Skip to main content

Home/ Global Economy/ Group items tagged crisis

Rss Feed Group items tagged

Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: The most important number | The Economist - 0 views

  •  
    Why decreasing unemployment is the criterion...
Gene Ellis

Some thoughts on German politics and the saver's tax in Cyprus | Credit Writedowns - 0 views

  • Now, the large 82.8% German government debt to GDP ratio is a source of shame for many because Germany was a driving force in enshrining the 60% government debt to GDP hurdle into the Maastricht Treaty that set out terms for the euro zone.
  • Moreover, the interest rate policy of the ECB, geared as it was to the slow growth core, produced negative real interest rates and credit bubbles in Spain and Ireland during the last decade. German banks piled in to those countries as prospects domestically stagnated.
  • “The average German worker feels like a cash cow being sucked dry by a quick succession of reforms and bailouts that take money out of her pocket. First it was for reunification, then for European integration, then to right the economy, then to bail out German banks, and finally to bail out the European periphery. Fatigue has set in.”
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • The bottom line is that none of the major political parties in Germany are going to vote for bailouts for other euro zone countries unless massive strings are attached, since these bailouts are political losers.
  • The anti-bailout part of the FDP platform is the one part of their rhetoric which could successfully take them over the 5% hurdle. The FDP’s complicity in using German taxpayer money to bail out the so-called profligate periphery is a one-way ticket out of Parliament.
  • “First, the Greek reports come via statements made by Michael Fuchs, CDU deputy Bundestag head and a senior member of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party. Fuchs warned earlier today that Germany would veto further aid to Greece if the country has not met the conditions of its previous bailouts.
  • “Second, all along Germany has indicated that it is resistant to increasing funding of the ESM and EFSF bailout facilities. This presents a problem in the case of Spain and Italy because of the size of those economies.
  • Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, has been most vocal in predicting that these facilities will be inadequate when Spain and Italy hit the wall and that more extreme measures will have to be taken.
  • The basic dilemma here is that almost all of the eurozone governments including Germany carry high debt burdens in excess of the Maastricht Treaty. For example, Germany has been in breach of Maastricht Treaty in 8 of 10 years since 2002, has been over the Maastricht 60% hurdle in each of those ten years, and now carries a debt to GDP burden above 80%.
  • The long and short of it was that the Germans had reached the end of their ability to support bailouts.
  • All evidence is that this levy has created panic in Cyprus. After all, what is the use of having a deposit guarantee if government can arbitrarily circumvent it to impose losses on your deposits anyway?
  • One can't just blame Cyprus for this fiasco. The ECB, EC and European Union finance ministers signed off on the insured deposit grab too]
  • My view? It was inevitable that we would be in crisis again. The austerity world view of crisis resolution is completely at odds with the capacity of the euro zone’s institutional architecture to handle a crisis.
Gene Ellis

The Eurozone's Delayed Reckoning by Nouriel Roubini - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • For starters, the European Central Bank’s “outright monetary transactions” program has been incredibly effective: interest-rate spreads for Spain and Italy have fallen by about 250 basis points, even before a single euro has been spent to purchase government bonds.
  • The introduction of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), which provides another €500 billion ($650 billion) to be used to backstop banks and sovereigns, has also helped, as has European leaders’ recognition that a monetary union alone is unstable and incomplete, requiring deeper banking, fiscal, economic, and political integration.
  • But, perhaps most important, Germany’s attitude toward the eurozone in general, and Greece in particular, has changed. German officials now understand that, given extensive trade and financial links, a disorderly eurozone hurts not just the periphery but the core.
  • ...10 more annotations...
  • GDP continues to shrink,
  • Moreover, balkanization of economic activity, banking systems, and public-debt markets continues, as foreign investors flee the eurozone periphery and seek safety in the core.
  • Likewise, competitiveness losses have been partly reversed as wages have lagged productivity growth, thus reducing unit labor costs, and some structural reforms are ongoing.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      This, indeed, is the crux of the matter.
  • either the eurozone moves toward fuller integration (capped by political union to provide democratic legitimacy to the loss of national sovereignty on banking, fiscal, and economic affairs), or it will undergo disunion, dis-integration, fragmentation, and eventual breakup.
  • but countries like Germany, which were over-saving and running external surpluses, have not been forced to adjust by increasing domestic demand, so their trade surpluses have remained large.
  • German leaders fear that the risk-sharing elements of deeper integration
  • imply a politically unacceptable transfer union whereby Germany and the core unilaterally and permanently subsidize the periphery.
  • Of course, Germany fails to recognize that successful monetary unions like the United States have a full banking union with significant risk-sharing elements, and a fiscal union whereby idiosyncratic shocks to specific states’ output are absorbed by the federal budget. The US is also a large transfer union, in which richer states permanently subsidize the poorer ones.
    • Gene Ellis
       
      These are key features, built into the over-representation of the poorer, smaller, more agricultural, states; as well as in the central institutions.
  • But the fundamental crisis of the eurozone has not been resolved, and another year of muddling through could revive these risks in a more virulent form in 2014 and beyond. Unfortunately, the eurozone crisis is likely to remain with us for years to come, sustaining the likelihood of coercive debt restructurings and eurozone exits.
  •  
    Late 2012 reading
Gene Ellis

Solutions Remain Elusive After Financial Crisis - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • In this world, financial bubbles matter, capital flows are of dubious merit, low interest rates fail to stimulate growth and government spending becomes the only tool with real traction to spur economic activity.
  • With total government debt in the rich world stuck at around 100 percent of its combined economic output, there is a legitimate fear that a rise in interest rates could tip off a financial death spiral. Moreover, if countries with debt levels well under 50 percent of G.D.P. were so devastated by the crisis, it is hard to imagine what might happen to them if another were to hit them.
  • If so, the urgent task is what kind of limits should be imposed on banking and the rest of finance to temper its propensity to careen toward disaster.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • What good does the modern financial system do, for the rest of us? What determines financial fluctuations and shocks? How do they affect the broader economy? What can governments do to make them less disruptive? Economists have few answers.
Gene Ellis

David Ignatius: Mervyn King's hard lessons in Keynesian economics - The Washington Post - 0 views

  • As King struggled with the crisis, he concluded that the biggest vulnerability was the solvency of the banking system itself. The crash wasn’t just a liquidity squeeze caused by toxic assets; the problem was that big banks around the world were undercapitalized and, in many cases, insolvent.
  • King pushed the banks to recapitalize and, later, to accept more regulation. This upset a financial elite that, as King says, was the only sector of the British economy that had escaped the market revolution of the Margaret Thatcher years.
  • For King, the past decade reinforced the lessons Keynes drew from the 1930s: One is the psychological quirkiness of investors, which Keynes described as “animal spirits” on the upside and “extreme liquidity preference” on the down.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Then and now, monetary policy could not persuade frightened people to spend and invest.
  • The second Keynesian lesson was the need for some international structure to balance surplus and deficit nations.
  • Those global institutions are weak, but the real crisis has been within the euro zone, which has no effective internal balancing mechanism: It lacks a federal structure to transfer money from surplus Germany to deficit Greece, and it lacks flexible internal exchange rates that could allow a Greece or Spain to devalue its currency and find its own equilibrium.
  • Europe has responded to the crisis with the very British approach of muddling through, but King predicts it won’t work. Creating a true federal union, while an admirable goal, will be the work of a hundred years; the only quick way for countries to adjust is the breakup of the euro zone. King thinks the euro zone must confront the basic choice between accepting a transfer union or changing the membership of the monetary union. “Muddling through” isn’t a serious option.
Gene Ellis

Happy 2013? | vox - 0 views

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Hopefully the following ten observations are less controversial in 2013 than in previous years.
  • As long known by elementary textbook readers, austerity policies have contractionary effects.
  • Debt reduction is a very long process; we're talking about decades,
  • ...20 more annotations...
  • The debt-to-GDP ratio is best reduced through sustained nominal GDP growth.
  • Besides, having been there, no one really wants to unleash inflation anymore. That leaves us with real GDP growth as a necessary condition for bringing the debt-to-GDP down painlessly.
  • But in today’s world voters are angry at everything that is called Europe and will not back a fiscal union.
  • The crisis has delivered a surprising degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility.
  • This means that the need for dissolving the euro back into national currencies at almost any cost has evaporated.
  • Sustained real growth should be the number one priority.
  • In most Eurozone countries, structural reforms are as needed now as they were before the crisis.
  • Banks are at the heart of a diabolic loop: bank holdings of their national public debts (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
  • Massive forbearance has allowed many banks to not fully account for the losses that they incurred in 2007-8.
  • For that reason, they deleverage, which leads to a credit crunch, which slows growth down.
  • The ECB is the lender of last resort both to banks and to governments.
  • This involves massive moral hazard.
  • The long-hoped-for awakening of the ECB has produced several miracles, especially a major relaxation of market anguish.
  • Austerity policies must stop, now.
  • Growth will not return unless bank lending is adequately available.
  • The ECB may act as lender in last resort to banks and governments, but who will bear the residual costs?
  • The only remaining option is public debt restructuring, a purging of the legacy.
  • This will lead to bank failures. This means that debt reductions must be deep enough to make it possible for governments to then borrow, to shift to expansionary fiscal policies and to bail out the banks that they destroyed in the first place, in effect undoing the diabolic loop.
  • Who will lend? Even the best-crafted bank restructuring will not allow an immediate recovery of market access. The ECB is the only institution in the world that can help out.
  • There is no easy option for the Eurozone after three years of deep mismanagement. Governments will not accept drastic action unless forced to. This means that we need another round of crisis worsening.
  •  
    Good article by Wyplosz on ten observations and five consequences of Euro policy. 4 Jan 2013
Gene Ellis

This crisis cannot be resolved while monetary union remains - Telegraph - 1 views

  •  
    important piece quoting Olivier Blanchard
Gene Ellis

German and French banks call the shots - European, Business - Independent.ie - 0 views

  • German and French banks call the shots Print Email  NormalLargeExtra Large ShareNew  0  0   Also in European Debt crisis: European shares edge lower and growth worries persist Bank of England's Tucker 'wasn't encouraged to lean on Barclays' Draghi keeps door open to further interest rate cuts Marks and Spencers sales hit by summer deluge Spain's debt tops 7pc danger level as Madrid gets more time European Home "Shocking" 2012 HoroscopeWhat Does 2012 Have In Store For You? Shockingly Accurate. See Free!www.PremiumAstrology.comExpat Health InsuranceQuick, Compare, Trusted Website Expatriate Health Insurance Quoteswww.ExpatFinder.com/Instant-Quoteshttp://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BMEejVeb8T8fDKoSG_QaAhrTCB-q_1OYBmoqphxvAjbcB0NkREAMYAyDgw6kIKAU4AFD4gumFAmCpsL6AzAGgAairsfEDsgESd3d3LmluZGVwZW5kZW50LmllyAEB2gFfaHR0cDovL3d3dy5pbmRlcGVuZGVudC5pZS9idXNpbmVzcy9ldXJvcGVhbi9nZX
  • d, for reasons best
  • known to itself, the ECB -- in clear contravention of both previous market precedent and financial logic -- has insisted that the senior bondholders be repaid in full and has lent the Irish banks, institutions which it must have known were hopelessly insolvent, €70bn to do so.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Top of the list are German banks, to whom we owe €92bn with a further €38bn of other exposures. Does the fact that Irish banks potentially owe their counterparts up to €146bn explain the German government's implacable opposition to any write-down of the Irish banks' debts? After the British and the Germans, it is the French banks -- with total Irish bank loans of almost €32bn and a further €23bn of other exposures -- who have the biggest exposure to Ireland. Does this provide at least a partial explanation for French president Nicolas Sarkozy's truculence when faced with Irish requests that senior bondholders be forced to accept a haircut?
Gene Ellis

German Bundesbank Opposes Euro Crisis Strategy - SPIEGEL ONLINE - 0 views

  •  
    Good Der Spiegel article of late Aug 2012
Gene Ellis

Merkel's good politics and bad economics - FT.com - 0 views

  • the ECB gears up to go full throttle into a business that, according to its statutes, is verboten: buying the debt of member states.
  • Of course, Mr Draghi mumbles about conditionality: cheap cash only in exchange for deficit-slashing and market reforms. Sure. And when Mr Monti and Mariano Rajoy, Spanish prime minister, instead bend to the wishes of their electorates, what then? Will Mr Draghi stop buying and let their bonds go through the floor? Of course not. You do not have to be a central banker to predict the obvious: no market pressure, no reform.
  • The ECB is about to turn into a money machine, into a lender of last resort, and damn the treaties that mandate an inflation-fighting commitment to “price stability”. The magic phrase now is “capping bond yields”, meaning the ECB buys up the debt of Italy and others in order to depress their borrowing costs.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • Look beyond the debt crisis and take the longer view. European growth has been slowing for 40 years. During this period its share of global gross domestic product has shrunk by 10 percentage points; that of the US has held steady.
  • Otmar Issing, the ECB’s former chief economist, recalls how, before 1981, “the Italian Treasury set yields for government debt. All the bonds that couldn’t be sold at that price had to be bought up by the Banca d’Italia.” Hence easy money, exploding debt, double-digit inflation – and no change in the country’s frozen politics. Why reform when you can always devalue?
  • After the fall of the Berlin Wall, chancellor Helmut Kohl offered the D-Mark to President François Mitterrand in exchange for French acceptance of German reunification. This noble gesture of self-containment was not, of course, an entirely selfless act. As part of a hard-headed bargain in return for giving up the symbol of German economic primacy, Europe’s monetary and fiscal policy would be “Germanised”.
  • Mr Weidmann is right to fear the moral hazard contemplated by the ECB and its lackadaisical allies from Madrid to Berlin.
‹ Previous 21 - 40 of 185 Next › Last »
Showing 20 items per page