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Gene Ellis

Europe Can't Handle the Euro - 0 views

  • When leaders of the 11 nations that agreed to combine their currencies gathered in January 1999, they predicted great things: the single currency would shift global portfolios to euro assets, depressing the value of the dollar relative to the euro, and the new eurozone would be a strong player in the global economy, reflecting the size of an integrated European market. Instead the euro plummeted, Europes economy remains weak, and unemployment is more than twice the U.S. level.
  • The ECB will eventually be judged not by its words but by whether it achieves low inflation and does so without increasing cyclical unemployment. I am not optimistic about either part of this goal.
  • The ECB must make monetary policy for "Europe as a whole," which in practice means doing what is appropriate for Germany, France and Italy, the eurozones three largest countries. Last year demand conditions in those countries were relatively weak, while demand conditions in Spain and Ireland were very strong. That meant a monetary policy that was too expansionary for Spain and Ireland, causing a substantial acceleration of their inflation and threatening their competitiveness.
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  • Such disparities of demand conditions will undoubtedly persist in the future because European countries differ substantially in industrial composition and in a variety of economic policies.
  • the time will come when the ECB will set a policy that is too tight for the outliers, leading to substantially higher unemployment than if they were free to set their own monetary policies. Even without discretionary monetary policies, the interest rates in countries with weak demand would naturally decline, and the external values of their currencies would fall, both acting as offsetting stabilizers of the countries weak demand. But this will not be possible within the EMU, where a single interest rate and a single exchange rate prevail. Result: higher average cyclical unemployment.
  • In the U.S., a fall in regional demand leads to lower wages, which help to maintain employment; to movements of labor to regions where demand is stronger; and to a net fiscal transfer from Washington (because lower regional income means lower federal tax liability). None of this happens in Europe, where wages are inflexible, mobility is severely limited by language and custom, and there are no significant fiscal transfers.
  • Politicians can now blame the ECB for high unemployment and complain that it is a powerful force beyond national control. Instead of seeking to make labor markets more flexible, European governments are talking more about "social wages," about mandatory 35-hour workweeks, and about rolling back even the small reductions in social benefits Germany achieved under Helmut Kohls government. Worse yet, there are attempts to eliminate differences in labor practices and even differences in wages among the EMU countries.
  • Moreover, these policies reduce the international competitiveness of many European industries and encourage the adoption of protectionist policies to keep out non-European products.
  • Forcing a single monetary policy on all of Europe will cause the countries that suffer what they regard as unnecessarily high unemployment to resent the actions of others. Attempts to force a Europewide tax system, especially if taxes are used to redistribute incomes among European countries, will compound the potential for conflict.
  • EMU is meant to be a marriage made in heaven with no possibility of divorce.
Gene Ellis

Central Bank Sets Bond Plan Meant to Ease Euro Debt Peril - NYTimes.com - 0 views

    • Gene Ellis
       
      ON the open market, mimd
  • The European Central Bank said Thursday it had agreed on a framework for buying the bonds of troubled euro-zone countries on the open market in unlimited quantities, but left the timing unclear.
  • In essence, the bank left the next step to the beleaguered governments. They would be required to ask the E.C.B. formally to begin buying their bonds in the open market and would have to agree to follow detailed conditions for paying down their debt and hewing to fiscal discipline. It would be up to the E.C.B. to determine whether the terms of the agreement were acceptable, and whether the government was meeting those conditions over time.
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  • Small companies in Spain and Italy pay more than 2 percentage points more for loans than their German counterparts, according to E.C.B. data.
  • The E.C.B. has already indicated that it will concentrate on buying bonds that mature within two or three years, rather than longer-term bonds.
Gene Ellis

One more summit: The crisis rolls on | vox - 0 views

  • Reading the official documents from the June 28 summit requires linguistic and divination skills.
  • The clearest result is that EFSF/ESM funds can be used directly to support banks.
  • The summit attendees seem to have successfully drawn the conclusion that this was necessary from the disastrous impact of their mid-June decision on new lending to Spanish authorities to shore up their banks. Within hours, the main conclusion drawn by the markets was that the Spanish public debt had grown by €100 billion, bringing Spain closer to the fate of Ireland (bad bank debt dragging down a government with an otherwise healthy fiscal position).
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  • The new agreement suggests that in the future, banks will be bailed out by the collective effort of Eurozone countries.
  • First, this arrangement is to be finalised by the end of the year. This means that, in the end, the Spanish debt will rise by €100 billion (the market participants who enthusiastically celebrated the decision by raising the price of Spanish bonds will eventually understand that). Ditto in the not unlikely case that some Italian or French banks wobble before December.
  • Second, conditions will be attached to such a rescue. These recommendations could be clever if they require “Swedish-style” bank restructuring whereby shareholders and other major stakeholders are made to absorb first the losses, and if a new clearly untainted management replaces the previous one. Such interventions limit the costs to taxpayers; they can even turn a profit. Of course, the conditions could also be silly, raising the costs to taxpayers to huge levels.
  • Third, the arrangement is linked to the establishment of a “single supervisory mechanism involving the ECB”. This could be a single Eurozone supervisor built inside the ECB, which would go a long way to plugging one the worst mistakes in the Maastricht Treaty (lack of a joint regulation and resolution regime for banks).
  • But this is not what the official text says, which makes one suspect that policymakers have not agreed to something simple and clean. Most likely, they will keep negotiating and come with the usual 17-headed monster that exhausted diplomats are wont to invent.
  • This is important because a contagious banking crisis that hits several large banks would require much more money than is available in the EFSF-EMS facilities.
  • Light conditionality, as they requested, is bound to collapse at the foot of the Bundestag, which must approve every single loan.
  • There was no knock-out winner in this summit, but on points I’d have to say that the winner is the crisis.
  • There was nothing on collapsing Greece, nothing on unsustainable public debts in several countries, and no end in sight to recession in an increasing number of countries.
  • Charles Wyplosz
Gene Ellis

The Cost of Protecting Greece's Public Sector - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • So today, for every seven private employees who have been laid off, only one has left the public sector.
  • Greece’s creditors — the troika comprised of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund — have made public-sector layoffs a condition for providing the next tranche of the biggest bailout in history.
  • Public employment grew by fivefold from 1970 through 2009 — at an annual growth rate of 4 percent, according to according to a recent academic study by Zafiris Tzannatos and Iannis Monogios.. Over the same four decades, employment in the private sector increased by only 27 percent — an annual rate of less than 1 percent.
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  • According to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, in some government agencies overstaffing was considered to be around 50 percent. Yet so bloated were the managerial ranks that one in five departments did not have any employees apart from the department head, and less than one in 10 had over 20 employees.
  • Wages in the public sector were on average almost one and half times higher than in the private sector.
  • Public sector wages account for some 27 percent of the government’s total expenditures.
Gene Ellis

Euro crisis based on 'design flaws' in monetary union, conference told - 0 views

  • Euro crisis based on ‘design flaws’ in monetary union, conference told
  • The European Central Bank’s current status, where it does not act as a ‘lender of last resort’ in a similar method to other central banks, was particularly criticised.
  • He said the current version of the treaty establishing the ESM, the new permanent bailout fund for the eurozone, would also not function as such a lender – and said it was “incapable of ending the crisis”.
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  • “What I am proposing is a guaranteed yet conditional [lender of last resort] which can reconcile moral hazard concerns with the need to protect sovereign borrowers from the kind of solvency issues we have witnessed since the onset of the economic crisis,” he said
  • McDonnell also called for a full banking union within the eurozone, saying a deposit insurance corporation should be established to fill this gap.
Gene Ellis

Some thoughts on German politics and the saver's tax in Cyprus | Credit Writedowns - 0 views

  • Now, the large 82.8% German government debt to GDP ratio is a source of shame for many because Germany was a driving force in enshrining the 60% government debt to GDP hurdle into the Maastricht Treaty that set out terms for the euro zone.
  • Moreover, the interest rate policy of the ECB, geared as it was to the slow growth core, produced negative real interest rates and credit bubbles in Spain and Ireland during the last decade. German banks piled in to those countries as prospects domestically stagnated.
  • “The average German worker feels like a cash cow being sucked dry by a quick succession of reforms and bailouts that take money out of her pocket. First it was for reunification, then for European integration, then to right the economy, then to bail out German banks, and finally to bail out the European periphery. Fatigue has set in.”
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  • The bottom line is that none of the major political parties in Germany are going to vote for bailouts for other euro zone countries unless massive strings are attached, since these bailouts are political losers.
  • The anti-bailout part of the FDP platform is the one part of their rhetoric which could successfully take them over the 5% hurdle. The FDP’s complicity in using German taxpayer money to bail out the so-called profligate periphery is a one-way ticket out of Parliament.
  • “First, the Greek reports come via statements made by Michael Fuchs, CDU deputy Bundestag head and a senior member of German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s party. Fuchs warned earlier today that Germany would veto further aid to Greece if the country has not met the conditions of its previous bailouts.
  • “Second, all along Germany has indicated that it is resistant to increasing funding of the ESM and EFSF bailout facilities. This presents a problem in the case of Spain and Italy because of the size of those economies.
  • Willem Buiter, Chief Economist at Citigroup, has been most vocal in predicting that these facilities will be inadequate when Spain and Italy hit the wall and that more extreme measures will have to be taken.
  • The basic dilemma here is that almost all of the eurozone governments including Germany carry high debt burdens in excess of the Maastricht Treaty. For example, Germany has been in breach of Maastricht Treaty in 8 of 10 years since 2002, has been over the Maastricht 60% hurdle in each of those ten years, and now carries a debt to GDP burden above 80%.
  • The long and short of it was that the Germans had reached the end of their ability to support bailouts.
  • All evidence is that this levy has created panic in Cyprus. After all, what is the use of having a deposit guarantee if government can arbitrarily circumvent it to impose losses on your deposits anyway?
  • One can't just blame Cyprus for this fiasco. The ECB, EC and European Union finance ministers signed off on the insured deposit grab too]
  • My view? It was inevitable that we would be in crisis again. The austerity world view of crisis resolution is completely at odds with the capacity of the euro zone’s institutional architecture to handle a crisis.
Gene Ellis

Kenen on the euro | vox - 0 views

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Early work on optimum currency areas by Robert Mundell had emphasised the symmetry or asymmetry of disturbances hitting different regional economies as a key criterion on which to gauge their suitability for sharing a common currency.
  • Peter took this insight further by arguing that disturbances were often sector specific and that the diversification of regional economies was therefore a key consideration in gauging their suitability for monetary union (the better diversified an economy was, the less likely it was to be badly destabilised by a sector-specific shock). (Kenen 1969).
  • We now know that Kenen flagged a problem for which the Eurozone could have been better prepared. With an outsized capital-goods producing sector, Germany benefitted from a strong positive shock as a result of China’s emergence onto the global stage, given the Chinese economy’s voracious appetite for capital goods.
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  • Portugal and Italy, on the other hand, specialised much more heavily in consumer-goods producing sectors and felt the brunt of Chinese competition. No Eurozone member was sufficiently well diversified to shrug off this kind of shock, something that should have made the euro’s architects think twice.
  • Specifically, they should have thought again, Kenen argued, about the coordination of national fiscal policies, the need for a common Eurozone budget, and mechanisms for transferring fiscal resources from booming to depressed regions.
  • More than any other economist, Peter understood that monetary union was a legal as well as an economic construct. His careful parsing of the Maastricht Treaty explained to the economics profession exactly what the treaty did and did not allow (Kenen 1992).
  • Peter even anticipated the debate over TARGET2 imbalances, observing in 1999 that it was possible to “easily conceive of conditions…in which one [national central bank] would be reluctant to build up claims indefinitely on some other national central bank.” (Kenen 1999).
  • Finally, Peter observed that the possibility of a member state exiting from the Eurozone could not be ruled out but warned that European officials should be cautious in bandying about the idea (Kenen 1999). “The costs of defecting,” he wrote back in 1999, “could be very high.”
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    Good Eichengreen, Wyplosz EUVox article on Peter Kenen and insights on why the Euro might have difficuties.
Gene Ellis

Happy 2013? | vox - 0 views

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Hopefully the following ten observations are less controversial in 2013 than in previous years.
  • As long known by elementary textbook readers, austerity policies have contractionary effects.
  • Debt reduction is a very long process; we're talking about decades,
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  • The debt-to-GDP ratio is best reduced through sustained nominal GDP growth.
  • Besides, having been there, no one really wants to unleash inflation anymore. That leaves us with real GDP growth as a necessary condition for bringing the debt-to-GDP down painlessly.
  • But in today’s world voters are angry at everything that is called Europe and will not back a fiscal union.
  • The crisis has delivered a surprising degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility.
  • This means that the need for dissolving the euro back into national currencies at almost any cost has evaporated.
  • Sustained real growth should be the number one priority.
  • In most Eurozone countries, structural reforms are as needed now as they were before the crisis.
  • Banks are at the heart of a diabolic loop: bank holdings of their national public debts (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
  • The long-hoped-for awakening of the ECB has produced several miracles, especially a major relaxation of market anguish.
  • For that reason, they deleverage, which leads to a credit crunch, which slows growth down.
  • The ECB is the lender of last resort both to banks and to governments.
  • This involves massive moral hazard.
  • Massive forbearance has allowed many banks to not fully account for the losses that they incurred in 2007-8.
  • Austerity policies must stop, now.
  • Growth will not return unless bank lending is adequately available.
  • The ECB may act as lender in last resort to banks and governments, but who will bear the residual costs?
  • The only remaining option is public debt restructuring, a purging of the legacy.
  • This will lead to bank failures. This means that debt reductions must be deep enough to make it possible for governments to then borrow, to shift to expansionary fiscal policies and to bail out the banks that they destroyed in the first place, in effect undoing the diabolic loop.
  • Who will lend? Even the best-crafted bank restructuring will not allow an immediate recovery of market access. The ECB is the only institution in the world that can help out.
  • There is no easy option for the Eurozone after three years of deep mismanagement. Governments will not accept drastic action unless forced to. This means that we need another round of crisis worsening.
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    Good article by Wyplosz on ten observations and five consequences of Euro policy. 4 Jan 2013
Gene Ellis

Should You Eat Chicken? - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • U.S.D.A. does not stand alone. The Food and Drug Administration (F.D.A.), knowing that manufacturers grow animals under conditions virtually guaranteed to breed disease, allows them to attempt to ward off disease by feeding them antibiotics from birth until death. (This despite the stated intention of the agency to change that, and a court order requiring it to.)
  • About a quarter of all chicken parts are contaminated,
  • The F.D.A. must disallow the use of prophylactic antibiotics in animal production.
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  • The U.S.D.A. must consider salmonella that’s been linked to illness an “adulterant” (as it does strains of E. coli), which would mean that its very presence on foods would be sufficient to take them off the market. Again, it’s almost as simple as that. (Sweden produces chicken with zero levels of salmonella. Are they that much smarter than us?)
Gene Ellis

At Anchor Off Lithuania, Its Own Energy Supply - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • The price of natural gas in Lithuania was 15 percent higher than the European average last year, according to the European Commission. Only Bulgaria, where Gazprom has a near monopoly, paid more. Gazprom also has an ownership stake in Lithuania’s natural gas distribution network. Part of Lithuania’s electrical infrastructure is still controlled from Moscow, too, and it is not yet possible to connect the country to the European grid.
  • Lithuania also does not use oil shale, which provides much of the electricity for Estonia, the third Baltic member of the European Union.
  • Lithuania used to rely on nuclear power to supply most of its electricity. But as a condition of joining the union in 2004, the country agreed to shut down its Chernobyl-style nuclear power station at Ignalina.
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  • Klaipedos Nafta, a state-controlled oil terminal operator, is leasing the ship, formally known as a floating gas storage and regasification unit, from a Norwegian company, Hoegh, in a 10-year deal for 430 million euros, or $560 million.
  • Lithuania would need to import L.N.G. at prices 5 to 10 percent less than Gazprom charges for its gas to ensure the project breaks even; Lithuanian officials said the price of L.N.G. imports could be as much as 20 percent less than Gazprom charges.
  • “We will be able for the first time in our history to negotiate, because we have alternative sources,”
  • But Mr. Masiulis said his greatest challenge was overcoming the Lithuanian bureaucracy and fending off attempts to give the project “a shade of corruption.”
Gene Ellis

Multinationals beach tax bills in Spanish shells - FT.com - 0 views

  • From here a single employee presided over a company that from 2009 to 2011 made €9.9bn of net profits, all while earning an annual salary of only €55,000.
  • Exxon’s Spanish subsidiary was structured as a so-called ETVE, a type of holding company used by many multinationals, including Hewlett-Packard, Pepsi, Eli Lilly, Anheuser-Busch InBev and Vodafone.
  • According to the ETVE’s 2009 accounts, Exxon was able to transfer €3.6bn of dividends from its unit in Luxembourg to Spain. A dividend of €2.26bn was then paid on to its US parent without incurring withholding taxes that it would typically have to pay when moving money outside of the EU.
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  • ransfers from a Luxembourg company to the US would have typically been subject to a withholding tax. Last year, after attracting the attention of Spanish tax authorities, Exxon quietly closed down the operation.
  • “Normally you would have to pay a 10 per cent withholding tax at source to send profits to the US,
  • Spain introduced the ETVE in the mid-1990s to encourage foreign investment, and better compete with Luxembourg and Holland for international companies seeking tax-efficient European holding structures. It also allowed for foreign companies to take advantage of Spain’s strong network of bilateral tax treaties with countries in Latin America, such as Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, which can offer more favourable tax rates than other countries. Once the ETVE has been established all overseas dividends that are paid into it are exempt from tax in Spain, and can be easily moved on to a final destination, providing a small number of conditions have been met. Most importantly, corporation tax must have been paid in the country of origin on the dividends being transferred, and companies using ETVEs to house shareholdings in foreign subsidiaries must not be resident in any country identified by Spain as a tax haven.
  • In fact, Linthal is an ETVE used by Ambev, a subsidiary of Anheuser-Busch InBev, the Belgian-based brewer, to distribute dividends from several Latin American beer brands, such as Argentina’s Quilmes and Cervecería Boliviana Nacional, to its holding company in Brazil.
Gene Ellis

What Is Plan B for Greece? by Kenneth Rogoff - Project Syndicate - 0 views

  • even if all of its past debts are forgiven.
  • But even if Greece’s debt had been completely wiped out, going from a primary deficit of 10% of GDP to a balanced budget requires massive belt tightening – and, inevitably, recession.
  • Nonetheless, Europe needs to be much more generous in permanently writing down debt and, even more urgently, in reducing short-term repayment flows.
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  • First and foremost, the eurozone countries’ decision to admit Greece to the single currency in 2002 was woefully irresponsible, with French advocacy deserving much of the blame.
  • Second, much of the financing for Greece’s debts came from German and French banks that earned huge profits by intermediating loans from their own countries and from Asia.
  • Third, Greece’s eurozone partners wield a massive stick that is typically absent in sovereign-debt negotiations. If Greece does not accept the conditions imposed on it to maintain its membership in the single currency, it risks being thrown out of the European Union altogether.
Gene Ellis

Syriza and the French indemnity of 1871-73 | Michael Pettis' CHINA FINANCIAL MARKETS - 0 views

  • Fundamental to the argument that Spain (or Greece, or anyone else) has a moral obligation to repay in full its debt to Germany are two assumptions. The first assumption is that “Spain” borrowed the money from “Germany”, and that there is a collective obligation on the part of Spain to repay the German collective. The second assumption is that Spain had a choice in what it could do with the German money that poured into the country, and so it must be held responsible for its having mis-used hard-earned german funds.
  • There was plenty of irresponsible behavior in every country, and it is absurd to think that if German and Spanish banks were pouring nearly unlimited amounts of money into countries at extremely low or even negative real interest rates, especially once these initial inflows had set off stock market and real estate booms, that there was any chance that these countries would not respond in the way every country in history, including Germany in the 1870s and in the 1920s, had responded under similar conditions.
  • The winners have been banks, owners of assets, and business owners, mainly in Germany, whose profits were much higher during the last decade than they could possibly have been otherwise
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  •  Second, it is the responsibility of the leading centrist parties to recognize the options explicitly. If they do not, extremist parties either of the right or the left will take control of the debate, and convert what is a conflict between different economic sectors into a nationalist conflict or a class conflict. If the former win, it will spell the end of the grand European experiment.
  • First, as long as Spain suffers from its current debt burden, it does not matter how intelligently and forcefully it implements economic reforms. It will not be able to grow out of its debt burden and must choose between two paths
  • Most currency and sovereign debt crises in modern history ultimately represent a conflict over how the costs are to be assigned among two different groups
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    Highly recommended!
Gene Ellis

As LED Industry Evolves, China Elbows Ahead - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • As LED Industry Evolves, China Elbows Ahead
  • “LED lighting could see itself become the next solar, wind or other future opportunity that the U.S. will have given away by failing to address Chinese industrial policies and unfairly traded products,”
  • SolarWorld, a solar panel maker that complained to the American government about what it considered unfair advantages for Chinese competitors, was later the victim of a cyberattack by Chinese military officials, according to a recent indictment by the Justice Department.
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  • American, European and Chinese regulators have put in effect energy-efficiency rules that phase out the use of incandescent bulbs. Big multinationals that make light bulbs like Philips, Osram and General Electric have responded by embracing light-emitting diodes, which use one-fifth of the electricity of incandescent bulbs and half the electricity of fluorescent bulbs.
  • Many Chinese producers also have a poor and worsening reputation for quality, which may hurt them in the long term.
  • The industry, for instance, is highly segmented.
  • Lighting accounts for about 6 percent of the world’s emissions of greenhouse gases, and LEDs have the potential to steeply reduce them.
  • Prices have fallen by nearly half in the last year for low-end, low-wattage LEDs made in China, and by 15 to 20 percent for the higher-wattage versions made elsewhere, buyers and manufacturing executives said.
  • “We do not buy Chinese LEDs,” said Mike Pugh, the procurement director at Xicato in San Jose, Calif., a large provider of indoor lighting systems for retailers and hotels. “We just can’t take that chance.”
  • Xicato instead buys LEDs from multinationals like Cree of Durham, N.C.; Philips Lumileds, based in San Jose, Calif.; and Osram Opto Semiconductors of Regensburg, Germany.
  • Three-quarters of China’s electricity still comes from burning coal, which contributes to severe air pollution as well as global warming.
  • The Chinese LED industry has created tens of thousands of well-paid jobs for young community college graduates
  • She earns $500 a month plus medical benefits and free food and lodging in an air-conditioned dormitory where employees sleep four to six i
  • the solar and LED industries in China received huge loans at low interest rates from state-owned banks following directives from Beijing
Gene Ellis

Profits Vanish in Venezuela After Currency Devaluation - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Profits Vanish in Venezuela After Currency Devaluation
  • The country’s high inflation — currently around 60 percent a year — has also meant that the prices in bolívares that companies charge for many goods and services have risen sharply.
  • Now companies are feeling the pain from a series of currency devaluations over the last year and a half. Photo
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  • But the rosy outlook changed in late March, when Brink’s started calculating its sales using the recently created exchange rate of about 50 bolívares to the dollar
  • Further complicating the picture, the Venezuelan government has not allowed companies to repatriate profits for the last five years.
  • Companies have ways of chipping away at the locked-up profits, including charging higher fees to Venezuelan subsidiaries for goods and services provided by the parent corporation. But many foreign companies are stuck holding vast troves of bolívares that shrink in value each time there is a devaluation.
  • Procter & Gamble said in April that it had the equivalent of about $900 million in cash in this country and that it was taking a $275 million write-down as a result of applying the government’s intermediate exchange rate to its Venezuelan balance sheet. Colgate-Palmolive wrote down $174 million, while Ford wrote down about $316 million.
  • “All the companies knew there would be a loss because everyone knew there wouldn’t be dollars” available at the fixed exchange rate, said an executive with an American company in Venezuela who spoke on the condition of anonymity. “We were trapped because the law here did not give you a way out.”
  • The government has also failed to pay companies the hard currency it had promised them for imports bought on credit from suppliers, and in many cases suppliers are now refusing to ship more goods to Venezuela until they receive payment.
  • Stores are often out of basic products such as dish soap or corn flour. DirecTV has stopped taking on new customers because it cannot get the dollars to import more dish antennas.
  • Without dollars, car companies cannot import the parts needed to assemble vehicles; Ford and Toyota were forced to temporarily close their factories.
  • In yet another reflection of the currency restrictions, the government has refused to let airlines operating in Venezuela trade the bolívares they receive for ticket sales and other services here for dollars. The International Air Transport Association says that the airlines have more than $4 billion in revenues held up in the country, based on the government’s base exchange rate at the time the tickets were sold.
  • American Airlines says that it is owed $750 million by the country’s government.
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