Page 1
929
DIALOGUE
Cognitive Processes Shaped by the
Impulse to Blame
Joshua Knobe
†
In his incisive and thought-provoking paper "Cognitive
Foundations of the Impulse to Blame," Lawrence Solan points
to a surprising fact about the cognitive processes underlying
attributions of blame.
1
This surprising fact is that almost all of
the processes that we use when trying to determine whether or
not a person is blameworthy are also ones that we sometimes
use even when we are not even considering the issue of blame.
2
Only a very small amount of processing is used exclusively
when we are interested in questions of blame.
This point can be made vivid with a simple example.
Suppose that we witness a terrible accident and then assign an
investigator to answer the question: "Why did this accident
occur?" This investigator spends many months gathering
evidence, formulating hypotheses, and considering arguments
of various types. Finally, he comes back with a definite
answer. And now suppose we tell him that we also want an
answer to a second question, namely: "Was anyone to blame for
this accident?" The investigator probably won't have to spend
another few months answering this new question. It appears
that almost all of the work has already been done; the
investigator can simply take the results he has already
obtained, do a little extra thinking, and come up with an
answer.
†
Princeton University. I am grateful to Lawrence Solan and Gilbert
Harman for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse of Blame, 68
B
ROOK
. L. R
EV
. 1003 (2003).
2
Id. at 1004.
Page 2
930
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 71:2
Solan provides support for this initial intuition through
a sophisticated analysis of the cognitive processes that underlie
attributions of blame. Specifically, he shows that attributions
of blame rely in a crucial way on judgments about mental states
and about causal relations.
3
He then shows that we would
have made
Page 1
929
DIALOGUE
Cognitive Processes Shaped by the
Impulse to Blame
Joshua Knobe
†
In his incisive and thought-provoking paper "Cognitive
Foundations of the Impulse to Blame," Lawrence Solan points
to a surprising fact about the cognitive processes underlying
attributions of blame.
1
This surprising fact is that almost all of
the processes that we use when trying to determine whether or
not a person is blameworthy are also ones that we sometimes
use even when we are not even considering the issue of blame.
2
Only a very small amount of processing is used exclusively
when we are interested in questions of blame.
This point can be made vivid with a simple example.
Suppose that we witness a terrible accident and then assign an
investigator to answer the question: "Why did this accident
occur?" This investigator spends many months gathering
evidence, formulating hypotheses, and considering arguments
of various types. Finally, he comes back with a definite
answer. And now suppose we tell him that we also want an
answer to a second question, namely: "Was anyone to blame for
this accident?" The investigator probably won't have to spend
another few months answering this new question. It appears
that almost all of the work has already been done; the
investigator can simply take the results he has already
obtained, do a little extra thinking, and come up with an
answer.
†
Princeton University. I am grateful to Lawrence Solan and Gilbert
Harman for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
1
Lawrence M. Solan, Cognitive Foundations of the Impulse of Blame, 68
B
ROOK
. L. R
EV
. 1003 (2003).
2
Id. at 1004.
Page 2
930
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
[Vol. 71:2
Solan provides support for this initial intuition through
a sophisticated analysis of the cognitive processes that underlie
attributions of blame. Specifically, he shows that attributions
of blame rely in a crucial way on judgments about mental states
and about causal relations.
3
He then shows that we would
have made