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Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Making of a Euromess - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • No, the real story behind the euromess lies not in the profligacy of politicians but in the arrogance of elites — specifically, the policy elites who pushed Europe into adopting a single currency well before the continent was ready for such an experiment.
  • Consider the case of Spain, which on the eve of the crisis appeared to be a model fiscal citizen.
  • But with its warm weather and beaches, Spain was also the Florida of Europe — and like Florida, it experienced a huge housing boom. The financing for this boom came largely from outside the country: there were giant inflows of capital from the rest of Europe, Germany in particular.
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  • The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, the prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to the housing boom.
  • Then the bubble burst.
  • But the flood of red ink
  • was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.
  • The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in the rest of Europe. If Spain still had its old currency, the peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing the value of a peseta by 20 percent against other European currencies. But Spain no longer has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.
  • Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks. But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble.
  • None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency.
  • What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.
  • Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready. More Articles in Opinion »
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - Bubbles and the Banks - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Bear in mind that the implosion of the 1990s stock bubble, while nasty — households took a $5 trillion hit — didn’t provoke a financial crisis. So what was different about the housing bubble that followed?
  • The short answer is that while the stock bubble created a lot of risk, that risk was fairly widely diffused across the economy. By contrast, the risks created by the housing bubble were strongly concentrated in the financial sector. As a result, the collapse of the housing bubble threatened to bring down the nation’s banks. And banks play a special role in the economy. If they can’t function, the wheels of commerce as a whole grind to a halt.
  • Why did the bankers take on so much risk? Because it was in their self-interest to do so.
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  • Of course, that conflict of interest is the reason we have bank regulation. But in the years before the crisis, the rules were relaxed — and, even more important, regulators failed to expand the rules to cover the growing “shadow” banking system, consisting of institutions like Lehman Brothers that performed banklike functions even though they didn’t offer conventional bank deposits.
  • And here’s the thing: Since that aid came with few strings — in particular, no major banks were nationalized even though some clearly wouldn’t have survived without government help — there’s every incentive for bankers to engage in a repeat performance.
Gene Ellis

House Votes To Extend Export-Import Bank's Authority For Three Years | Fox Business - 0 views

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Gene Ellis

PIMCO | - ​​TARGET2: A Channel for Europe's Capital Flight - 0 views

  • Its full name is more than a mouthful. Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement System is better known as TARGET2 for short. It is the behind-the-scene payments system that conveniently enables citizens across the euro area to settle electronic transactions in euro. And at just over €500 billion, its TARGET2 claim on the Eurosystem is also the largest and fastest growing item on the Bundesbank’s balance sheet, as well as a source of much misunderstanding and debate.
  • The allocation of TARGET2 balances among the seventeen national central banks, which together with the ECB make up the Eurosystem, reflects where the market allocates the money created by the ECB. The fact that the Bundesbank has a large TARGET2 claim (asset) on the Eurosystem, while national central banks in southern Europe and Ireland together have an equally large TARGET2 liability, simply reflects that a lot of the ECB’s newly created money has ended up in Germany. Why? Because of capital flight.
  • Since the euro eliminated exchange rate risk among its member states, Germany has invested a substantial portion of its savings in Europe’s current account deficit countries. Some of those savings are now returning home. That’s the capital flight.
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  • The ECB stepped into the void left by foreign investors pulling their savings out of these current account deficit countries by lending their banks more money.
  • When large capital flight to Germany occurred before the euro’s introduction, the deutschemark would appreciate against other European currencies. While pegged against the deutschemark, these exchange rates were still flexible. That flexibility disappeared with the euro. When capital flight occurs today, the Bundesbank effectively ends up with loans to the other national central banks that are reflected in the TARGET2 claims on the Eurosystem. 
  • Debt overhangs persist, growth is mediocre and the governance structure – a common monetary policy without a centralized fiscal policy – is a challenge.
  • The ECB has allowed banks to borrow as much money as they want for up to three years. Indeed, at the end of February banks were borrowing €1.2 trillion from the ECB, twelve times the amount of their required reserves. With so much excess liquidity in the money markets, further capital flight is likely to cause a disproportionable share of this money to end up in Germany
  • Concerned about the stability of the euro, Germany’s savers are shifting their money into real estate. German residential house prices and rents rose by 4.7% last year, the fastest increase since 1993’s reunification boom. So far, Germans are not leveraging to buy houses. Growth in German mortgages is paltry at just 1.2% per annum according to the ECB as of December 2011, but in our view all ingredients for a debt-financed house price boom are there. Distrust in the euro is rising,
  • The ECB’s generous monetary policy will delay the internal devaluation adjustment of the eurozone’s current account deficit countries.
  • Mexico’s current account deficit fell by 5.3% of GDP in 1995, according to Haver Analytics, in the wake of capital flight following the government’s decision to float the peso in 1994, while its recession lasted only one year.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: The non-puzzle of peripheral pain | The Economist - 0 views

  • Mystery mostly solved, then; the rich periphery's riches relative to Germany were largely a short-run phenomenon driven by a dramatic short-run divergence in house price trends.
  • Investors who bet that productivity growth would be much faster in the south were wrong.* All the prices and wages set on the basis of the expectation of faster productivity growth were correspondingly wrong and needed to adjust. Real effective exchange rates were badly out of alignment.
  • Two things began happening in the euro zone in 2007. Growth in the number of euros spent every year began slowing, and the distribution of euro spending within the euro area began shifting back northward.
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  • The picture is one in which there are many fewer euros floating around the euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and the distribution of those euros is moving northward.
  • It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  The overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.
  • This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.
  • Where prices were rigid, as in goods and labour markets, fewer euros meant slow disinflation but rapid contraction in output and a big rise in unemployment.
  • Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.
  • Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.
  • If there had been no single currency, the northward capital flight would have depreciated peripheral currencies. Had the periphery borrowed in its own currency, that would have imposed losses on its foreign creditors while also boosting its export industry. Had peripheral economies instead borrowed in dollars or deutschmarks their debt burdens would have ballooned with depreciation, potentially pushing banks and sovereigns into default—but the depreciation boost to competitiveness would have remained. Either way, the depreciation of the currency would effectively shrink the value of wealth in the periphery.
  • The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.
  • This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.
  • as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster
  • For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.
Gene Ellis

Colm McCarthy: The eurozone is still at risk and we need to get our house in order - An... - 0 views

  • Friday's two-notch downgrade of Italy by ratings agency Moody's explicitly mentions default risk and eurozone fracturing.
  • History teaches that muddle rather than conspiracy lies behind even the greatest turning points and the doubters are being too quick on the draw.
  • accompanied by some rowing back from the apparently significant decisions taken at the summit on June 28 and 29.
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  • These thoughts are spurred by the rather weak communique, which followed the meeting earlier last week of eurogroup finance ministers in Brussels,
  • There is, as yet, no mechanism in place to ensure bond market support to Spain and Italy and nobody, except the ECB, has the funds to keep their governments funded, should they be forced from the market. The ECB has suspended its bond-buying programme so the high-wire act continues, without a safety net.
  • The eurozone could face a major crisis at short notice if either country experiences serious trouble selling government paper, which both must do in large volume and on a continuing basis.
  • The avoidance of default on the core sovereign debt, the debt undertaken without duress by the Irish State, is a legitimate objective of national policy.
  • It had become clear, early in 2010, that the blanket bank guarantee would bankrupt the Irish State, and the Government finally began to acknowledge that haircuts for senior, but unsecured, bank bondholders had become unavoidable.
  • As far as I am aware, this is the first time in the history of central banking that a sovereign state has been compelled, to the point of national insolvency, and by its own central bank (by our Government's choice, the ECB), to make whole those who foolishly purchased bonds issued by private banks, which had gone bust and been closed down.
Gene Ellis

Why Is Zambia So Poor? And Will Things Ever Get Better? - 0 views

  • Sixty-four percent of the population lives on less than $1 per day, 14 percent have HIV, 40 percent don’t have access to clean drinking water. Almost 90 percent of women in rural areas cannot read or write. Name a category—schools, health care, environment—and I’ll give you statistics that will depress the shit out of you.
  • For more than 150 years, the only reason to come to Kitwe—to Zambia, really—was the copper.
  • Most of the buildings in Kitwe, the roads, the health clinics, the schools, were built by the national mining company
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  • At its peak, the Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines company employed more than 65,000 Zambians and carried out services like water delivery and waste collection for five cities in the Copper Belt Province.
  • Mining employment has dropped to just 30,000, half of its glory-days peak, and the job of maintaining all that company housing and infrastructure has reverted back to the government.
  • The stats identify Switzerland as Zambia’s primary export market. This is not an indicator that Zambia hosts a thriving chocolate and suspenders sector, but rather that its copper trades are booked in the jurisdiction where they are least likely to be taxed.
  • Many of the mining companies pay just 0.6 percent royalties to Zambia, far below the already-meager industry standard of three percent.
  • And then there’s the Chinese. They arrived like a well-packed picnic, everything in shipping crates ready to be unpacked. Their own materials, their own equipment, their own workers, their own fences. If you were designing a foreign investment not to benefit the host community, this is what it would look like.
  • This is Namwile Uzondile, the director of a rural health education project.
  • Last year Namwile conducted a survey of prostitutes here in Kitwe, and found that at least half of them had education certificates, but couldn’t find work. Most had been married off early, 15 or 16, and since then had either left their husbands or lost them to AIDS.
  • First, you go to the tribal chief. Ninety-four percent of the land in Zambia is customary or traditional, no one has a title to it. It’s not just sitting there, people are living on it, farming, grazing animals, it’s just technically under the control of a chief.
  • In Zambia most of the chiefs require a gift just to get a meeting. This might mean taking them lunch at a restaurant in Lusaka, or it could mean buying their daughter a car—it’s up to them.
  • Another reason Zambia lacks skills is that some parts of the workforce operate as cartels. Take lawyers. Zambia only has 1,000 of them, and they’re concentrated where the money is: Lusaka (government), Copper Belt (mining) and Livingstone (safari tourists).
  • Last year, only six lawyers were admitted to the bar out of 164 who took the exam. The year before that, it was 16 out of 145. Keep in mind, these aren’t people coming in off the streets. These are people who have a law degree.
  • More than 60 percent of Zambia’s government revenue comes from the copper mines.
  • Taxing all this informal activity would be costly in both resources and voter goodwill. In 2012, Zambia collected just $2.3 million in income taxes from its citizens.
  • It goes as high up as you want to follow it. Michael Sata, the president of Zambia, appointed his uncle the finance minister, his nephew the deputy finance minister, his niece the local government minister, and cousins as ambassador to Japan and chief justice.
  • Zambia’s cabinet has ballooned to 20 ministers and 47 deputy ministers, the largest in Africa. With salaries three to four times higher than opposition MPs and each ministerial post bundled with perks like a company car, free fuel, house servants, and mobile phone talk-time, you get the feeling politicians aren’t jumping from opposition into government on moral sentiment alone.
  • But even if Zambia was run by a coalition of charitable technocrats and Mormon philanthropists, that wouldn’t solve the most fundamental problem of all: There simply isn’t that much money to go around.
  • In 2011, Zambia spent a total of $4.3 billion running itself. Stretch that to cover every man, woman, and child, and it amounts to just $325 per person per year. That amount—less than a dollar per person per day—has to cover education, health care, infrastructure, law enforcement, foreign debt … everything.
  • Now she goes all NGO. “Little government capacity,” she says, is the nicest way to put it. “There are simply no systems for routine government services,” she says. Getting a license, a permit, certificates, approvals to start work, visas for expats to fly down here—nothing is in one place, nothing is fast or easy.
  • And that’s just the bureaucracy. Then there are the cops that pull you over to ask for 50 kwacha ($10); the schools with slots reserved for paying parents; the hospitals that swear the earliest appointment, the only available medicine, is six months away until you reach into your pocket.
  • “Sometimes we have to pay for the inspectors to come to our mines,” Jane says.
  • The conversation goes like this: Jane tells the local certification body that she needs an inspector to sign off for a permit. The local certification body tells her that they would be happy to come out to the site, but they don’t have fuel for their cars, or enough petty cash to pay per diems. Jane offers to pay their costs, but only their costs, and the payments aren’t related to clearing the inspection.
  • The company has even paid the police to follow up on complaints or to investigate thefts. “They say, ‘We don’t have this in our budget’ or ‘We’ll need you to pay for it,’” Jane says. So the company fixes the police cars, covers their travel expenses, treats them to lunch.
  • “We tell them, ‘The company I work for, we’re not going to pay up.’ But at the end of the day, they know you’re on a short timeline, and they aren’t.”
  • Thomas’ family told him his nephews didn’t need to be in school. From their perspective, that’s not totally irrational. In a country with so few formal jobs and so much competition for getting them, I can see how spending hundreds of hours, thousands of kwachas, on education would seem superfluous. Thomas’ daughter wants to become a lawyer. You could almost forgive Thomas if he told her that the bar exam failure rate is more than 90 percent, so what’s the use?
  • International investors pledged $750 million last year to build infrastructure.
Gene Ellis

Eurozone: Looking for growth | vox - 0 views

  • Empirical evidence suggests deleveraging episodes accompanied by a housing crisis will take on average five and a half years across high-income OECD countries (or seven years when accompanied by a banking crisis (Aspachs-Bracon et al. 2011, IMF 2012).
  • Little resolution of banking-sector difficulties in the Eurozone suggests that deleveraging and credit will probably remain slow and impaired for much longer than previously thought. Recoveries that happen without credit are, on average, a third longer than recovery episodes with credit (Darvas 2013).
  • Damages to trend growth are notoriously difficult to assess,
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  • In addition, observed GDP growth tends to be revised until several years after the first estimate
  • Our work is based on a simple Solow growth-accounting methodology.
  • A common feature of all economies is a collapse in productivity, which is typical of a big recession. In addition, Spain and Italy also underwent a very sharp labour contraction.
  • The additional effect of ageing.
  • A downside risk is that investment growth does not recover fully (for example, because banks fail to provide the necessary funding). In this case, we assume investment growth is only half what it was before the onset of economic turmoil.
  • We also estimate productivity through a convergence equation, which would slightly lift productivity in peripheral countries in the future.
  • This exercise suggests that in the absence of policy reforms, trend growth will have been damaged significantly, by at least one percentage point, post-crisis, compared with pre-crisis levels,
  • In the event that investment fails to recover quickly
  •  or unemployment levels take longer to fall than in previous recovery episodes, then trend growth would be significantly lower for longer. Trend growth might well remain negative in Spain and Italy, and may fail to increase for Germany or France.
  • this exercise shows the damage will indeed be long lasting, permanently impairing growth in a context of an ageing population that needs higher growth capacity than ever before.
Gene Ellis

A Fracking Good Story by Bjørn Lomborg - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • Carbon-dioxide emissions in the United States have dropped to their lowest level in 20 years.
  • this year’s expected CO2 emissions have declined by more than 800 million tons, or 14%, from their peak in 2007.
  • The cause is an unprecedented switch to natural gas, which emits 45% less carbon per energy unit. The US used to generate about half its electricity from coal, and roughly 20% from gas. Over the past five years, those numbers have changed, first slowly and now dramatically: in April of this year, coal’s share in power generation plummeted to just 32%, on par with gas.
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  • For starters, fracking has caused gas prices to drop dramatically.
  • Indeed, US carbon emissions have dropped some 20% per capita, and are now at their lowest level since Dwight D. Eisenhower left the White House in 1961.
  • the shift from coal to natural gas has reduced US emissions by 400-500 megatonnes (Mt) of CO2 per year. To put that number in perspective, it is about twice the total effect of the Kyoto Protocol on carbon emissions in the rest of the world, including the European Union.
  • America’s 30,000 wind turbines reduce emissions by just one-tenth the amount that natural gas does. Biofuels reduce emissions by only ten Mt, and solar panels by a paltry three Mt.
  • Since 1990, the EU has heavily subsidized solar and wind energy at a cost of more than $20 billion annually. Yet its per capita CO2 emissions have fallen by less than half of the reduction achieved in the US – even in percentage terms, the US is now doing better.
  • Along with the closure of German nuclear power stations, this has led, ironically, to a resurgence of coal.
Gene Ellis

PORTFOLIO.HU | Blanchard: Eurozone integration needs to go forward or go back, but it c... - 0 views

  • There is no question that, when it was introduced, inflation targeting represented progress. But we have learnt that it has serious limitations. You can have an economy in which inflation is stable and low, but behind the scenes the composition of the output is wrong, and the financial system accumulates risks. It’s very clear that, to deal with all these issues, just using the policy rate is not enough.
  • The way to think about monetary policy in the future is that the central bank has in effect two sets of tools. One is a traditional one, the policy interest rate. The other is the set of macro prudential tools, from loan to value ratios, to cyclical capital ratios, etc. If there is a housing boom, you do not want to kill it through an increase in the policy rate which would affect the whole economy. You want to use measures that will limit mortgage lending to households.
  • I think that it has either to go forward or to go back, but it cannot stay where it is. I think nobody really wants to go back, so it has to go forward.
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  • I suspect that, in order to limit country specific shocks, euro members may have to actively use macro prudential tools such as rules on the amount of liquidity that banks should hold, or upper limit to loans to value ratios, much more so that they have in the past.
  • If the U.S. and a number of other advanced countries are going to decrease their current account deficits, then some countries will have to decrease their current account surpluses. And for this to happen, there has to be, among other changes, an adjustment of the exchange rates. Put more bluntly, most emerging markets have to accept an appreciation.
Gene Ellis

Why We Lie - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • "I was amazed at how quickly and easily this guy was able to open the door," Peter said. The locksmith told him that locks are on doors only to keep honest people honest. One percent of people will always be honest and never steal. Another 1% will always be dishonest and always try to pick your lock and steal your television; locks won't do much to protect you from the hardened thieves, who can get into your house if they really want to. The purpose of locks, the locksmith said, is to protect you from the 98% of mostly honest people who might be tempted to try your door if it had no lock.
  • What we have found, in a nutshell: Everybody has the capacity to be dishonest, and almost everybody cheats—just by a little. Except for a few outliers at the top and bottom, the behavior of almost everyone is driven by two opposing motivations. On the one hand, we want to benefit from cheating and get as much money and glory as possible; on the other hand, we want to view ourselves as honest, honorable people. Sadly, it is this kind of small-scale mass cheating, not the high-profile cases, that is most corrosive to society.
  • It has shown rather conclusively that cheating does not correspond to the traditional, rational model of human behavior—that is, the idea that people simply weigh the benefits (say, money) against the costs (the possibility of getting caught and punished) and act accordingly.
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  • All of this means that, although it is obviously important to pay attention to flagrant misbehaviors, it is probably even more important to discourage the small and more ubiquitous forms of dishonesty—the misbehavior that affects all of us, as both perpetrators and victims.
Gene Ellis

Bringer of Prosperity or Bottomless Pit? 'Putting the Virtuous in the Dock Rather than ... - 0 views

  • You should look at it more holistically. We wouldn't have been able to increase our exports if the other countries had behaved like us and had not increased their demand for an entire decade.
  • Excluding Greece from the union would be the completely wrong approach. Greece's problem is its inefficiency in terms of public finances. That can be corrected.
  • Starbatty: In my experience, speculators are only successful when political promises diverge from economic reality, as has become clear in Greece.
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  • In the German Council of Economic Experts, we proposed a consolidation pact, under which each country would be required to specify a fully verifiable path that it will follow as it puts its financial house in order. It wouldn't just be a solution for Greece; it would be for everyone.
  • And you seriously believe that would help? Following that approach, the Greeks would save themselves to death, just as the Germans did in the early 1930s under then-Reich Chancellor Heinrich Brüning. What you expect the Greeks to do is Brüning squared. The real problem is that Greece shouldn't have been accepted into the monetary union in the first place.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      An important point:  the role of German policy in allowing 1.3 million short-term workers into the labor market, and its role in lowering the tax on labor.
  • But such a pact would be circumscribed to helping countries help themselves.
  • But government debt is still growing considerably. Doesn't this also increase the risk of inflation? Starbatty: That's what I assume. Inflation would be an elegant means of reducing debt, and many academics are discussing this scenario. But it becomes truly problematic when government bonds eventually lose their status as a safe haven. If China or Japan arrive at this conclusion and sell their bonds, a bubble could burst that is far more dangerous than any other bubble. If that happens, markets will plunge, and interest rates will shoot up.
  • Likewise, when it comes to assistance, I think we have a clear legal framework, according to which neither any member state nor the entire Union can be held liable for the debt of another member state.
  • its 1.3 million short-time workers do not find regular employment again,
  • The European Central Bank would never, ever contemplate using inflation to eliminate debt.
Gene Ellis

U.S. Ports Seek to Lure Big Ships After Panama Canal Expands - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • But, he said, containers loaded on the West Coast, which has built up its container yards and highway and rail infrastructure, can outrun those that travel to the East Coast by water, and that can make the difference when speed and dependability are more important than cost alone
  • Besides, he added, costs and fees can shift; Panama can be expected to raise rates for canal passage, and “the railroads are not going to sit idly by” and let the water route undercut their business.
  • After Hurricane Katrina, Gov. Haley Barbour of Mississippi trumpeted plans for a “port of the future” at Gulfport with a 50-foot-deep channel, redirecting some $600 million in federal housing disaster funds on a project he pledged would spur the economy and create bountiful jobs.
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  • To Robert Puentes, a transportation expert at the Brookings Institution, the problem of whether the ports are overbuilding for a Panama payoff is one of planning. “We are the only industrialized country on the planet that doesn’t have a comprehensive freight policy,” he said.
Gene Ellis

IMF's Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped By Meta-Uncertainty - WSJ.com - 0 views

  • In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy.
  • This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%.
  • What Europe needs to do:
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  • These countries have to do what they need to do. There’s no question there has to be fiscal consolidation. We can discuss the pace, but it has to happen. The other is competitiveness, which I see as much tougher of the two.
  • It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.
  • Take the big two, Italy and Spain. You can always dream of more, but I think they’re serious about doing it, both on the fiscal front and the structural-reforms front. I think it may well be that even if they do everything they can, and do it right, it’s still not enough. They have to have help — I would say when needed rather than if needed.
  • The banks have to be recapped, and they have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on the agenda. I don’t think they can make it without help to the banks.
  • If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates
  • And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.
  • It’s not that I don’t care about the way it’s done. But I care about the result. These countries, if they’re doing the right things, they have to be able to finance themselves.
  • Some people say a euro depreciation would help Europe a lot. I think there is an argument for it, even in a multilateral context. You have to depreciate vis-a-vis somebody, so somebody has to appreciate. My sense is we would like most of the depreciation to be vis-a-vis emerging-market countries. Even if there was a depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar, I still think it would be a good thing.
  • We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. The footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. The countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
  • There’s no question, the periphery countries have to improve their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at the level of the euro or fiscal policy can do. This they have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.
  • It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.
  • And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.
  • At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.
  • Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.
Gene Ellis

Tracing Germs Through the Aisles - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • More than 70 percent of all the antibiotics used in the United States are given to animals.
  • Agribusiness groups disagree and say the main problem is overuse of antibiotic treatments for people. Bugs rarely migrate from animals to people, and even when they do, the risk they pose to human health is negligible, the industry contends.
  • He is comparing the genetic sequences of E. coli germs resistant to multiple antibiotics found in the meat samples to the ones that have caused urinary tract infections in people (mostly women).
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  • Urinary infections were chosen because they are so common. American women get more than eight million of them a year. In rare cases the infections enter the bloodstream and are fatal.
  • A new strain of the antibiotic-resistant bug MRSA, for example, was first detected in people in Holland in 2003, and now represents 40 percent of the MRSA infections in humans in that country, according to Jan Kluytmans, a Dutch researcher. That same strain was common in pigs on farms before it was found in people, scientists say.
  • He thinks the Food and Drug Administration’s efforts to limit antibiotic use on farms have been weak. In 1977, the F.D.A. said it would begin to ban some agricultural uses of antibiotics. But the House and Senate appropriations committees — dominated by agricultural interests — passed resolutions against the ban, and the agency retreated. More recently, the agency has limited the use of two important classes of antibiotics in animals. But advocates say it needs to go further and ban use of all antibiotics for growth promotion. Sweden and Denmark have already done so.
  • Ms. Slaughter said aggressive lobbying by agribusiness interests has played a major role in blocking passage of legislation.
  • But the economics of food presents perhaps the biggest obstacle. On large industrial farms, animals are raised in close contact with one another and with big concentrations of bacteria-laden feces and urine. Antibiotics keep infections at bay but also create drug resistance.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: Debtors' prison | The Economist - 0 views

  • But the reforms often fail to work. The Spanish law is intended to promote restructuring of viable firms but in practice most insolvencies end in liquidation after lengthy court proceedings.
  • High household debt helps explain why the Netherlands, along with Italy and Spain, remained in recession in the second quarter of 2013 even as the euro area in general embarked on recovery. Dutch GDP this year will be 2% lower than in 2011 and more than 3% below its previous peak, in 2008.
  • it illustrates the malign effect of high debt when house prices fall
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  • One aim of the exercise is to identify the bad debts that are fouling up euro-zone banks and preventing the flow of new credit. This is important because parts of the single-currency area are crippled not just by public borrowing but by private debt, most of which is sitting on banking books.
  • High private debt is more detrimental to growth than high public debt, according to recent research by the IMF.
  • The malign effect of high private debt becomes apparent in the busts that follow credit-driven booms. Households that have borrowed too much in relation to their income trim their spending, the main component of GDP. Overleveraged firms avoid investing and concentrate on shrinking their balance-sheets by paying off loans. As bad debts erode their capital, banks become more reluctant to lend. These adverse trends reinforce each other, increasing the overall drag on growth.
  • Other balance-sheet indicators also suggest that Italian business is in a bad way. For example, 30% of corporate debt is owed by firms whose pre-tax earnings are less than the interest payments they have to make. That share of frail companies is even higher in Spain and Portugal (40% and nearly 50% respectively).
  • Little progress has been made to lighten the private-debt burden since the crisis began. Though it eased in Spain from 227% of GDP in 2009 to 215% in 2012, it rose over the same period in Cyprus, Ireland and Portugal. In Britain, by contrast, private debt fell from 207% of GDP in 2009 to 190% in 2012 thanks to improvements by both households and firms.
  • There is an inherent contradiction between the need for debtor countries in the euro zone to regain competitiveness through lower prices and at the same time to ease excessive debt with a dose of inflation.
  • Firms that have overborrowed are reluctant to embark on new ventures, and banks are in any case reluctant to lend because their balance-sheets are peppered with bad debts. This unhappy state of affairs prevails throughout southern Europe though its precise causes vary.
Gene Ellis

Multinationals beach tax bills in Spanish shells - FT.com - 0 views

  • From here a single employee presided over a company that from 2009 to 2011 made €9.9bn of net profits, all while earning an annual salary of only €55,000.
  • Exxon’s Spanish subsidiary was structured as a so-called ETVE, a type of holding company used by many multinationals, including Hewlett-Packard, Pepsi, Eli Lilly, Anheuser-Busch InBev and Vodafone.
  • According to the ETVE’s 2009 accounts, Exxon was able to transfer €3.6bn of dividends from its unit in Luxembourg to Spain. A dividend of €2.26bn was then paid on to its US parent without incurring withholding taxes that it would typically have to pay when moving money outside of the EU.
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  • ransfers from a Luxembourg company to the US would have typically been subject to a withholding tax. Last year, after attracting the attention of Spanish tax authorities, Exxon quietly closed down the operation.
  • “Normally you would have to pay a 10 per cent withholding tax at source to send profits to the US,
  • Spain introduced the ETVE in the mid-1990s to encourage foreign investment, and better compete with Luxembourg and Holland for international companies seeking tax-efficient European holding structures. It also allowed for foreign companies to take advantage of Spain’s strong network of bilateral tax treaties with countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which can offer more favourable tax rates than other countries. Once the ETVE has been established all overseas dividends that are paid into it are exempt from tax in Spain, and can be easily moved on to a final destination, providing a small number of conditions have been met. Most importantly, corporation tax must have been paid in the country of origin on the dividends being transferred, and companies using ETVEs to house shareholdings in foreign subsidiaries must not be resident in any country identified by Spain as a tax haven.
  • In fact, Linthal is an ETVE used by Ambev, a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch InBev, the Belgian-based brewer, to distribute dividends from several Latin American beer brands, such as Argentina’s Quilmes and Cervecería Boliviana Nacional, to its holding company in Brazil.
Gene Ellis

Silicon Valley Tries to Remake the Idea Machine - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Silicon Valley Tries to Remake the Idea Machine
  • The federal government now spends $126 billion a year on R. and D., according to the National Science Foundation. (It’s pocket change compared with the $267 billion that the private sector spends.) Asian economies now account for 34 percent of global spending; America’s share is 30 percent.
  • Perhaps more crucial, the invention of much of the stuff that really created jobs and energized the economy — the Internet, the mouse, smartphones, among countless other ideas — was institutionalized. Old-fashioned innovation factories, like Xerox PARC and Bell Labs, were financed by large companies and operated under the premise that scientists should be given large budgets, a supercomputer or two and plenty of time to make discoveries and work out the kinks of their quixotic creations.
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  • “It’s the unique ingredient of the U.S. business model — not just smart scientists in universities, but a critical mass of very smart scientists working in the neighborhood of commercial businesses,
  • Start-ups became so cheap to create — founders can just rent space in the cloud from Amazon instead of buying servers and buildings to house them — that it became easier and more efficient for big companies to simply buy new ideas rather than coming up with the framework for inventing them. Some of Google’s largest businesses, like Android and Maps, were acquired.
  • Microsoft Research just announced the opening of a skunk-works group called Special Projects.
  • All of their parent companies, however, are determined to learn from the mistakes that Xerox and AT&T made, namely failing to capitalize on their own research. It’s Valley lore, after all, that companies like Apple and Fairchild Semiconductor built their fame and fortune on research done at Xerox and Bell.
  • Astro Teller
  • Google X does the inverse: It picks products to make, then hires people specifically to build them: artists and philosophers and designers, many of whom don’t even know what they’ll be working on until they join.
  • The word ‘basic’ implies ‘unguided,’ and ‘unguided’ is probably best put in government-funded universities rather than industry.”
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