Haug pursues two objectives in this essay. First, he wants to develop a better understanding of the global conflicts at the beginning of the twenty-first century. To reach that understanding, it is, he argues, necessary to get beyond the crude empiricist language of the mainstream. Secondly, therefore, he elaborates and further develops certain key aspects of Antonio Gramsci's theory of hegemony (consensual leadership through multilateralism vs. mere supremacy, "hegemonic sacrifice," etc.) in order better to grasp the lines of conflicts in national as well as international politics. Haug takes as his starting point the guiding question of a 2006 conference in Athens, namely whether the current political conjuncture should be interpreted as one of imperialism or, in Hardt and Negri's sense, as empire. He recasts this question from one of interpretation to one of history, and in so doing he rearticulates the concepts of empire vs. imperialism. He sees transnational high-tech capitalism as having arrived at a crossroads. One path from this crossroads, he argues, leads to rival imperialisms; and the other path leads to the formation of a regulated world market flanked by world ecological and social politics, to, in short, an "empire" of transnational capitalism. The big question underlying Haug's project is this: Will the United States succeed, after the political, military, and economic debacle of the phase of the unilateral "imperialist" politics of George W. Bush, in recovering a political leadership role in the world? The effort of the United States under President Obama to do so must contend with the Bush legacy, consisting of two unwinnable wars, a deep economic crisis that began as a financial crisis, and a politically and culturally divided nation. Haug's essay does not pretend to answer this larger question; its more modest purpose is foundational, that is, to articulate the question more clearly and to establish the prerequisites and criteria for a pro

This essay takes as its starting point an apparent tension between theories of democratic deliberation and democratic theories of multicultural accommodation and makes the case that many multiculturalists and deliberative democrats converge on an ideal of political freedom, understood as nondomination. It argues for distinguishing two dimensions of nondomination: inter-agentive nondomination, which obtains when all participants in a power relation are free from rule by others who can set its terms, and systemic nondomination, which obtains when the terms of a power relation itself are responsive to those they affect. Because inter-agentive and systemic nondomination do not covary, it is critical to distinguish between them, in order to build institutions and practices that promote both.

This article examines distributional disparities within nations. There are six main conclusions. First, about 80 per cent of the world's population now lives in regions whose median country has a Gini close to 40. Second, as outliers are now only located among middle-income and rich countries, the 'upwards' side of the 'Inverted-U' between inequality and income per capita has evaporated (and with it the hypothesis that posits that 'things have to get worse before they can get better'). Third, among middle-income countries, Latin America and mineral-rich Southern Africa are uniquely unequal, while Eastern Europe follows a distributional path similar to the Nordic countries. Fourth, among rich countries there is a large (and growing) distributional diversity. Fifth, within a global trend of rising inequality, there are two opposite forces at work. One is 'centrifugal' and leads to an increased diversity in the shares of the top 10 per cent and bottom 40 per cent. The other is 'centripetal' and leads to a growing uniformity in the income-share appropriated by deciles 5 to 9. Therefore, half of the world's population (the middle and upper-middle classes) have acquired strong 'property rights' over half of their respective national incomes; the other half of this income, however, is increasingly up for grabs between the very rich and the poor. And sixth, globalization is thus creating a distributional scenario in which what really matters is the income-share of the rich (because the rest 'follows').

The literature on globalization of services has tended to focus on advanced industrial nations, underestimating the important role Southern markets have played. Given the complexities of the global economy, much can be gained from exploring the ways in which flexible management practices and workplace culture in the United States and India have increasingly conjoined under an emerging set of common principles. In particular, one finds similar phenomena contributing to patterns of job insecurity in both countries: non-standard employment contracts, long working hours, growing emphasis on individualization, and increasing control over workers. Interestingly, workers in both countries have similar strategies in staying employed as well as dealing with the growing insecurity. In neither country, however, has employment precariousness resulted in a backlash against the government. I posit the reason for this is that even as workers recognize the structural sources of job insecurity due to globalization, they individualize their failures and inability to cope with the changing market.

While the transnational public sphere has existed in the Arendtian sense at least since the mid-19th century, a new kind of reflexively political global civil society emerged in the late 20th century. However, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), advocacy groups, and networks have limited agendas and legitimacy and, without the support of at least one state, limited means to realise changes. Since 2001, theWorld Social Forum (WSF) has formed a key attempt in forging links and ties of solidarity among diverse actors. Although the WSF may seem a party of opinion when defined negatively against neoliberal globalisation, imperialism, and violence, in more positive ideological terms it remains a rather incoherent collection of diverse actors; while itself defined as a mere open space. There is a quest for new forms of agency such as a world political party. Various historical predecessors of global political parties, real and imagined, provide conceptual resources, useful experiences for envisaging the structure, and function of a possible planetary partyformation. H.G. Wells's 'open conspiracy' is a particularly important future-oriented leftdemocratic vision. Wells believed that only a mass movement of truly committed individuals and groups could have the power to transform the world political organisation, by creating a democratic world commonwealth. Recently, for instance, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri have formulated similar ideas. I argue that transformative political agency presupposes a shared programme, based on common elements of a wider and deeper world-view, and willingness to engage in processes of collective will-formation in terms of democratic procedures. From this perspective, I outline a possible organisation and some substantial directions for a global political party. The point is also to respond to the criticism of existing parties and cultivate the critical-pluralist ethos of global civil society, but in terms of democratic party-formation

The scholarly works of Jürgen Habermas and Michel Foucault have been subject to ongoing scrutiny for a number of decades. However, less attention has been given to their activities as public intellectuals and the relation between these and their philosophical and theoretical projects. Drawing on their own conceptualization of the role of the intellectual, the article aims to illuminate these issues by examining Habermas' advocacy of a 'Core Europe' and his defense of NATO bombardments in Kosovo in 1999 as well as Foucault's involvement with the Groupe d'Information des Prisons (GIP) and a wide variety of his interviews, op-ed articles, etc. In showing that the intellectuals' views differ in important ways from those of the scholars but nevertheless inhabit a crucial position in the overall edifice of their oeuvres, the article concludes that the practices of theorists deserve more attention for a comprehensive and more nuanced account of their thought.

Its preoccupation with ontology presents radical democracy with a thorny dilemma: how to combine commitment and affirmation with a distinctive emphasis on contingency and contestability. The article addresses this dilemma by engaging with three different perspectives. Ernesto Laclau's work shows the intrinsic constraints of ontology and the inadequacy of a simple distinction between ontology and ethico-political decision. Simon Critchley opposes tying radical politics to ontological prefiguration and argues for a particular ethico-political orientation. But ethics and politics come entwined with ontological assumptions, and the ethical direction of politics can be as restrictive as its ontological framing. William Connolly weds ontology and ethics to a sharp awareness of their contestability. But his approach does not reach deep enough. It is not alive to the contestability of the very recognition of contestability. To enhance openness and reflexivity, projects of radical democracy should combine a dimension of substantive, detailed accounts with a reflexive commitment to contestability, which disrupts, questions and renews the thicker descriptions in the name of democracy and truth.

When Adorno refers to the concept of maturity (Mündigkeit), he generally means having the courage and the ability to use one's own understanding independently of dominant heteronomous patterns of thought. This Kantian-sounding claim is essentially an exhortation: maturity demands self-liberation from heteronomy, i.e. autonomy. The problem, however, is that in spite of Adorno's general endorsement of Kant's definition of maturity, he ultimately rejects the corresponding Kantian definition of autonomy. Yet Adorno does not simply discard the Kantian concept of autonomy. On the contrary, he will try to correct it by returning to it what it lacks, namely, intimacy or 'live contact with the warmth of things'. In this gesture, he aims to restore to autonomy its ethical substance or lived ethical context, not as a mere supplement to the purity of duty, but rather as necessary to the very process of becoming mature. This article examines Adorno's concept of maturity in the context of the dialectical relationship between autonomy and intimacy.

This article addresses the problem of global norm diffusion in international relations with particular reference to the implementation of 'the responsibility to protect' (R2P) in East Asia. Exposing the limits of previous work on norm localization, we develop the framework of the norm diffusion loop. Rather than understanding norm diffusion as a linear top-down process, we demonstrate that the reception of R2P has evolved in a far more dynamic way that can best be described as a feedback loop. We first look into the processes and causal mechanisms that helped to construct R2P as an emerging transnational soft norm; then we analyse the challenges of diffusing R2P from the global to the regional and domestic levels; and, finally, we examine the variation of norm effects within the same region across states, investigating in particular how R2P has shaped Chinese and Japanese policy responses respectively.

Held argues that globalisation is undermining democracy at the level of the nation state. Responding to this and to the escalation of military conflict, the mounting scale of environmental problems and increasing global inequality, he argues for the establishment of cosmopolitan democracy to enable the global implementation of social-democratic policies. This article provides an exposition and critical evaluation of cosmopolitan social democracy (CSD), identifying its main strengths and weaknesses, and argues that Held advocates CSD to remedy the world's major problems by reforming the global capitalist order, but that this is unlikely to work because these problems will persist until capitalism is replaced by socialism.

For decades, scholars of political culture have held that mass political attitudes have a profound impact on the process of democratization. In studying this impact, an increasing number of political scientists have recently theorized that the level of democratization a political system reaches depends on the extent to which its political institutions meet citizen demand for democracy. In testing such theoretical models of democratic demand and supply, however, many political scientists have mistakenly equated democratic demand with citizen preference for democracy over its alternatives. In this study, we first argue that popular demand for democracy is not the same thing as democratic regime preference or support. Instead, demand for democracy arises from dissatisfaction with democracy-in-practice. By analyzing the fourth wave of the World Values Survey, we then demonstrate that the critical orientations of democrats promote democratic development more powerfully than do the two attitudes - democratic regime support and self-expression values - that prior public opinion research has identified as the forces driving democratization.

This study examines the impact of international administrations on the development and functioning of political parties in post-conflict settings, using Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo as case studies. These cases show how, next to the establishment of a functioning institutional framework, the development and maturity of local political elites are crucial factors of post-conflict democratization, as a genuine handover of power has yet to take place in both countries. Notwithstanding the international political relevance attached to the establishment of democratic governance in post-conflict areas, the local dimension of (enforced) democratization, especially the role and relevance of political parties, has been largely overlooked in academic research. This analysis therefore explores the institutional and cultural dimensions of 'external' democratization and international administrations' influence on political parties and politics in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

In comparison to GATT law, WTO law is characterized by a notably expanded coverage. Since its inception in 1995, its material density and reach has been further extended. It was only a question of time before the demand would arise for this branch of law to fulfil objectives lying outside the traditional borders of International Economic Law (IEL). In particular, it was recognized that WTO law touches in many ways upon human rights issues. Vigorous claims were made to transform the WTO order into a human rights organization. Some authors were of the opinion that human rights law (HRL) could be integrated into WTO law via the interpretative rules of the VCLT. This contribution tries to evidence that such attempts are inherently flawed.

For decades, China has maintained State import monopoly in cultural products. The opaque State trading operations ensure a maximum level of flexibility and efficacy in the government censorship of imports. The WTO judiciary held in the China-Publications case that this practice is inconsistent with China's trading rights commitments under its Accession Protocol and cannot be justified by the public morals exception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. To comply with the WTO ruling, China must restructure its censorship regime, which it apparently is not prepared to do. This article analyses the implications of the WTO decision and provides a critical assessment of the new WTO jurisprudence regarding trading rights and the China Accession Protocol.

Are information technologies good for democracy? Could cyberspace be a more democratic "place" in the world? To explore these questions, this article juxtaposes the supposedly democratizing effects of information technologies against Walt Whitman's and John Dewey's idealized "aesthetic democracy," a passionate relationship that embodies a public spirit toward oneself and one's fellow citizens. Although information technologies are often understood as a means to increase or deepen democracy, such claims equate democracy with a set of practices or forms, but the forms themselves are not inherently democratic. Aesthetic democracy, I argue, sheds light on the democratic pitfalls and possibilities of information technologies and cyberspace. This article provides a theory of aesthetic democracy for the cyber-environment by first exploring the difference between effects on democratic governance versus effects on democracy and then developing the concept of aesthetic democracy. The next section applies aesthetic democracy as a critique of information technologies and cyberspace. The final section suggests a way to reconstruct an aesthetic democracy that transcends borders and could thereby open up the possibility of a global, democratic, unbordered cyberpolis.

Why does the willingness of interest groups to join forces with their peers abroad vary across issues? The present article points to cross-issue variation in the "constrain-thy-neighbor" effects of transnational law. Interest groups consider not only whether they are worse off if they themselves are subjected to a transnational law. They also consider how it affects them if the same law applies abroad. Depending on the issue, they derive advantages or disadvantages from seeing their neighbors constrained, and this affects their willingness to fight transnational legislation on that issue. To illustrate the argument, the article compares cohesion within the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European peak employer federation, on two aspects of EU company law. UNICE members were divided over EU takeover directives while uniting against EU worker participation directives. Statements released by German and British UNICE members show that the divergent constrain-thy-neighbor effect associated with these issues contributed to variation in cohesion.

Notwithstanding the challenges of poverty and a political economy of underdevelopment, the post-colonial State in the Commonwealth Caribbean has been able to sustain a consistent record of commitment to democracy, 'free and fair' elections and open party electoral competition. However, the dominant view that the Caribbean represents an oasis of democratic stability in the developing world has suffered irreparable damage given widespread corruption, institutional inertia, open challenge to the State and clear structural deficiencies even while elections are conducted in an atmosphere of seeming freeness and fairness. It is clear therefore that democracy is under challenge in the region and that inadequate attention has been paid to bolstering its democratic content. However, recent decisions by the judicial system against sitting prime ministers and governments portend well for the overall health of democracy in the region in spite of its numerous challenges. Further, democratic consolidation is evident given the efforts that have been made to correct some of the democratic deficits.

This article focuses on how three dimensions of critical democracy preparation (place-based geographical knowledge, social and political awareness of American Indian history and culture, and orientations conducive to the development of personal connections with American Indians) were impacted by different instructional approaches introduced when implementing an innovative Indian Education for All education program at a K-5 school in Montana. Student-learning outcomes were measured through pre- and post-intervention tests of place-based and social/political knowledge and a short survey of personal orientations. Instructional approaches across first-grade through fifth-grade were identified through interviews and participant observation. In their own ways, participating teachers, working in partnership with Salish tribal educators, demonstrated that Indigenous education contributes to critical-democracy learning. The specific outcomes of the Indigenous-education program varied according to the different instructional approaches teachers elected to pursue. Instructional comparisons showed that combining place-based instruction with guided reflection on personal connections with American Indian people through "boundary-breaking" approaches that aim to bring about critical consciousness ignited the most impressive changes in learners' orientations. The research findings offer particularly valuable insights for teachers striving for equity and excellence in elementary schools with American Indian populations.

This article studies the new constitutions of Ecuador and Bolivia in order to determine to what extent indigenous concepts of democracy have been incorporated into these important documents. The research presented here suggests that there is a significant correlation between the demands made by indigenous social movements over the past two decades and the new constitutional texts of both countries, which essentially embrace the alternative forms of citizenship and democracy espoused by indigenous social movement groups. For many activists, these changes open the door to what they perceive as a richer democracy.

Although history has shown us that the church plays a role in the political liberalization of non-democratic countries, the nature of the church's role and how it participates in politics has yet to be fully revealed. By revisiting the Polish Church's historic role in the collapse of communism, I argue that we have overestimated the church's effect on political liberalization in that case, which has led us to neglect or be prematurely disappointed in its role in the remaining communist countries such as in Cuba. Drawing from the Polish case, I conclude that the church's moral, self-limiting, and transnational character needs to be recognized and incorporated into a general theory of democratization. It is this aspect of the church that has helped it to remain active within remaining communist societies, and provide the moral support that is an integral part of political liberalization processes.