A few things. First I’m pretty sure nothing should be 0% risk weighted. Second, yes, risk weightings are going to continue to be a big part of the real problem. Third Basel III fails to address the issue of the hegemony of the ratings agency cartel.
On another note, I remain fairly convinced that there isn’t any way to completely remove the chance that banks blow up. Banks are completely unlike any other corporate structure – they are inherently levered and can therefore be wiped out by a nasty run on the bank, even if perfectly solvent. So what’s the answer? The minute we admit that TBTF exists, we have to charge for the privilege of being TBTF rather than try to regulate it out. Insurance premiums payable to a pre-funded disaster recovery fund, that are heavily geared to (true) leverage and spiral exponentially above 30x leverage sounds like a good start. Throw in additional premia based on the % of revenues from trading, the type of funding that props up the balance sheet and the liquidity of underlying assets, and Bob’s your uncle, we might have the beginnings of something that works.
rune66 on 07 May 12En pragmatisk model, som man kan undre sig over ikke bliver overvejet seriøst (TBTF = too big to fail).