Action (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy) - 0 views
-
intentionally
-
Should we think of the consequences, conventional or causal, of physical behavior as constituents of an action distinct from but ‘generated by’ the movement? Or should we think that there is a single action describable in a host of ways?
- ...22 more annotations...
-
there have been many attempts to map the relations between intentions for the future, acting intentionally, and acting with a certain intention.
-
There has been a notable or notorious debate about whether the agent's reasons in acting are causes of the action
-
It is frequently noted that the agent has some sort of immediate awareness of his physical activity and of the goals that the activity is aimed at realizing.
-
It is also important to the concept of ‘goal directed action’ that agents normally implement a kind of direct control or guidance over their own behavior.
-
For many years, the most intensely debated topic in the philosophy of action concerned the explanation of intentional actions in terms of the agent's reasons for acting
-
Davidson and other action theorists defended the position that reason explanations are causal explanations
-
In the foregoing, reference has been made to explanations of actions in terms of reasons, but recent work on agency has questioned whether contemporary frameworks for the philosophy of action have really articulated the way in which an agent's desires and other pro-attitudes have the distinctive force of reasons in the setting of these ordinary explanations