Documents 5A-B: Iraq through CIA Eyes after 9/11
A: Central Intelligence Agency, “The Iraq Threat,” 15 December 2001, SPWR [Senior Publish When Ready] 12501-07, Top Secret, excised copy
B: Central Intelligence Agency, Senior Executive Memorandum [SEM], “In Response to a query about the status of Iran’s nuclear program,” 11 January 2002, Top Secret, excised copy
Source: MDR request to CIA
These two high-level CIA assessments from late 2001 and early 2002 demonstrate the lack of solid intelligence regarding Iraq’s WMD programs during the run-up to the 2003 war in Iraq.[3] There was a marked gap between the empirical information which the CIA could report, and be certain about, and the threat assessments which analysts were tasked to produce. Worst-case outcomes are proposed, then quickly undermined by admitting the lack of any intelligence to support doomsday scenarios. “The worst case scenario is illicit acquisition of sufficient fissile material, uranium or plutonium, to allow Baghdad to produce a crude nuclear weapon within a year. CIA has not detected a dedicated Iraqi effort to obtain fissile material from another government or on the black market but Baghdad could be expected to entertain any offers it deems credible” [SEM].