[ 69][ 69] Ibid. , p. 160;462. ...suite 51 The last sentence was perhaps fair comment, but the history itself was remarkably self-serving. T shirt burberry soldes The assertion that France had grown stronger after160;1870 and eventually prevailed over Germany ignored the fact that France had made no effort to regain Alsace-Lorraine for forty years, and had only done so in a war brought on largely by Germany itself. In fact, Lloyd George was baldly suggesting that the Great War had been a war of revenge instigated by France. It is tempting to treat this as merely an unfortunate use of language, and to assume he meant simply that ill-feeling over the seizure of territories in160;1870-1871 contributed to the tense atmosphere of the pre-war period. But Lloyd George was to repeat the claim many times in the next few years (without correction from colleagues) that French revanchisme over Alsace-Lorraine -160;not German aggression160;- caused the war.[ 70][ 70] See, for instance, House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George... vetement homme ralph lauren suite Placed in context, there are compelling grounds for thinking he believed it. 52 As we have seen, Lloyd George and most of Britain's educated classes had entered the war with great reluctance. The French were their Entente partners and allies against Prussian aggression, but they remained French, Britain's 'hereditary enemy', a race apart, whereas the Germans, notwithstanding the recklessness of the Kaiser and his Prussian High Command, were Britain's cousins. At the end of a war which had cost a million casualties, therefore, Britain's educated classes betrayed a scarcely veiled loathing of the French. Being Latins, they were clever, witty, sophisticated, but also self-regarding, mercurial, 'materialistic' and amoral. Had they not employed these qualities to draw Britain into the war in furtherance of their own national interests? In short, had it not been a French war, in which the British, trusting and phlegmatic, had been deceived into fighting their own cousins, in order to serve French imperialism? In the words of one contemporary, it was a case of 'the more nimble quicker-witted French, as against the stolid English Teuton'.[ 71][ 71] 'The Marching Capacity of Germans', Observer, 16160;Aug. nouveau sac vanessa bruno pas cher 160;1914,...suite 53 Viewed in this light, Lloyd George's statement was fully consistent with much that followed. Among other things, it helps explain the bitterness with which most British statesmen regarded France. It also explains their opposition to severe sanctions against Germany, their reluctance to believe that Britain and Germany could ever again fight one another, and their determination to discourage France from repeating its allegedly aggressive behaviour in Europe. In the words of the Fontainebleau memorandum, the Germans were 'one of the most vigorous and powerful races of the world'.suite But British statesmen were convinced that with the Prussian element vanquished they could draw a line under recent history and assume that another war with Germany was out of the question. As a result, even before the Peace Conference began they brushed aside Marshal Foch's appeals to bear in mind the potential threat that Germany posed to the European balance of power and the crucially important role of Eastern Europe within the overall balance. Instead, they took out their frustration on France for constantly raising these awkward questions. 48 Thereafter Franco-British relations went from bad to worse. At the Peace Conference Clemenceau sought practical guarantees against a renewal of German aggression. Lloyd George resisted him at every turn. Clemenceau, a liberal Anglophone who as a young man had translated J. Burberry pas cher 160;S.160;Mill's Life of Auguste Comte and the first volume of Logic, was dismayed, but sought to reason with the British. To no avail. The British delegation flatly rejected all warnings about Germany from either him or Foch.[ 67][ 67] Robert Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis…, op. 160;cit. ,. survetement gucci soldes ..suite 49 On the weekend of 21-23160;March, Lloyd George, frustrated by French policy, gathered his advisers for two days of reflection at Fontainebleau. The resulting memorandum, circulated in Lloyd George's name to the French and Americans, has won praise from generations of historians as an exemplary statement of enlightened internationalism.[ 68][ 68] Antony Lentin, an authority on the peace settlement, describes... Doudoune moncler soldes suite No doubt this was just how Lloyd George and his colleagues regarded it. Yet his reference to Alsace-Lorraine, used to illustrate the consequences of an oppressive peace settlement, reveals a different feature of British attitudes. According to the memorandum, Prussia-Germany's seizure of these French provinces in160;1870 should have made Germany stronger and France weaker, but in fact it had done just the opposite because it led France to create alliances and eventually force the return of the lost provinces. 50 France itself has demonstrated that those who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit back are utterly wrong. Year by year France became numerically weaker in comparison with her victorious neighbour, but in reality she became ever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe; she made alliance with those whom Germany had wronged or menaced; she never ceased to warn the world of its danger and ultimately she was able to secure the overthrow of the far mightier power which had trampled so brutally upon her. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments armies to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of160;1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors.
started by xketi156 on 08 Jan 15
The assertion that France had grown stronger after160;1870 and eventually prevailed over Germany ignored the fact that France had made no effort to regain Alsace-Lorraine for forty years, and had only done so in a war brought on largely by Germany itself. In fact, Lloyd George was baldly suggesting that the Great War had been a war of revenge instigated by France. It is tempting to treat this as merely an unfortunate use of language, and to assume he meant simply that ill-feeling over the seizure of territories in160;1870-1871 contributed to the tense atmosphere of the pre-war period. But Lloyd George was to repeat the claim many times in the next few years (without correction from colleagues) that French revanchisme over Alsace-Lorraine -160;not German aggression160;- caused the war.[ 70][ 70] See, for instance, House of Lords Record Office, Lloyd George... vetement homme ralph lauren suite Placed in context, there are compelling grounds for thinking he believed it. 52 As we have seen, Lloyd George and most of Britain's educated classes had entered the war with great reluctance. The French were their Entente partners and allies against Prussian aggression, but they remained French, Britain's 'hereditary enemy', a race apart, whereas the Germans, notwithstanding the recklessness of the Kaiser and his Prussian High Command, were Britain's cousins. At the end of a war which had cost a million casualties, therefore, Britain's educated classes betrayed a scarcely veiled loathing of the French. Being Latins, they were clever, witty, sophisticated, but also self-regarding, mercurial, 'materialistic' and amoral. Had they not employed these qualities to draw Britain into the war in furtherance of their own national interests? In short, had it not been a French war, in which the British, trusting and phlegmatic, had been deceived into fighting their own cousins, in order to serve French imperialism? In the words of one contemporary, it was a case of 'the more nimble quicker-witted French, as against the stolid English Teuton'.[ 71][ 71] 'The Marching Capacity of Germans', Observer, 16160;Aug. nouveau sac vanessa bruno pas cher
160;1914,...suite 53 Viewed in this light, Lloyd George's statement was fully consistent with much that followed. Among other things, it helps explain the bitterness with which most British statesmen regarded France. It also explains their opposition to severe sanctions against Germany, their reluctance to believe that Britain and Germany could ever again fight one another, and their determination to discourage France from repeating its allegedly aggressive behaviour in Europe. In the words of the Fontainebleau memorandum, the Germans were 'one of the most vigorous and powerful races of the world'.suite But British statesmen were convinced that with the Prussian element vanquished they could draw a line under recent history and assume that another war with Germany was out of the question. As a result, even before the Peace Conference began they brushed aside Marshal Foch's appeals to bear in mind the potential threat that Germany posed to the European balance of power and the crucially important role of Eastern Europe within the overall balance. Instead, they took out their frustration on France for constantly raising these awkward questions. 48 Thereafter Franco-British relations went from bad to worse. At the Peace Conference Clemenceau sought practical guarantees against a renewal of German aggression. Lloyd George resisted him at every turn. Clemenceau, a liberal Anglophone who as a young man had translated J. Burberry pas cher
160;S.160;Mill's Life of Auguste Comte and the first volume of Logic, was dismayed, but sought to reason with the British. To no avail. The British delegation flatly rejected all warnings about Germany from either him or Foch.[ 67][ 67] Robert Boyce, The Great Interwar Crisis…, op. 160;cit. ,. survetement gucci soldes ..suite 49 On the weekend of 21-23160;March, Lloyd George, frustrated by French policy, gathered his advisers for two days of reflection at Fontainebleau. The resulting memorandum, circulated in Lloyd George's name to the French and Americans, has won praise from generations of historians as an exemplary statement of enlightened internationalism.[ 68][ 68] Antony Lentin, an authority on the peace settlement, describes... Doudoune moncler soldes
suite No doubt this was just how Lloyd George and his colleagues regarded it. Yet his reference to Alsace-Lorraine, used to illustrate the consequences of an oppressive peace settlement, reveals a different feature of British attitudes. According to the memorandum, Prussia-Germany's seizure of these French provinces in160;1870 should have made Germany stronger and France weaker, but in fact it had done just the opposite because it led France to create alliances and eventually force the return of the lost provinces. 50 France itself has demonstrated that those who say you can make Germany so feeble that she will never be able to hit back are utterly wrong. Year by year France became numerically weaker in comparison with her victorious neighbour, but in reality she became ever more powerful. She kept watch on Europe; she made alliance with those whom Germany had wronged or menaced; she never ceased to warn the world of its danger and ultimately she was able to secure the overthrow of the far mightier power which had trampled so brutally upon her. You may strip Germany of her colonies, reduce her armaments armies to a mere police force and her navy to that of a fifth rate power; all the same in the end if she feels that she has been unjustly treated in the peace of160;1919 she will find means of exacting retribution from her conquerors.