Group items tagged

Difference Principle allows allocation that does not conform to strict equality so long as the inequality has the effect that the least advantaged in society are materially better off than they would be under strict equality

Resource-based distributive principles, and principles based on what people deserve because of their work, endeavor to incorporate this idea of economic responsibility

distributive principles should be designed and assessed according to how they affect welfare

Advocates of Welfare-based principles

feminist critiques of existing distributive principles note that they tend to ignore the particular circumstances of women

Libertarian principles

criticize any patterned distributive ideal

Distributive principles may vary in numerous dimensions. They can vary in what is subject to distribution (income, wealth, opportunities, jobs, welfare, utility, etc.); in the nature of the subjects of the distribution (natural persons, groups of persons, reference classes, etc.); and on what basis distribution should be made (equality, maximization, according to individual characteristics, according to free transactions, etc.)

distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic activity among individuals in a society

distributive justice theory is a practical enterprise

There has never been, and never will be

any society whose distribution conforms to one of the proposed principles

Only when people realized that the distribution of economic benefits and burdens could be affected by government did distributive justice become a live topic

Governments continuously make and change laws affecting the distribution of economic benefits and burdens in their societies. Almost all changes, from the standard tax and industry laws through to divorce laws have some distributive effect, and, as a result, different societies have different distributions

Distributive justice theory contributes practically by providing guidance for these unavoidable and constant choices

Contrary to a popular misconception, economics alone cannot decide what policy changes we should make. Economics, at its best, can tell us the effects of pursuing different policies; it cannot, without the guidance of normative principles, recommend which policy to pursue. The arguments and principles discussed in the present entry aim to supply this kind of guidance.

One of the simplest principles of distributive justice is that of strict or radical equality

every person should have the same level of material goods and services

people are owed equal respect and that equality in material goods and services is the best way to give effect to this ideal.

The two main problems are the construction of appropriate indices for measurement (the index problem), and the specification of time frames

The index problem arises primarily because the goods to be distributed need to be measured if they are going to be distributed according to some pattern (such as equality)

requiring identical bundles will make virtually everybody materially worse off than they would be under an alternative allocation

Some index for measuring the value of goods and services is required.

Money is an index for the value of material goods and services

imperfect

opportunities

Nevertheless, using money as index for the value of material goods and services is the most practical response

widely used

The second main specification problem involves time frames

One version of the principle of strict equality requires that all people should have the same wealth at some initial point, after which people are free to use their wealth in whatever way they choose

‘starting-gate’ principles

may lead in time to very inegalitarian wealth distributions

The most common form of strict equality principle specifies that income (measured in terms of money) should be equal in each time-frame, though even this may lead to significant disparities in wealth if variations in savings are permitted

Hence, strict equality principles are commonly conjoined with some society-wide specification of just saving behavior

moral criticisms

unduly restrict freedom

do not give best effect to equal respect for persons

conflict with what people deserve

most common criticism is a welfare-based one

everyone can be materially better off if incomes are not strictly equal

The wealth of an economy is not a fixed amount from one period to the next

The most common way of producing more wealth is to have a system where those who are more productive earn greater incomes.

most widely discussed theory of distributive justice in the past three decades has been that proposed by John Rawls

1. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value. 2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: (a) They are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and (b), they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

The main moral motivation for the Difference Principle is similar to that for strict equality: equal respect for persons

Difference Principle materially collapses to a form of strict equality under empirical conditions where differences in income have no effect on the work incentive of people

Opinion divides on the size of the inequalities which would, as a matter of empirical fact, be allowed by the Difference Principle, and on how much better off the least advantaged would be under the Difference Principle than under a strict equality principle

Rawls is not opposed to the principle of strict equality per se, his concern is about the absolute position of the least advantaged group rather than their relative position

numerous criticisms

The most common explanation appeals to solidarity (Crocker): that being materially equal is an important expression of the equality of persons. Another common explanation appeals to the power some may have over others, if they are better off materially

Rawls' response

priority of his first principle: The inequalities consistent with the Difference Principle are only permitted so long as they do not compromise the fair value of the political liberties

Utilitarian objection

Difference Principle is that it does not maximize utility

Libertarians object

Difference Principle involves unacceptable infringements on liberty

redistributive taxation to the poor

The Difference Principle is also criticized as a primary distributive principle on the grounds that it mostly ignores claims that people deserve certain economic benefits in light of their actions

Desert-Based Principles

some may deserve a higher level of material goods because of their hard work or contributions even if their unequal rewards do not also function to improve the position of the least advantaged

explanations of how people come to be in more or less advantaged positions is relevant to their fairness

Resource-based principles criticize the Difference Principle on the grounds that it is not ‘ambition-sensitive’ enough

‘endowment-sensitive’

not sensitive to the consequences of people's choices

does not compensate people for natural inequalities

Resource-based principles

Resource Egalitarianism

prescribe equality of resources

do not normally prescribe a patterned outcome

outcomes are determined by people's free use of their resources

provided people have equal resources they should live with the consequences of their choices

social circumstances over which people have no control should not adversely affect life prospects or earning capacities

unequal natural endowments should attract compensation

handicaps, ill-health, or low levels of natural talents

Ronald Dworkin, (Dworkin 1981a, 1981b), proposes that people begin with equal resources but end up with unequal economic benefits as a result of their own choices

They note that natural inequalities are not distributed according to people's choices, nor are they justified by reference to some other morally relevant fact about people

buy insurance against being disadvantaged

It is simply not clear how to implement equality of resources in a complex economy and hence despite its theoretical advantages, it is difficult to see it as a practical improvement on the Difference Principle.

Welfare-based principles are motivated by the idea that what is of primary moral importance is the level of welfare of people.

imprecise

concerns of other theories

as derivative concerns

particular welfare functions to maximize

vary enormously

most commonly advocated by economists

Historically, Utilitarians have used the term ‘utility’ rather than ‘welfare’ and utility has been defined variously as pleasure, happiness, or preference-satisfaction

philosophical activity has concentrated on a variant known as Utilitarianism

choosing that distribution maximizing the arithmetic sum of all satisfied preferences (unsatisfied preferences being negative), weighted for the intensity of those preferences.

Utilitarianism fails to take the distinctness of persons seriously

immoral to make some people suffer so that there is a net gain for other people

no requirement for people to consent to the suffering or sacrifice

individual preferences or interests referring to the holdings of others

Utilitarian distribution principles, like the other principles described here, have problems with specification and implementation

interpersonal utility comparisons are impossible

many Preference Utilitarians believe their principle prescribes strongly egalitarian structures with lots of state invention while many other Preference Utilitarians believe it prescribes a laissez faire style of capitalism

Another complaint against welfarism is that it ignores, and in fact cannot even make sense of, claims that people deserve certain economic benefits in light of their actions

various forms of welfarism treat people as mere containers for well-being, rather than purposeful beings, responsible for their actions and creative in their environments

The different desert-based principles of distribution differ primarily according to what they identify as the basis for deserving

three broad categories

Contribution

Effort

Compensation

Aristotle argued that virtue should be a basis for distributing rewards, but most contemporary principles owe a larger debt to John Locke. Locke argued people deserve to have those items produced by their toil and industry, the products (or the value thereof) being a fitting reward for their effort

people freely apply their abilities and talents, in varying degrees, to socially productive work. People come to deserve varying levels of income by providing goods and services desired by others

Distributive systems are just insofar as they distribute incomes according to the different levels earned or deserved by the individuals in the society for their productive labors, efforts, or contributions

value of raising the standard of living — collectively, ‘the social product’

only activity directed at raising the social product will serve as a basis for deserving income

a value societies hold independently

societies value higher standards of living, and therefore choose the raising of living standards as the primary value relevant to desert-based distribution

Payments designed to give people incentives are a form of entitlement particularly worth distinguishing from desert-payments as they are commonly confused

Incentive-payments are ‘forward-looking’

desert-payments are ‘backwards-looking’

incentives and desert provide distinct rationales for income and should not be conflated

While some have sought to justify current capitalist distributions via desert-based distributive principles, John Stuart Mill and many since have forcefully argued the contrary claim — that the implementation of a productivity principle would involve dramatic changes in modern market economies and would greatly reduce the inequalities characteristic of them

contemporary Desert-based principles are rarely complete distributive principles. They usually are only designed to cover distribution among working adults, leaving basic welfare needs to be met by other principles

difficult to identify what is to count as a contribution, an effort or a cost, and it is even more difficult to measure these in a complex modern economy

moral objection

make economic benefits depend on factors over which people have little control

productivity-based principles — a person's productivity seems clearly to be influenced by many factors over which the person has little control

under most welfare-based principles, it is also the case that people's level of economic benefits depend on factors beyond their control

desert theorists who emphasize the responsibility of people in choosing to engage in more or less productive activities

Most contemporary versions of the principles discussed so far allow some role for the market as a means of achieving the desired distributive pattern

advocates of Libertarian distributive principles rarely see the market as a means to some desired pattern, since the principle(s) they advocate do not ostensibly propose a ‘pattern’ at all, but instead describe the sorts of acquisitions or exchanges which are themselves just

just outcomes are those arrived at by the separate just actions of individuals; a particular distributive pattern is not required for justice

Nozick proposes a 3-part "Entitlement Theory"

distribution is just if everyone is entitled to the holdings they possess under the distribution

principle of justice in transfer

fair contracts while ruling out stealing, fraud, etc

principle of justice in acquisition

gaining of exclusive property rights over the material world

The obvious objection to this claim is that it is not clear why the first people to acquire some part of the material world should be able to exclude others from it

Lockean Proviso

‘enough and as good left in common for others’

challenges

acquisition is just if and only if the position of others after the acquisition is no worse than their position was when the acquisition was unowned or ‘held in common’

principle of rectification for past injustice

Past injustices systematically undermine the justice of every subsequent distribution in historical theories

The numbers of injustices perpetrated throughout history, both within nations and between them, are enormous and the necessary details of the vast majority of injustices are unavailable

As a consequence, Nozick's entitlement theory will never provide any guidance as to what the current distribution of material holdings should be nor what distributions or redistributions are legitimate or illegitimate

Libertarians inspired by Nozick usually advocate a system in which there are exclusive property rights, with the role of the government restricted to the protection of these property rights. The property rights commonly rule out taxation for purposes other than raising the funds necessary to protect property rights

Any taxation of the income from such selling, according to Nozick, ‘institute[s] (partial) ownership by others of people and their actions and labor’.

main difficulties

other route for trying to justify exclusive property rights has been to argue that they are required for the maximization of freedom and/or liberty or the minimization of violations of these

false

But the challenge for these Libertarians is to show why only their favored liberties and freedoms are valuable, and not those which are weakened by a system of exclusive property rights

There is no one feminist conception of distributive justice; theorists who name themselves feminists defend positions across the political spectrum

an interest in what difference, if any, the practical experience of gender makes to the subject matter or study of justice

The distributive principles so far outlined, with the exception of strict egalitarianism, could be classified as liberal theories — they both inform, and are the product of, the liberal democracies which have emerged over the last two centuries

‘the personal is political.’

critique of liberal theories

resulting liberal theories of justice have fundamentally been unable to accommodate the injustices that have their origins in this ‘protected’ private sphere

liberal theories of distributive justice are unable to address the oppression which surfaces in the so-called private sphere of government non-interference

women have substantial disadvantages in competing in the market because of childrearing responsibilities which are not equally shared with men. As a consequence, any theory relying on market mechanisms, including most liberal theories, will yield systems which result in women systematically having less income and wealth than men. Thus, feminists have challenged contemporary political theorists to rethink the boundaries of political authority in the name of securing a just outcome for women and other historically oppressed groups

challenge

navigate both a coherent theoretical and practical path in response to the best feminist critiques available

distributive decisions arising through the legitimate application of particular democratic processes might even, at least in part, constitute distributive justice

Data on people's beliefs about distributive justice is also useful for addressing the necessary intersection between philosophical and political processes. Such beliefs put constraints on what institutional and policy reforms are practically achievable in any generation — especially when the society is committed to democratic processes

it is at least possible that the best distributive theory, when implemented, might yield a system which still has many injustices and/or negative consequences

Given that distributive justice is about what to do now, not just what to think, alternate distributive theories must, in part, compete as comprehensive systems which take into account the practical constraints we face.

Distributive justice is not an area where we can say an idea is good in theory but not in practice. If it is not good in practice, then it is not good in theory either