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How Edward Snowden Changed Everything | The Nation - 0 views

www.thenation.com/...ard-snowden-changed-everything surveillance state Snowden Wizner state-of-play civil-liberties must-read
shared by Paul Merrell on 16 Nov 15 - No Cached
  • Ben Wizner, who is perhaps best known as Edward Snowden’s lawyer, directs the American Civil Liberties Union’s Speech, Privacy & Technology Project. Wizner, who joined the ACLU in August 2001, one month before the 9/11 attacks, has been a force in the legal battles against torture, watch lists, and extraordinary rendition since the beginning of the global “war on terror.” Ad Policy On October 15, we met with Wizner in an upstate New York pub to discuss the state of privacy advocacy today. In sometimes sardonic tones, he talked about the transition from litigating on issues of torture to privacy advocacy, differences between corporate and state-sponsored surveillance, recent developments in state legislatures and the federal government, and some of the obstacles impeding civil liberties litigation. The interview has been edited and abridged for publication.
  • en Wizner, who is perhaps best known as Edward Snowden’s lawyer, directs the American Civil Liberties Union’s Speech, Privacy & Technology Project. Wizner, who joined the ACLU in August 2001, one month before the 9/11 attacks, has been a force in the legal battles against torture, watch lists, and extraordinary rendition since the beginning of the global “war on terror.” Ad Policy On October 15, we met with Wizner in an upstate New York pub to discuss the state of privacy advocacy today. In sometimes sardonic tones, he talked about the transition from litigating on issues of torture to privacy advocacy, differences between corporate and state-sponsored surveillance, recent developments in state legislatures and the federal government, and some of the obstacles impeding civil liberties litigation. The interview has been edited and abridged for publication.
  • Many of the technologies, both military technologies and surveillance technologies, that are developed for purposes of policing the empire find their way back home and get repurposed. You saw this in Ferguson, where we had military equipment in the streets to police nonviolent civil unrest, and we’re seeing this with surveillance technologies, where things that are deployed for use in war zones are now commonly in the arsenals of local police departments. For example, a cellphone surveillance tool that we call the StingRay—which mimics a cellphone tower and communicates with all the phones around—was really developed as a military technology to help identify targets. Now, because it’s so inexpensive, and because there is a surplus of these things that are being developed, it ends up getting pushed down into local communities without local democratic consent or control.
  • ...4 more annotations...
  • SG & TP: How do you see the current state of the right to privacy? BW: I joked when I took this job that I was relieved that I was going to be working on the Fourth Amendment, because finally I’d have a chance to win. That was intended as gallows humor; the Fourth Amendment had been a dishrag for the last several decades, largely because of the war on drugs. The joke in civil liberties circles was, “What amendment?” But I was able to make this joke because I was coming to Fourth Amendment litigation from something even worse, which was trying to sue the CIA for torture, or targeted killings, or various things where the invariable outcome was some kind of non-justiciability ruling. We weren’t even reaching the merits at all. It turns out that my gallows humor joke was prescient.
  • The truth is that over the last few years, we’ve seen some of the most important Fourth Amendment decisions from the Supreme Court in perhaps half a century. Certainly, I think the Jones decision in 2012 [U.S. v. Jones], which held that GPS tracking was a Fourth Amendment search, was the most important Fourth Amendment decision since Katz in 1967 [Katz v. United States], in terms of starting a revolution in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence signifying that changes in technology were not just differences in degree, but they were differences in kind, and require the Court to grapple with it in a different way. Just two years later, you saw the Court holding that police can’t search your phone incident to an arrest without getting a warrant [Riley v. California]. Since 2012, at the level of Supreme Court jurisprudence, we’re seeing a recognition that technology has required a rethinking of the Fourth Amendment at the state and local level. We’re seeing a wave of privacy legislation that’s really passing beneath the radar for people who are not paying close attention. It’s not just happening in liberal states like California; it’s happening in red states like Montana, Utah, and Wyoming. And purple states like Colorado and Maine. You see as many libertarians and conservatives pushing these new rules as you see liberals. It really has cut across at least party lines, if not ideologies. My overall point here is that with respect to constraints on government surveillance—I should be more specific—law-enforcement government surveillance—momentum has been on our side in a way that has surprised even me.
  • Do you think that increased privacy protections will happen on the state level before they happen on the federal level? BW: I think so. For example, look at what occurred with the death penalty and the Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. The question under the Eighth Amendment is, “Is the practice cruel and unusual?” The Court has looked at what it calls “evolving standards of decency” [Trop v. Dulles, 1958]. It matters to the Court, when it’s deciding whether a juvenile can be executed or if a juvenile can get life without parole, what’s going on in the states. It was important to the litigants in those cases to be able to show that even if most states allowed the bad practice, the momentum was in the other direction. The states that were legislating on this most recently were liberalizing their rules, were making it harder to execute people under 18 or to lock them up without the possibility of parole. I think you’re going to see the same thing with Fourth Amendment and privacy jurisprudence, even though the Court doesn’t have a specific doctrine like “evolving standards of decency.” The Court uses this much-maligned test, “Do individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy?” We’ll advance the argument, I think successfully, that part of what the Court should look at in considering whether an expectation of privacy is reasonable is showing what’s going on in the states. If we can show that a dozen or eighteen state legislatures have enacted a constitutional protection that doesn’t exist in federal constitutional law, I think that that will influence the Supreme Court.
  • The question is will it also influence Congress. I think there the answer is also “yes.” If you’re a member of the House or the Senate from Montana, and you see that your state legislature and your Republican governor have enacted privacy legislation, you’re not going to be worried about voting in that direction. I think this is one of those places where, unlike civil rights, where you saw most of the action at the federal level and then getting forced down to the states, we’re going to see more action at the state level getting funneled up to the federal government.
  • Paul Merrell on 16 Nov 15
     
    A must-read. Ben Wizner discusses the current climate in the courts in government surveillance cases and how Edward Snowden's disclosures have affected that, and much more. Wizner is not only Edward Snowden's lawyer, he is also the coordinator of all ACLU litigation on electronic surveillance matters.
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Korematsu's Demise? | Just Security - 0 views

www.justsecurity.org/...korematsus-demise surveillance state NYPD-intelligence litigation Korematsu
shared by Paul Merrell on 20 Oct 15 - No Cached
  • There’s a lot that’s remarkable about last Tuesday’s Third Circuit decision in Hassan v. City of New York, which Faiza Patel cogently summarized in her post last week. In a nutshell, Hassan involves a challenge to secret intelligence operations carried out by the New York Police Department (NYPD) over the years since September 11 that allegedly targets Muslim communities “based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity ‘is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.'” The district court had tersely granted the City’s motion to dismiss both because it concluded the plaintiffs lacked standing and because, in the alternative, it held that the plaintiffs had failed to overcome the pleading burden articulated by the Supreme Court in Iqbal. But the Third Circuit reversed on both fronts, holding that the plaintiffs’ allegations, if true, were more than enough to establish both that they had suffered an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy Article III standing, and that their equal protection and First Amendment claims were sufficiently plausible to satisfy Iqbal. To be sure, the Third Circuit’s decision is interlocutory — coming at a very preliminary stage in the litigation. But what I want to suggest in the post that follows is that, as much as any other post-September 11 judicial decision, Hassan represents the full-throated repudiation of the Supreme Court’s infamous World War II-era ruling in Korematsu v. United States that has been so long in coming — and so thoroughly overdue.
  • As I’ve written about before, Korematsu reflects two separate — but equally important — constitutional failures. The first failure was the internment policy itself, which we now know (and which the US government knew at the time) to have been a completely unnecessary — if not hysterical — overreaction to hyperbolic and (after Midway, at least) categorically overstated fears of a Japanese invasion of the West Coast. By itself, the camps were a dark stain on the history of civil liberties in the United States — albeit one of many, alas. But the second failure was, historically, the far more significant and unique one — the Supreme Court’s conscious constitutional rationalization of the internment policy, based upon a combination of naïveté on the Justices’ part and the affirmatively misleading (if not downright disingenuous) briefing by the federal government. As Justice Robert H. Jackson understood — and forcefully articulated — in his Korematsu dissent, the real violence to the “rule of law” resulting from the camps was thus not the underlying policy, but rather its validation by the Supreme Court. In his words, “a military commander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident. But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”
  • But we’ve struggled somewhat with the second constitutional failure. The courts have repudiated Korematsu’s conviction; the Office of the Solicitor General has confessed error for its role in perpetuating the government’s misleading case before the Supreme Court; and scholars have suggested that Korematsu itself has become part of the “anti-canon” — the class of Supreme Court decisions so reviled that they are cited, if at all, in support of the wrongness of their holdings. But Korematsu itself remains on the books, as do broader concerns that courts are still vulnerable to Korematsu — style reasoning, i.e., that the need to protect national security might provide legal justification for government conduct that would otherwise be unjustifiable. Indeed, one need look no further than the ongoing debate over the SSCI’s torture report for evidence of the Korematsu mentality being alive and well.
  • ...2 more annotations...
  • That’s why I find the Third Circuit’s analysis in Hassan so significant — not because it allows this particular civil suit to go forward, but because it does so based upon an explicit (and conscious) rejection of Korematsu — style legal reasoning. As Judge Ambro explains, “No matter how tempting it might be to do otherwise, we must apply the same rigorous standards even where national security is at stake. We have learned from experience that it is often where the asserted interest appears most compelling that we must be most vigilant in protecting constitutional rights.” And applying the strict judicial scrutiny that is triggered by government action deemed to be intentionally discriminatory on the basis of religious affiliation, the court proceeds to hold that the NYPD lacked a sufficiently compelling justification for such discriminatory treatment, because even if abstract claims of security necessity could be a compelling government interest, the NYPD’s alleged policy was far too overbroad to survive the narrow tailoring required by strict scrutiny. Thus, quoting directly from Justice Jackson’s Korematsu dissent, Judge Ambro closed his opinion by noting that “Our job is judicial. We ‘can apply only law, and must abide by the Constitution, or [we] cease to be civil courts and become instruments of [police] policy.'”
  • Faiza’s post provides far more detail on the specifics of the Third Circuit’s analysis, and the opinion itself is worth a read. For present purposes, though, it’s this mentality that I find so refreshing — that even when the government invokes the specter of September 11 and the need to prevent future acts of terrorism, courts will not abdicate their responsibility to scrutinize the government’s justifications with care, and to be especially wary of overbroad government programs carried out under the broad guise of “necessity.” Hassan certainly isn’t the first example of this kind of principled judicial decisionmaking in a post-September 11 counterterrorism suit, but it is the one that, at least in my view, most directly confronts — and rejects — the kind of deferential judicial review that was responsible for the second constitutional failure in Korematsu, and all of the pain that followed.
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Parvez Musharaf Dubai na ja sakey | Samaa Urdu News - 0 views

goo.gl/2g8JM9 urdu news DUBAI ECL Karachi parvezmusharraf SupremeCourt
shared by latesturdunews on 17 Mar 16 - No Cached
  • latesturdunews on 17 Mar 16
     
    اسلام آباد:عدالت کی جانب سے اجازت ملنے  کے باوجود سابق صدر پرویزمشرف بیرون ملک روانہ نہ ہو سکے۔ آل پاکستان مسلم لیگ کے ذرائع رات بھرمیڈیا کو پرویز مشرف کی روانگی سے متعلق اطلاع فراہم کرتے رہے لیکن...
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Mumkin hai ke sabiq saddar musharraf Pakistan wapas na ayen | Samaa Urdu News - 0 views

goo.gl/tjaoTU urdu news aitzazahsan ECL PERVEZMUSHARRAF SupremeCourt
shared by latesturdunews on 17 Mar 16 - No Cached
  • latesturdunews on 17 Mar 16
     
    اسلام آباد : سینیٹ میں قائد حزبِ اختلاف اعتزاز احسن نے عدالت کی جانب سے سابق صدر پرویز مشرف کو بیرونِ ملک سفر کی اجازت دینے پرحیرت کا اظہار کیا ہے، اعتزاز کا کہنا تھا کہ وہ وقت...
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Court to rule on cellphone privacy : SCOTUSblog - 0 views

www.scotusblog.com/...t-to-rule-on-cellphone-privacy surveillance state constitutional law 4th Amendment cellphone privacy
shared by Paul Merrell on 18 Jan 14 - No Cached
  • Moving into another conflict between technology and privacy, the Supreme Court agreed on Friday afternoon to rule on police authority to search the contents of a cellphone they take from an individual they have arrested.  The Court accepted for review a state case and a federal case, involving differing versions of hand-held telephone capacity.
  • Both of the new cases on cellphone privacy involve the authority of police, who do not have a search warrant, to examine the data that is stored on a cellphone taken from a suspect at the time of arrest.  The two cases span the advance in technology of cellphones:  the government case, Wurie, involves the kind of device that is now considered old-fashioned — the simple flip phone.  The Riley case involves the more sophisticated type of device, which functions literally as a hand-held computer, capable of containing a great deal more personal information. The state case involves a San Diego man, David Leon Riley, convicted of shooting at an occupied vehicle, attempted murder, and assault with a semi-automatic weapon.  Riley was not arrested at the time of the shooting incident in August 2009; instead, he was arrested later, after he was stopped for driving with expired license plates.   Police seized the cellphone he was carrying at the time of his arrest, and twice examined its contents, without a warrant. The data turned up evidence identifying him as a gang member out to kill members of a rival gang.  Other contents included a photo of him with a red car seen at the shooting site.  Police were then able to trace calls, leading to a trail of evidence pointing to Riley as a participant in the shooting.  No one positively identified him, but the data from the cellphone search was put before the jury, which convicted him of all three counts.  He has been sentenced to fifteen years to life in prison.
  • Riley’s petition had posed a general question about whether the Fourth Amendment allowed police without a warrant to search “the digital contents of an individual’s cellphone seized from the person at the time of arrest.”  In granting review, the Court said it would only rule on this issue: “Whether evidence admitted at [his] trial was obtained in a search of [his] cellphone that violated [his] Fourth Amendment rights.” The government case involves a South Boston man, Brima Wurie.  In 2007, a police officer saw him make an apparent drug sale out of his car.  The officer confronted the buyer, turning up two bags of crack cocaine. He partially identified his drug source. Officers followed Wurie from the scene, and arrested him.  He was then taken to a police station, where the officers retrieved two cellphones.   One of the phones was receiving repeated calls from a number identified as Wurie’s home.  The officers checked the phone’s call log.  They traced him to his house.  The officers deemed the fact that he had cellphones with him as an indication that he carried out drug dealing with the use of such a device. He was convicted of being a felon who had a gun and ammunition, distributing crack cocaine, and possessing the crack with intent to distribute it  He sought to block the use of the evidence taken from his cellphone, but that failed.  He was convicted on all charges, and has been sentenced to 262 months in prison.
  • ...1 more annotation...
  • Although the two cases raise the same constitutional issue, the Court did not consolidate them for review, so presumably there will be separate briefing and argument on each.  They probably would be argued one after the other, however.  The Court did not expedite the briefing schedule, but they still are expected to be heard in April.
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Court Rules Feds Need Warrant to Access Drug Prescriptions Database | American Civil Li... - 0 views

www.aclu.org/...-feds-need-warrant-access-drug surveillance state DEA prescriptions patient-records 4th Amendment warrant
shared by Paul Merrell on 14 Feb 14 - No Cached
  • In a significant win for the privacy rights of anyone who has ever gotten a drug prescription, a federal judge in Oregon ruled yesterday that the DEA needs a warrant to search confidential prescription records. Oregon, like 48 other states, has a Prescription Drug Monitoring Program (PDMP), which tracks patients’ prescriptions for medications used to treat a long list of sensitive medical conditions. Although Oregon law requires police to get a warrant from a judge before searching prescription records in the database, the DEA has been requesting records using administrative subpoenas, which do not involve judicial authorization or probable cause. After the State of Oregon sued the DEA over this practice, the ACLU and ACLU of Oregon joined the suit on behalf of four patients and a doctor in the state. Last month, we argued in court that the DEA is violating the Fourth Amendment by bypassing the Constitution’s warrant requirement when seeking private prescription records. Yesterday, the court agreed. The court’s ruling is the first time a judge has held that law enforcement must get a probable cause warrant to access confidential prescription records from a state database in a criminal investigation. The opinion is significant for several reasons.
  • First, the court soundly rejected the DEA’s extreme argument that people lose their Fourth Amendment privacy rights in their medical information when they engage in confidential discussions with their doctor and pharmacist about their illnesses and treatment decisions. The federal government had argued that the “third party doctrine” applied, comparing confidential prescription records to electricity consumption records, bank records, and other categories of information held by third-party companies, for which courts have said police don’t need a warrant. The judge batted this argument aside, explaining that prescription records are “more inherently personal or private than bank records, and are entitled to and treated with a heightened expectation of privacy.” As the court held: “Although there is not an absolute right to privacy in prescription information, as patients must expect that physicians, pharmacists, and other medical personnel can and must access their records, it is more than reasonable for patients to believe that law enforcement agencies will not have unfettered access to their records.” More importantly, this ruling fits into a series of recent opinions calling into question the continuing vitality of the third party doctrine in modern society. As Justice Sotomayor wrote in United States v. Jonestwo years ago, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties. This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks.” This sentiment was echoed by the federal judge who ruled last year that the NSA’s bulk telephone metadata program violates the Fourth Amendment. The Oregon case is another blow to the third party doctrine’s shaky foundation.
  • In addition, although yesterday’s ruling is only binding within Oregon, it will be persuasive precedent for courts evaluating law enforcement’s use of subpoenas to obtain private prescription records—and similar information—around the country. The case is a reminder to the DEA and other law enforcement agencies that they are not above the law, and that they must comply with the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement when seeking sensitive information in criminal investigations. Finally, the case should add momentum to a movement within state legislatures to amend PDMP statutes to require police to get a warrant for prescription records. Ten states currently require a warrant as a matter of state law (Rhode Island was the most recent state to add this requirement, last year). The Pennsylvania House has passed legislation creating a warrant requirement for that state’s PDMP, and is waiting for the state senate to act. The Florida legislature may update the privacy protections for its PDMP this year. Action by state legislatures will send a strong message to the DEA that it should be getting warrants everywhere, not just in Oregon.
  • Paul Merrell on 14 Feb 14
     
    A case to watch as it wends it way through the appellate process. A very big win for the ACLU, with major implications for federal intelligence gathering in general. 
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The NSA says it 'obviously' can track locations without a warrant. That's not so obvious. - 0 views

www.washingtonpost.com/...a-warrant-thats-not-so-obvious surveillance state NSA NSA-targets location-data constitutional law
shared by Paul Merrell on 05 Dec 13 - No Cached
  • In conversations with The Washington Post over Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani's recent story on cellphone location tracking, an intelligence agency lawyer told Gellman, "obviously there is no Fourth Amendment expectation in communications metadata.” But some experts say it's far from obvious that the 1979 Supreme Court case on which the administration bases this view gives the government unfettered power to scoop up Americans' cellphone location data.
  • And there's some reason to believe that a majority of the current Supreme Court justices might agree with her on the location data aspect of metadata. The most recent Supreme Court case involving location tracking, United States v. Jones was settled on narrow trespassing grounds in 2012. But five Supreme Court justices signed on to concurring opinions that questioned whether Smith v. Maryland holds up in the face of modern technology.  An opinion concurring in judgment with the Jones decision written by Justice Samuel Alito, and joined by Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer and Elena Kagan specifically noted the prevalence of smartphones and argued that "the use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy."
  • A separate concurring opinion from a fifth justice, Sonia Sotomayor made many of the same arguments, saying "fundamentally, it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties" -- and even went further by arguing that "awareness that the Government may be watching chills associational and expressive freedoms."
  • Paul Merrell on 05 Dec 13
     
    A Supreme Court majority also specifically reserved judgment on whether the principles of Smith v. Maryland would apply in cases involving dragnet surveillance, specifically referring to Smith, in the case of Amnesty International v. Clapper, last year. Both Amnesty Int'l  and Jones were decided before revelations of widespread NSA surveillance broke beginning in June, 2013. Since then, the mood of the nation has changed enormously, from ignorant to informed and mostly objecting.  That factor will weigh heavily in the Supreme Court's inevitable decision on whether dragnet seizure of call metadata is constitutional.   So it takes some chutzpah for government lawyers to claim that Smith v. Maryland authorized warrantless gathering of telephone metadata in the dragnet context where no single person is suspected of a crime. The Supreme Court has never so held. At stake: whether we become an Orwellian state.
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Supreme Court Says Phones Can't Be Searched Without a Warrant - NYTimes.com - 0 views

www.nytimes.com/...cellphones-search-privacy.html digital-privacy litigation U.S. cellphone-privacy NSA-reform
shared by Paul Merrell on 26 Jun 14 - No Cached
  • In a sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age, the Supreme Court on Wednesday unanimously ruled that the police need warrants to search the cellphones of people they arrest.While the decision will offer protection to the 12 million people arrested every year, many for minor crimes, its impact will most likely be much broader. The ruling almost certainly also applies to searches of tablet and laptop computers, and its reasoning may apply to searches of homes and businesses and of information held by third parties like phone companies.“This is a bold opinion,” said Orin S. Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University. “It is the first computer-search case, and it says we are in a new digital age. You can’t apply the old rules anymore.”
  • Paul Merrell on 26 Jun 14
     
    It is now beyond doubt that the Supreme Court is declining to authorize an Orwellian government surveillance future for the U.S. This sweeping, unanimous ruling definitely has broad application beyond cellphones, in no small part because the court recognized that cellphones of today are more like desktop computers and a host of other computerized devices than they are like the telephones of yesteryear. Hence, almost everything the court said afterward about the privacy rights in cellphones applies equally to all personal use computers. 
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Curbs on Surveillance State Urged | Consortiumnews - 1 views

consortiumnews.com/...bs-on-surveillance-state-urged surveillance state VIPS NSA-reform
shared by Paul Merrell on 06 Mar 15 - No Cached
  • In the post 9/11 era, the U.S. government vastly expanded its surveillance of nearly everyone on earth, even U.S. citizens, brushing aside constitutional protections in the name of security. A group of intelligence veterans urges reform of those practices to protect privacy and to stop the waste of resources. MEMORANDUM FOR: Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight BoardFROM: Veteran Intelligence Professionals for Sanity (VIPS)Subject: Two Administrations and Congress Dismantled the Constitution – How Can It Be Restored? Drastic Erosion of Citizen Privacy Since 9/11Since the events of September 11, 2001, actions by successive U.S. administrations – backed by legislation such as the Patriot Act and the FISA Amendments Act (FAA) – have eroded privacy provisions guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Lawsuits challenging these actions have languished, with the U.S. Supreme Court having declined to hear the one case to reach it for review, Clapper vs. Amnesty International.
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Great Privacy Essay: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance | CIO - 0 views

www.cio.com/...era-of-total-surveillance.html privacy the-Fourth-Amendment
shared by Gary Edwards on 04 Aug 14 - No Cached
  • Gary Edwards on 04 Aug 14
     
    "'Failing Expectations: Fourth Amendment Doctrine in the Era of Total Surveillance' is a thought-provoking essay written by a Fordham University law professor about how the reasonable expectation test for privacy is failing to protect us. Add into our networked world the third-party doctrine and we have little protection against unreasonable searches and seizures."
  • Paul Merrell on 05 Aug 14
     
    It doesn't detract substantially from the essay's central thesis, but an important part of the learned professor's heartfelt desires were delivered in a Supreme Court decision just decided, after the essay was published, Reilly v. California, http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-132_8l9c.pdf The Court held in relevant part: "We also reject the United States' final suggestion that officers should always be able to search a phone's call log, as they did in Wurie's case. The Government relies on Smithv. Maryland, 442 U. S. 735 (1979), which held that no warrant was required to use a pen register at telephone company premises to identify numbers dialed by a particular caller. The Court in that case, however, concluded that the use of a pen register was not a "search" at all under the Fourth Amendment. See id., at 745-746. There is no dispute here that the officers engaged in a search of Wurie's cell phone. Moreover, call logs typically contain more than just phone numbers; they include any identifying information that an individual might add, such as the label "my house" in Wurie's case." The effect there was to confine Smith v. Maryland, the foundation of the third-party doctrine, to its particular facts. In other words, the third-party doctrine is now confined to connected telephone numbers, the connect time, and the duration of the call. If any other metadata is gathered, such as location data, the third-party doctrine no longer applies. When you read the rest of the Reilly decision, you see a unanimous Supreme Court shooting down one government defense after another that have been used in the NSA's defense to mass telecommunications surveillance. But most interestingly, the Court unmistakably has laid the groundwork for a later decision drastically cutting back on digital surveillance without a search warrant based on particularized probable cause to believe that evidence of a specific crime has occurred and that the requested sear
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