depreciation of the currency would effectively shrink the value of wealth in the periphery.
  • The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.
  • This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.
  • as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster
  • For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.
Gene Ellis

Nigeria Pays Off Its Big Debt, Sign of an Economic Rebound - NYTimes.com - 0 views

query.nytimes.com/...fullpage.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 15 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Nigeria reached a deal last October with the Paris Club, which includes the United States, Germany, France and other wealthy nations, that allowed it to pay off about $30 billion in accumulated debt for about $12 billion, an overall discount of about 60 percent.
  • Nigeria, which owed about $36 billion in overall debt, is one of the most indebted nations in the world.
  • Yet Nigeria had not been among the nations that have received write-offs or discounts on their debts, as several poor countries have. In part that is because of its reputation for corruption, earned by a succession of military governments that plundered the state treasury, and because Nigeria, with its oil wealth, is seen as being able to pay.
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  • But Nigeria's debt was largely accumulated under civilian governments,
  • The World Bank president, Paul D. Wolfowitz, announced on Friday an important step toward providing $37 billion in debt relief to 17 of the poorest countries, most of them in Africa. He said he had enough votes from donor countries on the board of the International Development Association, the bank arm that provides very low interest loans, to approve the measure.
  • The 17 countries will begin receiving the relief, worth close to $1 billion a year over 40 years, on July 1. They are Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Honduras, Madagascar, Mali, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Gene Ellis

What If We Never Run Out of Oil? - Charles C. Mann - The Atlantic - 0 views

www.theatlantic.com/...4

oil

shared by Gene Ellis on 15 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • In most cases, mining tar sands involves drilling two horizontal wells, one above the other, into the bitumen layer; injecting massive gouts of high-pressure steam and solvents into the top well, liquefying the bitumen; sucking up the melted bitumen as it drips into the sand around the lower well; and then refining the bitumen into “synthetic crude oil.”
  • Economists sometimes describe a fuel in terms of its energy return on energy invested (EROEI), a measure of how much energy must be used up to acquire, process, and deliver the fuel in a useful form. OPEC oil, for example, is typically estimated to have an EROEI of 12 to 18, which means that 12 to 18 barrels of oil are produced at the wellhead for every barrel of oil consumed during their production. In this calculation, tar sands look awful: they have an EROEI of 4 to 7. (Steaming out the bitumen also requires a lot of water. Environmentalists ask, with some justification, where it all is going to come from.)
  • To obtain shale gas, companies first dig wells that reach down thousands of feet. Then, with the absurd agility of anime characters, the drills wriggle sideways to bore thousands of feet more through methane-bearing shale. Once in place, the well injects high-pressure water into the stone, creating hairline cracks. The water is mixed with chemicals and “proppant,” particles of sand or ceramic that help keep the cracks open once they have formed. Gas trapped between layers of shale seeps past the proppant and rises through the well to be collected.
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  • Water-assisted fracturing has been in use since the late 1940s, but it became “fracking” only recently, when it was married with horizontal drilling and the advanced sensing techniques that let it be used deep underground. Energy costs are surprisingly small; a Swiss-American research team calculated in 2011 that the average EROEI for fracked gas in a representative Pennsylvania county was about 87—about six times better than for Persian Gulf oil and 16 times better than for tar sands. (Fracking uses a lot of water, though, and activists charge that the chemicals contaminate underground water supplies.)
  • Today, a fifth of U.S. energy consumption is fueled by coal, mainly from Appalachia and the West, a long-term energy source that has provided jobs for millions, a century-old way of life
  • and pollution that kills more than 10,000 Americans a year (that estimate is from a 2010 National Research Council study).
  • Roughly speaking, burning coal produces twice as much carbon dioxide as burning the equivalent amount of natural gas. Almost all domestic coal is used to generate electricity—it produces 38 percent of the U.S. power supply. Fracking is swiftly changing this: in 2011, utilities reported plans to shut down 57 of the nation’s 1,287 coal-fired generators the following year. Largely in consequence, U.S. energy-related carbon-dioxide emissions have dropped to figures last seen in 1995. Since 2006, they have fallen more than those from any other nation in the world.
  • In the sort of development that irresistibly attracts descriptors like ironic, Germany, often touted as an environmental model for its commitment to solar and wind power, has expanded its use of coal, and as a result is steadily increasing its carbon-dioxide output. Unlike Americans, Europeans can’t readily switch to natural gas; Continental nations, which import most of their natural gas, agreed to long-term contracts that tie its price to the price of oil, now quite high.
  • Several researchers told me that the current towel-snapping between Beijing and Tokyo over islands in the East China Sea is due less to nationalistic posturing than to nearby petroleum deposits.)
  • In mid-March, Japan’s Chikyu test ended a week early, after sand got in the well mechanism. But by then the researchers had already retrieved about 4 million cubic feet of natural gas from methane hydrate, at double the expected rate.
  • What is known, says Timothy Collett, the energy-research director for the USGS program, is that some of the gulf’s more than 3,500 oil and gas wells are in gas-hydrate areas.
  • In Dutch-disease scenarios, oil weakens all the pillars but one—the petroleum industry, which bloats steroidally.
  • Because the national petroleum company, with its gush of oil revenues, is the center of national economic power, “the ruler typically puts a loyalist in charge,” says Michael Ross, a UCLA political scientist and the author of The Oil Curse (2012). “The possibilities for corruption are endless.” Governments dip into the oil kitty to reward friends and buy off enemies. Sometimes the money goes to simple bribes; in the early 1990s, hundreds of millions of euros from France’s state oil company, Elf Aquitaine, lined the pockets of businessmen and politicians at home and abroad.
  • How much of Venezuela’s oil wealth Hugo Chávez hijacked for his own political purposes is unknown, because his government stopped publishing the relevant income and expenditure figures. Similarly, Ross points out, Saddam Hussein allocated more than half the government’s funds to the Iraq National Oil Company; nobody has any idea what happened to the stash, though, because INOC never released a budget. (Saddam personally directed the nationalization of Iraqi oil in 1972, then leveraged his control of petroleum revenues to seize power from his rivals.)
  • “How will the royal family contain both the mullahs and the unemployed youth without a slush fund?”
  • It seems fair to say that if autocrats in these places were toppled, most Americans would not mourn. But it seems equally fair to say that they would not necessarily be enthusiastic about their replacements.
Gene Ellis

IRIN Africa | GUINEA: Winners and losers in Guinea's bauxite industry | Guine... - 0 views

www.irinnews.org/...s-in-guinea-s-bauxite-industry

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • GUINEA: Winners and losers in Guinea’s bauxite industry
  • “Rather than making people richer, mining has made them poorer,” said Akoumba Diallo, a mining sector researcher. “It polluted their environments so they can’t grow crops or let animals feed near mining sites. And it is hard to get water anywhere because it’s contaminated.” With mining contributing to 85 percent of the country’s external revenue, and the World Bank estimating investments of up to US$20 billion in bauxite mining in Guinea over the next decade, the government is currently rewriting and renegotiating its mining contracts - unchanged for 25 years - with 15 companies to ensure Guineans are more likely to benefit from the wealth they spawn.
  • Mining companies are legally obliged to pay taxes to owners of the land they mine,
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  • “We have been paying US$100,000 in annual taxes directly to the Kindia prefecture,” he told IRIN. “The distribution of the money rests with them according to the needs they have identified in Mambia.”
  • Seeing this for themselves, the CBK became concerned that the money was not being well spent, according to Cirra Dieng, communications officer at the CBK, and withdrew its payments in 2007 awaiting some explanation. They are still waiting.
  • The EITI has set up a monitoring committee made up of government representatives, mining companies and civil society to push mining companies to publish what they pay and the government to disclose what it receives at the state, prefecture and CRD level. So far it has done so for six mining companies, including the CBK.
Gene Ellis

Business and government: The new age of crony capitalism | The Economist - 1 views

www.economist.com/...ent-years-crony-capitalism-may

shared by Gene Ellis on 25 Apr 14 - No Cached
  • Rent-seeking” is what economists call a special type of money-making: the sort made possible by political connections. This can range from outright graft to a lack of competition, poor regulation and the transfer of public assets to firms at bargain prices. Well-placed people have made their fortunes this way ever since rulers had enough power to issue profitable licences, permits and contracts to their cronies.
  • Capitalism based on rent-seeking is not just unfair, but also bad for long-term growth.
  • It identifies sectors which are particularly dependent on government—such as mining, oil and gas, banking and casinos—
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  • Second, the financial incentives for businesses may be changing. The share of billionaire wealth from rent-rich industries in emerging markets is now falling, from a peak of 76% in 2008 to 58% today. This is partly a natural progression.
  • In China today the big money is made from the internet, not building heavy industrial plants with subsidised loans on land secured through party connections.
Gene Ellis

Michael Spence explores the causes of partial and stalled economic recoveries. - Projec... - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...nd-stalled-economic-recoveries

shared by Gene Ellis on 19 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Indeed, recent data suggest that more than half of the acceleration in US growth is occurring on the tradable side, even though it accounts for only about one-third of the economy. And that contribution is probably an underestimate, because income generated on the tradable supply side produces income that becomes demand on the non-tradable side – a multiplier effect that crosses the tradable/non-tradable boundary.
  • the main problem is that public-sector investment remains well below growth-sustaining levels. The hard part of fully realizing potential growth is shifting the composition of domestic demand from consumption to investment without adding leverage. That means paying for it on the public-sector side, via taxes and a reduction in household consumption (and in wealth accumulation).
  • But such adjustments cannot happen in a monetary union, so unit labor costs are slowly re-converging via a protracted process of flat nominal wage growth and slowly declining real wages (a process that would be quicker with higher inflation in Germany and Northern Europe).
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