Arab-spring

Gomaa's fatwas were consistent with historical Sunni views that regard revolution with scepticism, if not outright terror, at the prospect of public disorder. The mufti's stance of neutrality, meanwhile, alienated significant segments of the Egyptian population who expected him to take a much stronger stance against the unlawful conduct of the regime and its security forces

The various responses by religious leaders to the events of the Arab Spring suggest three distinct issues facing the role of religion and politics (particularly, the possibility of a more democratic politics) in the Arab World. First, the lack of institutional independence from strong regimes continues to undermine scholars' legitimacy. It is hard to believe, for example, that Qaradawi's stance regarding Bahrain was not influenced by the Gulf Cooperation Council's anti-Iran policies. This failure to be consistent, meanwhile, undermines his status as a moral voice in these times of uncertainty. Second, among traditional scholars, there remains a profound failure to understand the nature of the modern state and how it differs from the personal rule that characterized pre-modern states. Third, traditionalist scholars continue to view politics as something exogenous to the religious life, as if it were something that can safely be ignored without doing any damage to one's life as a Muslim.

the desire by virtually all political parties to use the religious establishment to further their political programs contradicts the desire to have an independent religious establishment that could be faithful to its own mission

To the extent that traditional scholars still cling to a conception of political rule that identifies legitimacy in the personal attributes of the ruler, they anachronistically promote the idea that good politics is the function of the virtuous ruler, rather than the modern notion that virtuous rule is the product of the right institutions.

the Arab Spring rejected the notion that one can live a virtuous private life untouched by an unjust and corrupt political sphere

If one accepts the proposition that the character of a regime profoundly affects everything produced within its domain, then it is no surprise that the authoritarianism of the last 50 years in the Arab World produced sterile and decadent religious as well as secular thought

Having lived through a succession of food-price shocks over the years, including the 30-per cent spike that triggered widespread protest in the spring of 2008, Egyptians simply don't want the government to shift the burden of price increases onto their shoulders. It's not so much the steady march of inflation that worries them as it is the wild week-to-week price swings that often occur.

Even if the government promised to raise cash payments annually to keep up with to the cost of living, he said: "I would not trust such a promise."

If Egyptians manage to wrest economic and political power from the oligarchs who have held it for so long, they will have a chance to protect their agricultural landscape and ensure a good food supply for everyone.

There are essentially no non-state institutions in the country. Saudi Arabia has not had trade unions since the 1950s, when the government banned them in the oil-rich province where the then-American oil company ARAMCO was based. Likewise, there are no legal political parties, youth associations, women’s organizations, or independent human rights organizations.

By intervening, the Saudis hoped not only to protect their Bahraini ally, but to split their internal opposition using sectarian politics. As the protests grew and the GCC deliberated, the Saudi official press peddled the regime’s line: an Iranian-Shia conspiracy was targeting the Sunni heartland. The champions of Sunni Islam would save the Gulf from the Iranian-Shia takeover. The Saudi regime proved not only to its subjects, but also to Western governments, a determination to crush protest and expel Iranian and Shia influence from the peninsula. The message to President Obama was to think twice before supporting democracy and human rights in the Arabian Peninsula. The message to Saudis was that critics would be tarred as traitors to the nation and enemies of the faith.

All local newspapers reported on it favorably.

Many in the younger generation are critical of the regime’s repressive gender policies, but they support its opposition to the Shia as alien, heretical, and loyal to Iran.

the “liberal press”—also officially controlled—published articles denouncing sectarianism. Liberal authors attacked sectarian preachers of hate and instead celebrated national unity, wataniyya. Not that these liberal authors favored political protest or close ties with the Shia. Rather, they offered Saudis an alternative discourse that still served the regime’s interests. With society divided between supposedly liberal intellectuals and hateful preachers, the regime confirms in the minds of people that it alone can broker between the fiercely opposed groups.

Protesters avoid arrest by supporting the king and demanding that bureaucrats respect his royal decrees. Anger is therefore channelled toward low-level civil servants without challenging the regime directly or insisting on royal intervention. As long as protests do not question the policies of senior members of the royal family, they are tolerated, perhaps to some extent welcomed as a means to vent public anger.

The press has dubbed the wave of small-scale demonstrations “protest fever.” Importantly, women are uniting in pursuit of their interests and rights, suggesting that this is the beginning of a civil rights movement. Saudi women have agitated before—in 1990 some were arrested for violating a driving ban—but the 2011 protests are different. At local and regional levels, women’s demands are more fundamental than before. They want employment, the right to vote in municipal elections, and freedom of speech.

When protesters agitate for the end of the regime, they are shown no mercy. As of this writing, seven demonstrators have been shot and killed by Saudi security forces. In the virtual world, government agents continue to use propaganda, counterarguments, and rumors against calls for protest.

should pressure start coming from the West, the Saudi regime knows how to exploit its allies’ weak spots: fear of terrorism and an insatiable appetite for oil and military contracts.

Digital activism will continue to provide an outlet to a population denied basic freedom. But with popular unrest largely under wraps and the West silent, the regime faces no threat in the short term.

The economic and social deprivation, political oppression, and corruption that triggered revolutions elsewhere are all present in Saudi Arabia, but these alone are not sufficient to precipitate an uprising. Saudi Arabia does not have trade unions—the majority of its working population is foreign, which has stunted the growth of organized labor—a women’s movement, or an active student population, three factors that helped to make protests in Tunis and Cairo successful. Elsewhere in the Arab world, in the absence of these important factors, revolt stumbled, turned violent, and could not progress without serious foreign intervention. Libya is a case in point.

where the state is the only institution that matters, effectively bringing people together offline may be impossible

Gebril stated that in Egypt constitutions were conventionally drawn by government appointed commissions and approved by the public in a referendum. However, for this to function well today, he argued, it was crucial to inform the public. Gebril purported that Islam did not reconcile with secularism. The moderator, Huveydi, challenged Gebril’s statement and indicated that it was possible to make secularism and Islam congruent as it was the case in Turkey. Gebril argued that the principles needed to accomplish a real democracy were present in the traditions of Egypt and Islamic world.

underlining the weaknesses of the characteristics of representative democracy of the 1924 constitution stated that the tutelary approach of 1960s was fortified with the 1982 Constitution. The present constitution could not meet the demands of the society

in Egypt and what needed to be discussed today was the role of military, place of religion and especially the balance of powers.

since it could not be based on one group’s interests and opinions, it had to be structured in a way that would include and protect minorities in the political mechanism. Stating that secularism did not always bring democracy, it was argued that the important thing was the presence of democracy and that ways to reconcile universal values with local conditions had to be sought without resorting to reactionarism..

more towards strengthening the democratization process in Turkey, and he argued that this approach carried the potential to reverse the homogenous nation building process, decrease the power of tutelage regime and widen the political field. Ete concluded his analysis with two observations: 1. Turkey’s history of democracy was full of instances in which the authoritarian regime regenerated itself. 2. Decisive steps must be taken in the struggle for democracy

Abd Rabou specifically emphasized four different dimensions of the change in Egypt: democratization; institutionalization and formation of democratic organizations; free elections and the transformation of political culture

Demirel, who found the simplification of arguments to to authoritarian regime vs. democratic public problematic, argued that the authoritarian tendencies of the public also had to be heeded. Demirel argued that the advances made in civil-military relations in the recent years were not yet solidified in the political life and a regression back to military rule was still a possibility.

Reiterating that the retreat of the military did not necessarily signal the end of the tutelage regime, Demirel argued that it was still probable to regress into complete tutelage especially in the context of the Kurdish problem. He ended his speech by issuing a warning against the threats to civil rights and freedoms from the political powers.

this revolution toppled the foundations of the Sykes-Picot order. He objected the perceptions of the revolution as the new Sykes-Picot order. In other words, he opposed the idea the revolution and its aftermath were imposed on the region by external powers. He insisted the post revolution was a period in which the region decided on its own fate in accordance with the changing dynamics. In parallel to other participants, he argued this was the first time an Arab individual claimed his own destiny. He further claimed that in this process, in which the driving force is a quest for dignity, regional politics will be determined by internal dynamics and stated that the region will be changed to the extent the revolution maintains its momentum.

Iran and Turkey were the beneficiaries of this new order.

in both Turkey and Egypt an approach that perceived the making of the new constitution as an instrument to limit the power of the ruling regime instead of a process that reflected the current distribution of power in the country

such a constitutional culture and such a constitutional system that protects human rights by striking a balance between universal and local values will contribute to the resolution of minority problem in Egypt and identity issues in Turkey.