Aristotle on the Nature of Truth

One of several very perceptive references to Aristotle. Not sure whether Hughes is noting that for Aristotle, some sorts of knowledge are worthwhile even when they are not immediately practical; but Hughes makes the same point himself.

Interestingly, Gonzalez seems to take the opposite position, saying that in the Greek it is "logos" that is "epi." The passage to which Kirkland appeals here is a paraphrase of the entire passage which takes "to sumpheron" and "to blaberon", the beneficial and the harmful as the objects of the appearing.  If Gonzalez is right that I perhaps ought not have used the vocabulary of grounding in translating the passage on p. 89 of the book, still, I do not take the article of the articular infinitive as a relative pronoun.  The passage says that logos makes clear the beneficial and the harmful and thus also the just and the unjust. My main point is that legein and appearing together uncover what is just and unjust remains untouched by this criticism. 

The original title was to have been: The Saying of Things: The Nature of Truth and the Truth of Nature as Justice. The title was rejected as too obscure partly because it did not refer at all to Aristotle. I like the idea of using "with Aristotle."

Frank opts for the Heideggerian formulation, which is understandable given his own very interesting work on Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle. In the book, however, I emphasize truth as the ability to respond or, co-response-ability (24, 37, 39, 45).

This certainly suggests a movement beyond earlier Greek notions of aletheia; it would be interesting to hear your thoughts on how Aristotle responds to (diverges from, incorporates) these earlier understandings of aletheia. What I have in mind specifically is the idea of aletheia as comprehensive and as facing what is, without avoidance or distortion. (I argued for this in "Aletheia from Poetry into Philosophy: Homer to Parmenides," here: http://books.google.com/books?vid=ISBN9781438427355 .) One can see a respect for an ecology in Parmenides' use, I believe. Yet in the 5th century I haven't seen the idea of responsiveness, or of appropriate resonse. An interesting "starter" bibliography is here: http://www.ontology-2.com/idx01b.htm . See especially Thomas Cole, "Archaic Truth," QUCC New Series, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1983), pp. 7-28 (http://www.jstor.org/stable/20538760); and Tilman Krischer, "ΕΤΥΜΟΣ und ΑΛΗΘΗΣ," Philologus 109 (1965), pp. 161-174.

Rose, the second chapter of the book, entitled 'A History of Truth as Cor-respondence', traces a transition in the meaning of aletheia from Homer through Simonides to Herodotus. I mention the role of your friend Parmenides, or at least some of the things he has his goddess say, in this context (see, pp. 28-33). The trajectory I outline illustrates how aletheia has always been 1) closely associated with verbs of saying and 2) intimately bound up with concrete inter-human relationships. Increasingly, though, it begins to point to the dynamic of revealing and concealing endemic to the human relation to things. I follow Heribert Boeder suggestion that logos means both "the caring attention to a determinate thing" and the relationship we have to each thing which "existis according to its own peculiarity." I conclude that section of the book this way: "Truth as aletheia is conditioned by this twofold saying: the saying of things. Here, things become the genuine witnesses to the truth; and truth becomes a matter of doing justice to the testimony of things." (33). I wonder if we could think more about the connection between the showing of aletheia and the notion of deiknumi, showing forth, which you have suggested to me is connected with dike, or justice.

Yes, it was that chapter I was looking at. Your point there about trust as part of the relationship of aletheia is very important; the role of the recipient or addressee of an account that gives the aletheia is often overlooked. Related to the notion of aletheia-telling as part of worthy or appropriate conduct in interpersonal or political settings, and another angle on the issue on which I'd like to hear you expand, is this. Parmenides breaks with earlier accounts of aletheia in at least these two ways: (a) He suggests that one can seek aletheia, or at least orient oneself towards it, by means of reasoned inquiry. Previously one became able to give the aletheia either by having eyewitness knowledge and being a respected person, or by getting some insight from the gods (if they didn't feel like deceiving at the time). (b) He suggests that one does not have to be a member of the divinity or a god/goddess in order to have access to aletheia; one could gain access not only by battlefield valor or high birth but by reasoning and comprehensive awareness (contrasting with the selective awareness associated with some customs?). In fact, only by going through realms that are not his own (other cities, an area belonging to and ruled by females) can the young man even learn how to inquire. But attitudes toward aletheia, what is required individually and socially for receptivity to it, are implied but not directly stated. The only thing I can thing of that comes close is the claim that the young man travels beyond all cities, but is brought to the goddess by Dike and Themis. That is, on one hand he's going beyond the reach of customs as they are known; on the other hand he is supported by right (which is usually associated with custom and usage). There is something else in Parmenides that may be relevant, may make his account a sort of precursor of what you've presented in Aristotle; I'll put that in a diffe

This is a crucial question, for it points to the methodological approach of the entire book, namely that of legomenology. Without understanding the meaning and significance of legomenology, what animates the book as a work of philosophy, as opposed to philological reconstruction, is lost.