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According to the subject-title itself, the presumption is that there is a possibility for US–China cooperation in assistance to Africa. However, to turn that possibility into reality needs a lot of work. The reason is simple: how could two parties discuss an important issue concerning the third party without the third’s knowledge? How could the two parties carry out this kind of cooperation without the third party’s participation at the very beginning? How could we start the cooperation without much understanding, let alone agreement, of each other’s concept of the issue?

The status of China and Africa is equal, not a relation of superior and inferior. Although the relation is strategic, it is equal and friendly. Both China and Africa appreciate each other and cooperate with each other.

The principles guiding China–Africa relations can be summarised as equality and mutual respect, bilateralism and co-development, no-political strings attached and non-interference of domestic affairs, and stress on the capability of self-reliance.

China's corporate practices became sensational news that guaranteed immediate research funding as scientific evidence was necessary to demonstrate the problems that could result from doing business with China. The West, which has always used civil society as a tool of democratisation, loudly proclaimed the need for civil society's involvement in order to monitor China's errant ways.

Recently China hosted a China-Africa Civil Society Dialogue which I attended in Beijing. According to the organisers, this workshop was held in the context of FOCAC. The theme they maintained was on increasing mutual understanding, promoting exchanges and cooperation through various strategies that include developing a platform of exchanges and cooperation for NGOs from China and Africa within FOCAC. Given China's stance of non-adherence to the West's approach of imposing aid conditionalities on African governments, one questions what approach will be applied to civil societies. This is critical as most civil societies in Africa have now become an extension of the particular donor's foreign policy objectives.

The fact is international donors have always viewed civil society as a key ingredient in the processes of democratisation. The United States's foreign policy, which is steeped deep in promoting democracy in all corners of the world, viewed civil societies as a tool that could hold governments to account, serving as a watchdog on governments and thereby promoting governance.

What the Chinese are doing is purchasing natural resources from African countries in exchange for either cash or large constructions of infrastructure. Plain and simple. The Chinese do not care if our governments are democratically elected or whether those governments care for their people or whether they ask for fair value for their commodities. As an African, I have no problem with this.

First, African countries should come together to form OPEC-like groups for our natural resources.  This would ensure that we aren’t competing against each other in the market of our goods allowing us to obtain higher prices. Second, we need to take advantage of Chinese, European and American rivalries with each other and see if we can get better deals for our resources. It is clear that there is a demand for the rich mineral resources Africa has from the non-African countries; we must find ways to use this situation to our advantage and extract high prices for our goods.

n DRC the Chinese made very sure that they put in the contract that the copper concession had to be evaluated so they could be sure there was enough copper in there, and copper that could be mined at a cost-effective price. But the Nigerian deal was never very secure... we still don’t know the details about it, but everything fell apart. The Mambila Hydro project also fell apart. There was no financing, the oil concessions they were offered turned to be not of good quality. There were a lot of things that happened that stopped these kinds of deals from going forward, the biggest being that the president who had negotiated the deal,

The West looks at Africa as a place of war, disease, chaos and terrible things and a place to be pitied. The Chinese look at Africa as a place for consumers and business partners and it’s a very different picture.

When they went to Ghana, they said, You want electricity, you want to develop the Bui Dam. We can do it. And they said, How we be sure you pay us? Ghana said, We have cocoa and the Chinese started up and they started an escrow account and the cocoa gets exported and money's paid into the escrow account to guarantee the loan. Deals like this happened across the continent. Its' not altruism, it's not foreign aid: it's about business, but looking at Africa in a different way.

The US can’t be bothered to fund and provide the technology transfer needed to kick-start the economies of the continent (unless it’s oil). Rather, for reasons of cost, of its own fears for national security and its own poor economic state after the meltdown of global markets, it would have cheap and labour-intensive China do the job instead. And then wade in and take the pickings when markets improve.

In its recent approach to Africa, China could not be more different from the West. It has focused on trade and commercially justified investment, rather than aid grants and heavily subsidized loans. It has declined to tell African governments how they should run their countries, or to make its investments contingent on government reform. And it has moved quickly and decisively, especially in comparison to many Western aid establishments. Moyo’s attitude toward the boom in Chinese business in Africa is amply revealed by the name of a chapter in her book: “The Chinese Are Our Friends.” Perhaps what Africa needs, she notes, is a reliable commercial partner, not a high-minded scold. And perhaps Africa should take its lessons from a country that has recently pulled itself out of poverty, not countries that have been rich for generations.

“China’s interest in agricultural investment—in land—is a hot-button issue,” wrote Deborah Bräutigam, a professor at American University and a leading expert on China’s economic relations with Africa, in a recent paper. “For many, land is at the heart of a nation’s identity, and it is especially easy to raise emotions about outsiders when land is involved.”

“Recently, a very interesting Chinese delegation visited Brussels,” I was told by Jonathan Holslag, head of research for the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. “And they asked to see all the old colonial maps of the Congo. These are the only maps that reflect reasonably accurate surveys of Congo’s underground, and they want to use them for development plans in Katanga and elsewhere. If you look at Chinese policy documents, it is very obvious that they are focused on opening up the heart of the continent. There is clearly a long-term strategy for doing this, and it seeks to break up the north-south flow of minerals, to build east-west lines that will allow them to bypass South Africa.”

greater environmental sensitivity in China has had contradictory effects. Domestic environmental activists, working with sympathetic scientists and government officials, have had some impact. Chinese banks have explicitly adopted environmental guidelines. China imposed strict laws banning logging in virgin forests a decade ago, winning praise from environmental groups. But the ban on domestic logging spurred imports linked to excessive logging in Southeast Asia as well as Africa. China thus stands accused of supporting policies abroad that it rejects at home.

How does the re-branding of Africa as an entrepreneurial space fit with the persistently negative image of the continent’s people?

Some white commentators have even claimed that the US has entered a post-racial era, where racism was no longer a factor in defining who you are. I don’t think many African-Americans would have supported that claim, and certainly not those affected by revenge killings after Obama’s election and inauguration.