Regan also articulates his firm belief that ‘moral philosophy is no substitute for political action’, but insists, ‘still, it can make a contribution. Its currency is ideas’. This assertion was made many years ago in 1983. However, it appears that large sections of the animal advocacy movement was not (and is not) listening to this important message. Many factions in the modern animal protection movement do not agree that a well worked out philosophical position assists in the furtherance of altering the moral standing of nonhuman animals. Moreover, many of those that do seem to agree with the general point that social movements require a solid basis for claims-making, appear not to accept the case for animal rights in the first place. Recent developments in the animal movement tends to confirm such a view. For example, Francione [4] states that ‘the modern animal “rights” movement has explicitly rejected the doctrine of animal rights’. In fact, it might be tempting to claim, analogous to Gilroy’s [5] declaration that ‘there ain’t no black in the Union Jack’, that there ain’t much rights in ‘animal rights’ either. This tends to beg the question, if not rights violations, what do modern animal advocates substantially rely upon in order to make claims on behalf of nonhuman animals? Francione argues that the contemporary animal movement appears content to rely on a new formulation of traditional ideas, which he labels ‘new welfarism’. He describes this conception of new welfarism as a ‘hybrid position’ which may be understood to be a more progressive, or in Francione’s terms, a ‘modified’ welfare position compared with traditional animal welfarism, especially in the sense that this ‘version of animal welfare…accepts animal rights as an ideal state of affairs that can be achieved only through continued adherence to animal welfare measures’.
