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Gene Ellis

Happy 2013? | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/happy-2013

shared by Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13 - No Cached
  • Hopefully the following ten observations are less controversial in 2013 than in previous years.
  • As long known by elementary textbook readers, austerity policies have contractionary effects.
  • Debt reduction is a very long process; we're talking about decades,
  • ...20 more annotations...
  • The debt-to-GDP ratio is best reduced through sustained nominal GDP growth.
  • Besides, having been there, no one really wants to unleash inflation anymore. That leaves us with real GDP growth as a necessary condition for bringing the debt-to-GDP down painlessly.
  • But in today’s world voters are angry at everything that is called Europe and will not back a fiscal union.
  • The crisis has delivered a surprising degree of wage flexibility and labour mobility.
  • This means that the need for dissolving the euro back into national currencies at almost any cost has evaporated.
  • Sustained real growth should be the number one priority.
  • In most Eurozone countries, structural reforms are as needed now as they were before the crisis.
  • Banks are at the heart of a diabolic loop: bank holdings of their national public debts (Brunnermeier et al., 2011).
  • The long-hoped-for awakening of the ECB has produced several miracles, especially a major relaxation of market anguish.
  • For that reason, they deleverage, which leads to a credit crunch, which slows growth down.
  • The ECB is the lender of last resort both to banks and to governments.
  • This involves massive moral hazard.
  • Massive forbearance has allowed many banks to not fully account for the losses that they incurred in 2007-8.
  • Austerity policies must stop, now.
  • Growth will not return unless bank lending is adequately available.
  • The ECB may act as lender in last resort to banks and governments, but who will bear the residual costs?
  • The only remaining option is public debt restructuring, a purging of the legacy.
  • This will lead to bank failures. This means that debt reductions must be deep enough to make it possible for governments to then borrow, to shift to expansionary fiscal policies and to bail out the banks that they destroyed in the first place, in effect undoing the diabolic loop.
  • Who will lend? Even the best-crafted bank restructuring will not allow an immediate recovery of market access. The ECB is the only institution in the world that can help out.
  • There is no easy option for the Eurozone after three years of deep mismanagement. Governments will not accept drastic action unless forced to. This means that we need another round of crisis worsening.
  • Gene Ellis on 26 Jan 13
     
    Good article by Wyplosz on ten observations and five consequences of Euro policy. 4 Jan 2013
Gene Ellis

The Great Wage Slowdown of the 21st Century - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...wdown-of-the-21st-century.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 08 Oct 14 - No Cached
  • You can think of Mr. Obama’s argument as falling into two categories (even if he didn’t say so): the reasons that overall economic growth may accelerate, and the reasons that middle- and low-income workers may benefit more from that growth than they have lately.
  • On the growth side of the ledger, both energy and education have been problems.
  • And the number of high-school and college graduates is rising. The financial crisis deserves some perverse credit, because it sent people fleeing back to school, much as the Great Depression did
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • Yet educational attainment has slowed so much that the United States has lost its once-enormous global lead.
  • the biggest reason to think economic growth may translate more directly into wage gains is the turnabout in health costs. After years of rapid increases, they have slowed sharply in the last three years. Mr. Obama likes to give more credit to the 2010 health care law than most observers do, but he’s not wrong about the trend’s significance.
  • It’s also possible that the forces behind the great wage slowdown – from globalization to our often-sclerotic government to (at least for many workers) technological change – are still more powerful than the positive forces.
Gene Ellis

The euro crisis: The non-puzzle of peripheral pain | The Economist - 0 views

www.economist.com/...euro-crisis-0

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • Mystery mostly solved, then; the rich periphery's riches relative to Germany were largely a short-run phenomenon driven by a dramatic short-run divergence in house price trends.
  • Investors who bet that productivity growth would be much faster in the south were wrong.* All the prices and wages set on the basis of the expectation of faster productivity growth were correspondingly wrong and needed to adjust. Real effective exchange rates were badly out of alignment.
  • Two things began happening in the euro zone in 2007. Growth in the number of euros spent every year began slowing, and the distribution of euro spending within the euro area began shifting back northward.
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  • The picture is one in which there are many fewer euros floating around the euro area than markets expected a half decade ago, and the distribution of those euros is moving northward.
  • It seems reasonable to argue that the distributional shift needed to occur, given the actual productivity performance.  The overall slowdown in euro spending growth, however, looks like an unnecessary and painful complication to adjustment.
  • This has all been the result of the commitment to keep just one euro. But that commitment is painful, and the alternative—more than one euro—is looking more attractive.
  • Where prices were rigid, as in goods and labour markets, fewer euros meant slow disinflation but rapid contraction in output and a big rise in unemployment.
  • If there had been no single currency, the northward capital flight would have depreciated peripheral currencies. Had the periphery borrowed in its own currency, that would have imposed losses on its foreign creditors while also boosting its export industry. Had peripheral economies instead borrowed in dollars or deutschmarks their debt burdens would have ballooned with depreciation, potentially pushing banks and sovereigns into default—but the depreciation boost to competitiveness would have remained. Either way, the depreciation of the currency would effectively shrink the value of wealth in the periphery.
  • Since 2010, Spanish home prices have dropped over 20%, while German home prices are up a smidge.
  • Where prices were more flexible, as in asset markets, price adjustment was quick. Over the past two years, Spanish equities have fallen 24%, while German equities are up 8%.
  • The northward euro shift had two nasty effects, then: it shrank asset values while also (via wage rigidity) creating substantial unemployment.
  • This threatened to accelerate into a full-scale run and collapse until the ECB intervened.
  • as markets observed the periphery's reduced ability to pay off its debts, they moved their euros northward even faster
  • For the periphery to raise its external surplus (necessary in order to service its large and growing debts) it must rely much more on import compression than on export growth.
Gene Ellis

The Quality of Jobs: The New Normal and the Old Normal - NYTimes.com - 0 views

economix.blogs.nytimes.com/...-new-normal-and-the-old-normal

shared by Gene Ellis on 20 Sep 13 - No Cached
  • Despite 42 consecutive months of gains in private-sector employment, the unemployment rate is still at 7.3 percent; in December 2007 it was only 4.6 percent. The current unemployment rate is higher now than in 2007 across all age, education, occupation, gender and ethnic groups.
  • That’s despite the fact that about four million workers have left the labor force, driving the labor force participation rate to a historic low
  • Although the share of the long-term unemployed has fallen from its peak of 45 percent in 2011 to 38 percent today, it is still far above its 2001-7 average. And about eight million people are working part-time for “economic reasons,”
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  • 60 percent of the net job losses occurred in middle-income occupations with median hourly wages of $13.84 to $21.13. In contrast, these occupations have accounted for less than a quarter of the net job gains in the recovery, while low-wage occupations with median hourly wages of $7.69 to $13.83 have accounted for more than half of these gains.
  • Over the last year, more than 40 percent of job growth has been in low-paying sectors including retail, leisure/hospitality (hotels and restaurants) and temporary help agencies.
  • The economy’s growth rate has been less than half the rate of previous recoveries and the employment losses in the Great Recession were more than twice as large as those in previous recessions.
  • Based on history, what’s distinctive about this recovery is its sluggish pace, not the composition of its jobs.
  • What is distinctive during this recovery relative to earlier ones is the growing disparity in wages across sectors, a trend that was apparent long before the Great Recession.
  • Since then, however, wage growth has fallen far short of productivity growth, and that’s true for workers regardless of education, occupation, gender or race.
  • But technological change and the globalization it has enabled have played major roles, and these driving forces have probably strengthened during the recovery.
  • Jobs that are routine, that do not involve manual tasks and that do not need to be done near the customer are being replaced by computers and automation or are being outsourced to low-cost workers in other countries.
  • According to another study, the top 1 percent of households captured 65 percent of real family income gains (including realized capital gains) between 2002 and 2007 and 95 percent of the gains between 2009 and 2012. In 2012, the top decile claimed more than 50 percent of income, the highest share ever.
Gene Ellis

Op-Ed Columnist - The Making of a Euromess - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...15krugman.html

Krugman Euro Spain Greece economics

shared by Gene Ellis on 24 Apr 13 - Cached
  • No, the real story behind the euromess lies not in the profligacy of politicians but in the arrogance of elites — specifically, the policy elites who pushed Europe into adopting a single currency well before the continent was ready for such an experiment.
  • Consider the case of Spain, which on the eve of the crisis appeared to be a model fiscal citizen.
  • But with its warm weather and beaches, Spain was also the Florida of Europe — and like Florida, it experienced a huge housing boom. The financing for this boom came largely from outside the country: there were giant inflows of capital from the rest of Europe, Germany in particular.
  • ...9 more annotations...
  • The result was rapid growth combined with significant inflation: between 2000 and 2008, the prices of goods and services produced in Spain rose by 35 percent, compared with a rise of only 10 percent in Germany. Thanks to rising costs, Spanish exports became increasingly uncompetitive, but job growth stayed strong thanks to the housing boom.
  • Then the bubble burst.
  • But the flood of red ink
  • was a result, not a cause, of Spain’s problems.
  • The nation’s core economic problem is that costs and prices have gotten out of line with those in the rest of Europe. If Spain still had its old currency, the peseta, it could remedy that problem quickly through devaluation — by, say, reducing the value of a peseta by 20 percent against other European currencies. But Spain no longer has its own money, which means that it can regain competitiveness only through a slow, grinding process of deflation.
  • Now, if Spain were an American state rather than a European country, things wouldn’t be so bad. For one thing, costs and prices wouldn’t have gotten so far out of line: Florida, which among other things was freely able to attract workers from other states and keep labor costs down, never experienced anything like Spain’s relative inflation. For another, Spain would be receiving a lot of automatic support in the crisis: Florida’s housing boom has gone bust, but Washington keeps sending the Social Security and Medicare checks. But Spain isn’t an American state, and as a result it’s in deep trouble.
  • None of this should come as a big surprise. Long before the euro came into being, economists warned that Europe wasn’t ready for a single currency.
  • What we’ll probably see over the next few years is a painful process of muddling through: bailouts accompanied by demands for savage austerity, all against a background of very high unemployment, perpetuated by the grinding deflation I already mentioned.
  • Yes, some governments were irresponsible; but the fundamental problem was hubris, the arrogant belief that Europe could make a single currency work despite strong reasons to believe that it wasn’t ready. More Articles in Opinion »
Gene Ellis

German and French banks call the shots - European, Business - Independent.ie - 0 views

www.independent.ie/...ks-call-the-shots-2607577.html

german french banks ireland debt

shared by Gene Ellis on 11 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • German and French banks call the shots Print Email  NormalLargeExtra Large ShareNew  0  0   Also in European Debt crisis: European shares edge lower and growth worries persist Bank of England's Tucker 'wasn't encouraged to lean on Barclays' Draghi keeps door open to further interest rate cuts Marks and Spencers sales hit by summer deluge Spain's debt tops 7pc danger level as Madrid gets more time European Home "Shocking" 2012 HoroscopeWhat Does 2012 Have In Store For You? Shockingly Accurate. See Free!www.PremiumAstrology.comExpat Health InsuranceQuick, Compare, Trusted Website Expatriate Health Insurance Quoteswww.ExpatFinder.com/Instant-Quoteshttp://www.googleadservices.com/pagead/aclk?sa=L&ai=BMEejVeb8T8fDKoSG_QaAhrTCB-q_1OYBmoqphxvAjbcB0NkREAMYAyDgw6kIKAU4AFD4gumFAmCpsL6AzAGgAairsfEDsgESd3d3LmluZGVwZW5kZW50LmllyAEB2gFfaHR0cDovL3d3dy5pbmRlcGVuZGVudC5pZS9idXNpbmVzcy9ldXJvcGVhbi9nZX
  • d, for reasons best
  • known to itself, the ECB -- in clear contravention of both previous market precedent and financial logic -- has insisted that the senior bondholders be repaid in full and has lent the Irish banks, institutions which it must have known were hopelessly insolvent, €70bn to do so.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Top of the list are German banks, to whom we owe €92bn with a further €38bn of other exposures. Does the fact that Irish banks potentially owe their counterparts up to €146bn explain the German government's implacable opposition to any write-down of the Irish banks' debts? After the British and the Germans, it is the French banks -- with total Irish bank loans of almost €32bn and a further €23bn of other exposures -- who have the biggest exposure to Ireland. Does this provide at least a partial explanation for French president Nicolas Sarkozy's truculence when faced with Irish requests that senior bondholders be forced to accept a haircut?
Gene Ellis

GDP growth masks a broken eurozone | Business | The Guardian - 0 views

www.theguardian.com/...growth-masks-a-broken-eurozone

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • Weidmann said the policies of austerity he supported would work slowly but staying the course was important. To him, a lost generation of young workers, who were denied skilled training and out of work for several years, is a matter for individual countries. He cannot see that sovereign states under the current arrangements are denied the funds to invest and improve productivity over the longer term. He cannot see that austerity, if only for this reason, is self-defeating.
Gene Ellis

George Soros: how to save the EU from the euro crisis - the speech in full | Business |... - 0 views

www.guardian.co.uk/...ave-eu-from-euro-crisis-speech

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13 - No Cached
  • The crisis has also transformed the European Union into something radically different from what was originally intended. The EU was meant to be a voluntary association of equal states but the crisis has turned it into a hierarchy with Germany and other creditors in charge and the heavily indebted countries relegated to second-class status. While in theory Germany cannot dictate policy, in practice no policy can be proposed without obtaining Germany's permission first.
  • Italy now has a majority opposed to the euro and the trend is likely to grow. There is now a real danger that the euro crisis may end up destroying the European Union.
  • The answer to the first question is extremely complicated because the euro crisis is extremely complex. It has both a political and a financial dimension. And the financial dimension can be divided into at least three components: a sovereign debt crisis and a banking crisis, as well as divergences in competitiveness
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  • The crisis is almost entirely self-inflicted. It has the quality of a nightmare.
  • My interpretation of the euro crisis is very different from the views prevailing in Germany. I hope that by offering you a different perspective I may get you to reconsider your position before more damage is done. That is my goal in coming here.
  • I regarded the European Union as the embodiment of an open society – a voluntary association of equal states who surrendered part of their sovereignty for the common good.
  • The process of integration was spearheaded by a small group of far sighted statesmen who recognised that perfection was unattainable and practiced what Karl Popper called piecemeal social engineering. They set themselves limited objectives and firm timelines and then mobilised the political will for a small step forward, knowing full well that when they achieved it, its inadequacy would become apparent and require a further step.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Excellent point!
  • Unfortunately, the Maastricht treaty was fundamentally flawed. The architects of the euro recognised that it was an incomplete construct: a currency union without a political union. The architects had reason to believe, however, that when the need arose, the political will to take the next step forward could be mobilized. After all, that was how the process of integration had worked until then.
  • For instance, the Maastricht Treaty took it for granted that only the public sector could produce chronic deficits because the private sector would always correct its own excesses. The financial crisis of 2007-8 proved that wrong.
  • When the Soviet empire started to disintegrate, Germany's leaders realized that reunification was possible only in the context of a more united Europe and they were prepared to make considerable sacrifices to achieve it. When it came to bargaining, they were willing to contribute a little more and take a little less than the others, thereby facilitating agreement.
  • The financial crisis also revealed a near fatal defect in the construction of the euro: by creating an independent central bank, member countries became indebted in a currency they did not control. This exposed them to the risk of default.
  • Developed countries have no reason to default; they can always print money. Their currency may depreciate in value, but the risk of default is practically nonexistent. By contrast, less developed countries that have to borrow in a foreign currency run the risk of default. To make matters worse, financial markets can actually drive such countries into default through bear raids. The risk of default relegated some member countries to the status of a third world country that became over-indebted in a foreign currency. 
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Again, another excellent point!
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Not quite... Maggie Thatcher, a Conservative; and Gordon Brown, of Labour, both recognized this possible loss of sovereignty (and economic policy weapons they might use to keep the UK afloat), and refused to join the euro.
  • The emphasis placed on sovereign credit revealed the hitherto ignored feature of the euro, namely that by creating an independent central bank the euro member countries signed away part of their sovereign status.
  • Only at the end of 2009, when the extent of the Greek deficit was revealed, did the financial markets realize that a member country could actually default. But then the markets raised the risk premiums on the weaker countries with a vengeance.
  • Then the IMF and the international banking authorities saved the international banking system by lending just enough money to the heavily indebted countries to enable them to avoid default but at the cost of pushing them into a lasting depression. Latin America suffered a lost decade.
  • In effect, however, the euro had turned their government bonds into bonds of third world countries that carry the risk of default.
  • In retrospect, that was the root cause of the euro crisis.
  • The burden of responsibility falls mainly on Germany. The Bundesbank helped design the blueprint for the euro whose defects put Germany into the driver's seat.
  • he fact that Greece blatantly broke the rules has helped to support this attitude. But other countries like Spain and Ireland had played by the rules;
  • the misfortunes of the heavily indebted countries are largely caused by the rules that govern the euro.
    • Gene Ellis
      Gene Ellis on 09 Apr 13
       
      Well, yes, but this is an extremely big point.  If, instead of convergence, we continue to see growth patterns growing apart, what then?
  • Germany did not seek the dominant position into which it has been thrust and it is unwilling to accept the obligations and liabilities that go with it.
  • Austerity doesn't work.
  • As soon as the pressure from the financial markets abated, Germany started to whittle down the promises it had made at the height of the crisis.
  • What happened in Cyprus undermined the business model of European banks, which relies heavily on deposits. Until now the authorities went out of their way to protect depositors
  • Banks will have to pay risk premiums that will fall more heavily on weaker banks and the banks of weaker countries. The insidious link between the cost of sovereign debt and bank debt will be reinforced.
  • In this context the German word "Schuld" plays a key role. As you know it means both debt and responsibility or guilt.
  • If countries that abide by the fiscal compact were allowed to convert their entire existing stock of government debt into eurobonds, the positive impact would be little short of the miraculous.
  • Only the divergences in competitiveness would remain unresolved.
  • Germany is opposed to eurobonds on the grounds that once they are introduced there can be no assurance that the so-called periphery countries would not break the rules once again. I believe these fears are misplaced.
  • Losing the privilege of issuing eurobonds and having to pay stiff risk premiums would be a powerful inducement to stay in compliance.
  • There are also widespread fears that eurobonds would ruin Germany's credit rating. eurobonds are often compared with the Marshall Plan.
  • It is up to Germany to decide whether it is willing to authorise eurobonds or not. But it has no right to prevent the heavily indebted countries from escaping their misery by banding together and issuing eurobonds. In other words, if Germany is opposed to eurobonds it should consider leaving the euro and letting the others introduce them.
  • Individual countries would still need to undertake structural reforms. Those that fail to do so would turn into permanent pockets of poverty and dependency similar to the ones that persist in many rich countries.
  • They would survive on limited support from European Structural Funds and remittances
  • Second, the European Union also needs a banking union and eventually a political union.
  • If Germany left, the euro would depreciate. The debtor countries would regain their competitiveness. Their debt would diminish in real terms and, if they issued eurobonds, the threat of default would disappear. 
Gene Ellis

Revisiting the pain in Spain | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...revisiting-pain-spain

shared by Gene Ellis on 05 Feb 15 - No Cached
  • The fundamental reason why this was possible was the ECB’s announcement in 2012 that it would perform the role of lender of last resort in the government bond markets. This took the fear factor out of the market, and allowed yields in the Spanish (and other) government bond markets to decline without fundamentals showing much – if any – improvement.
  • This was made possible by the fact that in the UK – a stand-alone country – the adjustment mechanism included a large currency depreciation that led to a significantly higher nominal growth rate than in Spain, where currency depreciation was not possible and where intense austerity measures were imposed.
  • This in a way can be said to be the price Spain paid for being in a monetary union.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • The ECB’s Outright Monetary Transactions programme was instrumental in reducing Spanish government bond yields. This alleviated the Spanish fiscal position, but did not make it sustainable. The continuing unsustainability of the Spanish government debt has to do with two factors: First while r (the interest rate) declined, g (nominal growth) remained much lower in Spain than in the UK. The latter was due to the deflationary forces in the Eurozone – themselves a result of excessive austerity and the absence of currency depreciation (which was made possible in the UK thanks to the expansionary monetary policies of the Bank of England).
Gene Ellis

Germany's strange parallel universe - FT.com - 0 views

www.ft.com/...89-11e3-8905-00144feab7de.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 29 Oct 13 - No Cached
  • Germany experienced a mild recession in 2003; today’s vulnerable countries are suffering depressions.
  • today’s vulnerable countries are pursuing adjustment in a period of chronically weak demand.
  • They have to improve their competitiveness. But the only one in which nominal wages have fallen substantially is Greece. Elsewhere, it is rising productivity that has improved competitiveness. But that is the other side of the coin from the unemployment.
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  • All these countries are going to end up with gross public debt at more than 100 per cent of GDP. This will be hard to manage.
  • Ongoing fiscal transfers seem neither desirable nor feasible.
  • But better insurance mechanisms for sovereigns and banks are needed in the long run. Yet all this will be academic if the eurozone does not allow its members to return to economic health over a reasonable time period.
  • Meanwhile, Germany is redirecting its surpluses outside the eurozone.
  • But it also will not work, for two reasons: first, the eurozone is far too big to achieve export-led growth, as Germany has done; and, second, the currency is likely to appreciate still further, thereby squeezing the less competitive economies all over again.
Gene Ellis

Bringer of Prosperity or Bottomless Pit?: Top German Economists Debate the Euro - SPIEG... - 0 views

www.spiegel.de/...-debate-the-euro-a-685018.html

shared by Gene Ellis on 09 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • No, of course not. Today, we live in a currency zone that, despite everything, is significantly more stable than where the dollar or yen are used. The euro has brought growth and prosperity to Europe.
  • Actually, the euro was a mistake with particularly serious consequences. A monetary union requires its members to pursue the same policies and be similarly productive. The so-called convergence criteria were meant to ensure that this would happen. But -- as the dramatic developments in Greece are now showing -- they didn't.
  • Unfortunately, our fears have become a reality. The monetary union was launched with real self-deception.
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  • The euro was sold to us as a modernization program for Europe, and we were also told that it would push the Community toward stability. But, in reality, it has drifted apart and become a truly unstable entity.
  • The euro was sold to us as a modernization program for Europe, and we were also told that it would push the Community toward stability. But, in reality, it has drifted apart and become a truly unstable entity.
  • There is no reason why the euro should be coming under pressure. The decision to introduce it was smart and far-sighted.
  • thanks to the common currency, it's no longer possible, for example, to wage speculative attacks on individual currencies. This eliminates a key disruptive factor that massively destabilized markets in the past.
  • Still, thanks to the common currency, it's no longer possible, for example, to wage speculative attacks on individual currencies. This eliminates a key disruptive factor that massively destabilized markets in the past.
  • Today, there are two blocs within the monetary union: a strong currency bloc in the north and a weak one in the south.
  • Starbatty: But that's exactly the problem! In the past, exchange rates served as a valve. Individual countries could control their economies by allowing their currencies to gain or lose value.
  • But that's exactly the problem! In the past, exchange rates served as a valve.
  • SPIEGEL: What would happen if the old currencies were reintroduced in the euro zone tomorrow? Bofinger: It would be a catastrophe. The German mark would have to appreciate significantly -- I'd say by 10 percent to 20 percent. Everything that we've worked so hard to attain in terms of competitiveness would vanish overnight.
  • What would happen if the old currencies were reintroduced in the euro zone tomorrow? Bofinger: It would be a catastrophe. The German mark would have to appreciate significantly -- I'd say by 10 percent to 20 percent. Everything that we've worked so hard to attain in terms of competitiveness would vanish overnight.
  • SPIEGEL: Would it have been better if all countries in Europe had kept their own currencies? Starbatty: Yes. A community can't function when it's made up of unequal partners who are supposed to behave as equals. With the euro, Germany has created an artificial competitive advantage for itself, which has enabled us to conquer markets all over the world.
  • Starbatty: Yes. A community can't function when it's made up of unequal partners who are supposed to behave as equals. With the euro, Germany has created an artificial competitive advantage for itself, which has enabled us to conquer markets all over the world.
  • Since 1995, there have been almost no appreciable wage increases in Germany, partly as a result of pressure brought on from increases in subcontracted labor. Politicians have done everything to relieve employers of the burden of paying social security contributions because we fell into this strange panic, believing we weren't globally competitive. With our economic policies, we placed too much of a lopsided emphasis on exports.
  • Politicians have done everything to relieve employers of the burden of paying social security contributions because we fell into this strange panic, believing we weren't globally competitive.
Gene Ellis

"Which Eurobonds?" by Jeffrey Frankel | Project Syndicate - 0 views

www.project-syndicate.org/...which-eurobonds-

jeffrey project syndicate

shared by Gene Ellis on 16 Jun 12 - No Cached
  • Any solution to the eurozone crisis must meet a short-run objective and a long-run goal. Unfortunately, the two tend to conflict.Illustration by Paul LachineCommentsView/Create comment on this paragraphThe short-run objective is to return Greece, Portugal, and other troubled countries to a sustainable debt path (that is, a declining debt/GDP ratio). Austerity has raised debt/GDP ratios, but a debt write-down or bigger bailouts would undermine the long-term goal of minimizing the risk of similar debt crises in the future.CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph
  • it is hard to commit today to practice fiscal rectitude tomorrow. Official debt caps, such as the Maastricht fiscal criteria and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), failed because they were unenforceable.
  • The introduction of Eurobonds – joint, aggregate eurozone liabilities – could be part of the solution, if designed properly. There is certainly demand for them in China and other major emerging countries, which are desperate for an alternative to low-yielding US government securities.
  • ...12 more annotations...
  • But Germany remains opposed on moral-hazard grounds: a joint guarantee of Eurozone members’ liabilities would strengthen individual national governments’ incentive to spend beyond their means.
  • The German Council of Economic Experts has proposed a European Redemption Fund (ERF). The plan would convert into de facto 25-year Eurobonds the existing sovereign debt of member countries in excess of 60% of GDP, the threshold specified by the Maastricht criteria and the SGP.
  • But this seems upside down.
  • it offers absolution precisely on the 60%-of-GDP margin where countries will have the most trouble resisting temptation.
  • the main explanation for the absence of US moral hazard is that the right precedent was set in 1841, when the federal government let eight states and the Territory of Florida default.
  • Ever since 1841, the market requires that US states running up questionable levels of debt pay an interest-rate premium to compensate for the default risk.
  • Had the ECB operated from the outset under a rule prohibiting it from accepting SGP-noncompliant countries’ debt as collateral, the entire eurozone sovereign-debt problem might have been avoided.
  • the expansion in the US took place at the federal level, where spending today amounts to 24% of GDP, compared to just 1.2% of GDP for the European Union budget.
  • The version of Eurobonds that might work as the missing long-term enforcement mechanism is almost the reverse of the Germans’ ERF proposal: the “blue bonds” proposed two years ago by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker. Under this plan, only debt issued by national authorities below the 60%-of-GDP threshold could receive eurozone backing and seniority. When a country issued debt above the threshold, the resulting “red bonds” would lose this status.
  • The point is that the enforcement mechanism would be truly automatic: market interest rates would provide the discipline that bureaucrats in Brussels cannot.
  • Of course, the eurozone cannot establish a blue-bond regime without first solving the problems of debt overhang and troubled banks. Otherwise, the plan itself would be destabilizing, because almost all countries would immediately be in the red.
  • But one thing seems clear. German taxpayers, whose longstanding suspicion of profligate Mediterranean euro members has been vindicated, will not be happy when asked to pay still more for the cause of European integration. At a minimum, they will need some credible reason to believe that 20 years of false assurances have come to an end – that this is the last bailout.
Gene Ellis

No ordinary recession: There is much to fear beyond fear itself | vox - 0 views

www.voxeu.org/...e-much-fear-beyond-fear-itself

shared by Gene Ellis on 18 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • Richard Koo (2003) coined the term “balance sheet recession” to characterise the endless travail of Japan following the collapse of its real estate and stock market bubbles in 1990. The Japanese government did not act to repair the balance sheets of the private sector following the crash. Instead, it chose a policy of keeping bank rate near zero so as to reduce deposit rates and let the banks earn their way back into solvency. At the same time it supported the real sector by repeated large doses of Keynesian deficit spending. It took a decade and a half for these policies to bring the Japanese economy back to reasonable health.
  • At the time, a majority of forecasts predicted that the economy would slip back into depression once defence expenditures were terminated and the armed forces demobilised. The forecasts were wrong. This famous postwar “forecasting debacle” demonstrated how simple income-expenditure reasoning, ignoring the state of balance sheets, can lead one completely astray.
  • The lesson to be drawn from these two cases is that deficit spending will be absorbed into the financial sinkholes in private sector balance sheets and will not become effective until those holes have been filled.
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  • The present administration, like the last, would like to recapitalise the banks at least partly by attracting private capital. That can hardly be accomplished as long as the value of large chunks of the banks’ assets remains anybody’s guess.
  • When the entire private sector is bent on shortening its balance sheet and paying down debt, the public sector’s balance sheet must move in the opposite, offsetting direction. When the entire private sector is striving to save, the government must dis-save. The political obstacles to doing these things on a sufficient scale are formidable.
  • The Swedish policy following the 1992 crisis has been often referred to in recent months. Sweden acted quickly and decisively to close insolvent banks, and to quarantine their bad assets into a special fund.2 Eventually, all the assets, good and bad, ended up in the private banking sector again. The stockholders in the failed banks lost all their equity while the loss to taxpayers of the bad assets was minimal in the end. The operation was necessary to the recovery but what actually got the economy out of a very sharp and deep recession was the 25-30% devaluation of the krona which produced a long period of strong export-led growth.
  • So the private sector as a whole is bent on reducing debt.
  • Businesses will use depreciation charges and sell off inventories to do so. Households are trying once more to save. Less investment and more saving spell declining incomes.
  • now that they know how dangerous their leverage of yesteryear was.
  • Fiscal stimulus will not have much effect as long as the financial system is deleveraging.
  • er self-imposed constitutional balanced budget requirements and are consequently acting as powerful amplifiers of recession with respect to both income and employment.
  • Almost all American states now suffer und
Gene Ellis

IMF's Blanchard: Global Economy Gripped By Meta-Uncertainty - WSJ.com - 0 views

stream.wsj.com/...SS-2-33475

shared by Gene Ellis on 17 Jul 12 - No Cached
  • In 2008-09, there was a collapse of global trade. We were all very surprised. Output was not doing well, but the collapse in global trade was enormous. We realized at the time that the elasticity of trade with respect to global output was not 1, as you might think, but more like 3 to 4. So this explained it. And then it recovered like crazy.
  • This is still true. If global output goes down by 1%, global trade goes down by 3% to 4%.
  • What Europe needs to do:
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  • These countries have to do what they need to do. There’s no question there has to be fiscal consolidation. We can discuss the pace, but it has to happen. The other is competitiveness, which I see as much tougher of the two.
  • It has to be through a combination of structural reforms, hoping they will work, and nominal wage adjustments, although one cannot be incredibly optimistic about the scope there. We know that that’s going to take a while.
  • Take the big two, Italy and Spain. You can always dream of more, but I think they’re serious about doing it, both on the fiscal front and the structural-reforms front. I think it may well be that even if they do everything they can, and do it right, it’s still not enough. They have to have help — I would say when needed rather than if needed.
  • The banks have to be recapped, and they have to be recapped not using sovereign money. I think that is really very, very high on the agenda. I don’t think they can make it without help to the banks.
  • If the banks were healthier, I think they would lend at lower rates
  • And the sovereigns have to be able to borrow at reasonable rates. As long as they behave and they do all the things they’re asked to do, they have to be able to borrow at lower rates than they currently do. Some way has to be found to do it.
  • It’s not that I don’t care about the way it’s done. But I care about the result. These countries, if they’re doing the right things, they have to be able to finance themselves.
  • Some people say a euro depreciation would help Europe a lot. I think there is an argument for it, even in a multilateral context. You have to depreciate vis-a-vis somebody, so somebody has to appreciate. My sense is we would like most of the depreciation to be vis-a-vis emerging-market countries. Even if there was a depreciation vis-a-vis the dollar, I still think it would be a good thing.
  • We’ve done simulations. Other people have done simulations as well. 10% real depreciation would lead to a 1.4% increase in growth for a year — which at this stage, given the numbers, would be nice. The footnote, and it’s a very big footnote, is that … how much you benefit depends on how big your exports are related to your GDP and where you export — whether you export in the euro zone or outside. Unfortunately the countries that benefit the most are the countries that really don’t need it — Germany, the Netherlands. The countries that benefit the least are Greece, Portugal, Italy, Spain
  • There’s no question, the periphery countries have to improve their competitiveness. That’s not something even monetary policy at the level of the euro or fiscal policy can do. This they have to do through productivity improvements or nominal wage adjustments.
  • It is no secret that they have tended to respond to crises rather than be much more proactive.
  • And now there’s a sense in which they’re thinking about the full architecture.
  • At this stage I think there is a genuine commitment to thinking about the whole beast. That’s why these words — fiscal union, banking union — have come in.
  • Where I think there is still a problem is that all these things will take a lot of time. And some of these things may not happen because they’re unpopular. And meanwhile, there is a fire in the house. So they have to be willing to do more in the short term.
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