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ndeed, where Western firms may be deterred by domestic pressures from NGO’s or by the impact on corporate image of a connection with repressive or corrupt regimes, China benefits by a ‘double whammy’ - its freedom from such pressures makes it a more attractive partner for some regimes, and the absence of competition from Western multinationals creates the possibility of larger profits. [1]

“We started in Sudan from scratch” said Li Xiaobing, a Chinese Trade Ministry deputy director dealing with Africa. “When we started there, they were an oil importer, and now they are an oil exporter. We've built refineries, pipelines and production." He dismissed a question about Sudan's human rights record, saying, "We import from every source we can get oil from." [8].

There are no benchmarks and preconditions, no environmental impact assessment. If a G8 country had offered to rebuild the stadium, we'd still be having meetings about it."

The antigovernment demonstrators think France still pulls the strings, and while French officials deny this, their actions often suggest otherwise. In Gabon, where the election of an autocrat’s son dashed hopes for ending 40 years of rule under the Bongo family, Mr. Sarkozy’s man in Africa, Alain Joyandet, showed up at Ali Bongo’s pomp-filled inauguration, telling reporters that Mr. Bongo “must be given time.”

recently noted persistent human rights abuses by Cameroon

French officials have discouraged scrutiny of African leaders’ corruption, the fruits of which often end up in Paris. A French good-government group’s campaign to expose and recover the “ill-gotten gains” of three of the most notorious leaders — the late Omar Bongo of Gabon, Denis Sassou-Nguesso of the Congo Republic and Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo of Equatorial Guinea — has been opposed by the prosecutor of the French Republic on the grounds that the group has no standing to sue, and that the facts are “ill defined.”

A number of themes were singled out in his criticism. For one, accusing China of a "divide and rule" policy, he rejected Beijing's refusal to allow delegates of the African Union (AU) to participate in the Forum or to consider the AU as a representative of Africans. It "is an insult to the African Union. […] Is it reasonable for China—as a single country—to preside over an entire continent? This is an injustice. […] China's unwillingness to accept the presence of African Union commissioners means that they do not want the African Union, or African Unity, but rather China wants to cooperate with Africa as separate nations, rather than as a union."

he raised an interesting point, accusing China of evading politics and Beijing of abandoning the movements and countries that need its support. "Here I am reminded of the strange Chinese position on the Goldstone report…China should have a more visible position on this, rather than being satisfied with a tentative vote." In an unequivocal statement he said: "Genuine cooperation must include politics […] and should not be limited to building roads and schools. It is true that this is required, but international cooperation is not based on constructing buildings and giving aid, but rather through political positions." These remarks highlight one of Beijing's principal weaknesses in the international system: its systematic attempts to avoid taking clear-cut positions on global issues in an effort to please all sides. Sooner or later, Beijing's political passivity will begin to undermine its economic interests. Implicitly, Libya's Foreign Minister warns the Chinese that the countries and people of Africa (and the Middle East) expect more vigorous political support and, while they may appreciate China's economic contribution, they have no intention of becoming subjugated to the Chinese and prefer to keep their options open.

It is far too soon to eulogize China's Africa policy, one of the most remarkable success stories in global politics over the last two decades. China is not only heavily invested in Africa for many years to come, but most African governments and public opinion still appreciate the Chinese economic contribution, while overlooking its negative implications such as bad governance, corruption, human rights abuses and lack of transparency. Yet, there are initial signs that Africa's leaders are becoming aware of these shortcomings based not only on their historical experience but also on current international norms, greater visibility and demands for accountability.

In its recent approach to Africa, China could not be more different from the West. It has focused on trade and commercially justified investment, rather than aid grants and heavily subsidized loans. It has declined to tell African governments how they should run their countries, or to make its investments contingent on government reform. And it has moved quickly and decisively, especially in comparison to many Western aid establishments. Moyo’s attitude toward the boom in Chinese business in Africa is amply revealed by the name of a chapter in her book: “The Chinese Are Our Friends.” Perhaps what Africa needs, she notes, is a reliable commercial partner, not a high-minded scold. And perhaps Africa should take its lessons from a country that has recently pulled itself out of poverty, not countries that have been rich for generations.

“China’s interest in agricultural investment—in land—is a hot-button issue,” wrote Deborah Bräutigam, a professor at American University and a leading expert on China’s economic relations with Africa, in a recent paper. “For many, land is at the heart of a nation’s identity, and it is especially easy to raise emotions about outsiders when land is involved.”

“Recently, a very interesting Chinese delegation visited Brussels,” I was told by Jonathan Holslag, head of research for the Brussels Institute of Contemporary China Studies. “And they asked to see all the old colonial maps of the Congo. These are the only maps that reflect reasonably accurate surveys of Congo’s underground, and they want to use them for development plans in Katanga and elsewhere. If you look at Chinese policy documents, it is very obvious that they are focused on opening up the heart of the continent. There is clearly a long-term strategy for doing this, and it seeks to break up the north-south flow of minerals, to build east-west lines that will allow them to bypass South Africa.”

Africa's largest oil producer, via the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), signed a $28.5 billion Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), ranked as one of the world's largest construction companies.

Former NNPC head Shehu Ladan revealed that the CSCEC-led consortium would be operated by China holding 80 per cent of shares, until costs were recovered. Given the opacity of accounting, especially concerning mega-developments, this is likely to become a major fault-line replicating Nigeria's long history with supply and demand-side corruption.

‘Right now, Nigerians are not getting value for their oil anyway,’ said Brautigam. ‘If the government can agree to allow a Chinese company to build and manage these refineries for an extended period of time, they may finally be able to say good-bye to the days of long lines at petrol stations.’

China has long been renowned in Africa as the architect behind the continent’s ‘weapons of mass construction’. To date, this trademark is best symbolised by the 1,860 km Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TanZam), constructed from 1970-1975, at a cost of $500 million. The project, a vital inter-SADC vehicle financed via an interest-free loan, was finished ahead of schedule and served the critical purpose of diminishing Zambia's dependence on apartheid South Africa and Ian Smith's Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), crucially aiding in the isolation of the former.

Nigeria, Africa's largest oil producer, via the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), signed a $28.5 billion Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the China State Construction Engineering Corporation (CSCEC), ranked as one of the world's largest construction companies.

For Nigeria, importing 85 per cent or $10 billion worth of refined oil annually, the proposal for three greenfield refineries and a petroleum complex is the difference between freedom and dependence. Presently, of Nigeria's four refineries, including Warri (125,000 barrels per day); Kaduna (110,000 bpd); Port Harcourt, Rivers State (150,000 bpd); Port Harcourt, Alesa Elemi (120,000 bpd); only one is said to be operational.