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Swiss National Bank (SNB) Chair Thomas Jordan provided an update on the central bank's central bank digital currency (CBDC) experiments and thinking. Firstly, the SNB's position remains that there is no need for a Swiss retail CBDC because digital payment requirements are already satisfied, and there are possibly far-reaching consequences for the financial system. However, the SNB continues to advance its wholesale CBDC work aimed at settling tokenized securities on the SIX Digital Exchange (SIX) platform. He also called attention to the unusual approach of issuing the CBDC on a third-party (i.e., SDX) platform. However, as pointed out by Ledger Insights, SIX also operates the Swiss real-time gross settlement (RTGS) system, so a trust relationship already exists. However, the SNB is also evaluating other options for tokenized securities settlement, such as the RTGS "trigger" solutions being tested by the European Central Bank in its wholesale CBDC experiments. https://www.snb.ch/en/publications/communication/speeches/2024/ref_20240408_tjn

Payments Canada has published Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC): Retail Considerations, the latest in a series of educational papers on CBDC. This paper explores the design considerations for implementation of a retail CBDC in the Canadian payments environment. A retail CBDC is aimed to take on traditional attributes of physical cash and would be used by consumers and businesses (relative to wholesale CBDC, which would be used by financial institutions).

A Bank for International Settlements (BIS) paper examines how CBDCs can contribute to an open, safe and competitive monetary system that supports innovation and serves the public interest. Like the latest generation of instant retail payment systems, retail CBDCs could ensure open payment platforms and a competitive level playing field that is conducive to innovation. The ultimate benefits of adopting a new payment technology will depend on the competitive structure of the underlying payment system and data governance arrangements. The same technology that can encourage a virtuous circle of greater access, lower costs and better services might equally induce a vicious circle of data silos, market power and anti-competitive practices. CBDCs and open platforms are the most conducive to a virtuous circle. CBDCs built on digital identification could improve cross-border payments, and limit the risks of currency substitution. Multi-CBDC arrangements could surmount the hurdles of sharing digital IDs across borders, but will require international cooperation.

Banco de la República (Banrep) published a working paper that concluded that assessed the need for and potential consequences of introducing a retail CBDC in Colombia. Based on an extensive review of the CBDC literature, it concluded that there is not currently a convincing case, but this conclusion does not exclude the possibility that one of these might justify the issuance of the retail CBDC in the future. That could be the case under a sudden popularization of unregulated stablecoins or a retail CBDC issued by another country, which could reduce the transmission of monetary policy, lead to a fragmentation of the payment system, and represent potential risks to financial stability. However, the paper stressed that the central bank has not taken a final decision on CBDC issuance, instead aiming to roll out a fast payment system by 2025.

The Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) published a paper that investigates the macroeconomic effects of different retail CBDC regimes in a New Keynesian model with a heterogeneous household sector. Generally, it finds that the introduction of a retail CBDC increases economy-wide utility as it allows higher consumption. Moreover, the shock absorption capability increases in an economy with retail CBDC. This particularly applies to the case when the central bank uses the retail CBDC as a monetary policy instrument. By adjusting the maximum amount of retail CBDC, the central bank can stabilize prices more effectively after adverse shocks. However, this stabilization implies distributional effects between households.

The Bank of England is recruiting for Solution Architects within the Technology team of its Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) Unit. The CBDC Unit is responsible for analyzing the opportunities and challenges presented by CBDC and developing the design of a CBDC. The Unit's activities include macroeconomic analysis, work on functional design, exploration of technology options, and engaging private-sector and international counterparts. The responsibility of the job holder will be to explore the technology design and architecture options for a potential retail CBDC.

The North Carolina (NC) House of Representatives and the Florida House of Representatives and Senate approved anti-central bank digital currency (CBDC) legislation.  The NC legislation prohibits individuals from using CBDCs for any payments to the state, and bars the Federal Reserve from using NC as a potential CBDC pilot testing ground. The Florida legislation excludes CBDC from the definition of "money" for purposes of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). The Cato Institute's Nicholas Anthony has written a nice explainer on the impact of the UCC on digital currency in general, and the Uniform Law Commission has published a paper that covers the CBDC impact specifically.

Ripple has announced the CBDC Innovate challenge, with a total prize pool of $150,000. The Ripple CBDC Innovate challenge seeks to inspire programmers to build applications capable of running on the XRP Ledger and supporting retail central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), interoperability and financial inclusion. The deadline for the first batch of submissions is August 25. Competitors are expected to build or update a fintech or payment solution that makes use of CBDC and can run on the XRP Ledger, create a solution that can take advantage of CBDC's advantages or create an interface that allows any human to engage with a CBDC.

Huw Van Steenis: Many central bankers are proposing to create a "Goldilocks CBDC": Not so much in circulation that it causes a run on the banking system as individuals switch savings to CBDCs, but not so little that it is irrelevant. But is it really worth spending many billions for something so limited and risky? And what is the use case? The history of money suggests creating a Goldilocks scheme is going to be difficult. But it also shows many monetary false starts of technology and ideas that were later adopted. Here are a five things to consider. First, work needs to be carried out to understand why all CBDC pilots so far have disappointed. Second, do not underestimate the potential financial stability and monetary policy impacts. Third, the focus should be on wholesale, not retail. Fourth, only use systems battle-tested at scale (hurdle for critical market infrastructure should be very high). Finally, there should be an honest conversation about the implications for privacy if central banks can track spending of CBDCs, issues of competition with private banks and the structure of finance before committing to the more radical versions of CBDCs.

The bulk of euro-denominated cash is held for store of value purposes, with such holdings sharply increasing in times of high economic uncertainty. We develop a Diamond and Dybvig model with public money as a store of value and heterogeneous beliefs about bank stability that accounts for this evidence. Consumers who are sufficiently pessimistic prefer to hold cash. In our model, the introduction of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) as a store of value that is superior to cash leads to bank disintermediation as some depositors opt for switching to CBDC based on their beliefs. While CBDC partially replaces deposits, long-term lending decreases less than proportionally as remaining depositors are, on aver-age, more optimistic about bank stability and banks re-balance their portfolio accordingly. The appropriate calibration of CBDC design features such as remuneration and quantity limits can mitigate these effects. We study the individual and social welfare implications of introducing CBDC as a store of value.

The U.K.-based Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) published a paper on the potential adverse international security effects of the development of foreign central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Concerns center on (1) the possibility of China dominating the CBDC market, (2) implications of first-mover advantage (and conversely the implications of the Bank of England delaying domestic development of a CBDC), (3) he role of CBDCs in international sanctions, and (4) the impact of foreign CBDCs on the United Kingdom as a financial center.

The Bank of Canada published a paper that examines the optimal amount of user anonymity in a CBDC in the context of bank lending. Anonymity, defined as the lender's inability to discern an entrepreneur's actions that enable fund diversion, influences the choice of payment instrument due to its impact on a bank's lending decisions. The paper shows that moderate anonymity in CBDC leads to an inefficient pooling equilibrium. To avoid this, CBDC anonymity should be either low, reducing attractiveness, or high, discouraging bank lending. Specifically, the anonymity should be high when CBDC significantly benefits sales, and low otherwise. However, competition between deposits and CBDC may hinder the implementation of low anonymity.

The Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (JEDC) published a paper that studies the macroeconomic consequences of a foreign CBDC available to residents in a small open economy using a DSGE model. It finds that a gradual and permanent increase in the domestic households' preferences toward the foreign CBDC leads to a structural reduction in economic activity, especially if the CBDC is designed to be similar to domestic deposits. The paper suggests several policy responses that may smooth the transition, limit disruptive effects and avoid the long-run GDP loss. It also shows that an economy with a large stock of foreign CBDC is better shielded from exogenous increases in the interest rate on foreign debt, if the CBDC remuneration remains constant.

The ECB's Ulrich Bindseil con-authored a paper that argues that macroeconomic models of CBDC often start from an early CBDC narrative which is no longer in line with the one of central banks actually working on CBDC. These include not accounting for design features communicated by central banks, such as no-remuneration, quantity limits, access restrictions, and automated sweeping functionality linking CBDC wallets with commercial bank accounts. Also, they do not explain well enough the difference between CBDC and banknotes within their macro-economic models, apart from remuneration.

Bank Negara Malaysia is "actively building internal capacity to support informed decisions" on central bank digital currency (CBDC) including conducting proofs of concepts (POCs). Though they do not have any immediate plans to issue CBDC they will "actively assess the potential value proposition of CBDC". The central bank said that policy decisions around CBDCs will be guided by whether it is able to demonstrate clear benefits to Malaysia as a whole while ensuring that risks from CBDCs are effectively managed, in particular, the financial stability risks. https://www.bnm.gov.my/-/ar2020_en_pr

This VoxEU/CEPR article argues that there is no obvious justification for retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) in most advanced economy (AE) jurisdictions where a large share of the population has access to bank accounts. From a user perspective, such CBDC do not seem attractive enough to compete successfully with private bank deposits and private retail payment systems like PayPal. The key advantage of CBDC, its absolute safety, is irrelevant for retail payments. However, for emerging and developing economies (EMDEs), retail CBDC could be a suitable tool to approach the problem of a large share of the population being unbanked. However, in both AE and EMDE jurisdictions, there is a huge potential for wholesale CBDC as a store of value for retail payment service providers.

The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) is considering a "phased introduction" of a central bank digital currency (CBDC) including running pilot programs. CBDCs are desirable not just for the benefits they create in payments systems, but also might be necessary to protect the general public in an environment of volatile private virtual currencies. Hence, the RBI is currently working towards a phased implementation strategy and examining use cases which could be implemented with little or no disruption, including both retail and wholesale CBDC. Hence, it would appear that the RBI is still in the very early stages of it CBDC deliberations, even though it has been exploring the pros and cons of introducing CBDCs for quite some time. https://www.rbi.org.in/Scripts/BS_SpeechesView.aspx?Id=1111

CBDC can be designed with attributes similar to cash or deposits, and can be interest-bearing: a CBDC that closely competes with deposits depresses bank credit and output, while a cash-like CBDC may lead to the disappearance of cash. Then, the optimal CBDC design trades off bank intermediation against the social value of maintaining diverse payment instruments. When network effects matter, an interest-bearing CBDC alleviates the central bank's tradeoff.

Norges Bank published a third report on central bank digital currency (CBDC) and the Bank will publish another report early next year, after which it will decide how to proceed with its CBDC work. However, the prospective introduction of a CBDC is still some way off. The lack of urgency reflects the Bank's view so far that there is no acute need to introduce it. The latest paper considers the potential impact on the stability of the financial system through the effect of CBDC issuance on bank funding markets. It concludes that CBDC has the potential to substantially crowd out bank funding instruments due to its superior safety features.

The Bank of Jamaica is inviting interested central bank digital currency (CBDC) providers to develop and test potential CBDC solutions in its recently established Fintech Regulatory Sandbox. Households and businesses would be able to use the proposed CBDC to make payments and store value, as they do now with cash. However the Bank is assuring the public that it will continue to issue bank notes and coins. The CBDC would be issued to licensed deposit taking institutions on a wholesale basis just as now being done with physical currency, which makes it sound like possibly a synthetic CBDC.