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J. B.

Atheism from a Recliner - Reformation21 Blog - 0 views

  • "Atheism," Myers asserts, "is the default position. You don't have to do anything to be an atheist, but you have to work awfully hard not to be one..."
    • J. B.
       
      Do you have to do anything to disbelieve in your parents?
  • No rules, we might add, except for the ones Myers deems "right and appropriate." No obligations, except those that Myers is "happy" to fulfill.
  • Myers, however, is right about one thing: you don't have to do anything to be an atheist. It is the "natural" disposition of every human being (Eph 2:3; cf. Ps 51:5; Jer 13:23).
J. B.

'A Universe From Nothing,' by Lawrence M. Krauss - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • Where, for starters, are the laws of quantum mechanics themselves supposed to have come from? Krauss is more or less upfront, as it turns out, about not having a clue about that. He acknowledges (albeit in a parenthesis, and just a few pages before the end of the book) that every­thing he has been talking about simply takes the basic principles of quantum mechanics for granted
  • It happens that ever since the scientific revolution of the 17th century, what physics has given us in the way of candidates for the fundamental laws of nature have as a general rule simply taken it for granted that there is, at the bottom of everything, some basic, elementary, eternally persisting, concrete, physical stuff.
  • And what the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all the fundamental laws of nature are about, and all there is for the fundamental laws of nature to be about, insofar as physics has ever been able to imagine, is how that elementary stuff is arranged.
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  • But the laws have no bearing whatsoever on questions of where the elementary stuff came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular elementary stuff it does, as opposed to something else, or to nothing at all.
  • the fundamental laws of this theory take the form of rules concerning which arrangements of those fields are physically possible and which aren’t, and rules connecting the arrangements of those fields at later times to their arrangements at earlier times, and so on — and they have nothing whatsoever to say on the subject of where those fields came from, or of why the world should have consisted of the particular kinds of fields it does, or of why it should have consisted of fields at all, or of why there should have been a world in the first place.
  • Krauss seems to be thinking that these vacuum states amount to the relativistic-­quantum-field-theoretical version of there not being any physical stuff at all. And he has an argument — or thinks he does — that the laws of relativistic quantum field theories entail that vacuum states are unstable. And that, in a nutshell, is the account he proposes of why there should be something rather than nothing.
  • Relativistic-quantum-field-theoretical vacuum states — no less than giraffes or refrigerators or solar systems — are particular arrangements of elementary physical stuff. The true relativistic-quantum-field-­theoretical equivalent to there not being any physical stuff at all isn’t this or that particular arrangement of the fields — what it is (obviously, and ineluctably, and on the contrary) is the simple absence of the fields!
  • Who cares what we would or would not have made a peep about a hundred years ago? We were wrong a hundred years ago. We know more now. And if what we formerly took for nothing turns out, on closer examination, to have the makings of protons and neutrons and tables and chairs and planets and solar systems and galaxies and universes in it, then it wasn’t nothing, and it couldn’t have been nothing, in the first place.
J. B.

Little 'Value' in New Harris Book | (A)theologies | Religion Dispatches - 0 views

  • So what is the secret that has eluded David Hume and G. E. Moore, and just about every professional philosopher of the twentieth century, including the present writer? It seems to be a matter of “well-being.” We value well-being and we therefore ought to promote it, both for ourselves and for others.
  • Moral philosophers have always realized that matters of empirical fact are relevant to moral decision making.
  • But what about the actual business of well-being itself? Perhaps brain science can tell us why one person likes to go to a baseball game and another to the opera, but can it tell us whether we should go to the baseball game or the opera?
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  • Science alone just cannot do it. It cannot decide questions like these. I don’t know what Harris studied in his philosophy courses as an undergrad at Stanford, but they don’t seem to have penetrated very deeply. He denounces philosophers before him (including myself, I should admit) without really addressing the challenge their arguments pose to his claims. The trouble is that Harris seems so keen to get to religion that he has little or no time for such conventional academic courtesies. To say that religion is a bit of an obsession for Harris is rather like saying Hitler had a bit of a thing about the Jews.
  • And more importantly, why should I care about the well-being of others if I can increase my own?
  • Push the discussion a bit further. Why should I maximize well-being? I will look after myself and my family and my friends, because I like doing that and when they are happy so am I. But why should I care about others? How can science answer this?
  • And at times—at many times—his obsession comes across as not just misplaced but thoroughly mean-minded.
  • if truth be known, I am much closer to Harris than to Collins on the matter of the truth-status of Christianity.
  • My objection is that in a book on the foundations of ethics it is simply out of place to spend so much time on such a personal attack.
  • apart from the fact that philosophers from Socrates to John Rawls have been offering secular moralities, why does Harris not actually engage those (like Saint Thomas Aquinas) who have offered religiously-based systems of ethics?
  • If God wanted to destroy New Atheism, getting this book written was a good start.
  •  
    Atheist Michael Ruse critiques fellow Atheist Sam Harris's new book.
J. B.

400,000 Textual Variants in the New Testament Alone? Blomberg - 0 views

  • There are also over 5700 ancient Greek manuscripts, including lectionaries, from the centuries prior to the invention of the printing press, with anywhere from a few verses to entire New Testament contained in them.  Add the manuscripts of ancient languages into which the Greek New Testament was translated, and that number swells to over 20,000.  Now we have only on average 20 distinctive variants per manuscript, though obviously that number will be far greater or far lower, even on average, depending on the amount of the New Testament contained in the manuscript.
  • The United Bible Societies’ Greek New Testament, 4th edition, one of the two standard scholarly reconstructions of the most probable original wording for each of the New Testament documents, thus prints only about 1200 variants in its footnotes, where there is even a small amount of significant doubt about the original reading and/or that makes even a small amount of significant difference in meaning.
  • English Bible translations usually choose only 200-300 of these to put in their footnotes or marginal notes as involving a significant enough question of meaning to be of interest to the average reader.  These involve less than 1% of all the words in the Greek New Testament
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  • Of these few hundred, only two affect more than just a couple of verses, the so-called longer ending of Mark (16:9-20) and the story of the woman caught in adultery (John 7:53-8:11).
  • No other document known to humanity from any culture in the centuries before Gutenburg comes even remotely close to having had this many of hand-copied manuscripts preserved of it.  In the ancient Greco-Roman world, the next closest is Homer’s Iliad with less than 700 manuscripts.  For Roman histories like Pliny’s Natural History we have twenty good manuscripts and for Caesar’s Gallic War, a meager ten.  For the vast majority of ancient documents we have copies in the single digits; for most of the Gnostic texts we have exactly one copy, though occasionally a few more.  Plus the time lag between the originals and the oldest copies is usually centuries, not just decades, as with the New Testament.
J. B.

Confessions of an Ex-Moralist - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • On the contrary, I find myself in a far better position than before to change minds – and, what is more important, hearts. For to argue that people who use animals for food and other purposes are doing something terribly wrong is hardly the way to win them over. That is more likely to elicit their defensive resistance.Instead I now focus on conveying information: about the state of affairs on factory farms and elsewhere, the environmental devastation that results and, especially, the sentient, intelligent, gentle and noble natures of the animals who are being brutalized and slaughtered. It is also important to spread knowledge of alternatives, like how to adopt a healthy and appetizing vegan diet. If such efforts will not cause people to alter their eating and buying habits, support the passage of various laws and so forth, I don’t know what will.
    • J. B.
       
      Of course persons are probably only being convinced by this under moral assumptions such as "it is wrong to cause environmental devastation." And how does he draw some dichotomy between Convincing someone that you shouldn't do something "because its wrong" and convincing someone that you shouldn't do something "because it causes environmental devastation"? We are more likely to ask "Why?" in regards to the first and not the second simply because most people assume "environmental devastation" is wrong. But if it is not wrong, the reply to the second instance is "So what?"
  • while my desires are the same, my manner of trying to implement them has altered radically.
  • My outlook has therefore become more practical: I desire to influence the world in such a way that my desires have a greater likelihood of being realized. This implies being an active citizen.
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  • I am not attempting to justify anything; I am trying to motivate informed and reflective choices.
  • We have an intuitive sense of right and wrong that trumps even the commands of God. We have the ability to judge that God is good or bad. Therefore, even if God did not exist, we could fend for ourselves in matters of conscience. Ethics, not divine revelation, is the guide to life.
  • In my most recent published book, I defended a particular moral theory – my own version of deontological ethics – and then “applied” that theory to defend a particular moral claim: that other animals have an inherent right not to be eaten or otherwise used by humans. Oddly enough, it was as I crossed the final “t” and dotted the final “i” of that monograph, that I underwent what I call my anti-epiphany.
  • could I believe that, say, the wrongness of a lie was any more intrinsic to an intentionally deceptive utterance than beauty was to a sunset or wonderfulness to the universe? Does it not make far more sense to suppose that all of these phenomena arise in my breast, that they are the responses of a particular sensibility to otherwise valueless events and entities?So someone else might respond completely differently from me, such that for him or her, the lie was permissible, the sunset banal, the universe nothing but atoms and the void.
  • essential to morality is that its norms apply with equal legitimacy to everyone
  • I conceived of right and wrong as standing on their own two feet, without prop or crutch from God. We should do the right thing because it is the right thing to do, period. But this was a God too. It was the Godless God of secular morality, which commanded without commander – whose ways were thus even more mysterious than the God I did not believe in, who at least had the intelligible motive of rewarding us for doing what He wanted.
  • And what is more, I had known this. At some level of my being there had been the awareness, but I had brushed it aside. I had therefore lived in a semi-conscious state of self-delusion – what Sartre might have called bad faith. But in my case this was also a pun, for my bad faith was precisely the belief that I lacked faith in a divinity.
  • I myself had ignored the latter issue for most of my career, since, if there was one thing I knew in this entire universe, it was that some things are morally wrong.
  • And yet I knew in my soul, with all of my conviction, with a passion, that they were wrong, wrong, wrong. I knew this with more certainty than I knew that the earth is round.
  • the personal experiment of excluding all moral concepts and language from my thinking, feeling and actions has proved so workable and attractive, I am convinced that anyone who gives it a fair shot would likely find it to his liking.
  • there are fewer practical differences between moralism and amoralism than might have been expected. It seems to me that what could broadly be called desire has been the moving force of humanity, no matter how we might have window-dressed it with moral talk.
  • Mother Theresa was acting as much from desire as was the Marquis de Sade. But the sort of desire that now concerns me most is what we would want if we were absolutely convinced that there is no such thing as moral right and wrong. I think the most likely answer is: pretty much the same as what we want now.
J. B.

Randolph Richards on Secretaries and Ancient Letters | Bible.org Blogs - 0 views

  • We know secretaries were used in certain letters and the idea one goes to the trouble of using a secretary but not using their skills in doing so makes no cultural sense.
J. B.

Could the Mind be the Brain? - Maverick Philosopher - 0 views

  • proving that the mind cannot be identical to the brain does not amount to proving that the mind is capable of existing apart from some material embodiment or other.
  • if my mind is identical to my brain, then my mind and my brain share all properties: everything true of the one is true of the other, and vice versa. But it is clear that they do not share all properties. The brain is a physical thing with a definite mass, weight, location, size, shape. One can inject dyes into various of its subregions. One can insert electrodes into it. One can remove and discard parts of it. One can add parts.  I can literally give you a piece of my brain. (And you hope I won't.)  But can I literally give you a piece of my mind? Does my mind have a weight in grams? Is it  divisible?  Do my thoughts have a location or a volume?  if one thought has a second as its object, as when I reflect, is the second thought located above the second?  How far above?  Can we intelligibly speak of the voltage drop across a thought?
  • If x and y differ property-wise, then x is not y.Mind and brain differ in respect of the property of being wholly occupied with the mind-body problem.  Ergo,Mind is not brain.
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  • even if every mental event is a brain event, not every brain event is a mental event
  • But what is wrong with holding the converse, namely, that every mental state is a brain state?  A similar indiscernibility objection can be made.  If every mental state is a brain state, then every belief (e.g. my belief that Boston is on the Charles River) is a brain state.  But beliefs have properties that brain states cannot have.  One is the property of being either true or false; another is intentionality.  So no belief is a brain state.  But then there are mental states that are not brain states.
  • if there are mental states that are brain states, then there must be some properties that distinguish these brain states that are mental states from the brain states that are not mental states.  These properties will have to be specifically mental: no physical property could do the trick.  But then, applying  the Indiscernibility of Identicals once again, any brain state that was initially supposed to be a mental state would be seen to  have a property that would entail its non-identity witha brain state.
J. B.

How Does Jesus Deal with a Doubting Believer? | It Is Written - 0 views

  • Having heard of Jesus’ ministry while in prison, John did not become more convinced that Jesus was the Messiah. Rather, he becomes less certain. There was something about Jesus’ ministry that appeared deficient to John.
  • it’s likely that John was questioning Jesus’ ministry because it lacked the element of final judgment that John and many of the Jews had expected.
  • The remaining unbelief of good men may sometimes, in an hour of temptation, strike at the root, and call in question the most fundamental truths which were thought to be well settled.
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  • the faith of the thief on the cross. He had no hope of getting off that cross and saving his life. His only hope was a dying Messiah hanging on a nearby cross.
  • So when Jesus declares, “Blessed is he who is not offended because of me,” He concedes that there are dimensions of His earthly ministry that may tempt people to disbelieve.
  • “Blessed is the one who is not offended by me,” said Jesus to doubting John (7:32). The Greek word translated “offended” literally means, “to be scandalized.” In the NT, it refers either to someone who is caused to fall into sin or to someone who is caused to fall into unbelief.
  • It’s one thing to have doubts and to struggle with doubts. It’s another when you and I give doubts a place of lodging in our hearts. When we do this, our doubts will soon change into skeptical unbelief. Today, our society praises skepticism as if it were one of the greatest of virtues.
  • But the Lord Jesus Christ does not praise such skepticism. He does not commend John the Baptist for his “open-mindedness.” Rather, He gives him a gentle warning—“John, blessed are you if you do not take offense at me,” that is, “You will be eternally happy if you refuse to entertain those doubts you’re struggling with. John, don’t stop believing in me.”
  • It’s difficult to show hospitality to doubt when we’re showing hospitality to Scripture.
J. B.

It Only Takes One Miracle - Craig Blomberg - 0 views

  • Is there anything humans value more than their autonomy, including their autonomy to rebel against God? We could have been created without this freedom but then we would probably be incapable of even having this kind of conversation.
    • J. B.
       
      But why think this kind of autonomy is valuable? What if there was some doubt that I existed. Would my relatives and friends now be more free than they are now in such a way that their lives would be richer? 
  • crucial to the very essence of our humanity
J. B.

Twin reduction abortions: Why do they trouble pro-choicers? - By William Saletan - Slat... - 0 views

  • "Even as a woman who has terminated a pregnancy, I totally understand the author's apprehension … something about it just doesn't feel right,"
  • To pro-lifers and hardcore pro-choicers, this queasiness seems odd. After all, a reduction is an abortion. If anything, reduction should be less problematic than ordinary abortion, since one life is deliberately being spared. Why, then, does reduction unsettle so many pro-choicers?
  • the main problem with reduction is that it breaches a wall at the center of pro-choice psychology. It exposes the equality between the offspring we raise and the offspring we abort.Look up any abortion-related item in Jezebel, and you'll see the developing human referred to as a fetus or pregnancy. But when the same entity appears in a non-abortion item, it gets an upgrade.
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  • This bifurcated mindset permeates pro-choice thinking. Embryos fertilized for procreation are embryos; embryos cloned for research are "activated eggs." A fetus you want is a baby; a fetus you don't want is a pregnancy. Under federal law, anyone who injures or kills a "child in utero" during a violent crime gets the same punishment as if he had injured or killed "the unborn child's mother," but no such penalty applies to "an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman … has been obtained."
  • Reduction destroys this distinction. It combines, in a single pregnancy, a wanted and an unwanted fetus. In the case of identical twins, even their genomes are indistinguishable. You can't pretend that one is precious and the other is just tissue. You're killing the same creature to which you're dedicating your life.
J. B.

Stephen Hawking Explains Creation, Big Bang Sans God, Christian News - 0 views

  • The black hole, which floats in space, is a star so massive that it has collapsed in on itself. Nothing, including light, can escape its gravity."Its gravitational field is so powerful it doesn't only warp and distort light but also time," he explained. Time, thus, doesn't exist in the black hole.Using this as the final key to revealing how the universe created itself, Hawking explained that if you travel back in time toward the moment of the big bang, the universe gets smaller until it comes to a point where the whole universe is in a space so small that it is "in effect a single infinitesimally small, infinitesimally dense black hole."He concluded, "You can't get to a time before the big bang because there was no before the big bang. We have finally found something that doesn't have a cause because there was no time for a cause to exist in. For me, this means there is no possibility of a Creator because there is no time for a Creator to have existed.""Since time itself began at the moment of the big bang, it was an event that could not have been caused or created by anyone or anything."
  • The black hole, which floats in space, is a star so massive that it has collapsed in on itself. Nothing, including light, can escape its gravity.
  • "Its gravitational field is so powerful it doesn't only warp and distort light but also time," he explained. Time, thus, doesn't exist in the black hole.
    • J. B.
       
      Does warping time entail the non-existence of time? I don't see how, but then I'm not Stephen Hawking.
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  • We have finally found something that doesn't have a cause because there was no time for a cause to exist in.
    • J. B.
       
      This assumes that causes must be temporally prior to and cannot be simultaneous with their effects. William Lane Craig argues that a cause can be simultaneous.
  • Using this as the final key to revealing how the universe created itself, Hawking explained that if you travel back in time toward the moment of the big bang, the universe gets smaller until it comes to a point where the whole universe is in a space so small that it is "in effect a single infinitesimally small, infinitesimally dense black hole."He concluded, "You can't get to a time before the big bang because there was no before the big bang
  • there is no possibility of a Creator because there is no time for a Creator to have existed.
    • J. B.
       
      But then, there was no time for the big bang to come to exist in either? Or there was not time for the black hole to exist?
  • Since time itself began at the moment of the big bang, it was an event that could not have been caused or created by anyone or anything.
    • J. B.
       
      This might as much lead us to think his theory is garbage as to think that something must come from nothing because... here we are after all.
J. B.

Did God Change at the Incarnation? - The Gospel Coalition Blog - 0 views

  • the biblical statements about God not changing needn’t be taken in a way that rules out change in any sense.
  • So these texts arguably leave open the possibility of God changing in ways consistent with his perfect character, his eternal decree, and his covenantal commitments, and it’s plausible to think the Incarnation would fall into that category.
  • (What would it mean for a timeless God to become temporal?
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  • The properties of each nature can be ascribed to the one person, Jesus Christ, but not necessarily to the other nature.
  • On this basis, it seems natural to say that God the Son is timeless and unchangeable with respect to his divine nature but temporal and changeable with respect to his human nature.
  • An analogy (albeit an imperfect one) may help to clarify this distinction. In the movie Avatar the protagonist, Jake Sully, is enlisted to operate a Na’vi-human hybrid body. Given the close mental connection between Sully and his ‘avatar’—he acts and experiences everything through that body—we might well say that he inhabits the hybrid body and that he now has two bodies. So consider this question: Can Sully run? Well, yes and no. He can’t run with respect to human body (he’s a paraplegic) but he can run with respect to his avatar body.
  • One difficulty persists, however. If the Incarnation involved a change in God the Son, we can’t ascribe that change merely to his human nature, because that would put the cart before the horse. You can’t appeal to Christ’s human nature to explain how he could take on a human nature in the first place! So how can this difficulty be resolved?
  • Perhaps the best solution here is to say that talk of ‘becoming’ human is really a loose way of speaking, one conditioned by our temporal perspective, and isn’t to be taken in the most literal sense. Like talk of God ‘regretting’ (1 Sam. 15:11, 35; cf. v. 29) this is simply a case of divine accommodation to human thought and language. As I see it, orthodox Christology doesn’t require us to say that the Incarnation involved an intrinsic change in God the Son. All we need to say is that (1) the Incarnation was a contingent event (i.e., God could have freely chosen not to take on a human nature) and (2) it’s timeless true that God the Son is not-related-by-incarnation with respect to creation-before-4-BC and related-by-incarnation with respect to creation-after-4-BC. The creation is conditioned by time, not God. Now admittedly that’s a pretty awkward way to express the matter (which is why we prefer looser ways of speaking in other contexts) but unfortunately complex questions often demand complex answers!
  •  
    James Anderson suggests answers.
J. B.

Sam Harris - Christian Terrorism and Islamophobia - 0 views

  • It has been widely reported that Breivik is a “Christian fundamentalist.” Having read parts of his 1500-page manifesto (2083: A European Declaration of Independence), I must say that I have my doubts. These do not appear to be the ruminations of an especially committed Christian:
  • What cannot be doubted, however, is that Breivik’s explicit goal was to punish European liberals for their timidity in the face of Islam.
  • He has, however, digested the opinions of many writers who share my general concerns—Theodore Dalrymple, Robert D. Kaplan, Lee Harris, Ibn Warraq, Bernard Lewis, Andrew Bostom, Robert Spencer, Walid Shoebat, Daniel Pipes, Bat Ye’or, Mark Steyn, Samuel Huntington, et al. He even singles out my friend and colleague Ayaan Hirsi Ali for special praise, repeatedly quoting a blogger who thinks she deserves a Nobel Peace Prize. With a friend like Breivik, one will never want for enemies.
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  • We are bound to hear a lot of deluded talk about the dangers of “Islamophobia” and about the need to address the threat of “terrorism” in purely generic terms. The emergence of “Christian” terrorism in Europe does absolutely nothing to diminish or simplify the problem of Islam—its repression of women, its hostility toward free speech, and its all-too-facile and frequent resort to threats and violence.
  •  
    Sam Harris blogs about Breivik. Worth reading.
J. B.

Enlightenment Fundamentalist Slays 80 at Norwegian Summer Camp - White Horse Inn Blog - 0 views

  • In an on-line manifesto, Breivik makes it clear that he is not a “fundamentalist Christian.”  He prefaces one comment with, “If there is a God…” and says that science should always trump religion.
  • The nineteenth century philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche shrewdly observed that in his day the bourgeois elites of Europe wanted  the fruit of Christianity (i.e., moral culture) without the tree itself (i.e., the actual doctrine and practice).  Breivik is not a poster-boy for “Christian fundamentalism,” but the fulfillment of Nietzsche’s prophecy.
J. B.

Adam and Eve as Historical People - 0 views

  •  
    C. John Collins article
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