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Ed Webb

Iran cuts access to Facebook as election looms - Yahoo! News - 0 views

  • TEHRAN, Iran – Iran has blocked access to Facebook, prompting government critics on Sunday to condemn the move as an attempt to muzzle the opposition ahead of next month's presidential election
Ed Webb

Mohammad Khatami, a Former President, Criticizes Iran's Government - NYTimes.com - 0 views

  • opposition leaders — much like their hard-line foes — are girding supporters for a long-term battle to be waged as much through ideas and quiet social organizing as through the public protests that followed Iran’s disputed presidential election on June 12. Both Mr. Khatami and members of the group he addressed, the Islamic Society of University Professors, expressed deep concerns about threats to academic freedom in the coming school year. On Saturday, after days of calls by conservatives to purge Iran’s universities of professors and curriculums deemed “un-Islamic,” the government announced the start of a high-level investigation on how the humanities are taught.
  • a “soft war” against internal enemies. Anyone in the field of culture must now recognize important distinctions between “friends and enemies,” “attack and defense” and “explanation and propaganda,”
  • He warned that the West, with its sophisticated media outlets, is better equipped for soft war than Iran.
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  • like his conservative counterparts, Mr. Moussavi also spoke of the need to deepen his movement with a “social approach, not only a political approach.” And he suggested that the opposition movement, despite its apparent weakness in the face of arrests, trials and intimidation, had won substantial moral victories.“Despite the regretful, bitter developments of recent days,” Mr. Moussavi wrote, “people now have timeless convictions that are miles more important than the election of one man.”
Ed Webb

The West should focus on North Africa - 0 views

  • This week, Algeria's president, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, will compete for a third term in office. Unlike in 2004, Mr. Bouteflika will run virtually uncontested. The opposition is boycotting because, according to two-time presidential contender Said Saadi, the elections are a "nihilistic folly." Indeed, Bouteflika is only able to run because he engineered a constitutional amendment abolishing term limits.
  • Disturbingly, the Algerian experience appears to be echoing across North Africa. In Tunisia, where elections are slated for the fall, President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali's political style remains highly authoritarian. The US State Department 2008 Human Rights Report, for example, expressed dismay at the "severe restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association" reflected in Mr. Ben Ali's approval ratings. Even in Morocco, where King Mohammad VI has some popular legitimacy, record lows in voter turnouts in 2007 suggest increased apathy and disillusionment with the voting process.
  • While the departure of Ben Ali and Bouteflika may not be imminent, in the absence of legitimate institutions, successors will enter their offices with even less credibility and historical legitimacy, potentially fueling further disaffection.
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  • In these countries, the US must take concrete measures to promote human rights and reform. In conjunction with European partners, a far more detailed and extensive program of scholarships, technical expertise assistance, civic education, English language programs, and other development programs should be offered to Tunisia and Algeria. Such efforts must be teamed with further impetus on economic regional cooperation and forward movement on the Western Sahara conflict. It is now time for a policy that takes into account the region's stability issues and makes all of North Africa into a development partner, rather than a potential time bomb, and ensures that having an election season actually means something.
Ed Webb

Not all Egyptians are dancing | Middle East Eye - 0 views

  • Egyptians were promised a day off during the second election day and plenty of song and dance. So heavy was the presence of paid bands and dancers, that some commentators noted that the number of those who were employed to provide an atmosphere of entertainment near polling stations outnumbered the actual voters.
  • a song by a popular Emirati singer Hussain al-Jesmi calling on Egyptians to vote was welcomed by the pro-military media, which also made it sure it was more than sufficiently aired
  • groups that boycotted the elections felt compelled to make parodies of the song using different lyrics
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  • The boycott camp also released a (more serious) song that denounces military rule, entitled A 7 A, an abbreviation interpreted to mean 'I will object'
Ed Webb

The Dashed Hopes of the Tunisian Revolution: Complicity between Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda - 0 views

  • While Tunisians are often told that theirs is the only revolution that remains from the "Arab Spring," they know full well that its goals have not been achieved.
  • Béji Caïd Essebsi has always rejected a democratic process within the party he founded in 2012--the party that carried him to the highest office. At the end of the party's congress held in Sousse on 9 and 10 January, the party appointed Caïd Essebsi's son to succeed him as party leader
  • Béji Caïd Essebsi has always rejected a democratic process within the party he founded in 2012--the party that carried him to the highest office. At the end of the party's congress held in Sousse on 9 and 10 January, the party appointed Caïd Essebsi's son to succeed him as party leader,
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  • after co-opting the leaders of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (DCR) into his party, Caïd Essebi revived all the methods of the previous regime
  • after co-opting the leaders of Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali's Democratic Constitutional Rally (DCR) into his party, Caïd Essebi revived all the methods of the previous regime
  • Not content with confusing past and present, in the name of national unity, the old statesman chose to make Ennahda's leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, the guest of honor at the congress. Yet, Nidaa Tounes was founded precisely in opposition to the Islamist party, and Nidaa Tounes voters have not forgotten the insults heaped upon their rivals during the 2014 election campaign
  • Not content with confusing past and present, in the name of national unity, the old statesman chose to make Ennahda's leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, the guest of honor at the congress. Yet, Nidaa Tounes was founded precisely in opposition to the Islamist party, and Nidaa Tounes voters have not forgotten the insults heaped upon their rivals during the 2014 election campaign.
  • The politicians who have taken turns governing the country all seem to have forgotten that it was economic demands that sparked the initial uprising
  • Beji Caïd Essebsi came up with a law meant to promote economic reconciliation. Ostensibly, the idea was to favor investments by restoring confidence. In fact, it was meant to suspend the prosecution of business executives for fraudulent activities under the Ben Ali regime
  • Politically, the country is witnessing a massive return to conservatism. The two biggest parties--Nidaa Tounes and Ennahda--have commandeered the multi-party system, which was accepted after the revolution. This takeover recreates the pre-revolutionary political landscape, except that Ennahda is no longer underground. And this conservatism goes hand in hand with measures at odds with article 2 of the Constitution, which guarantees individual freedom. New laws against homosexuality and the use of cannabis allow police to humiliate youngsters before jailing them.
  • eo-authoritarianism, societal conservatism, and a general moralizing mood all seem much to the liking of Ennahda, which is now a full-fledged partner of the party that outstripped it in the 2014 elections
  • While the president's party has become the main instrument for “recycling” politicians ousted in 2011, the phenomenon has become so banal that the press, and particularly television, is happy to do their share. And a number of high-ranking figures from the old regime are regularly invited to debate on television. In the name of freedom of speech, they give sober accounts of their participation in the governing bodies, speak of Ben Ali's timid personality, and claim that he loved his people so much that he can scarcely be called a dictator
  • civil society is showing signs of fatigue
Ed Webb

U.S. Cancels Journalist's Award Over Her Criticism of Trump - Foreign Policy - 0 views

  • a Finnish investigative journalist, has faced down death threats and harassment over her work exposing Russia’s propaganda machine long before the 2016 U.S. presidential elections. In January, the U.S. State Department took notice, telling Aro she would be honored with the prestigious International Women of Courage Award, to be presented in Washington by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. Weeks later, the State Department rescinded the award offer. A State Department spokesperson said it was due to a “regrettable error,” but Aro and U.S. officials familiar with the internal deliberations tell a different story. They say the department revoked her award after U.S. officials went through Aro’s social media posts and found she had also frequently criticized President Donald Trump.
  • There is no indication that the decision to revoke the award came from the secretary of state or the White House. Officials who spoke to FP have suggested the decision came from lower-level State Department officials wary of the optics of Pompeo granting an award to an outspoken critic of the Trump administration.
  • the incident underscores how skittish some officials—career and political alike—have become over government dealings with vocal critics of a notoriously thin-skinned president.
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  • lower-level officials self-censor dealings with critics of the administration abroad
  • “The reality in which political decisions or presidential pettiness directs top U.S. diplomats’ choices over whose human rights work is mentioned in the public sphere and whose is not is a really scary reality.”
  • She often debunks misinformation spread online and comments on major news events related to propaganda and election interference, including Brexit and the ongoing investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller into links between the Russian government and Trump’s campaign. She has regularly tweeted criticism about Trump’s sharp political rhetoric and attacks on the press
  • After first being notified she would get the award, Aro filled out forms and questionnaires at the request of officials and cancelled paid speaking engagements to travel to Washington to attend the March 7 ceremony in Washington. The State Department also sent her an official invitation to accept the award and planned an itinerary for a corresponding tour of the United States, complete with flights and high-profile visits to newspapers and universities across the country.
  • In 2014, Aro pursued reporting on a Russian troll factory in St. Petersburg that aimed to alter western public opinions. Long before the U.S. elections in 2016, which propelled Russian disinformation campaigns to the spotlight, she unearthed evidence of a state-sanctioned propaganda machine trying to shape online discourse and spread disinformation. After she published her investigation, Russian nationalist websites and pro-Moscow outlets in Finland coordinated smear campaigns against her, accusing her at times of being a Western intelligence agent and drug dealer, and bombarding her with anonymous abusive messages. She also received death threats.
  • reserved the right to seek damages, due to Aro having to cancel paid speaking events
Ed Webb

Algeria's Bouteflika will not seek fifth term, delays elections | News | Al Jazeera - 0 views

  • 's President Abdelaziz Bouteflika has said he will not seek a fifth term and announced the delay of the country's presidential polls amid mass protests against his reelection bid.
  • elections would follow a national conference on political and constitutional reform to be carried out by the end of 2019
  • government reshuffle would also take place soon. According to APS, Prime Minister Ahmed Ouyahia had already resigned
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  • weeks of mass demonstrations against Bouteflika's plan to extend his 20-year rule
  • "All eyes are on the army now. Is the army going to let new protests to happen next Friday?... With Bouteflika aside, the army is going to have its say as to what kind of position they will accept." "Now it seems the regime of Bouteflika is done but [the question is] are we going to get back the state civilly without... any pressure on all these people who have been using the state for their interest for so long? "If we look at the Tunisian transition for example, we saw that  we could not avoid having the old elite come back, but they did so through new institutions; it was more or less easier for people to control this outcome."
Ed Webb

Thread by @AnshelPfeffer - 0 views

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    Analysis of controversial Israel election ad viewable here: https://twitter.com/BarakRavid/status/1107747463631388673
Ed Webb

Upcoming elections could make or break Tunisia's fledgling free press - Committee to Protect Journalists - 0 views

  • Tunisia has secured greater press freedom than many of the Arab Spring countries, but local journalists told CPJ that with elections slated for this year, challenges including funding, transparency, and government pressure remain
  • Despite a ban on foreign funding, many of the independent journalists who spoke with CPJ said they believe Gulf money is secretly pouring in to campaigns, although they often lack the means to expose it. Businessmen and politicians are also using privately owned media companies and the government is harnessing public broadcasters to further their political agendas.
  • Broadcast regulator HAICA (the Independent High Authority of Audiovisual Communication) pulled the license of privately owned TV channel Nesma in July 2018, for pushing the political agenda of its owner Nabil Karoui, who planned to run for president. Police raided the station in April, but the channel is still on the air, only without a license
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  • Journalists speak privately of money from the United Arab Emirates flowing to establishment politicians and funds from Qatar to Islamists but there is little published evidence of this.
  • Money still talks loudly in Tunisia where unemployment is officially above 15 percent and many journalists are paid badly.
  • Reporters are hampered in their watchdog role by the government too, especially if they cover national security or police beats. In January last year, Interior Minister Lotfi Brahem admitted during a parliamentary hearing that Tunisian journalists were monitored and that he had even authorized the wiretapping of a French journalist covering unrest.
  • Tunisia has a world class right to information law on the books but Mekki said her attempts to get the Interior Ministry to disclose details of travel bans imposed on hundreds of young Tunisians have been stonewalled
  • a lack of transparency around media ownership, undisclosed campaign contributions to candidates and the use of public resources and public media by the current government to promote partisan agendas are challenges to independent media coverage.
  • "In Tunisia we have a unique situation where we have a weak government, weak political parties but strong civil society, which can work to guarantee the democratic transition overall and with that, press freedom gains,"
Ed Webb

RTL Today - Turkey introduces jail terms for 'fake news' - 0 views

  • Turkey's parliament on Thursday approved a tough pre-election law that could see reporters and social media users jailed for up to three years for spreading "fake news".
  • cement the government's already-firm grip on the media eight months before a general election that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan enters trailing in the polls.
  • The Council of Europe said the measure's vague definition of "disinformation" and accompanying threat of jail could have a "chilling effect and increased self-censorship, not least in view of the upcoming elections in June 2023".
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  • furiously opposed by Turkey's main opposition groups
  • One lawmaker from the secular CHP party smashed his mobile phone with a hammer in parliament to demonstrate how freedom of expression was being destroyed -- particularly for the young."I would like to address my brothers who are 15, 16, 17 years old and who will be deciding the fate of Turkey in 2023," CHP lawmaker Burak Erbay said before taking out his hammer."You have only one freedom left -- the phone in your pocket. There's Instagram, YouTube, Facebook. You communicate there," he said ahead of the vote."If the law here passes in parliament, you can break your phone like this," he said.
  • Most Turkish newspapers and television channels fell under the control of government officials and their business allies during a sweeping crackdown that followed a failed coup in 2016.
  • Turkey used the threat of heavy penalties to force giants such as Facebook and Twitter to appoint local representatives who can quickly comply with local court orders to take down contentious posts
  • The new legislation imposes a criminal penalty for those found guilty of spreading false or misleading information.It requires social networks and internet sites to hand over personal details of users suspected of "propagating misleading information".
  • Turkey was ranked 149th out of 180 countries in the annual media freedom index published by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) earlier this year."Authoritarianism is gaining ground in Turkey, challenging media pluralism," RSF said. "All possible means are used to undermine critics."
Ed Webb

Jadaliyya - 0 views

  • At the heart of the regime’s responses to these pressures is the “National Dialogue.” The Dialogue, which kicked off last May, is a vaguely conceived multi-track forum in which a host of carefully selected political figures and experts convene periodically to discuss public policy reforms. The political leadership has marketed this initiative to its international and domestic detractors as a testament to its readiness to engage opponents and alternative viewpoints. In reality, the Dialogue is the regime’s attempt at gaslighting critics
  • the spectacle (as opposed to the outcome) of deliberation is the clear driver of this initiative
  • by early 2023, the regime had decimated the resources it now needed to erect a convincing façade of participatory politics to mitigate the concerns of its international partners and to absorb popular discontent
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  • The very existence of the Dialogue underscores the extent to which Sisi has managed to lock himself in a corner after spending much of the past decade destroying all forms of managed dissent and limited pluralism, once a staple of the previous authoritarian order.
  • the July 2013 coup proceeded on the ruins of the “civilian punching bag” model of 2012-13. The latter describes a tacit arrangement in which the military was poised to pursue its interests from behind a civilian interlocutor (or, a “punching bag”), the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party—an arrangement that ended in utter failure. By 2013, therefore, the military’s appetite for working in collaboration with civilian parties had run its course.
  • the reinvention of Mubarak-style dominant party rule was not an appealing option for Sisi in 2014.
  • “the New Youth Project” or NYP for short. The NYP describes a host of formal and informal initiatives and programs that, collectively, seek to cultivate a new cadre of youth politicians and public servants socialized around military-centric nationalism
  • a broader effort the political leadership is undertaking to inject into public institutions a broad-based ideological commitment to the military-dominated political order
  • a pervading discourse senior officials and pro-regime figures have propagated in the past few years under the banner of “the battle of consciousness” (معركة الوعي). Behind this rather eerie term is a narrative claiming that Egypt’s most pressing national security concern is the spread of misinformation and ideational attacks against society’s so-called core values. The implication of course is that any expression of dissent, criticism of government performance, or questioning of state-provided information is a suspected attempt to foment instability and undermine Egypt’s social peace. The solution, the story goes, is countering such “false consciousness” by promoting public awareness of these threats and by enlisting more patriots in the “battle of consciousness.”
  • the Sisi regime has been pursuing a broad-scoped project to ideologically militarize civilian spheres and to inculcate all sectors of Egyptian society with ideas rationalizing blind support for the military-sponsored regime
  • the politicians who have been coached to impress the crowd by their confident demeanor, their captivating TED Talk public speaking style, and their superficial use of catchy phrases that borrow (albeit superficially) from the language of scientific research. Most importantly, they have been socialized to accept the supremacy of the military such that they would never question the men in uniform, as was the case with the contentious youth activists who often denigrated officers in public forums and protests between 2011 and 2013
  • a consistent strategy Sisi has adopted whenever frustrated with the ineffectiveness or the bureaucratic resistance of state institutions: the creation of parallel structures to bypass these institutions altogether. Thus, today one finds a host of bodies and offices Sisi formed over the years and that seemingly replicate the roles of existing government ministries. Examples include the Supreme Council for Investment, the Supreme Council for Combatting Terrorism, the Supreme Council for the Automotive Industry, and, currently under study, the Supreme Council for Education. Whereas the office of the minister of health still exists officially, a presidential advisor for health affairs (a former minister of health himself), appointed by Sisi in 2020, has taken a visible role in explaining and defending state health policies, just like a minister of health would.
  • Mustaqbal Watan Party (MWP). MWP was once the embodiment of Sisi’s dream of a new generation of pro-military youth politicians who could lead Egypt’s post-2013 political scene. After several wake-up calls, the regime was forced to restructure the party so that “Sisi’s youth” could step aside to accommodate a larger role for the older and more seasoned networks and affiliates of the Mubarak regime—the same actors the president once sought to sideline. These transformations underscore the inherent limitations of the NYP and the idea that Sisi, despite all the power and resources he possessed, had to forge compromises with the once-dreaded traditional political classes, even if at the expense of his own coveted project.
  • observers were aware that MWP was among the political parties the intelligence establishment created and funded to promote the Sisi presidency. Nevertheless, Sisi kept an official distance from the party, avoiding any insinuation that Mustaqbal Watan represents the wielders of power in any formal sense. This policy was partly shaped by Sisi’s aforementioned skepticism of political parties and his interest in engineering the political field from a distance
  • there was more to Sisi’s apprehension toward the Mubarakists than appeasing the January 25thers or deflecting criticism. On a more fundamental level, Sisi was keeping a watchful eye on presidential hopeful Ahmed Shafik, former Air Force general and Mubarak’s last prime minister, who ran for president in 2012 and lost to Morsi in a tight runoff. Even though Shafik opted (rather grudgingly) not to run for president in 2014 after it became clear Sisi was the state’s chosen candidate and trying to challenge him was pointless, his supporters did not relent.
  • The idea of former Mubarakists banding together outside the state’s purview[3] was (and remains) an alarming prospect for Sisi for multiple reasons. They are proficient in mobilizing supporters in elections and have a long experience in the business of setting up vote-buying machines. More than any other civilian player, they can work collaboratively with security agencies. Most significantly, if organized sufficiently, they have what it takes to offer Sisi’s international allies and domestic constituents the same deal he offers them: a stable authoritarian project accommodating the various geostrategic, political, and economic imperatives the Sisi regime claims to protect
  • In early 2021, over half of MWP’s Central Secretariat members had ties to the NDP (compared to a quarter in 2016), and so did two thirds of its provincial leaders. This reality stood in stark contrast to the state of affairs inside Mustaqbal Watan during its founding years, when a younger group of political outsiders were running the show. Interestingly, by 2021, only two of Mustaqbal Watan’s 2014 founding signatories enjoyed posts in the party’s Central Secretariat, which now featured a completely different cadre of politicians.
  • lawmakers voted down by a wide margin the president’s highly coveted civil service bill, among the reforms reportedly “encouraged” by the International Monetary Fund at the time
  • in the fall of 2019, the president decided to put an end to this disarray, ordering a freeze on parliament’s operations, nearly a year before the next legislative elections were due.
  • The lead-up to the 2018 vote confirmed in many ways Sisi’s intolerance of any political competition, even to the most limited degree. He went to great lengths to eliminate all presidential contenders by any means possible: imprisonment, intimidation, violence, and dubious legal measures. Left to his own devices, Sisi would have run unchallenged. Pressured by Washington, however, he ultimately agreed to let one of his own political cheerleaders, Moussa Mostafa Moussa, run against him in what proved to be an unconvincing (even if lighthearted) episode of political theater, with Sisi winning 97 percent of the votes.
Ed Webb

Back to the future for Egypt's state media - News - Aswat Masriya - 1 views

  • The presence of Republican Guards in the studios of state broadcasting headquarters on Wednesday, the day the army staged its takeover, was an early sign that state media would reprise their traditional role as loyal servants of a military-backed administration.
  • Within hours of commander-in-chief General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi broadcasting the announcement that Mursi had been removed and the constitution suspended, authorities shut down four private television stations controlled by Islamists.
  • Even before the takeover, Nile TV, one of two state channels, had begun airing video montages of triumphant soldiers performing their duties to the strains of patriotic music.
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  • The day after Mursi's removal, Nile TV and state radio suddenly hosted studio guests who railed against the Brotherhood as "enemies of the people" and cast Islamist supporters of the elected president as instigators of violence.
  • "Every editor-in-chief at national newspapers is treading water, waiting for the new regime and its policies to crystallise and taking into account that the armed forces have a stance to be reckoned with," Attiya Eissawi, managing editor at state-run Al-Ahram told Reuters.
  • "Many of them expect to be replaced if their new editorial policies are not to the satisfaction of the new regime."
  • 52 senior executives and editors at Al-Ahram, including the chairman of the company, which is also a publisher and houses a policy think-tank, have been axed since the fall of Mubarak and the election of Mursi
  • rights activists and journalists say the toppled leader tried to use government-owned channels and papers to his own advantage as his predecessors had done, only less successfully
  • State-employed journalists went on strike to demand the removal of Mursi's information minister, Salah Abdel-Maqsoud.In May, radio journalists stopped work in protest when the top editor of state radio was transferred to a small station covering youth affairs and sports, after the minister deemed a Radio Misr broadcast insulting to the president.
  • Al-Akhbar, one of the biggest, accused the Brotherhood of meddling and incompetence in a front-page editorial by the editor-in-chief the week before the mass anti-Mursi protests that gave popular support for the army's action.A journalist at al-Ahram told Reuters that phone calls from the military and the security services regarding news coverage had been the norm before Mubarak's fall."This time, they don't need to," the journalist said, citing huge popular support for the military's toppling of Mursi.
  • Since the Islamist channels were silenced, coverage of large protests by Mursi supporters against his removal have been scarce on state TV and at times completely absent on private satellite channels that fiercely opposed the Brotherhood.
  • "Unfortunately, the Egyptian media is only presenting one picture of what's happening now. It's the picture of those who want the military government," said Abdel Aziz Mujaahed, one of 29 Mubasher Misr staff members, including the station's general manager, who were arrested on Wednesday.
  • The Muslim Brotherhood's political arm said the state-owned printing press refused to print its newspaper - Freedom and Justice - for two days after Mursi's removal, but the paper was back on some newsstands on Saturday.A military source acknowledged restricting publication because the paper planned to splash an article, which he said was untrue, alleging that the army was split and a major unit remained loyal to Mursi.
Ed Webb

Survey reveals growing public apprehension over democratic process - 1 views

  • almost half of respondents (49.9 percent) said the government is moving toward an authoritarian and repressive style of governance, while 36 percent said the government is progressing on further democratization; 14.2 percent did not respond or said they do not have any opinion on that issue
  • 49.7 percent of respondents said they have no concerns about revealing their political views, while 46.7 percent said they are worried about expressing their views
  • the public's support for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) has come down some 11 percent in June 2013 compared to the same month a year ago, while the popularity of Erdoğan took a blow with a 7 percent drop in his popularity in just a month. Most people see Erdoğan's tone as harsh and confrontational. The government's Syrian policy remains unpopular as well
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  • AK Party is still the most popular party among the electorate, and if elections were held tomorrow, it would still lead the polls
  • Government claims that external forces, terror groups, provocateurs and social media actually instigated protests were not found to be credible by most respondents. Only 3.2 percent of respondents said unidentified external or internal powers were behind the protests, while 1.8 percent said provocateurs and instigators provoked the protests. Those who believe media or social media were behind the incidents ranked lowest in the survey with 0.6 percent.
  • a majority of those who said they voted for the ruling AK Party were against the building plans; 41.6 percent of people who voted for the AK Party in the June 2011 elections said they opposed the government plans, while 38.3 of AK Party supporters said they favor the plans
  • 62.1 percent of respondents said the media did not cover events fairly
  • The majority of those surveyed also said they believe the press is not free in Turkey, with 53.3 percent versus 41.1 percent.
  • 54.2 percent saying that they oppose the Syrian policy, while only 27.4 percent favor the government position
  • Half of surveyed individuals (49.9 percent) were against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's staying in power, however, while only 6.2 percent said they favored him staying; 43.9 percent said they did not care about Assad's prospects one way or another
  • Almost 43 percent said Turkey should not switch to a presidential system, with 30.9 percent declaring their support for a presidential system. In April polling data by MetroPOLL, support for a presidential system was 35.2 percent
  • 41.7 percent said Turkey needs a new political party
  • 72.5 percent of the respondents said they like President Abdullah Gül most among existing political figures. Gül was followed by Erdoğan with 53.5 percent, Kılıçdaroğlu 26.7 percent and Devlet Bahçeli 29.3 percent. Erdoğan lost almost 7 percentage points from the April poll conducted by MetroPOLL
  • The margin of error for the overall poll is 2 percentage points, and the confidence level is 95 percent
Ed Webb

Iranian activist lauds rise of 'citizen journalism' in Iran - Al-Monitor: the Pulse of the Middle East - 1 views

  • If he can improve the foreign relations, then the possible outcomes could be the removal or the reduction of sanctions. This leads to more investment opportunities that will result in more employment opportunities and improve those industries currently operating at a very limited level. Foreign policy is the first priority for this administration. Cultural and political progress is the next step. It is natural that Rouhani is putting all his effort and energy into solving this issue. However, the ministers, especially the minister of culture and Islamic guidance, have also tried to improve things. For example, through the Press Supervisory Board, they have issued licenses for several publications, although they were unsuccessful in obtaining a license for the two newspapers Neshat and Ham-Mihan and other political publications with ties to the Reformist movement. They have also tried to obtain the license that would allow both the Islamic Iran Participation Front [one of the main Reformist political groups] and the Mujahedeen of the Islamic Revolution Organization, to once again operate as legal parties in the country. Basically, the administration is slowly trying to achieve its political and cultural objectives. However, what was promised to people before the elections was much greater than what is actually happening. The promises made were greater and people’s demands are also more substantial than what the administration has managed to achieve in the past six months.
  • Rouhani needs to lean on people and civil organizations more than anything else, especially given the fact that during the previous elections, he was not associated with any party or organization himself. He became the only possible choice for the Reformists so they supported him and right now, he continues to have their support. However, if he disappoints them, they might become neutral or even start opposing him. The totalitarian movement that wants to take over the government starts by creating problems for Rouhani and his administration, and then when the time is ripe, they will strike the fatal blow.
  • After the events of the year 2009, the group that suffered the most, officially and unofficially, were the journalists working inside Iran. For a while, we had the highest number of imprisoned journalists and bloggers. Even now, some of our notable journalists are imprisoned or have lost their jobs and many more have left the country or have decided to suspend their activities. Some of those who left the country started working for the foreign media. This is why the Ministry of Intelligence and the security organizations are putting a lot of pressure on the families of these journalists, hoping to prevent them from working outside Iran. Inside Iran, with much effort, the journalists have tried to keep journalism alive and recently we have had some progress. Of course, we are yet to return to what was called “Tehran Spring” in the first two years of Khatami’s presidency; in fact, we might never return to it. These pressures have forced our journalists to work on an international level, to establish themselves in the social networks, and also to learn and practice citizen journalism. It is true that citizen journalism is different from professional journalism, but at the end, they are both trying to reflect what is happening in society and expose what needs to be exposed so that the totalitarian movement cannot do as it wills without any opposition
Ed Webb

Once a beacon, Lebanese dailies lose regional sway - 2 views

  • Its slogan was "the voice of the voiceless", but after four decades the prestigious Lebanese daily As-Safir is in danger of falling silent, illustrating the unprecedented crisis rocking the country's media.Lebanese newspapers, long seen as a beacon of freedom in a tumultuous region, are suffering because of the country's political paralysis and a slump in funding from rival regional powers.
  • As-Safir's main competitor, An-Nahar, is also struggling to survive and its employees have not been paid for months."Our ink has run dry," said Talal Salman, founder and editor-in-chief of As-Safir. "The Lebanese press, a pioneer in the Arab world, is undergoing its worst crisis ever."
  • He blames the country's political stalemate, with existing divisions exacerbated by the war in neighbouring Syria.Two main blocs dominate Lebanon: one backed by the West and Gulf kingdoms, and the other by Iran and Syria.The rift means there have been no parliamentary elections since 2009, and lawmakers have failed for nearly two years to elect a president."Without politics, there is no media, and there is no politics in Lebanon today,"
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  • Many of the region's most influential journalists have written their best stories for Lebanese newspapers, relishing the freedom to be critical that one could only dream of under other more oppressive governments.But the freedom was never complete.Some journalists have paid the ultimate price for their work, including An-Nahar's Samir Kassir and Gibran Tueini, who were both murdered as the Syrian army pulled out of Lebanon in 2005.As-Safir's Salman escaped an assassination attempt himself in 1984, when Lebanon was mired in civil war
  • long-standing reliance of Lebanese media on political financing from the Middle East's rival powers
  • advertising revenue slump
  • During the 1975-1990 Lebanese civil war, Libya's Muammar Gaddafi, Iraq's Saddam Hussein and the Palestine Liberation Organisation's Yasser Arafat were key financiers.As-Safir acted as the voice of Arab nationalists and defenders of the Palestinian cause, while An-Nahar stood for Lebanese pluralism.After the war, Saudi, Qatari and Iranian money took over, but a few years on, even Riyadh's oil-fuelled coffers ran dry.
  • regimes have taken to setting up newspapers on their own turf
  • The editors of An-Nahar, founded in 1933, have denied rumours that it may face closure, but its journalists have not been paid for seven months and several have been let go.Staff at the English-language Daily Star as well as the Al-Mustaqbal newspaper and television station owned by billionaire Sunni former Prime Minister Saad Hariri say they too are owed pay.
Ed Webb

Women, Media, Blasphemy, and the President: Four Constitutional Quarrels Explained : Tunisia Live - News, Economy, Culture and Travel - 0 views

  • current status of various constitutional controversies, such as the status of women, the criminalization of blasphemy, the creation of a government-appointed media regulatory committee, and the system for electing the president
  • multi-party support will be necessary to pass these articles
  • it remains disputed whether the president will be elected by the people or by the parliament
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  • Article 28 is the only article to address women specifically in the constitution, though Article 22 provides “equality for all.”
  • create a regulatory committee by having journalists nominate 18 candidates, of which the government would appoint nine
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