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thinkahol *

Being No One - The MIT Press - 0 views

mitpress.mit.edu/...default.asp

Being No One - The MIT Press

shared by thinkahol * on 23 Feb 12 - Cached
  • thinkahol * on 23 Feb 12
     
    According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Matvey Ezhov

PLoS Computational Biology: Qualia: The Geometry of Integrated Information - 1 views

www.ploscompbiol.org/...10.1371%2Fjournal.pcbi.1000462

qualia consciousness PLoS

shared by Matvey Ezhov on 23 Oct 09 - Cached
  • Matvey Ezhov on 23 Oct 09
     
    According to the integrated information theory, the quantity of consciousness is the amount of integrated information generated by a complex of elements, and the quality of experience is specified by the informational relationships it generates. This paper outlines a framework for characterizing the informational relationships generated by such systems. Qualia space (Q) is a space having an axis for each possible state (activity pattern) of a complex. Within Q, each submechanism specifies a point corresponding to a repertoire of system states. Arrows between repertoires in Q define informational relationships. Together, these arrows specify a quale-a shape that completely and univocally characterizes the quality of a conscious experience. Φ- the height of this shape-is the quantity of consciousness associated with the experience. Entanglement measures how irreducible informational relationships are to their component relationships, specifying concepts and modes. Several corollaries follow from these premises. The quale is determined by both the mechanism and state of the system. Thus, two different systems having identical activity patterns may generate different qualia. Conversely, the same quale may be generated by two systems that differ in both activity and connectivity. Both active and inactive elements specify a quale, but elements that are inactivated do not. Also, the activation of an element affects experience by changing the shape of the quale. The subdivision of experience into modalities and submodalities corresponds to subshapes in Q. In principle, different aspects of experience may be classified as different shapes in Q, and the similarity between experiences reduces to similarities between shapes. Finally, specific qualities, such as the "redness" of red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it, but require considering the entire quale. Ultimately, the present framework may offer a principled way for translating quali
thinkahol *

All In The Mind - 10 October 2009 - You are not a self! Bodies, brains and the nature o... - 0 views

www.abc.net.au/...2705963.htm

All In Mind - 10 October 2009 You are not<_em> a self! Bodies brains and the nature of consciousness

shared by thinkahol * on 25 Feb 11 - Cached
  • thinkahol * on 25 Feb 11
     
    German philosopher of mind Thomas Metzinger is one of the world's top researchers on consciousness, instrumental in its renaissance as a respectable problem for scientific enquiry. From out-of-body experiences to lucid dreaming, anarchic hand syndrome to phantom limbs, his investigations have taken him to places few dare to go. Be spooked, bewildered and amazed.
Matvey Ezhov

Ben Goertzel - Patterns of Awareness - 0 views

www.goertzel.org/...HardProblem.htm

goertzel ai consciousness

shared by Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09 - Cached
  • Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
     
    A Pattern-Theoretic, Panpsychist Solution to the Hard Problem of Consciousness
Volucer Volucer

Bigger not necessarily better, when it comes to brains - 1 views

www.physorg.com/news177692594.html

AI ИИ brain neuroscience news наука

shared by Volucer Volucer on 22 Nov 09 - Cached
  • Volucer Volucer on 22 Nov 09
     
    "In fact, the models suggest that counting could be achieved with only a few hundred nerve cells and only a few thousand could be enough to generate consciousness. "
Matvey Ezhov

On Biological and Digital Intelligence - 0 views

www.goertzel.org/...icalAndDigitalIntelligence.htm

shared by Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09 - Cached
  • In essence, Hawkins argues that, to whatever extent the concept of “consciousness” can’t be boiled down to brain theory, it’s simply a bunch of hooey.
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      Not true!
  • in which conscious experience is more foundational than physical systems or linguistic communications
  • Conscious experiences are associated with patterns, and patterns are associated with physical systems, but none of these is fully reducible to the other.&nbsp;
  • ...22 more annotations...
  • He makes the correct point that roughly-human-level AI’s will have dramatically different strengths and weaknesses from human being, due to different sensors and actuators and different physical infrastructures for their cognitive dynamics.&nbsp; But he doesn’t even touch the notion of self-modifying AI – the concept that once an AI gets smart enough to modify its own code, it’s likely to get exponentially smarter and smarter until it’s left us humans in the dust.
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      Совершенно не имеет отношения к теме, подход Хокинса легко масштабируется до сверх- и сверх-сверх-сверхчеловеческого интеллекта.
  • therefore if AI closely enough emulates the human brain it won’t radically self-modify either
  • Rather, I think the problem is that the field of AI has come to focus on “narrow AI” – programs that solve particularly, narrowly-defined problems – rather than “artificial general intelligence” (AGI).&nbsp;
  • cognitive science, artificial general intelligence, philosophy of mind and abstract mathematics
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      т.о. Гортзел признается, что вообще принимает и не считает нужным принимать нейронауку в расчет, т.е. опирается только на эмпирические представления о том, как работает сознание.
  • So what we’re doing is creating commercial narrow AI programs, using the software framework that we’re building out with our AGI design in mind.
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      и в этом его большое отличие от платформы Хокинса, которая имеет одинаковую структуру для всех ее применений
  • I tend to largely agree with his take on the brain
  • I think he oversimplifies some things fairly seriously – giving them very brief mention when they’re actually quite long and complicated stories.&nbsp; And some of these omissions, in my view, are not mere “biological details” but are rather points of serious importance for his program of abstracting principles from brain science and then re-concretizing these principles in the context of digital software.
  • One point Hawkins doesn’t really cover is how a mind/brain chooses which predictions to make, from among the many possible predictions that exist.
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      тут он вроде бы прав...
  • Hawkins proposes that there are neurons or neuronal groups that represent patterns as “tokens,” and that these tokens are then incorporated along with other neurons or neuronal groups into larger groupings representing more abstract patterns.&nbsp; This seems clearly to be correct, but he doesn’t give much information on how these tokens are supposed to be formed.&nbsp;
  • So, what’s wrong with Hawkins’ picture of brain function?&nbsp; Nothing’s exactly wrong with it, so far as I can tell.
  • But Edelman then takes the concept one step further and talks about “neural maps” – assemblies of neuronal groups that carry out particular perception, cognition or action functions.&nbsp; Neural maps, in essence, are sets of neuronal groups that host attractors of neurodynamics.&nbsp; And Edelman then observes, astutely, that the dynamics of the population of neuronal groups, over time, is likely to obey a form of evolution by natural selection.
  • How fascinating if the brain also operates in this way!
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      да нифига... слов нет
  • Hawkins argues that creativity is essentially just metaphorical thinking, generalization based on memory.&nbsp; While this is true in a grand sense, it’s not a very penetrating statement.
  • Evolutionary learning is the most powerful general search mechanism known to computer science, and is also hypothesized by Edelman to underly neural intelligence.&nbsp; This sort of idea, it seems to me, should be part of any synthetic approach to brain function.
  • Hawkins mentions the notion, and observes correctly that Hebbian learning in the brain is a lot subtler than the simple version that Donald Hebb laid out in the late 40’s.&nbsp;&nbsp; But he largely portrays these variations as biological details, and then shifts focus to the hierarchical architecture of the cortex.&nbsp;
  • Hawkins’ critique of AI, which in my view is overly harsh.&nbsp; He dismisses work on formal logic based reasoning as irrelevant to “real intelligence.”&nbsp;
  • So – to sum up – I think Hawkins’ statements about brain function are pretty much correct
  • What he omits are, for instance, &nbsp; The way the brain displays evolutionary learning as a consequence of the dynamics of multiple attractors involving sets of neural clusters The way the brain may emergently give rise to probabilistic reasoning via the statistical coordination of Hebbian learning
  • Learning of predictive patterns requires an explicit or implicit search through a large space of predictive patterns; evolutionary learning provides one approach to this problem, with computer science foundations and plausible connections to brain function; again, Hawkins does not propose any concrete alternative.
  • crucial question of how far one has to abstract away from brain function, to get to something that can be re-specialized into efficient computer software.&nbsp; My intuition is that this will require a higher level of abstraction than Hawkins seems to believe.&nbsp; But I stress that this is a matter of intuitive judgment – neither of us really knows.
  • Of course, to interpret the Novamente design as an “abstraction from the brain” is to interpret this phrase in a fairly extreme sense – we’re abstracting general processes like probabilistic inference and evolutionary learning and general properties like hierarchical structure from the brain, rather than particular algorithms.&nbsp;
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 09 Sep 09
       
      наконец-то он сказал это
  • Although I’m (unsurprisingly) most psyched about the Novamente approach, I think it’s also quite worthwhile to pursue AGI approaches that are closer to the brain level – there’s a large space between detailed brain simulation and Novamente, including neuron-level simulations, neural-cluster-level simulations, and so forth.&nbsp;
Matvey Ezhov

You can control your Marilyn Monroe neuron - 2 views

www.physorg.com/news175417796.html

shared by Matvey Ezhov on 27 Oct 09 - Cached
  • Another experiment designed to test how well the subjects could control the single neurons was a fade experiment in which the subject was shown a combined image of two faces: Josh Brolin (star of Goonies) and Marilyn Monroe, and told to think of Josh Brolin. The electrodes sent data on the Josh Brolin and Marilyn Monroe neurons to the computer, which brightened the image of the one causing most neuron firing. As the subject thought of Brolin, the image of Monroe faded out.
    • Matvey Ezhov
      Matvey Ezhov on 27 Oct 09
       
      This points that grandmother's cells correlates for consciousness, right?
  • Volucer Volucer on 27 Oct 09
     
    с нейронами моей бабушки дело обстоит еще сложнее чем думалось
  • Volucer Volucer on 14 Nov 09
     
    nope. Nonconsciousness species can control it too
Volucer Volucer

Quantum features of consciousness, computers and brain - 1 views

arxiv.org/0910.4300

наука ии consciousnes лженаука Quantum_brain

shared by Volucer Volucer on 02 Nov 09 - Cached
  • Volucer Volucer on 02 Nov 09
     
    new article about Everett's ideas
  • Matvey Ezhov on 02 Nov 09
     
    Yup, I think quantum processes could be important on subcellular level, but we are interested in at least supracellular processes.
  • Nikolay Sibirtsev on 03 Nov 09
     
    хех, с тегом лженаука - даже не буду открывать )
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