Geopolitics Weekly

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Would the traditional deterrence mechanisms no longer function in that case? Janning: They would still function for the "old" nuclear powers. These states are, and will continue to be, capable of striking any location on the Earth's surface with nuclear weapons to the extent that life can no longer exist there any more. That is not, however, the case for the "new" nuclear powers. They can only threaten an attacker with the risk of a retaliatory nuclear strike whose effect is not entirely predictable. This in itself is likely to negatively affect the so-called "extended deterrence" of today's nuclear powers. (Editor's note: Under extended deterrence, a state threatens nuclear retaliation in the event of a nuclear attack on its allies e.g. other NATO members.) In other words, America's allies can no longer be certain that a US security guarantee offers them adequate protection against a nuclear attack by third parties. Washington might, after all, decide that the cost of intervening under these conditions is just too high.

Janning: As a deterrent, the possession of nuclear weapons is certainly effective. But this protective shield has got holes in it. If countries like North Korea can only respond to a limited conventional attack by firing nuclear missiles against targets in the enemy's homeland, then nuclear weapons lose some of their effectiveness, as their use would mean responding to a limited regional conflict with the threat of total mutual destruction. But it's true that as long as states, especially politically isolated regimes, see their security interests at risk, the goal of voluntary renunciation of nuclear military technology will remain virtually unattainable. The effects of sanctions on Iran and North Korea up until now show that the best that can be achieved is only to delay or slow down the weapons programs.

At the same time, he approved a secret joint operation with the U.S. code named Project Sapphire, which removed 1,278 pounds of highly enriched uranium to the U.S..

Kazakhstan also has the Caspian Sea region's largest recoverable oil and gas reserves as well as the world's second largest deposits of uranium.

And it is flexing its diplomatic muscles as it became in January the first predominantly Muslim nation and the first former Soviet Union state to assume the chairmanship of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

As part of meeting the President's important four-year goal of securing nuclear weapons and materials globally, the report argues, it may be possible to cut in half the number of countries with weapons-usable nuclear material and all remaining countries could have clear and well-enforced rules requiring operators to protect nuclear stocks against a robust set of insider and outsider threats.

While these gains are possible, they can be accomplished only by expanding and accelerating current efforts. The report recommends several essential steps: Build a sense of urgency. Only if policymakers around the world become convinced that nuclear theft and terrorism are real and urgent threats to their countries' security, the report argues, will the four-year nuclear security effort succeed. To make that case, the report calls for joint threat briefings, outreach to intelligence agencies, nuclear terrorism exercises, and realistic tests of a country's ability to defeat insider and outsider threats. The nuclear security summit is an important step in building this sense of urgency.

Upgrade nuclear security to higher standards in more facilities in more countries. Achieving effective security for all nuclear material worldwide will require going well beyond the former Soviet Union and Pakistan, and ensuring security measures will be effective against a broad range of insider and outsider threats. The four-year deadline cannot be met with lengthy negotiations for U.S.-funded upgrades at every site - it will be essential to combine U.S.-funded upgrades with steps countries are convinced to take on their own. These efforts must include not just equipment but training, exchange of best practices, steps to strengthen security culture, and measures designed to ensure security will be maintained for the long haul.

Take a broader approach to reducing the number of sites where nuclear weapons, plutonium and HEU exists. Consolidating sites is essential; it can be cheaper, faster, and more effective to close down a nuclear site than to secure it. The four-year effort should seek to consolidate more types of nuclear material, using different incentives and a broader range of policy tools.

It also warned that weaknesses remained in measures Russia had taken in recent years to guard its nuclear stockpile, the world's largest.