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Global flows in a digital age

Now, one in three goods crosses national borders, and more than one-third of financial investments are international transactions. In the next decade, global flows could triple,

we find that countries with a larger number of connections in the global network of flows increase their GDP growth by up to 40 percent more than less connected countries do. The penalty for being left behind is rising.

Reversing the Flow of Oil

“Economically, it means that money that was flowing out of the United States into sovereign wealth funds and treasuries around the world will now stay in the U.S. and be invested in the U.S., creating jobs. It doesn’t change everything, but it certainly provides a new dimension to U.S. influence in the world.”

The oil bounty is thanks to modern production techniques including hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, which involves injecting water and chemicals into the ground to crack oil-saturated shale.

Africa losing billions from fraud and tax avoidance

In total, the continent lost about $850bn between 1970 and 2008, the report said. An estimated $217.7bn was illegally transferred out of Nigeria over that period, while Egypt lost $105.2bn and South Africa more than $81.8bn.

African Union’s (AU) high-level panel on illicit financial flows and the UN economic commission for Africa (Uneca).

Kiev Struggles to Break Russia’s Grip on Gas Flow

Global flows in a digital age

Global flows in a digital age

Deposit flight from Spanish banks has been gaining pace and it is not clear a euro zone agreement to lend Madrid up to 100 billion euros in rescue funds will reverse the flows if investors fear Spain may face a full sovereign bailout.

Many banks are reorganising, or being forced to reorganise, along national lines, accentuating a deepening north-south divide within the currency bloc.

Since government credit ratings and bond yields effectively set a floor for the borrowing costs of banks and businesses in their jurisdiction, the best-managed Spanish or Italian banks or companies have to pay far more for loans, if they can get them, than their worst-managed German or Dutch peers.

This coincided with the bubble years in peripheral Eurozone countries (2003-07). The effect of this is that Germany accumulated large net claims on Eurozone countries, which at the end of 2011 amounted to €634 billion.

Since 2009, when the TARGET2 balances started to take off, current account deficits of the peripheral countries as a whole declined from 9.1% of their GDP to 4.5%. These declines were mainly due to deep recessions in these countries.

the German banking system was lending the money to other Eurozone countries to allow them to buy surplus German products – a highly risky affair.

This narrative ignores one critical fact: Every irresponsible borrower is enabled by an irresponsible lender.

“Following the introduction of the euro,” he said, “a large amount of capital flowed into the countries which are now at the center of the crisis, such as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus.” What he didn’t say was how much of that capital flowed from Germany. In the second quarter of 2010, German banks had more assets in Greece than banks from any other country except France. They had more assets in Ireland than banks from any other country except the U.K. And they had more assets in Spain than banks from any other country, period.

Before the euro, when Germans saved, their current account balance rose, and with it, the value of the deutsche mark. After 2002 you could save in euros in Dortmund, and without currency risk your bank would invest in euros abroad

Russia Steps Up Economic Pressure on Kiev

Russia is now asking close to $500 for 1,000 cubic meters of gas, the standard unit for gas trade in Europe, which is a price about a third higher than what Russia’s gas company, Gazprom, charges clients elsewhere. Russia says the increase is justified because it seized control of the Crimean Peninsula, where its Black Sea naval fleet is stationed, ending the need to pay rent for the Sevastopol base. The base rent had been paid in the form of a $100 per 1,000 cubic meter discount on natural gas for Ukraine’s national energy company, Naftogaz.

Mr. Yatsenyuk raised the pressing need to build an interconnector pipe allowing for a so-called reverse flow from the European Union into the Ukrainian gas system. “We need reverse flows of gas from the European Union to support Ukraine’s energy security,” Mr. Yatsenyuk said.

Harnessing the power of shifting global flows

The gas flowing into Ukraine as of Monday was meant only to transit the country to Europe. “Gazprom supplies to Ukraine only the amount that has been paid for, and the amount that has been paid for is zero,” Gazprom’s spokesman, Sergei Kupriyanov, told reporters.

Gazprom, which has sought for the past decade to convince the Europeans that it is a reliable supplier and not an arm of Russian foreign policy, painted the dispute as strictly commercial.

Second, Gazprom has provoked economic ire in Europe over its plans to build an alternative gas route under the Black Sea for the company’s exclusive use, contradicting Europe’s open access laws. That has put the future of what is known as the South Stream pipeline in doubt.

A European Energy Executive’s Delicate Dance Over Ukraine

Major Western oil companies like BP and Exxon Mobil have extensive exploration deals in Russia that they fear could be jeopardized if the United States and European Union impose stiffer sanctions on the Putin regime.

“This is by far the toughest time for European energy security that I have seen,” said Mr. Scaroni. “This issue might stop the supply of Russian gas.”

Gross trade accounting: A transparent method to discover global value chain-related information behind official trade data: Part 1

With the rapid increase in intermediate trade flows, trade economists and policymakers have reached a near consensus that official trade statistics based on gross terms are deficient, often hiding the extent of global value chains. There is also widespread recognition among the official international statistics agencies that fragmentation of global production requires a new approach to measure trade, in particular the need to measure trade in value-added. This led the WTO and the OECD to launch a joint “Measuring Trade in Value-Added” initiative on 15 March 2012, which is designed to mainstream the production of trade in value-added statistics and make them a permanent part of the statistical landscape.

All the estimation methods used in recent efforts to measure trade in value-added are rooted in Leontief (1936). His work demonstrated that the amount and type of intermediate inputs needed in the production of one unit of output can be estimated based on the input-output structures across countries and industries.

Cross-border capital flows abruptly collapsed. Almost five years later, they remain 60% below their pre-crisis peak.

After expanding across national borders with the creation of the euro, eurozone banks have now reduced cross-border lending and other claims within the eurozone by $2.8 trillion since the end of 2007. Other types of cross-border investment in Europe have fallen by more than half. The rationale for the euro’s creation – the financial and economic integration of Europe – is now being undermined.

Current trends seem to be leading toward a more fragmented global financial system in which countries rely primarily on domestic capital formation. Sharper regional disparities in the availability and cost of capital could emerge, particularly for smaller businesses and consumers, constraining investment and growth in some countries. And, while a more balkanized financial system does reduce the likelihood of global shocks creating volatility in far-flung markets, it may also concentrate risks within local banking systems and increase the chance of domestic financial crises.

That is a sign that E.C.B. measures have not yet succeeded in restoring the flow of credit to troubled countries like Spain.

But the E.C.B.’s efforts have been thwarted by continued reluctance by banks, many of which are already burdened by bad loans and are trying to reduce risk. In some countries there may also be a lack of demand for loans, because corporate managers are not confident enough to resume investing in their businesses.

Expansion was, for lack of other options, financed largely through short-term loans.

since the onset of the global financial crisis, eurozone-based banks’ subsidiaries in emerging Europe have been reducing their exposure to the region. In 2009-2010, the European Bank Coordination Initiative – known informally as the “Vienna Initiative” – helped to avert a systemic crisis in developing Europe by stopping foreign-owned parent banks from staging a catastrophic stampede to the exits.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphBut, in the second half of 2011, the eurozone-based parent banks that dominate emerging Europe’s banking sector came under renewed pressure to deleverage. Many are now radically changing their business models to reduce risk.

In this world, financial bubbles matter, capital flows are of dubious merit, low interest rates fail to stimulate growth and government spending becomes the only tool with real traction to spur economic activity.

With total government debt in the rich world stuck at around 100 percent of its combined economic output, there is a legitimate fear that a rise in interest rates could tip off a financial death spiral. Moreover, if countries with debt levels well under 50 percent of G.D.P. were so devastated by the crisis, it is hard to imagine what might happen to them if another were to hit them.

If so, the urgent task is what kind of limits should be imposed on banking and the rest of finance to temper its propensity to careen toward disaster.