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The most dangerous myth, and one repeated daily in much of the major media, is that these troubles on both sides of the Atlantic are a result of a "debt crisis", and can only be resolved through fiscal tightening. The United States is not facing any public debt crisis at all, with interest payments on the debt at just 1.4% of GDP. Some eurozone countries do have a "debt crisis" - for example, Greece. But this is only because the European authorities have failed to take the necessary steps to resolve it, and have, instead, made it worse by shrinking the economy. In other words, there is no legitimate economic reason for a sovereign debt burden - even an unsustainable one - to result in years of economic stagnation and high unemployment. If the debt needs to be restructured because it is not payable, as in Greece, then that should be done as quickly as possible and with enough debt cancellation to make the resulting debt burden sustainable - as Argentina did with its successful default in 2001.

The obvious answer is that rich people have political clout-but can it really be so simple?

The euro is becoming an ever greater threat to Europe's common future. The currency union chains together economies that are simply incompatible. Politicians approve one bailout package after the other and, in doing so, have set down a dangerous path that could burden Europeans for generations to come and set the EU back by decades.

STOCKHOLM - Almost every developed nation in the world was walloped by the financial crisis, their economies paralyzed, their prospects for the future muddied. And then there's Sweden, the rock star of the recovery.

When unions throw their weight around, the result is more sustainable growth

Despite the financing challenges, Argentina's economy has grown by more than 8 percent a year since 2003, and many industries have benefited from the devaluation. Argentina has resumed exporting cars to Brazil. Tourism has flourished from an influx of Brazilians and other foreigners. In the end, Argentina may have one more lesson to teach Greece: the danger of fatalism. "A lot of people were saying that Argentina would never recover, that the peso would never regain value, that this country was damned," said Mr. Kerner, the analyst. "And it didn't happen."

It's important, yes, and must be addressed. But by a wide margin, it's not the nation's most pressing economic problem. That would be the widespread and persistent joblessness that has plagued the labor market since the Great Recession began in 2008. Almost 14 million people - 9.1 percent of the labor force - were officially counted as unemployed last month. But that's just the tip of the iceberg. There were almost 9 million part-time workers who wanted, but couldn't find, full-time jobs; 28 million in jobs they would have quit under normal conditions; and an additional 2.2 million who wanted work but couldn't find any and dropped out of the labor force. If the economy could generate jobs at the median wage for even half of these people, national income would grow by more than 10 times the total interest cost of the 2011 deficit (which was less than $40 billion). So anyone who says that reducing the deficit is more urgent than reducing unemployment is saying, in effect, that we should burn hundreds of billions of dollars worth of goods and services in a national bonfire. We ought to be tackling both problems at once. But in today's fractious political climate, many promising dual-purpose remedies - like infrastructure investments that would generate large and rapid returns - are called unthinkable, in the false belief that they would impoverish our grandchildren. Yet there are other ways to attack unemployment that could garner bipartisan support. Perhaps the most promising is a payroll tax holiday.

The Greek default has turned out to be the proverbial dog that didn't bark. The lesson for Europe - and for the US - is clear: it is time to stop listening to what banks say, and start focusing on what they do. We must re-evaluate the distorted political economy of the financial sector, before the excessive power of the few imposes even larger costs on everyone else.

Bernard Lietaer argues that the monoculture of money is what creates economic instability, leading to liquidity crises. He calls for a greater diversity of alternative currencies, citing innovative and enormously successful initiatives like the Lithuanian Doraland Economy, the Torekes in Belgium and Switzerland's famous alternative currency, the WIR.

While we all are facing the pinch of economic uncertainty there are some positive signs that are slowly emerging. Although in my mind, we are not out of the woods yet. In this part of the world, there have been interesting developments in India's and China's economy. On the other side of the world, it is the legal battle that SEC (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) has been having with white collar crimes. Let me share my views as to why this is something we as CFOs should be focused on and why it might have implications on your business here.

The period from March 2009 was the year of wishful thinking. Central banks cut interest rates and governments opened their cheque books providing a flood of cheap money that gave the illusion of recovery and a normal functioning economy. By pouring a lot of water into a bucket with a large hole, the world sustained the impression that the receptacle was almost full.

In their recent book on the history of financial crises, Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff note that banking crises are frequently succeeded by sovereign debt crises, as governments are forced to assume private liabilities to keep their national financial systems afloat. The 1997-98 Asian crisis provides a relatively recent example of how private debts can rapidly become public liabilities if a default threatens the overall economy.

Reactions to World Bank president Robert Zoellick's suggestion that gold might be used as part of a package of measures to reconstruct the international system ranged from the lukewarm to the bewildered.

When justified by economic fundamentals, a currency's exchange rate should be allowed to rise gradually. But when a currency's appreciation is triggered by capital inflows that represent the asset-diversification preferences of advanced-economy investors, it can and should be resisted.

Focus on yuan misguided; investment and domestic consumption, not exports, are engines of economy

The fear that began in Athens, raced through Europe, and finally shook the stock market in the United States is now affecting the broader global economy, from the ability of Asian corporations to raise money to the outlook for money-market funds where American savers park their cash.

Spain risks falling into the same trap as Greece, these investors say, unless it takes more forceful action. It could find itself unable to raise money on the private markets at acceptable interest rates - even though its government debt burden, as a share of the overall economy, is only half what Greece carries.

Greece is only the beginning. The world's leading economies have long lived beyond their means, and the financial crisis caused government debt to swell dramatically. Now the bill is coming due, but not all countries will be able to pay it.

As China gains dominance on the world stage, more and more multinational corporations will need to rethink their assumptions about competing under its state-capitalism model-one in which the government is the principal economic driver. So says Ian Bremmer, president of the political-risk consulting firm Eurasia Group and author of the upcoming book The End of the Free Market: Who Wins the War Between States and Corporations? In this video interview, Bremmer discusses the fundamental distinctions between state capitalism and free-market economies, as well as the strategic implications this has for Western companies and governments alike.

Meanwhile, the banks that caused much of this mess are getting all their money back. A more equitable approach would require the banks to pay at least part of the bill - writing down the debts of some European governments or extending their maturities into the future to allow battered European economies time to recover.