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"French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy is acting uneasily when it comes to contemporary politics. There is a sort of agitation in his work in relation to this question. At several places we read an appeal to deal thoroughly with this question and 'qu'il y a un travail à faire', that there is still work to do. From the beginning of the 1980s with the 'Centre de Recherches Philosophiques sur le Politique' and the two books resulting out of that, until the many, rather short texts he published on this topic during the last years of the century, the question of politics crosses very clearly Nancy's work. He not only fulminates against the contemporary philosophical 'content' with democracy. Instead of defending a political regime, he wants to think the form of politics in the most critical and sceptical way. To Nancy, the worst thing we can do in thinking contemporary politics, is taking it for granted that we know what politics is about today, given the evidence of the global democracy. So to him, we almost have to be at unease when it comes to politics. On the other hand, in thinking contemporary democracy, the work of Claude Lefort is undeniably the main reference. Long before the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the upsurge of an all-too-easy anti-Marxism, Lefort articulated in a nuanced way the formal differences between totalitarianism and democracy. According to Lefort, the specific 'form' of democracy is that it never becomes an accomplished and fulfilled form as such. In a certain sense, the only 'form' of democracy is formlessness, a form without form. In a democracy, the place of power becomes literally 'infigurable' as Lefort says. Democracy stands for formlessness or the relation to a void. Nancy objects so to say against a 'Leformal' conception of democracy - the empty place, the formless, the 'infigurable' or 'sans figure', the ever yet to come. … This conception of

Are information technologies good for democracy? Could cyberspace be a more democratic "place" in the world? To explore these questions, this article juxtaposes the supposedly democratizing effects of information technologies against Walt Whitman's and John Dewey's idealized "aesthetic democracy," a passionate relationship that embodies a public spirit toward oneself and one's fellow citizens. Although information technologies are often understood as a means to increase or deepen democracy, such claims equate democracy with a set of practices or forms, but the forms themselves are not inherently democratic. Aesthetic democracy, I argue, sheds light on the democratic pitfalls and possibilities of information technologies and cyberspace. This article provides a theory of aesthetic democracy for the cyber-environment by first exploring the difference between effects on democratic governance versus effects on democracy and then developing the concept of aesthetic democracy. The next section applies aesthetic democracy as a critique of information technologies and cyberspace. The final section suggests a way to reconstruct an aesthetic democracy that transcends borders and could thereby open up the possibility of a global, democratic, unbordered cyberpolis.

"On most accounts of global democracy, human rights are ascribed a central function. Still, their conceptual role in global democracy is often unclear. Two recent attempts to remedy this deficiency have been made by James Bohman and Michael Goodhart. What is interesting about their proposals is that they make the case that under the present circumstances of politics, global democracy is best conceptualized in terms of human rights. Although the article is sympathetic to this 'human rights approach', it defends the thesis that human rights are not enough for global democracy. It argues that insofar as we hold on to the general idea of democracy as a normative ideal of self-determination (self-rule) that is, of people determining their own lives and ruling over themselves, the concept of democracy accommodates two necessary conditions, namely, political bindingness and political equality. Further, it argues that neither Bohman's nor Goodhart's accounts fulfills these conditions and that one explanation for this could be traced to a lack of clarity concerning the distinction between democracy as normative ideal and democracy as decision method or rules (for example, institutions, laws and norms) for regulating social interactions. This ambiguity has implications for both Goodhart and Bohman. In Goodhart's work it manifests itself as a vagueness concerning the difference between political agency and democratic agency; in Bohman's work it becomes unclear whether he contributes a normative democratic theory or a theory of democratization. Although this article develops both a conceptual and a normative argument against their proposals, the aim is not to find fault with them but to point to questions that are in need of further elaboration to make them more convincing."

"Liberal democratic governments may differ in both their kind and degree of democracy. However, the literature too often conflates this distinction, hindering our ability to understand what kinds of governing structures are more democratic. To clarify this issue, the article examines two prominent contemporary models of democracy: developmental liberal democracy (DLD) and protective liberal democracy (PLD). While the former takes a 'thicker' approach to governance than the latter, conventional wisdom holds that these systems differ only in kind rather than degree. The article tests this assumption through an empirical comparison of electoral, legislative, and information-regulating institutions in two representative cases: Sweden and the United States. The empirical findings lead us to the conclusion that developmental liberal democracies represent not only a different kind, but also a deeper degree of democracy than protective liberal democracies. The implications for democracy promotion appear substantial."

Despite its increasing importance in contemporary political philosophy and its central role in international human rights law, there has been significant resistance among political theorists and philosophers to the idea that there is a moral human right to democracy. In John Rawls's late political philosophy of international justice and in the views of many who are sympathetic to his position, the idea that there is a moral human right to democracy is vigorously rejected.1 Other major recent treatments of human rights have either rejected the human right to democracy or shied away from making arguments one way or the other.2 One key concern animating the opposition to a moral human right to democracy is that the assertion of such a right in international society conflicts with the rights of peoples to collective self-determination. Some peoples, it is asserted, reject democracy or the equality on which it is founded, and because of this rejection, the recognition of a human right to democracy imposes on them a set of norms alien to their political cultures. Another concern, articulated in popular writings, is that new democracies often violate the basic moral rights of citizens. This worry about a tyranny of the majority suggests a strong conflict between democracy and other basic rights.

As democratization has advanced in the developing world, developed countries such as the United States have implemented explicit strategies of democracy promotion by providing assistance to governments, political parties, and other non-governmental groups and organizations through a variety of channels. This analysis examines the relationship between democracy support by the US Agency for International Development and democratization in the developing world between 1988 and 2001. In a model that examines the simultaneous processes linking democratization and democracy aid, we argue that carefully targeted democracy assistance has greater impact on democratization than more generic economic aid packages. We test the relationship in a simultaneous equation model, supplemented by several time-series cross-sectional regressions. Our data reveal a positive relationship between specific democracy aid packages and progress toward democracy. We conclude by weighing the implications of these findings for democratization and democracy promotion policies.

"This article argues that social democracy as a political ideology has much to contribute to a narrative of British democracy. Democracy is the central tenet of social democracy and this distinguishes it from Marxist socialism. However, despite the Labour Party in Britain emanating from a rich tradition of democratic politics, Labour elites have often been reluctant democratisers. Firstly, this article evaluates the ideological role of democracy in social democracy; secondly, it weighs New Labour's record on the democratisation agenda; and finally, it prescribes three democratic reforms to aspects of the British political system consistent with the aims of social democracy."

This article identifies a theoretical nexus between indigeneity and liberal democracy in three post-colonial contexts. Like democracy, the politics of indigeneity asks questions and makes assumptions about where power ought to lie and how it ought to be shared in relation to political inclusion and national sovereignty. The interaction of indigeneity with democracy highlights the limitations of liberal theory as well as the opportunities it provides to meet indigenous claims and conceptions of justice. Exploring the ideological tensions and commonalities between democracy and indigeneity allows a contrast, in comparative context, of the proposition that in Fiji, for example, democracy is "a foreign flower" unsuited to the local environment with the argument that liberal representative democracy can, in fact, mediate power in favour of an inclusive national polity.

A few years ago, it was a common complaint that the international dimension of democratization and, in particular, the external promotion of democracy were largely neglected by scholars of comparative politics and international relations. By now, academic research has begun to catch up with the growth of foreign and development policies explicitly aiming at the international promotion and protection of democratic regimes. Yet, what is still a largely unexplored desideratum is the challenge to theoretically grasp 'democracy promotion' as an aim and strategy of democratic foreign policies - that is, to embed the empirical research on democracy promotion in theoretical perspectives on international relations. This article sets out to contribute to filling this gap by developing a classification of competing theoretical approaches. First, research on the democratic peace - the one major research program concerned with democratic foreign policy - is used to derive potential motives behind the promotion of democracy. Then, on this basis, existing theories of international relations are modified in order to locate democracy promotion within the foreign policy of democratic states. In conclusion, the article presents four sketches of potential theoretical approaches to the external promotion of democracy.

Democratization studies have proven that the main difference between autocracy and democracy is, counter-intuitively, not the basic regime structure, but rather, the function and validity of democratic formal institutions defined as rules and norms. 1 For the institutionalist turn in democratization studies, see O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy'; O'Donnell, 'Another Institutionalization'; O'Donnell, 'Polyarchies'; Lauth, 'Informal Institutions'; Merkel and Croissant, 'Formale und informale Institutionen'; Weyland, 'Limitations'; Helmke and Levitsky, Informal Institutions. View all notes In 'defective democracies', 2 Merkel, 'Embedded and Defective'. View all notes or in the grey zone between authoritarian regimes and consolidated democracies, formal institutions disguise specific informal institutions which are usually 'the actual rules that are being followed'. 3 O'Donnell, 'Illusions About Consolidation', 10. View all notes Moreover, scholars have investigated the issue of stateness: 'without a state, no modern democracy is possible'. 4 Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 17. View all notes This article sheds light on this grey zone, particularly, on the type of state whose coercive state apparatus is autonomous. Its autonomy results primarily from the interplay between formal and informal institutions in post-transitional settings where 'perverse institutionalization' 5 Valenzuela, 'Democratic Consolidation', 62. View all notes creates and fosters undemocratic informal rules and/or enshrines them as formal codes. If the military autonomy reaches a threshold ranging from high to very high, constitutional institutions become Janus-faced and can enforce a sui generis repertoire of undemocratic informal institutions. Thus, the state exerts formal and informal 'domination', 6 Weber,

"While some types of democracy can sustain ethnic and cultural diversity, others can clearly undermine it. In The Dark Side of Democracy, Michael Mann argues that extreme crimes like genocide and ethnic cleansing tend to occur, or at least be legitimized, within a majoritarian democracy framework. This article broadens Mann's approach in two directions: first, it confirms that majoritarian democracy in plural societies can provide the pre-existing institutional context where conflict, nationalism and exclusion can thrive, eventually degenerating into self-destruction. Second, it focuses on the tendency by some governments to turn to patriotism and populism as sources of legitimacy at a time when the latter appears to be crumbling. In addition, the article questions both the 'democratic peace' and the 'failed democratization' approaches for their reliance on an ideal type and fixed notion of democracy, arguing that the latter has been weakened by neoliberal globalization, particularly as it interacts with the legacy of pre-existing forms of majoritarianism. The article concludes that these forces need to be studied simultaneously in order to have a broader picture of the contemporary weakening of democratic practices and institutions within some nation-states."

Experiences with racism and age negatively affect how Afro-Brazilians in Salvador and So Paulo rate democracy. Older cohorts are more likely to rate democracy high compared to younger cohorts who rate it as low. Respondents in Salvador tend to rate democracy lower than respondents in So Paulo. Moreover, interviews reveal that as citizens believe they are not accorded full rights, they do not agree that Brazil's political system is fully democratic. Studies examining democracy in Brazil and racial politics throughout the diaspora would benefit from examining racialized experiences of citizens, rather than simply including the demographic variable of race. It is these experiences that affect rating of democracy rather than ascribed notions of race.

'Confucian democracy' is considered oxymoronic because Confucianism is viewed as lacking an idea of equality among persons necessary for democracy. Against this widespread opinion, this article argues that Confucianism presupposes a uniquely Confucian idea of equality and that therefore a Confucian conception of democracy distinct from liberal democracy is not only conceptually possible but also morally justifiable. This article engages philosophical traditions of East and West by, first, reconstructing the prevailing position based on Joshua Cohen's political liberalism; second, articulating a plausible conception of Confucian democracy predicated on Confucian conceptions of persons and political participation from the Mencian tradition; and third, exposing the implausibility of the prevailing position in light of the articulation.

Pakistan's 1988 transition to democracy defies most of the conventional wisdom on democratization as well as the bulk of the literature on democratic transitions. This peculiar case can be understood as a case of 'temporary democracy', in which democracy emerges as a short-term outcome that is not likely to be sustained. Pakistan's military leaders chose to democratize because of the high short-term costs of repression coupled with the low long-term costs of allowing democracy. The authoritarian elite agreed to allow democratization knowing that the prospects of democratic consolidation were dim. In this sense, the same factors that made the consolidation of Pakistan's democracy unlikely made the transition possible.

Starting from the 1980s, institutions of direct democracy were introduced into most Latin American constitutions. To date, the practical application of these institutions remains almost exclusively restricted to the subtype of government plebiscites while the use of citizen initiated instruments remains scarce. To explain the region's low frequency of use of citizen initiated instruments of direct democracy this explorative study proceeds in three sections. The first recapitulates regulatory legislation on, and practical experience with direct democracy in Latin America. The second proposes and applies an index for the comparative measurement of legal obstacles provided by institutional frameworks and goes on to discuss further explanatory propositions on factors that may interact with these legal obstacles to obstruct direct democratic citizen participation. Finally, these hypotheses are tested through an interview-based study with actors involved in the recent practical experience with direct democracy in Costa Rica. The study concludes that the institutional design of citizen initiated instruments of direct democracy alone does not suffice to explain the frequency of their practical application. Rather than this, application frequency appears to be a function of the combined interactive effects of legal institutional factors with sociological and political party factors such as strategic action preferences and party elites' attitudes.

Two images of populism are well-established: it is either labelled as a pathological political phenomenon, or it is regarded as the most authentic form of political representation. In this article I argue that it is more fruitful to categorize populism as an ambivalence that, depending on the case, may constitute a threat to or a corrective for democracy. Unfolding my argument, I offer a roadmap for the understanding of the diverse and usually conflicting approaches to studying the relation between populism and democracy. In particular, three main approaches are identified and discussed: the liberal, the radical and the minimal. I stress that the latter is the most promising of them for the study of the ambivalent relationship between populism and democracy. In fact, the minimal approach does not imply a specific concept of democracy, and facilitates the undertaking of cross-regional comparisons. This helps to recognize that populism interacts differently with the two dimensions of democracy that Robert Dahl distinguished: while populism might well represent a democratic corrective in terms of inclusiveness, it also might become a democratic threat concerning public contestation

This article examines the discourses of democracy in the context of political development in Hong Kong during the first 12 years after the 1997 handover using rhetoric and frame analysis. Overall, the study shows how political actors define political options and promote development, which is favourable to their interests and views, through framing democracy in different ways. The study reveals the frames that describe different points of view, and contributes to the understanding of democrats' position as re-framers. The found frames are clustered into paradigmatic framesets that deal with the concrete democracy issue and the political situation in present-day Hong Kong. Consequently, the democracy debate in Hong Kong is organised around two opposite and idealised templates for democracy. The first cluster forms the pro-establishment model, which suggests solutions built around consensus and practical means. The second frameset, mostly used by the pro-democrats, supports the idea of a wider democratic change which entails broad normative changes in politics.

"Dual/multiple citizenship has become a widespread phenomenon in many parts of the world. This acceptance or tolerance of overlapping memberships in political communities represents an important element in the ongoing readjustment of the relationship between citizens and political communities in democratic systems. This article has two goals and parts. First, it evaluates dual citizenship from the perspective of five normative theories of democracy. Liberal and republican as well as multicultural and deliberative understandings of democracy deliver a broad spectrum of arguments in favour of dual citizenship. Only communitarians fear that dual citizenship endangers national democracies. Nevertheless, empirical evidence and national policies largely contradict these fears. The second part of the article reverses the perspective and shows that most theories of democracy do not only legitimate and facilitate the acceptance of dual citizenship - the phenomenon of multiple citizenships induces innovation in democratic theory in turn. A second look at the relationship between dual citizenship and theories of democracy reveals that dual citizenship stimulates refinements, expansions and reconceptualisations of these theories for a transnationalising world."

There is no 'finished product democracy'. How should democracy or self-rule be explained and evaluated today? It requires respect for the democracy of knowledge. A global conversation held at three international meetings, involving academics, civil society and social movement activists from Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America and North America, has issued in a Democracy Manifesto for our fast-moving times. We publish initial responses from participants each day this week to continue this conversation in the public domain.

For decades, scholars of political culture have held that mass political attitudes have a profound impact on the process of democratization. In studying this impact, an increasing number of political scientists have recently theorized that the level of democratization a political system reaches depends on the extent to which its political institutions meet citizen demand for democracy. In testing such theoretical models of democratic demand and supply, however, many political scientists have mistakenly equated democratic demand with citizen preference for democracy over its alternatives. In this study, we first argue that popular demand for democracy is not the same thing as democratic regime preference or support. Instead, demand for democracy arises from dissatisfaction with democracy-in-practice. By analyzing the fourth wave of the World Values Survey, we then demonstrate that the critical orientations of democrats promote democratic development more powerfully than do the two attitudes - democratic regime support and self-expression values - that prior public opinion research has identified as the forces driving democratization.