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Gene Ellis

Bank Lending in Euro Zone Slumped in November, Data Show - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • That is a sign that E.C.B. measures have not yet succeeded in restoring the flow of credit to troubled countries like Spain.
  • But the E.C.B.’s efforts have been thwarted by continued reluctance by banks, many of which are already burdened by bad loans and are trying to reduce risk. In some countries there may also be a lack of demand for loans, because corporate managers are not confident enough to resume investing in their businesses.
Gene Ellis

Emerging Europe's Deleveraging Dilemma by Erik Berglof and Božidar Đelić - Pr... - 0 views

  • Expansion was, for lack of other options, financed largely through short-term loans.
  • since the onset of the global financial crisis, eurozone-based banks’ subsidiaries in emerging Europe have been reducing their exposure to the region. In 2009-2010, the European Bank Coordination Initiative – known informally as the “Vienna Initiative” – helped to avert a systemic crisis in developing Europe by stopping foreign-owned parent banks from staging a catastrophic stampede to the exits.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut, in the second half of 2011, the eurozone-based parent banks that dominate emerging Europe’s banking sector came under renewed pressure to deleverage. Many are now radically changing their business models to reduce risk.
  • Over the last year, funding corresponding to 4% of the region’s GDP – and, in some countries, as much as 15% of GDP – has been withdrawn. Bank subsidiaries will increasingly have to finance local lending with local deposits and other local funding.
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  • excessive and chaotic deleveraging by lenders to emerging Europe – and the ensuing credit crunch – would destabilize this economically and institutionally fragile region.
  • View/Create comment on this paragraphFor Tigar, deleveraging has meant that banks that had pursued its business only a couple of years ago have suddenly cut lending – even though the company never missed a debt payment. Previous loans came due, while cash-flow needs grew. Despite its good operating margins, growing markets, and prime international clients, the company experienced a drop in liquidity, requiring serious balance-sheet restructuring.
  • Furthermore, collateral – especially real-estate assets – will continue to be downgraded.
  • Indeed, several Western financial groups are considering partial or complete exits from the region – without any clear strategic replacement in sight.
Gene Ellis

Happy 2013? | vox - 0 views

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Hopefully the following ten observations are less controversial in 2013 than in previous years.
  • As long known by elementary textbook readers, austerity policies have contractionary effects.
  • Debt reduction is a very long process; we're talking about decades,
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  • The debt-to-GDP ratio is best reduced through sustained nominal GDP growth.
  • Besides, having been there, no one really wants to unleash inflation anymore. That leaves us with real GDP growth as a necessary condition for bringing the debt-to-GDP down painlessly.
  • But in today’s world voters are angry at everything that is called Europe and will not back a fiscal union.
  • The crisis has delivered a surprising degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility.
  • This means that the need for dissolving the euro back into national currencies at almost any cost has evaporated.
  • Sustained real growth should be the number one priority.
  • In most Eurozone countries, structural reforms are as needed now as they were before the crisis.
  • Banks are at the heart of a diabolic loop: bank holdings of their national public debts (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
  • Massive forbearance has allowed many banks to not fully account for the losses that they incurred in 2007-8.
  • For that reason, they deleverage, which leads to a credit crunch, which slows growth down.
  • The ECB is the lender of last resort both to banks and to governments.
  • This involves massive moral hazard.
  • The long-hoped-for awakening of the ECB has produced several miracles, especially a major relaxation of market anguish.
  • Austerity policies must stop, now.
  • Growth will not return unless bank lending is adequately available.
  • The ECB may act as lender in last resort to banks and governments, but who will bear the residual costs?
  • The only remaining option is public debt restructuring, a purging of the legacy.
  • This will lead to bank failures. This means that debt reductions must be deep enough to make it possible for governments to then borrow, to shift to expansionary fiscal policies and to bail out the banks that they destroyed in the first place, in effect undoing the diabolic loop.
  • Who will lend? Even the best-crafted bank restructuring will not allow an immediate recovery of market access. The ECB is the only institution in the world that can help out.
  • There is no easy option for the Eurozone after three years of deep mismanagement. Governments will not accept drastic action unless forced to. This means that we need another round of crisis worsening.
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    Good article by Wyplosz on ten observations and five consequences of Euro policy. 4 Jan 2013
Gene Ellis

Analysis: Euro zone fragmenting faster than EU can act - 0 views

  • Deposit flight from Spanish banks has been gaining pace and it is not clear a euro zone agreement to lend Madrid up to 100 billion euros in rescue funds will reverse the flows if investors fear Spain may face a full sovereign bailout.
  • Many banks are reorganising, or being forced to reorganise, along national lines, accentuating a deepening north-south divide within the currency bloc.
  • Since government credit ratings and bond yields effectively set a floor for the borrowing costs of banks and businesses in their jurisdiction, the best-managed Spanish or Italian banks or companies have to pay far more for loans, if they can get them, than their worst-managed German or Dutch peers.
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  • European Central Bank President Mario Draghi acknowledged as he cut interest rates last week that the north-south disconnect was making it more difficult to run a single monetary policy.
  • Two huge injections of cheap three-year loans into the euro zone banking system this year, amounting to 1 trillion euros, bought only a few months' respite.
  • Conservative German economists led by Hans-Werner Sinn, head of the Ifo institute, are warning of dire consequences for Germany from ballooning claims via the ECB's system for settling payments among national central banks, known as TARGET2.
  • If a southern country were to default or leave the euro, they contend, Germany would be left with an astronomical bill, far beyond its theoretical limit of 211 billion euros liability for euro zone bailout funds.
  • As long as European monetary union is permanent and irreversible, such cross-border claims and capital flows within the currency area should not matter any more than money moving between Texas and California does.But even the faintest prospect of a Day of Reckoning changes that calculus radically.In that case, money would flood into German assets considered "safe" and out of securities and deposits in countries seen as at risk of leaving the monetary union. Some pessimists reckon we are already witnessing the early signs of such a process.
  • Either member governments would always be willing to let their national central banks give unlimited credit to each other, in which case a collapse would be impossible, or they might be unwilling to provide boundless credit, "and this will set the parameters for the dynamics of collapse", Garber warned.
  • "The problem is that at the time of a sovereign debt crisis, large portions of a national balance sheet may suddenly flee to the ECB's books, possibly overwhelming the capacity of a bailout fund to absorb the entire hit," he wrote in 2010,
  • national regulators in some EU countries are moving quietly to try to reduce their home banks' exposure to such an eventuality. The ECB itself last week set a limit on the amount of state-backed bank bonds that banks could use as collateral in its lending operations.
  • In one high-profile case, Germany's financial regulator Bafin ordered HypoVereinsbank (HVB), the German subsidiary of UniCredit, to curb transfers to its parent bank in Italy last year, people familiar with the case said.
  • In any case, common supervision without joint deposit insurance may be insufficient to reverse capital flight.
Gene Ellis

ECB Raises Pressure on Greece - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • FRANKFURT—The European Central Bank said it would reject Greek government bonds as collateral for its normal lending operations beginning Wednesday,
  • Government bonds and other debt securities backed by Greece "will become for the time being ineligible for use as collateral" in the ECB's monetary policy operations, the bank said in a statement.
  • Greek banks, which are largely shut out of private markets for financing, depend critically on cheap ECB loans to meet their daily funding needs. In June, Greek banks tapped the ECB and Greece's central bank for a combined €136 billion ($166 billion) in loans through normal refinancing operations and emergency credit, an amount roughly equal to two-thirds of the country's gross domestic product.
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  • Banks can still access emergency funds through the Greek central bank, but at a higher interest rate than normal ECB loans. The credit risk stays on Greece's books and isn't spread throughout the 17-member currency bloc,
  • It is the second time the ECB declined to accept Greek bonds as collateral. The first was in February, after Athens imposed steep losses on private creditors in a debt restructuring. That suspension ended after a little more than an week, when the ECB received guarantees from euro-zone governments that Greek bonds posted to the ECB as collateral would be repaid.
  • For banks, which are already under intense pressure, it means that they will have to resort to emergency liquidity assistance which will lend them with a higher rate.It is bad news and all we can hope for is that it won't last for long," a senior Greek banker said.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: Debtors' prison | The Economist - 0 views

  • But the reforms often fail to work. The Spanish law is intended to promote restructuring of viable firms but in practice most insolvencies end in liquidation after lengthy court proceedings.
  • High household debt helps explain why the Netherlands, along with Italy and Spain, remained in recession in the second quarter of 2013 even as the euro area in general embarked on recovery. Dutch GDP this year will be 2% lower than in 2011 and more than 3% below its previous peak, in 2008.
  • it illustrates the malign effect of high debt when house prices fall
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  • One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.
  • High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.
  • The malign effect of high private debt becomes apparent in the busts that follow credit-driven booms. Households that have borrowed too much in relation to their income trim their spending, the main component of GDP. Overleveraged firms avoid investing and concentrate on shrinking their balance-sheets by paying off loans. As bad debts erode their capital, banks become more reluctant to lend. These adverse trends reinforce each other, increasing the overall drag on growth.
  • Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).
  • Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.
  • There is an inherent contradiction between the need for debtor countries in the euro zone to regain competitiveness through lower prices and at the same time to ease excessive debt with a dose of inflation.
  • Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.
Gene Ellis

The Eurocrisis Can Easily Flare Up Again - Seeking Alpha - 0 views

  • It is clear for all that they will also have to swallow cuts, but for this to take place, politicians have to break promises, the ECB has to break the law, and the IMF has to do something rather unprecedented. None of this is easy, to put it mildly.
  • Recently, there was a new EU/IMF/ECB 'agreement' that won't fare any better.
  • Basically, we're lending Greece more in order for it to keep the appearance that it is servicing and paying of the debt.
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  • The International Monetary Fund will not disburse Greece's next bailout tranche until the country completes a voluntary buy back of its debt, an IMF spokesman said
  • Who will actually sell the debt at a 70% discount?
  • Most private Greek debt holders just want to hold to maturity, they've already been subjected to two haircuts.
  • Two thirds of the private holders of Greek debt are Greek banks (22 billion euro). These are certainly not going to sell because doing so forces them to realize losses on the debt,
  • There is a simple and obvious solution, which will then force itself. The official creditors should take really substantial losses on Greek debt.
  • The simple truth is that as long as Greece's economy is moribund and its debt/GDP trajectory spiraling out of control, nobody is going to invest in Greece, capital and educated people will leave in a vicious cycle, and Greece's capacity for paying back its debt shrinks by the day. Something has to give.
  • The only real alternative is Greece leaving the euro
  • This situation is basically a slow asphyxiation.
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    Exc. piece...  Eurocrisis as of Dec. 3, 2012
Gene Ellis

Efforts to Revive the Economy Lead to Worries of a Bubble - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • The Federal Reserve is well into its third round of “quantitative easing,” in which it buys longer-term assets to bring down long-term lending rates.
  • In March, a smaller percentage of working-age people were actually working than at any other time since 1979.
  • In March, a smaller percentage of working-age people were actually working than at any other time since 1979.
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  • Ben S. Bernanke and company would also like to kindle inflation expectations, spurring people to buy and companies to invest today instead of waiting until tomorrow. Supposedly, all of this will drive a self-sustaining economic recovery.
  • Alternatively, many investors look at something called the Q, devised by the economist James Tobin, which compares stock prices with corporate net worth. The nonfinancial companies are overpriced by 57 percent.
  • Investors are desperate for yield and are paying up for riskier assets.
  • There are more reliable measures of stock market value, and they look frothy. One gauge, the price of stocks based on the past decade of earnings, is named after the Yale economist Robert J. Shiller. Using that, stocks are too expensive by 65 percent.
  • Instead, the Fed has kindled speculation.
  • Last month, investors were paying more for such loans than at any time in the last five years. They are snapping up billions of dollars in securities made up of subprime auto loans.
Gene Ellis

George Soros: how to save the EU from the euro crisis - the speech in full | Business |... - 0 views

  • The crisis has also transformed the European Union into something radically different from what was originally intended. The EU was meant to be a voluntary association of equal states but the crisis has turned it into a hierarchy with Germany and other creditors in charge and the heavily indebted countries relegated to second-class status. While in theory Germany cannot dictate policy, in practice no policy can be proposed without obtaining Germany's permission first.
  • Italy now has a majority opposed to the euro and the trend is likely to grow. There is now a real danger that the euro crisis may end up destroying the European Union.
  • The answer to the first question is extremely complicated because the euro crisis is extremely complex. It has both a political and a financial dimension. And the financial dimension can be divided into at least three components: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis, as well as divergences in competitiveness
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  • The crisis is almost entirely self-inflicted. It has the quality of a nightmare.
  • My interpretation of the euro crisis is very different from the views prevailing in Germany. I hope that by offering you a different perspective I may get you to reconsider your position before more damage is done. That is my goal in coming here.
  • I regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states who surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.
  • The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who recognised that perfection was unattainable and practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set themselves limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilised the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      Excellent point!
  • Unfortunately, the Maastricht treaty was fundamentally flawed. The architects of the euro recognised that it was an incomplete construct: a currency union without a political union. The architects had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the political will to take the next step forward could be mobilized. After all, that was how the process of integration had worked until then.
  • For instance, the Maastricht Treaty took it for granted that only the public sector could produce chronic deficits because the private sector would always correct its own excesses. The financial crisis of 2007-8 proved that wrong.
  • When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany's leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining, they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.
  • The financial crisis also revealed a near fatal defect in the construction of the euro: by creating an independent central bank, member countries became indebted in a currency they did not control. This exposed them to the risk of default.
  • Developed countries have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically nonexistent. By contrast, less developed countries that have to borrow in a foreign currency run the risk of default. To make matters worse, financial markets can actually drive such countries into default through bear raids. The risk of default relegated some member countries to the status of a third world country that became over-indebted in a foreign currency. 
    • Gene Ellis
       
      Again, another excellent point!
    • Gene Ellis
       
      Not quite... Maggie Thatcher, a Conservative; and Gordon Brown, of Labour, both recognized this possible loss of sovereignty (and economic policy weapons they might use to keep the UK afloat), and refused to join the euro.
  • The emphasis placed on sovereign credit revealed the hitherto ignored feature of the euro, namely that by creating an independent central bank the euro member countries signed away part of their sovereign status.
  • Only at the end of 2009, when the extent of the Greek deficit was revealed, did the financial markets realize that a member country could actually default. But then the markets raised the risk premiums on the weaker countries with a vengeance.
  • Then the IMF and the international banking authorities saved the international banking system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default but at the cost of pushing them into a lasting depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.
  • In effect, however, the euro had turned their government bonds into bonds of third world countries that carry the risk of default.
  • In retrospect, that was the root cause of the euro crisis.
  • The burden of responsibility falls mainly on Germany. The Bundesbank helped design the blueprint for the euro whose defects put Germany into the driver's seat.
  • he fact that Greece blatantly broke the rules has helped to support this attitude. But other countries like Spain and Ireland had played by the rules;
  • the misfortunes of the heavily indebted countries are largely caused by the rules that govern the euro.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      Well, yes, but this is an extremely big point.  If, instead of convergence, we continue to see growth patterns growing apart, what then?
  • Germany did not seek the dominant position into which it has been thrust and it is unwilling to accept the obligations and liabilities that go with it.
  • Austerity doesn't work.
  • As soon as the pressure from the financial markets abated, Germany started to whittle down the promises it had made at the height of the crisis.
  • What happened in Cyprus undermined the business model of European banks, which relies heavily on deposits. Until now the authorities went out of their way to protect depositors
  • Banks will have to pay risk premiums that will fall more heavily on weaker banks and the banks of weaker countries. The insidious link between the cost of sovereign debt and bank debt will be reinforced.
  • In this context the German word "Schuld" plays a key role. As you know it means both debt and responsibility or guilt.
  • If countries that abide by the fiscal compact were allowed to convert their entire existing stock of government debt into eurobonds, the positive impact would be little short of the miraculous.
  • Only the divergences in competitiveness would remain unresolved.
  • Germany is opposed to eurobonds on the grounds that once they are introduced there can be no assurance that the so-called periphery countries would not break the rules once again. I believe these fears are misplaced.
  • Losing the privilege of issuing eurobonds and having to pay stiff risk premiums would be a powerful inducement to stay in compliance.
  • There are also widespread fears that eurobonds would ruin Germany's credit rating. eurobonds are often compared with the Marshall Plan.
  • It is up to Germany to decide whether it is willing to authorise eurobonds or not. But it has no right to prevent the heavily indebted countries from escaping their misery by banding together and issuing eurobonds. In other words, if Germany is opposed to eurobonds it should consider leaving the euro and letting the others introduce them.
  • Individual countries would still need to undertake structural reforms. Those that fail to do so would turn into permanent pockets of poverty and dependency similar to the ones that persist in many rich countries.
  • They would survive on limited support from European Structural Funds and remittances
  • Second, the European Union also needs a banking union and eventually a political union.
  • If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness. Their debt would diminish in real terms and, if they issued eurobonds, the threat of default would disappear. 
Gene Ellis

The Eurozone's Narrowing Window by Ashoka Mody - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • Ireland’s authorities have conducted similar recent operations, exchanging short-maturity paper for longer-term debt.
  • But growth prospects remain grim. The Portuguese economy is now expected to contract by 1% in 2013.
  • This strategy’s success presupposes that, in the interim, economic growth will strengthen the capacity to repay debt down the line.
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  • Private investors are acknowledging the reality that repayments will likely be drawn out, because insisting on existing terms could cause an untenable bunching of debt-service payments, with possibly unpleasant consequences.
  • Crucially for Europe, world trade has been virtually stagnant in recent months. Global trade and economic performance in the eurozone appear to be dragging each other down.
  • Moreover, Irish GNP (the income accruing to its nationals, as distinct from foreign firms operating in Ireland) continues to shrink.
  • Thus, the eurozone faces three choices: even more austerity for the heavily-indebted countries, socialization of the debt across Europe, or a creative re-profiling of debt, with investors forced to accept losses sooner or later.
  • Special European facilities, along with the IMF, lend money at below-market interest rates, which reduces the extent of austerity required. But the facilities’ resources are dwindling, and they certainly would not be sufficient if Spain and Italy were to seek support.
  • More ambitious pan-European efforts are embodied in various Eurobond proposals. These schemes imply socialization of debt – taxpayers elsewhere in Europe would share a country’s debt burden. These proposals, once in great vogue, have receded. Not surprisingly, the political opposition to such debt mutualization was intense.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      This gets at the crux of the matter.
Gene Ellis

PORTFOLIO.HU | Blanchard: Eurozone integration needs to go forward or go back, but it c... - 0 views

  • There is no question that, when it was introduced, inflation targeting represented progress. But we have learnt that it has serious limitations. You can have an economy in which inflation is stable and low, but behind the scenes the composition of the output is wrong, and the financial system accumulates risks. It’s very clear that, to deal with all these issues, just using the policy rate is not enough.
  • The way to think about monetary policy in the future is that the central bank has in effect two sets of tools. One is a traditional one, the policy interest rate. The other is the set of macro prudential tools, from loan to value ratios, to cyclical capital ratios, etc. If there is a housing boom, you do not want to kill it through an increase in the policy rate which would affect the whole economy. You want to use measures that will limit mortgage lending to households.
  • I think that it has either to go forward or to go back, but it cannot stay where it is. I think nobody really wants to go back, so it has to go forward.
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  • I suspect that, in order to limit country specific shocks, euro members may have to actively use macro prudential tools such as rules on the amount of liquidity that banks should hold, or upper limit to loans to value ratios, much more so that they have in the past.
  • If the U.S. and a number of other advanced countries are going to decrease their current account deficits, then some countries will have to decrease their current account surpluses. And for this to happen, there has to be, among other changes, an adjustment of the exchange rates. Put more bluntly, most emerging markets have to accept an appreciation.
Gene Ellis

Martin Feldstein: The Euro Zone's Double Failure - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • but that they don't constitute an official EU treaty and therefore cannot be enforced by the commission and other EU institutions.
  • Italy has a good shot at persuading investors that it has a favorable long-term budget outlook. Its fiscal deficit is now less than 4% of GDP.
  • If the new government can now enact changes in labor rules and investment incentives that raise GDP growth to a 2% annual rate, Italy's ratio of debt to GDP could fall to 60% in less than 15 years.
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  • Greece cannot hope to get its deficit under control fast enough to stabilize its debt and attract private lenders. Instead of remaining a permanent ward of Germany and the IMF, Greece should default on its debt, leave the euro zone, and return to a more competitive drachma.
  • But he should also make it clear that lending against private collateral should not be used by commercial banks to free up funds to purchase newly issued government bonds
  • As Italy shows its determination and its ability to reduce future deficits, it should be welcomed back to the capital markets.
Gene Ellis

"A Banking Union Baby Step" by Daniel Gros | Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • The recently created European Banking Authority has only limited powers over national supervisors, whose daily work is guided mainly by national considerations.
  • Moreover, the ECB already bears de facto responsibility for the stability of the eurozone’s banking system. But, until now, it had to lend massive amounts to banks without being able to judge their soundness, because all of that information was in the hands of national authorities who guarded it jealously and typically denied problems until it was too late.
  • Consider the case of a bank headquartered in Italy, but with an important subsidiary in Germany. The German operations naturally generate a surplus of funds (given that savings in Germany far exceed investment on average). The parent bank would like to use these funds to reinforce the group’s liquidity. But the German supervisory authorities consider Italy at risk and thus oppose any transfer of funds there.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe supervisor of the home country (Italy) has the opposite interest. It would like to see the “internal capital market” operate as much as possible. Here, too, it makes sense to have the ECB in charge as a neutral arbiter with respect to these opposing interests.
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  • Economic (and political) logic requires that the eurozone will soon also need a common bank rescue fund. Officially, this has not yet been acknowledged. But that is often the way that European integration proceeds: an incomplete step in one area later requires further steps in related areas.
Gene Ellis

"The Euro's Latest Reprieve" by Joseph E. Stiglitz | Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • Like an inmate on death row, the euro has received another last-minute stay of execution. It will survive a little longer. The markets are celebrating, as they have after each of the four previous “euro crisis” summits – until they come to understand that the fundamental problems have yet to be addressed.
  • Europe’s leaders have finally understood that the bootstrap operation by which Europe lends money to the banks to save the sovereigns, and to the sovereigns to save the banks, will not work.
  • Likewise, they now recognize that bailout loans that give the new lender seniority over other creditors worsen the position of private investors, who will simply demand even higher interest rates.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
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  • It is deeply troubling that it took Europe’s leaders so long to see something so obvious
  • What is now proposed is recapitalization of the European Investment Bank, part of a growth package of some $150 billion. But politicians are good at repackaging, and, by some accounts, the new money is a small fraction of that amount, and even that will not get into the system immediately. In short: the remedies – far too little and too late – are based on a misdiagnosis of the problem and flawed economics.
  • Eurobonds and a solidarity fund could promote growth and stabilize the interest rates faced by governments in crisis. Lower interest rates, for example, would free up money so that even countries with tight budget constraints could spend more on growth-enhancing investments.
  • Even well-managed banking systems would face problems in an economic downturn of Greek and Spanish magnitude; with the collapse of Spain’s real-estate bubble, its banks are even more at risk.
  • Europe’s leaders did not recognize this rising danger, which could easily be averted by a common guarantee, which would simultaneously correct the market distortion arising from the differential implicit subsidy.
  • The euro was flawed from the outset, but it was clear that the consequences would become apparent only in a crisis.
  • Workers may leave Ireland or Greece not because their productivity there is lower, but because, by leaving, they can escape the debt burden incurred by their parents.
  • Germany worries that, without strict supervision of banks and budgets, it will be left holding the bag for its more profligate neighbors. But that misses the key point: Spain, Ireland, and many other distressed countries ran budget surpluses before the crisis. The down
  • turn caused the deficits, not the other way around.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • If these countries made a mistake, it was only that, like Germany today, they were overly credulous of markets, so they (like the United States and so many others) allowed an asset bubble to grow unchecked.
  • Moreover, Germany is on the hook in either case: if the euro or the economies on the periphery collapse, the costs to Germany will be high.
  • While structural problems have weakened competitiveness and GDP growth in particular countries, they did not bring about the crisis, and addressing them will not resolve it.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
Gene Ellis

PIMCO | - ​​TARGET2: A Channel for Europe's Capital Flight - 0 views

  • Its full name is more than a mouthful. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement System is better known as TARGET2 for short. It is the behind-the-scene payments system that conveniently enables citizens across the euro area to settle electronic transactions in euro. And at just over €500 billion, its TARGET2 claim on the Eurosystem is also the largest and fastest growing item on the Bundesbank’s balance sheet, as well as a source of much misunderstanding and debate.
  • The allocation of TARGET2 balances among the seventeen national central banks, which together with the ECB make up the Eurosystem, reflects where the market allocates the money created by the ECB. The fact that the Bundesbank has a large TARGET2 claim (asset) on the Eurosystem, while national central banks in southern Europe and Ireland together have an equally large TARGET2 liability, simply reflects that a lot of the ECB’s newly created money has ended up in Germany. Why? Because of capital flight.
  • Since the euro eliminated exchange rate risk among its member states, Germany has invested a substantial portion of its savings in Europe’s current account deficit countries. Some of those savings are now returning home. That’s the capital flight.
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  • The ECB stepped into the void left by foreign investors pulling their savings out of these current account deficit countries by lending their banks more money.
  • When large capital flight to Germany occurred before the euro’s introduction, the deutschemark would appreciate against other European currencies. While pegged against the deutschemark, these exchange rates were still flexible. That flexibility disappeared with the euro. When capital flight occurs today, the Bundesbank effectively ends up with loans to the other national central banks that are reflected in the TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem. 
  • Debt overhangs persist, growth is mediocre and the governance structure – a common monetary policy without a centralized fiscal policy – is a challenge.
  • The ECB has allowed banks to borrow as much money as they want for up to three years. Indeed, at the end of February banks were borrowing €1.2 trillion from the ECB, twelve times the amount of their required reserves. With so much excess liquidity in the money markets, further capital flight is likely to cause a disproportionable share of this money to end up in Germany
  • Concerned about the stability of the euro, Germany’s savers are shifting their money into real estate. German residential house prices and rents rose by 4.7% last year, the fastest increase since 1993’s reunification boom. So far, Germans are not leveraging to buy houses. Growth in German mortgages is paltry at just 1.2% per annum according to the ECB as of December 2011, but in our view all ingredients for a debt-financed house price boom are there. Distrust in the euro is rising,
  • The ECB’s generous monetary policy will delay the internal devaluation adjustment of the eurozone’s current account deficit countries.
  • Mexico’s current account deficit fell by 5.3% of GDP in 1995, according to Haver Analytics, in the wake of capital flight following the government’s decision to float the peso in 1994, while its recession lasted only one year.
Gene Ellis

Ireland's Debt to Foreign Banks Is Still Unknown - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Mr. Weber, who is also a member of the European Central Bank’s governing council, said that the statistics reflected Ireland’s status as a financial center: much of what is recorded as claims on Ireland is in fact money funneled through Irish subsidiaries of German banks, and ultimately bound for elsewhere, Mr. Weber said. He said total German exposure was closer to $30 billion.
  • In both cases more than half of the exposure was to Ireland’s private sector, rather than lending to the government or Ireland’s beleaguered banks.
  • Taxpayers will bear the cost, but they may never find out how much. The bad bank, known as FMS Wertmanagement, has no plans to release financial statements, according to Soffin, the German government organization that oversees bank rescues.
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  • In Germany, Hypo Real Estate, a property and public sector lender owned by the government after a bailout, owed its near collapse largely to problems at Depfa, its subsidiary in Dublin. Last month Hypo transferred most of its troubled assets to a so-called bad bank that will slowly wind down the investments.
  • The latest figures from the Bank for International Settlements put total European bank exposure to Portugal and Spain at $853 billion, with Germany, France and Britain the biggest creditors.
  • That worst-case forecast highlights another potential hidden risk. Credit-default swaps are typically sold over the counter by investment banks, with little information available publicly about the financial strength of the sellers. “Only then will we know for sure if the institutions that wrote the credit-default swaps have the liquidity and the financial strength to perform as contracted,” Mr. Weinberg wrote in a note last week.
Gene Ellis

Euro-Zone Banks Cut Back Lending - WSJ.com - 0 views

  •  
    !!!!!
Gene Ellis

IMF's Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped By Meta-Uncertainty - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy.
  • This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%.
  • What Europe needs to do:
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  • These countries have to do what they need to do. There’s no question there has to be fiscal consolidation. We can discuss the pace, but it has to happen. The other is competitiveness, which I see as much tougher of the two.
  • It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.
  • Take the big two, Italy and Spain. You can always dream of more, but I think they’re serious about doing it, both on the fiscal front and the structural-reforms front. I think it may well be that even if they do everything they can, and do it right, it’s still not enough. They have to have help — I would say when needed rather than if needed.
  • The banks have to be recapped, and they have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on the agenda. I don’t think they can make it without help to the banks.
  • If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates
  • And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.
  • It’s not that I don’t care about the way it’s done. But I care about the result. These countries, if they’re doing the right things, they have to be able to finance themselves.
  • Some people say a euro depreciation would help Europe a lot. I think there is an argument for it, even in a multilateral context. You have to depreciate vis-a-vis somebody, so somebody has to appreciate. My sense is we would like most of the depreciation to be vis-a-vis emerging-market countries. Even if there was a depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar, I still think it would be a good thing.
  • We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. The footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. The countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
  • There’s no question, the periphery countries have to improve their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at the level of the euro or fiscal policy can do. This they have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.
  • It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.
  • And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.
  • At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.
  • Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.
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