In November 2007, the intelligence
community produced a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran’s nuclear
program. It confirmed that, as we suspected, Iran had operated a secret nuclear
weapons program in defiance of its treaty obligations. It also reported that,
in 2003, Iran
had suspended its covert effort to design a warhead – considered by some to be
the least challenging part of building a weapon. Despite the fact that Iran was testing missiles that could be used as
a delivery system and had announced its resumption of uranium enrichment, the
NIE opened with an eye-popping declaration: “We judge with high confidence that
in fall 2003, Tehran
halted its nuclear weapons program.”
The NIE’s
conclusion was so stunning that I felt certain it would immediately leak to the
press. As much as I disliked the idea, I decided to declassify the key findings
so that we could shape the news stories with the facts. The backlash was
immediate. Ahmadinejad hailed the NIE as “a great
victory.” Momentum for new sanctions
faded among the Europeans, Russians, and Chinese. As New York Times journalist David Sanger rightly put it, “The new
intelligence estimate relieved the international pressure on Iran – the same
pressure that the document itself claimed had successfully forced the country
to suspend its weapons ambitions.”
In January 2008, I took a trip to the
Middle East, where I tried to reassure leaders that we remained committed to
dealing with Iran.
Israel
and our Arab allies found themselves in a rare moment of unity. Both were
deeply concerned about Iran
and furious with the United
States about the NIE. In Saudi Arabia, I
met with King Abdullah and members of the Sudairi
Seven, the influential full brothers of the late King Fahd.
“Your Majesty, may I begin the
meeting?” I said. “I’m confident that every one of you believes that I wrote
the NIE as a way of avoiding taking action against Iran.”