Building Global Democracy

"Democracy, civil society and likewise their 'promotion' have for a long time shaped foreign policies inside as much as outside the countries of the Middle East. Since January 2011, however, these notions and policies have been challenged by a seemingly new concept, that of the 'Arab Youth'. While the term 'Arab Youth' is coined to denote the grassroots nature of the uprisings, as a political category it may be reinforcing the paternalistic presumptions of authoritarian regimes and global hegemonic power structures, which use it to undermine the capacity of the wider population for democratic change. Without empirically grounded and theoretically challenging works, 'Arab Youth' may perpetuate the same inequalities and top-down misunderstanding that 'democracy promotion' connotes within the Middle East. By locating Syrian youth within contemporary struggles through ethnographic case studies, this paper aims to sketch a nuanced, complex and colourful picture of the multifaceted ways that young people reinforce, resist and negotiate power relations in contemporary Syria. Specifically, it looks at youth responses to different forms of authority such as external power (Israeli occupation), the Syrian state and the authority of parents and sectarian communities."

"Battles over the control of information online are often fought at the level of Internet infrastructure. Forces of globalization and technological change have diminished the capacity of sovereign nation states and media content producers to directly control information flows. This loss of control over content and the failure of laws and markets to regain this control have redirected political and economic battles into the realm of infrastructure and, in particular, technologies of Internet governance. These arrangements of technical architecture are also arrangements of power. This shift of power to infrastructure is drawing renewed attention to the politics of Internet architecture and the legitimacy of the coordinating institutions and private ordering that create and administer these infrastructures. It also raises questions related to freedom of expression in the context of this increasing turn to infrastructure to control information. This article explores the relationship between governance and infrastructure, focusing on three specific examples of how battles over content have shifted into the realm of this Internet governance infrastructure: the use of the Internet's domain name system for intellectual property rights enforcement; the use of 'kill-switch' approaches to restrict the flow of information; and the termination of infrastructure services to WikiLeaks. The article concludes with some thoughts about the implications of this infrastructure-mediated governance for economic and expressive liberties."

"Taking up the test case of radical anti-globalization protest, this essay addresses Ernesto Laclau's theory of the democratic demand, reading it against Lacan's and Freud's conceptions of demand. I argue, largely drawing from Lacan's conception of enjoyment that a theory of the democratic demand must take into account the risk that a subject's enjoyment in positing a demand can overwhelm the potential political of the demand itself. In response to this risk, I argue that a theory of democracy should shift from a demand-driven politics centred around enjoying a specific subject position tied to 'resistance' towards a desire-driven politics that productively incorporates the 'no' as a means of articulating collective political aspirations."

"A meaningful discussion about the democratic limit or boundary is only now beginning. Martha Nussbaum's call for a world citizenship in response to the terrorist bombings of 9/11 has animated this conversation in the USA. In South Africa, the political transition from apartheid to democracy keeps running-up against the substance of the 'people'. In the absence of any 'traditional' unifying principles (of language, culture, religion, race and so on), the identity of South Africans is elusive. We might note too that much of the cosmopolitan literature on democracy appeals to a shift in scale, from the territorial state to the world or globe or even planet. One of the key gaps in democratic theory, however, has been its failure to conceptualize such a limit. How can democrats discriminate between citizen and non-citizen without being discriminatory? This is the question that this article seeks to address. It does so by following a major development in the work of Ernesto Laclau - from his collaboration with Chantal Mouffe in their groundbreaking work Hegemony and Socialist Strategy to his most recent book On Populist Reason."

"A new authoritarian order is taking shape, this time within rather than against the capitalist world order. Globalization, in short, is shedding its liberal cloak. Post-Cold War triumphalism was premature in the funeral it staged for the Second World, defined in terms of its autocracy rather than communism. The capitalist character of the new Second World lulls Western globalists into moral as well as geopolitical (hence moral realist) indifference. For many in high places, it is still inconceivable that global capitalism could be a house divided. "Globalization" turns out to be anything but the steadfast ally of democratization it purports to be. It is in fact the greatest gift to a new breed of authoritarian capitalists. The case of China alone is enough to dispel the notion that capitalism and democracy are two sides of the same globalist coin. But Sino-globalization is only unique in that it makes no pretense about its authoritarian ends and means. To revitalize democratization as a global force, a radically different mode of globalization will have to be fostered. We call this the Global Third Way, but what it amounts to is People Power without borders."

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms. 1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy'; O'Donnell, 'Another Institutionalization'; O'Donnell, 'Polyarchies'; Lauth, 'Informal Institutions'; Merkel and Croissant, 'Formale und informale Institutionen'; Weyland, 'Limitations'; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In 'defective democracies', 2 Merkel, 'Embedded and Defective'. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually 'the actual rules that are being followed'. 3 O'Donnell, 'Illusions About Consolidation', 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: 'without a state, no modern democracy is possible'. 4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where 'perverse institutionalization' 5 Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation', 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal 'domination', 6 Weber,

"This paper postulates that a country's integration into the world economy may lower citizens' political trust. I argue that economic globalization constrains government's choice set of feasible policies, impeding responsiveness to the median voter. Matching individual-level survey data from 1981 to 2007, repeated cross-sections of altogether 260'000 persons from 80 countries, with a measure of a country's degree of economic globalization for the same time period, I find that there is a trust-lowering impact of globalization; its magnitude, however, depends on whether or not the individual is informed about politics and the economy. Trust-lowering effects of globalization are larger for those who have no interest in politics, are unwilling to indicate their political leaning, or who have low educational levels. Two-stage least squares regressions and a set of country and time fixed effects support a causal interpretation. Obviously, viewing the domestic government as accountable for its policies plays a decisive role for the relation between economic globalization and political trust. Robustness against country's degree of economic development, past globalization and different time periods is tested."

"A Conservative accepts that democracy entails government by and (especially) for the people, but what constitutes the people is seen not in narrow but in expansive terms: the people are not confined to those who constitute a present transient majority but encompass rather past and future generations. Democracy is tempered by the need to avoid dictatorship of the masses, entrusting the task of governing to those chosen by the people and able to lead in interests of the people. Government entails a balance between accountability and autonomy, a balance delivered by the Westminster system of government, a system challenged by attempts at fundamental constitutional change."

"This article explores the literature on democratization to account for the proscription of political parties in democratizing states. A survey of 22 party bans in 12 European states identifies two distinct classes of proscription derived from the 'degree of democratization' present in a banning state. I identify features of 'new' and 'incomplete' democracies that help explain proscription. Case studies on Germany, Austria, Russia, Latvia and Greece illustrate the impact of 'modes of transition', heightened uncertainty, political tensions and instability on 'new democracy bans', and the impact of illiberalism, limited checks on executive power and circumscribed political participation on 'incomplete democracy bans'."

"In the literature on the turn to the left in the wider Latin American region, Central America has generally been neglected. The aim of this article is to seek to fill that gap, while specifically assessing the left turn's impact on prospects for democratization in the sub-region. Using three case studies - El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua - the article questions the usefulness of transition theory for analysis and instead offers a framework based on state/civil society interaction within the context of globalization. Four key conclusions are made: First, democratization is not a linear process, but can be subject to simultaneous processes of democratization and de-democratization. Second, continued deep structural inequalities remain central to the region's politics but these often provoke unproductive personalistic and partisan politics which can inhibit or curtail democratization. Third, interference from local and/or international economic actors can curtail or reverse democratization measures, underlining the influence of globalization. Fourth, Central America is particularly revelatory of these tendencies due to its acute exposure to extreme oligarchic power and outside influence. It hence can help shed light on wider questions on the blurring of boundaries between state, civil society and market and its impact on democratization, especially within the context of globalization. In this way the article contributes to the analysis of Central America in the current context of the 'pink tide', underlines the importance of continued analysis of Central America for democratization studies, and brings new insight to debates on transition theory."

"Liberal democratic governments may differ in both their kind and degree of democracy. However, the literature too often conflates this distinction, hindering our ability to understand what kinds of governing structures are more democratic. To clarify this issue, the article examines two prominent contemporary models of democracy: developmental liberal democracy (DLD) and protective liberal democracy (PLD). While the former takes a 'thicker' approach to governance than the latter, conventional wisdom holds that these systems differ only in kind rather than degree. The article tests this assumption through an empirical comparison of electoral, legislative, and information-regulating institutions in two representative cases: Sweden and the United States. The empirical findings lead us to the conclusion that developmental liberal democracies represent not only a different kind, but also a deeper degree of democracy than protective liberal democracies. The implications for democracy promotion appear substantial."

"This paper theorizes about the new international financial architecture as a manifestation of the 'second face of neoliberalism' - financial market reregulation through technocratic obfuscation and insularity from democratic political pressure. Using a more expansive definition of the new international financial architecture, one that includes the institutional nexus of international monetary management along with the rules and regulatory bodies governing capital, this argument is developed through an analysis of the origins and functions of two institutions comprising the new international financial architecture - the Basel Capital Accord and the diffusion of inflation targeting regimes across central banks. This paper excavates the neoliberal logic inscribed in these institutions and further shows how these new forms of institutional logic contributed to the financial crisis of 2008 by putting in place a set of opportunities and constraints that led to rapid growth in the market for asset-backed securities. The implications of this analysis for the future of regulatory reform are discussed, with particular attention paid to the question of what role central banks should play in this process."

"The notion of global governance has always been intimately linked to that of crisis. In recent crisis episodes the architecture of global governance has been held responsible for weak or ineffective regulatory mechanisms that failed to either prevent systemic crises or to at least give an "early warning" of impending disasters, while in other episodes global governance institutions have been blamed for poor crisis responses and management. Global governance institutions have also been blamed for failing to expand the scope of their jurisdictions to incorporate new systemic risks and new market players, as well as for their inability to adapt to new political, economic, social and environmental challenges. The framing article for this special issue on "Global Governance in Crisis" examines four key features of global governance in the context of the global financial crisis: (1) the dynamic role played by ideas in making global governance "hang together" during periods of crisis; (2) how crisis serves as a driver of change in global governance (and why it sometimes does not); (3) how ubiquitous the global financial crisis was as an event in world politics; and (4) the conditions that constitute an event as a crisis. Due to the complexity and institutional "stickiness" of the contemporary architecture of global governance, the article concludes that a far-reaching overhaul and structural reforms in global governance processes is both costly and improbable in the short-term."

"This article, originally delivered in the Fall of 2011 at a seminar held in Beirut at the Centre for Arab Unity Studies, examines the 2011 amendments to the Moroccan Constitution in light of the historical background. The tumultuous events of the so-called 'Arab Spring' brought new urgency to the issue of constitutional reforms that had been broached initially on the accession of Muhammad VI to the throne in 1999. Since independence, Moroccan political society has typically been vibrant, democratic and home to numerous political parties of various orientations and, since the 1970s, has witnessed calls by various sides for constitutional reforms as well as for the institution of a constitutional or parliamentary monarchy. On 9 March 2011 Muhammad VI gave a momentous address subjecting the issue of royal authority to public deliberations. This topic had previously ranked as one of the few unapproachable taboos of the political scene. A vital driving force in the process of constitutional reform has been the youthful February 20 Movement that was instrumental in the mobilization of millions of Moroccans and led to submitting the new draft Constitution to popular referendum and its ratification on 1 July 2011. Unlike other Arab countries, Morocco's functioning democracy, its well-established political parties and the fact that the issue of constitutional reforms had already been on the table meant that when Moroccans descended into the streets they had a set of clearly defined demands - demands that were also less drastic than those being made in other countries. Yet while Moroccan politics have been highly developed and articulate since the 1940s, the events of the Arab Spring provided the necessary shock and catalyst to transform relative complacency into action. The dense topography of mature political parties and organizations in Morocco factored in two ways: first, it permitted a stable environment for democr

"Libya's contemporary history has been dominated by the interplay of the perpetual dynamics of religion, tribalism, oil and ideology. After 42 years in power Qadhafi was killed at the hands of revolutionaries and the final chapter of his dictatorial reign was terminated. With direct and powerful support from NATO and some Arab governments the revolution, led by the National Transitional Council and military councils in many Libyan cities, was another reflection of the supremacy of the perpetual dynamics. The purpose of this article is to examine the interaction of these dynamics and how they are echoed in post-Qadhafi Libya. An assessment is made of the manifestations related to these dynamics by providing a sketch of existing social and political features. This will help determine the fundamentals that shape the foreseeable future of the country and predict the role of the various political forces interacting in the field. The article is a product of direct research, analysis, eye-witness accounts and interviews in Libya with important personages and representatives of powerful currents now currently competing on the scene and vying for influence in the determination of the future of the country after Qadhafi."

"In 2006, Bangkok's middle-class residents overwhelmingly supported the military coup that displaced the elected government of Thaksin Shinawatra. Survey research shows that opponents of Thaksin had a stronger commitment to liberal democracy and possibly to royalist values while rural voters supported Thaksin because he fulfilled their social demands. Opposition to Thaksin was not motivated by economic interests, but rather, there is some evidence that urban middle- and upper-class voters disliked Thaksin because they heard negative reporting about him, which were less available in the countryside. These findings are compatible with a new theory of democratic consolidation, in which the upper classes have the means that would enable and encourage them to pay sufficient attention to politics to discover that what they viewed as 'good government' was violated by the ruling party, which could have led to demands for more democracy historically. More recently, however, in Thailand and perhaps other instances in Southeast Asia and Latin America, those with the money and leisure to follow politics closely have heard reports about the 'bad government' of populist, democratically elected leaders, and thus have turned against them."

"The argument advanced in this article is that EU policies helped to trigger the so-called Arab Spring, not by intention but by default. This contention is advanced through an examination of four strands of EU policy towards those countries designated as Mediterranean Partner Countries (MPCs) under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Programme (EMP) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), namely: trade and economic development, political reform, the 'peace process', and regional security (including migration control). What emerges is that the EU has not just departed from its own normative principles and aspirations for Arab reform in some instances, but that the EU has consistently prioritized European security interests over 'shared prosperity' and democracy promotion in the Mediterranean. The net result is a set of structured, institutionalized and securitized relationships which will be difficult to reconfigure and will not help Arab reformers attain their goals."

"While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the 'democratic peace' and the 'failed democratization' approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states."

"The exposure of alleged coup plots in 2007 has shaken the guardian role of the Turkish military in politics. What were the conditions that led to the exposure of the coups and what is their significance for the future of Turkish democracy? Drawing on insights from southern Europe, the article argues that failed coup plots can lead to democratic civil-military relations especially if they work simultaneously with other facilitating conditions, such as increasing acceptance of democratic attitudes among officers, consensus among civilians over the role of the military, and the influence of external actors, such as the European Union. The article focuses on such domestic and international factors to analyse the transformation of the Turkish military, the splits within the armed forces and the resulting plots. It argues that one positive outcome of the exposed conspiracies in Turkey has been the enactment of new institutional amendments that would eradicate the remaining powers of the military. Yet, a negative outcome of the coup investigations has been an increase in polarization and hostility. Turkish democracy still lacks mutual trust among significant political groups, which creates unfavourable conditions for democratic consolidation."

"Through a case study of democratization movements in South Korea from 1980 to 1987, this study aims to contribute to further sophistication of social movement theories. Recognizing the limitation of the existing political opportunity approach, this paper presents a systematic definition of political opportunity structure and shows the mechanism through which it plays a role in the development of a social movement. In particular, in explaining South Korea's democratization movements, the authors distinguish political opportunity from its structure and suggest political opportunity as a framework that could explain the changes in risks and changes affecting social movements."