The government nonetheless argues, and many courts have agreed, that OLC opinions are exempt from disclosure under FOIA because they are “deliberative” and “pre-decisional.” This assessment conflates two distinct decisions: the decision of an agency whether to adopt a course of conduct, and OLC’s decision regarding how to interpret the law. The latter decision may be one factor — along with other, non-legal factors, such as political viability, financial cost, and the existence of competing priorities — in the agency’s “deliberations” on the former. The agency ultimately must decide whether to move forward with a policy. But on the question of how the law should be interpreted, it is OLC, not the agency, which has the final word. If the agency were to issue a different legal interpretation, there is no question that OLC’s would take precedence, and the agency would be courting legal jeopardy by adopting a course of action in tension with OLC’s reading of the law.
Perhaps the solution is simply to require the government to abide by its own characterization. If OLC opinions are to be given the status of deliberative documents and/or legal advice, so be it; but in that case, they cannot be binding on any agency or official, nor can they mitigate any official’s criminal or civil liability (unless they genuinely negate a required state of mind). If, on the other hand, the government wishes to treat OLC opinions as authoritative and a shield against prosecution or civil suit, then they must be called what they are — law — and made available to the public. Until that happens, the public will remain a victim of secret law, and there will be no one but the administration to blame.