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In the past, I have talked about risk-aware culture and Enterprise Risk but have not so far talked about a risk that is part of the business. In the same vein without taking that risk companies can't survive. This situation becomes a reality as soon as a company or a lender issues credit or lends money.Now as a CFO, this is a difficult balance to strike as credit risk is linked more to potential bankruptcy of a customer. So do you say no to a potential transaction because the financial metrics of a customer are weak or do you take the current benefits associated with the transaction to be executed and hope that bankruptcy situation doesn't arise?

Financial markets have become increasingly volatile, largely because of computer trading on a massive scale. A "transaction tax" could slow down the entire operation

We provide direct evidence of market manipulation at the beginning of the financial crisis in November 2007. The type of manipulation, a "bear raid," would have been prevented by a regulation that was repealed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in July 2007. The regulation, the uptick rule, was designed to prevent manipulation and promote stability and was in force from 1938 as a key part of the government response to the 1928 market crash and its aftermath. On November 1, 2007, Citigroup experienced an unusual increase in trading volume and decrease in price. Our analysis of financial industry data shows that this decline coincided with an anomalous increase in borrowed shares, the selling of which would be a large fraction of the total trading volume. The selling of borrowed shares cannot be explained by news events as there is no corresponding increase in selling by share owners. A similar number of shares were returned on a single day six days later. The magnitude and coincidence of borrowing and returning of shares is evidence of a concerted effort to drive down Citigroup's stock price and achieve a profit, i.e., a bear raid. Interpretations and analyses of financial markets should consider the possibility that the intentional actions of individual actors or coordinated groups can impact market behavior. Markets are not sufficiently transparent to reveal even major market manipulation events. Our results point to the need for regulations that prevent intentional actions that cause markets to deviate from equilibrium and contribute to crashes. Enforcement actions cannot reverse severe damage to the economic system. The current "alternative" uptick rule which is only in effect for stocks dropping by over 10% in a single day is insufficient. Prevention may be achieved through improved availability of market data and the original uptick rule or other transaction limitations.