Group items matching

in title, tags, annotations or url

Description The Lisbon Treaty reformed the foundations of the European Union and marked the culmination of a process of Treaty reform that began after the Treaty of Nice and spanned almost a decade. This book addresses the main innovations made by the new Treaty, examining its legal and political consequences in a reformed EU. The book is organized thematically around the principal issues that occupied those engaged in the reforms over the last decade. The chapters include analysis of the reform process itself and the political forces that shaped the relevant provisions of the Lisbon Treaty. The book contains detailed analysis of the relevant legal changes made by the Lisbon Treaty on each topic covered. This legal analysis is informed by broader literature from related disciplines, such as political science and international relations, since it is only by doing so that it is possible fully to understand the legal implications of the new provisions dealing with issues such as the inter-institutional division of power within the EU, the distribution of competence, the hierarchy of legal acts and the Charter of Rights. The book addresses the political and legal implications of the Treaty provisions, and the discussion is set against the background of the pre-existing legal and political regime, aiding a full understanding of the effect of the new rules contained in the Lisbon Treaty.

Given the controversies and difficulties which preceded the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty, it is easy to forget that the Treaty is a complex legal document in need of detailed analysis for its impact to be fully understood. Jean-Claude Piris, the Director General of the Legal Service of the Council of the European Union, provides such an analysis, looking at the historical and political contexts of the Treaty, its impact on the democratic framework of the EU and its provisions in relation to substantive law. Impartial legal analysis of the EU's functions, its powers and the treaties which govern it make this the seminal text on the most significant recent development in EU law.• An authoritative and informed description of all legal effects of the Treaty of Lisbon, comparing them to the ex-ante situation and helping readers to understand its roots and the consequences of its provisions • Contextual legal analysis explains the reasons why the agreed provisions have been adopted and their interdependence • Outlines the workings, limitations and challenges of an organisation which plays an important role in the political, economic and social lives of all Europeans

ContentsIntroduction; 1. Origins and birth of the Treaty of Lisbon; 2. General provisions; 3. Democracy; 4. Fundamental rights; 5. Freedom, security and justice; 6. Institutions; 7. External affairs; 8. Financial, economic, social and other internal affairs; 9. Conclusion: the Treaty of Lisbon and beyond; 10. Annexes.

Abstract: The European Union finally succeeded in ramming through introduction of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009. The treaty was touted by the powers in Brussels as the vehicle that would create the long-awaited "single phone line" to Europe. Lisbon was to streamline the gargantuan EU bureaucracy and make communication between the two sides of the Atlantic smooth and tidy. Instead, the mess is worse than before, with five EU "presidents" tripping over each other and confusing Washington with ill-defined, overlapping, and flat-out confusing roles and foreign policy objectives. The Lisbon Treaty essentially allows the EU a foreign policy power-grab, the driving force of which is the notion that the countries of Europe will be stronger collectively than they are separately. But sovereignty cannot be traded for influence, and the EU's attempts to do so could threaten the security of Europe-- and of the United States.

The treaty, which aims to make decision-making smoother, creates a long-term president and enhances the powers of the EU foreign policy chief, is intended to give the 27-country bloc more political clout to match its economic weight.

The Lisbon Treaty changes the rules on how decisions are reached by the EU because decision-making has become unwieldy since the accession of 10 countries, mostly from eastern and central Europe, in 2004 and two more in 2007. It hands more power to the European Parliament, which shares some legislative responsibilities with the European Commission - the EU executive and a powerful regulatory body. Member states' leaders retain a lot of power.

The heads of the EU's three main institutions on Wednesday (7 September) came together to point out to Czech President Vaclav Klaus the "costs" to Europe if he continues to delay ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, the union's new rulebook. European Commission chief Jose Manuel Barroso, European Parliament President Jerzy Buzek and Fredrik Reinfeldt, the Swedish Prime Minister and the current chair of the EU, said several pending decisions are awaiting clarification from Prague.

The uncertainty stems from the fact that the Czech constitutional court is examining a legal challenge to the Lisbon Treaty, lodged by senators close to Mr Klaus. It is unclear how quickly the court will make its decision and, if the decision is positive, how much later Mr Klaus would then sign the treaty, completing ratification. Time is pressing because the current commission's mandate expires at the end of October, as does the post of the current high representative for foreign affairs, held by Javier Solana. The Swedish presidency is nervous about entering uncharted legal territory. It can either keep the commission as a caretaker, but ineffectual, executive, or try to set up a new commission under the Lisbon Treaty rules. Another option would be to negotiate a new commission with the current rules, but that would mean unwanted negotiations on reducing its size.

European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso has sided with smaller member states in trying to restrict the role of the proposed president of the European Council, a new post created by the Lisbon Treaty. Addressing the European Parliament on Wednesday (7 October), Mr Barroso chastised MEPs for referring to the post as "president of Europe."

"I am sorry, there will not be a president of Europe. There will be, if we have Lisbon, the president of the European Council. It is important to understand that point because sometimes I think there are some ideas about certain derives institutionelles [institutional drifts]," he said.

The commission president has no formal powers in appointing the European Council president but he warned: "The European Commission will not accept the idea that the president of European Council is the president of Europe." Mr Barroso's remarks came shortly after a leaked paper on the new Lisbon Treaty posts by Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg underlined the importance of maintaining the "institutional balance" of the union. The paper has been interpreted in some quarters as an anti-Blair move. Poland has also prepared a document on the role of the president of the European Council. Earlier this week, Polish Europe minister Mikolaj Dowgielewicz indicated to EUobserver the limited role that Warsaw foresees for the new president.