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Virtual Shackles - TLDR: EA Sucks - 0 views

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    Deconstructing EA's claims in light of the recent poll that EA is America's worst company. This also functions as a *fantastic* guide to some crucial critical thinking tools.
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How Bayes' Rule Can Make You A Better Thinker - 1 views

  • To find out more about this topic, we spoke to mathematician Spencer Greenberg, co-founder of Rebellion Research and a contributing member of AskAMathematician where he answers questions on math and physics. He has also created a free Bayesian thinking module that's available online.
  • Bayes’s Rule is a theorem in probability theory that answers the question, "When you encounter new information, how much should it change your confidence in a belief?" It’s essentially about making decisions under uncertainty, and how we should update or revise our theories as new evidence emerges. It can also be used to help us reach decisions in those circumstances when very few observations or pieces of evidence are available. And it can also be used to help us avoid common mistakes and fallacies in our thinking.
  • The key to Bayesianism is in understanding the power of probabilistic reasoning. But unlike games of chance, in which there’s no ambiguity and everyone agrees on what’s going on (like the roll of die), Bayesians use probability to express their degree of belief about something.
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  • When it comes to the confidence we have in our beliefs — what can be expressed in terms of probability — we can’t just make up any number we want. There’s only one consistent way to handle those degrees in beliefs.
  • In the strictest sense, of course, this requires a bit of mathematical knowledge. But Greenberg says there’s still an easy way to use this principle in daily life — and one that can be converted to plain English.
  • Greenberg says it’s the question of evidence which he should apply, which goes like this:: Assuming that our hypothesis is true, how much more plausible, or likely, is the evidence compared to the hypothesis if it was not true?
  • “It’s important to note that the idea here is not to answer the question in a precise way — like saying that it’s 3.2 times more likely — rather, it’s to get a rough sense. Is it a high number, a modest number, or a small number?”
  • To make Bayes practical, we have to start with the belief of how likely something is. Then we need to ask the question of evidence, and whether or not we should increase the confidence in our beliefs by a lot, a little, and so on.
  • “Much of the time people will automatically try to shoot down evidence, but you can get evidence for things that are not true. Just because you have evidence doesn’t mean you should change your mind. But it does mean that you should change your degree of belief.”
  • Greenberg also describes Representativeness Heuristic in which people tend to look at how similar things are.
  • Greenberg also says that we should shy away from phrases like, “I believe,” or “I don’t believe.” “That’s the wrong way to frame it,” he says. “We should think about things in terms of how probable they are. You almost never have anything close to perfect certainty.”
  • “Let’s say you believe that your nutrition supplement works,” he told us, “Then you get a small amount of evidence against it working, and you completely write that evidence off because you say, ‘well, I still believe it works because it’s just a small amount of evidence.’ But then you get more evidence that it doesn’t work. If you were an ideal reasoner, you’d see that accumulation of evidence, and every time you get that evidence, you should believe less and less that the nutritional supplements are actually working.” Eventually, says Greenberg, you end up tipping things so that you no longer believe. But instead, we end up never changing our mind.
  • “You should never say that you have absolute certainty, because it closes the door to being able to revise your certainty in light of new information,” Greenberg told io9. “And the same thing can be said for having zero percent certainty about something happening. If you’re at 100% certainty, then the correct way of updating is to stay at 100% forever, and no amount of evidence can tip you.”
  • Lastly, he also says that probabilities can depend on the observer — what is a kind of probability relativity. We all have access to different information, so different people should assign different rates of probability to different things based on different sets of evidence.
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    "Having a strong opinion about an issue can make it hard to take in new information about it, or to consider other options when they're presented. Thankfully, there's an old rule that can help us avoid this problem - and even help us make good decisions when we're uncertain. Here's how Bayesian Reasoning works, and why it can make you a better thinker."
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Magic trick transforms conservatives into liberals - 0 views

  • When US presidential candidate Mitt Romney said last year that he was not even going to try to reach 47% of the US electorate, and that he would focus on the 5–10% thought to be floating voters, he was articulating a commonly held opinion: that most voters are locked in to their ideological party loyalty.
  • But Lars Hall, a cognitive scientist at Lund University in Sweden, knew better. “His calculation, only zeroing in on 10% of voters, is a risky proposition,” he says.
  • When Hall and his colleagues tested the rigidity of people’s political attitudes and voting intentions during Sweden’s 2010 general election, they discovered that loyalty was malleable: nearly half of all voters were open to changing their minds. The team's work is published today in PLoS ONE1.
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  • Hall’s group polled 162 voters
  • The person conducting the experiment secretly filled in an identical survey with the reverse of the voter's answers, and used sleight-of-hand to exchange the answer sheets, placing the voter in the opposite political camp (see video above).
  • No more than 22% of the manipulated answers were detected, and 92% of the study participants accepted the manipulated summary score as their own.
  • What is interesting about the latest study is that, on the basis of the manipulated score, 10% of the subjects switched their voting intentions, from right to left wing or vice versa. Another 19% changed from firm support of their preferred coalition to undecided. A further 18% had been undecided before the survey, indicating that as many as 47% of the electorate were open to changing their minds, in sharp contrast to the 10% of voters identified as undecided in Swedish polls at the time.
  • Eugene Borgida, a social and political psychologist at the University of Minnesota in Minneapolis, is not surprised that some people changed their minds in the experiment. “We know that when you ask someone to explain their views, it tends to temporarily destabilize those views,” he says.
  • But Borgida wonders how durable the results would be. “I suspect if left alone these people would drift back to their baseline affiliation.” The team, he says, “may be overstating the proportion of people who are malleable”.
  • And after the trick was explained to them, many were pleased to find themselves not so hidebound by ideology as to be unable to even contemplate another point of view. But they still were often relieved that they were not supporting the wrong party
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    "'Choice blindness' can induce voters to reverse their party loyalty."
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Researchers Finally Replicated Reinhart-Rogoff, and There Are Serious Problems. - 0 views

  • Countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent have a slightly negative average growth rate, in fact.
  • This has been one of the most cited stats in the public debate during the Great Recession.
  • In a new paper, "Does High Public Debt Consistently Stifle Economic Growth? A Critique of Reinhart and Rogoff," Thomas Herndon, Michael Ash, and Robert Pollin of the University of Massachusetts, Amherst successfully replicate the results.
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  • After trying to replicate the Reinhart-Rogoff results and failing, they reached out to Reinhart and Rogoff and they were willing to share their data spreadhseet. This allowed Herndon et al. to see how how Reinhart and Rogoff's data was constructed.
  • They find that three main issues stand out.
  • First, Reinhart and Rogoff selectively exclude years of high debt and average growth.
  • Second, they use a debatable method to weight the countries.
  • Third, there also appears to be a coding error that excludes high-debt and average-growth countries.
  • All three bias in favor of their result, and without them you don't get their controversial result.
  • Selective Exclusions. Reinhart-Rogoff use 1946-2009 as their period, with the main difference among countries being their starting year.
  • The paper didn't disclose which years they excluded or why.
  • Unconventional Weighting. Reinhart-Rogoff divides country years into debt-to-GDP buckets. They then take the average real growth for each country within the buckets.
  • this weighting significantly reduces the average; if you weight by the number of years you find a higher growth rate above 90 percent.
  • Coding Error. As Herndon-Ash-Pollin puts it: "A coding error in the RR working spreadsheet entirely excludes five countries, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, and Denmark, from the analysis.
  • Being a bit of a doubting Thomas on this coding error, I wouldn't believe unless I touched the digital Excel wound myself. One of the authors was able to show me that, and here it is. You can see the Excel blue-box for formulas missing some data:
  • If this error turns out to be an actual mistake Reinhart-Rogoff made, well, all I can hope is that future historians note that one of the core empirical points providing the intellectual foundation for the global move to austerity in the early 2010s was based on someone accidentally not updating a row formula in Excel.
  • So what do Herndon-Ash-Pollin conclude? They find "the average real GDP growth rate for countries carrying a public debt-to-GDP ratio of over 90 percent is actually 2.2 percent, not -0.1 percent as [Reinhart-Rogoff claim]." [UPDATE: To clarify, they find 2.2 percent if they include all the years, weigh by number of years, and avoid the Excel error.] Going further into the data, they are unable to find a breakpoint where growth falls quickly and significantly.
  • This is also good evidence for why you should release your data online, so it can be properly vetted.
  • But beyond that, looking through the data and how much it can collapse because of this or that assumption, it becomes quite clear that there's no magic number out there. The debt needs to be thought of as a response to the contingent circumstances we find ourselves in, with mass unemployment, a Federal Reserve desperately trying to gain traction at the zero lower bound, and a gap between what we could be producing and what we are. The past guides us, but so far it has failed to provide evidence of an emergency threshold. In fact, it tells us that a larger deficit right now would help us greatly.
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    "In 2010, economists Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff released a paper, "Growth in a Time of Debt." Their "main result is that...median growth rates for countries with public debt over 90 percent of GDP are roughly one percent lower than otherwise; average (mean) growth rates are several percent lower." Countries with debt-to-GDP ratios above 90 percent have a slightly negative average growth rate, in fact."
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Why I Hate Your Freedom - 1 views

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    "You can find more information about me at www.raikoth.net. This is the Non-Libertarian FAQ (aka Why I Hate Your Freedom)" One of the best things I've ever read about why *I* too am not a Libertarian. Gripping stuff.
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The Trouble With Intuition - 0 views

  • Some 45 years after Wise found the private edition of the Sonnets, two British book dealers, named John Carter and Graham Pollard, decided to investigate his finds. They re-examined the Browning volume and identified eight reasons why its existence was inconsistent with typical practices of the era. For example, none of the copies had been inscribed by the author, none were trimmed and bound in the customary way, and the Brownings never mentioned the special private printing in any letters, memoirs, or other documents.
  • The 1847 edition had to be a fake.
  • According to Gladwell, those experts' intuitions proved correct, and the initial scientific tests that authenticated the statue turned out to have been faulty.
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  • Cases in which forgeries that intuitively appear real but later are discovered through analysis to be frauds are fairly common in the art world.
  • Gladwell's message in Blink has been interpreted by some readers as a broad license to rely on intuition and dispense with analysis, which can lead to flawed decisions.
  • Intuition means different things to different people. To some it refers to a sudden flash of insight, or even the spiritual experience of discovering a previously hidden truth.
  • In its more mundane form, intuition refers to a way of knowing and deciding that is distinct from and complements logical analysis.
  • The idea that hunches can outperform reason is neither unique nor original to Malcolm Gladwell, of course. Most students and professors have long believed that, when in doubt, test-takers should stick with their first answers and "go with their gut." But data show that test-takers are more than twice as likely to change an incorrect answer to a correct one than vice versa.
  • Intuition does have its uses, but it should not be exalted above analysis.
  • There is, moreover, one class of intuitions that consistently leads us astray—dangerously astray. These intuitions are stubbornly resistant to analysis, and it is exactly these intuitions that we shouldn't trust. Unfortunately, they are also the intuitions that we find the most compelling: mistaken intuitions about how our own minds work.
  • The finding that people fail to notice unexpected events when their attention is otherwise engaged is interesting. What is doubly intriguing is the mismatch between what we notice and what we think we will notice.
  • If you believe you will notice unexpected events regardless of how much of your attention is devoted to other tasks, you won't be vigilant enough for possible risks.
  • In the vast majority of cases in which DNA evidence exonerated a death-row inmate, the original conviction was based largely on the testimony of a confident eyewitness with a vivid memory of the crime. Jurors (and everyone else) tend to intuitively trust that when people are certain, they are likely to be right.
  • Study after study has shown that memories of important events like those are no more accurate than run-of-the-mill memories. They are more vivid, and we are therefore more confident about their accuracy, but that confidence is largely an illusion.
  • The most troublesome aspect of intuition may be the misleading role it plays in how we perceive patterns and identify causal relationships.
  • To determine whether two events are truly associated, we must consider how frequently each one occurs by itself, and how frequently they occur together. With just one or a few anecdotes, that's impossible, so it pays to err on the side of caution when inferring the existence of an association from a small number of examples.
  • We can rely on accumulated data, but too often we don't. Why not? Because our intuitions respond to vivid stories, not abstract statistics.
  • But more than a dozen large-scale epidemiological studies, involving hundreds of thousands of subjects, have shown that children who were vaccinated are no more likely to be diagnosed with autism than are children who were not vaccinated. In other words, there is no association between vaccination and autism. And in the absence of an association, there cannot be a causal link.
  • Many people who believe that vaccination can cause autism are aware of those data. But the intuitive cause-detector in our minds is driven by stories, not statistics, and once a compelling story leads us to ascribe an effect to a cause, we can hold to that belief as stubbornly as when we trust in our ability to talk on a phone while driving—or to spot a person wearing a gorilla suit.
  • Gladwell surrounds his arguments with examples that suggest an association, letting his readers infer the causal relationships he wants to convey.
  • The kouros example is effective because it capitalizes on our tendency to generalize from a single positive association, leading to the conclusion that intuition trumps reason. But in this case, a bit of thought would show that conclusion to be unlikely, even within the confined realm of art fakery. Think about how often experts throughout history have been duped by forgers because intuition told them that they were looking at the real thing. It is ironic that Gladwell (knowingly or not) exploits one of the greatest weaknesses of intuition—our tendency to blithely infer cause from anecdotes—in making his case for intuition's extraordinary power.
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    By Daniel J. Simons and Christopher F. Chabris at The Chronicle Review - The Chronicle of Higher Education on May 30, 2010.
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Your intuitions are not magic - 0 views

  • As a formal system, pure math exists only inside our heads. We can try to apply it to the real world, but if we are misapplying it, nothing in the system itself will tell us that we're making a mistake.
  • When someone says "correlation", they are most commonly talking about Pearson's correlation coefficient, which seeks to gauge whether there's a linear relationship between two variables.
  • A person who doesn't stop to consider the assumptions of the techniques she's using is, in effect, thinking that her techniques are magical.
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  • Our brains keep track of countless pieces of information that we will not usually even think about. Few people will explicitly keep track of the amount of different restaurants they've seen.
    • anonymous
       
      This should probably read: "Our brains keep track of countless pieces of mis-remembered information"...
  • But like explicit statistical techniques, the brain makes numerous assumptions when building its models of the world.
    • anonymous
       
      Which this alludes to. :)
  • Thus, people asked to estimate the frequency of different causes of death underestimate the frequency of those that are underreported in the media, and overestimate the ones that are overreported.
  • like the person who was naively misapplying her statistical tools, the process which generates the answers is a black box to you.
  • he science seems absurd and unintuitive; our intuitions seem firm and clear. And indeed, sometimes there's a flaw in the science, and we are right to trust our intuitions. But on other occasions, our intuitions are wrong.
  • And what is ironic is that we persist on holding onto them exactly because we do not know how they work, because we cannot see their insides and all the things inside them that could go wrong.
  • That is why we need to study the cognitive sciences, figure out the way our intuitions work and how we might correct for mistakes.
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    By Kaj Sotala at Less Wrong on June 10, 2010.
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Charles, Prince of Piffle - 0 views

  • We have known for a long time that Prince Charles' empty sails are so rigged as to be swelled by any passing waft or breeze of crankiness and cant. He fell for the fake anthropologist Laurens van der Post. He was bowled over by the charms of homeopathic medicine. He has been believably reported as saying that plants do better if you talk to them in a soothing and encouraging way. But this latest departure promotes him from an advocate of harmless nonsense to positively sinister nonsense.
  • The heir to the throne seems to possess the ability to surround himself—perhaps by some mysterious ultramagnetic force?—with every moon-faced spoon-bender, shrub-flatterer, and water-diviner within range.
  • So this is where all the vapid talk about the "soul" of the universe is actually headed. Once the hard-won principles of reason and science have been discredited, the world will not pass into the hands of credulous herbivores who keep crystals by their sides and swoon over the poems of Khalil Gibran. The "vacuum" will be invaded instead by determined fundamentalists of every stripe who already know the truth by means of revelation and who actually seek real and serious power in the here and now.
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  • One thinks of the painstaking, cloud-dispelling labor of British scientists from Isaac Newton to Joseph Priestley to Charles Darwin to Ernest Rutherford to Alan Turing and Francis Crick, much of it built upon the shoulders of Galileo and Copernicus, only to see it casually slandered by a moral and intellectual weakling from the usurping House of Hanover.
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    Tagline: "A very silly man gives a very sinister speech." By Christopher Hitchens at Slate Magazine on June 14, 2010.
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What Do We Mean By "Rationality"? - 0 views

  • Epistemic rationality: believing, and updating on evidence, so as to systematically improve the correspondence between your map and the territory.  The art of obtaining beliefs that correspond to reality as closely as possible.  This correspondence is commonly termed "truth" or "accuracy", and we're happy to call it that.
  • First, the Bayesian formalisms in their full form are computationally intractable on most real-world problems.  No one can actually calculate and obey the math, any more than you can predict the stock market by calculating the movements of quarks.
  • we have to learn our own flaws, overcome our biases, prevent ourselves from self-deceiving, get ourselves into good emotional shape to confront the truth and do what needs doing, etcetera etcetera and so on
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  • Second, sometimes the meaning of the math itself is called into question.  The exact rules of probability theory are called into question by e.g. anthropic problems in which the number of observers is uncertain. 
  • We aren't interested in probability theory because it is the holy word handed down from Laplace.  We're interested in Bayesian-style belief-updating (with Occam priors) because we expect that this style of thinking gets us systematically closer to, you know, accuracy, the map that reflects the territory.
  • How can you improve your conception of rationality?  Not by saying to yourself, “It is my duty to be rational.”  By this you only enshrine your mistaken conception.  Perhaps your conception of rationality is that it is rational to believe the words of the Great Teacher, and the Great Teacher says, “The sky is green,” and you look up at the sky and see blue.  If you think:  “It may look like the sky is blue, but rationality is to believe the words of the Great Teacher,” you lose a chance to discover your mistake.
  • You cannot change reality, or prove the thought, by manipulating which meanings go with which words.
  • Instrumental rationality: achieving your values.  Not necessarily "your values" in the sense of being selfish values or unshared values: "your values" means anything you care about.  The art of choosing actions that steer the future toward outcomes ranked higher in your preferences.  On LW we sometimes refer to this as "winning".
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    By Eliezer Yudkowsky at Less Wrong on March 16, 2009.
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Objectivism & Politics, Part 55 - 0 views

  • It is facts, not opinions, results, not premises, that are of most importance to the conservative. Conservatives favor a type of freedom, a form of capitalism that works in the real world, not merely one that works according to the speculative “logic” of this or that intellectual.
  • The notion that trade can define most human relationships rests on the tacit assumption that the individual is a kind atomistic unit without any bonds or ties to the community at large which will profoundly influence his behavior.
  • Social organization through free contract implies that the contracting units know what they want and are guided by their desires, that is, that they are “perfectly rational,” which would be equivalent to saying that they are accurate mechanisms of desire-satisfaction.
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  • In fact, human activity is largely impulsive, a relatively unthinking and undetermined response to stimulus and suggestion.
  • Social bond individualism is civil and viable and constructive except in very abnormal situations.
  • Anarchic individualism is revolutionary and subversive from the very start; it shows a complete despite for all that civilization or the social order has painfully created, and this out of self-righteousness or egocentric attachment to an idea…. It is charged with a lofty disdain for the human condition, not the understanding of charity.
  • Objectivists benefit from the social bonds in the society around them, many of which they regard as irrational (such as the bonds defined by common law, family “duty,” social “obligations,” etc.). But if (per impossible) Objectivism became dominant in a society, many of those bonds would be dissolved. The result would be a social order in which most people (including, perhaps, many Objectivists) would not wish to live. It would be a society dominated by intellectual bullies who would use their aggressiveness and their ability to rationalize their (unconscious and unacknowledged) need for respect and status to manipulate and stomp over their weaker brethren.
  • Within the social world of Objectivism, the belief that the “rational interests of men do not clash” renders it nearly impossible for Objectivsts to settle differences amicably.
    • anonymous
       
      I would prefer a practical policy to the "it doesn't exist" approach.
  • precisely because Objectivists tend to regard all disputes as arising out of contradictory fundamental premises, personal disputes are framed as philosophical disputes involving metaphysical, epistemological, and moral arcana.
  • Once a personal dispute has been translated and rationalized into philosophical abstractions, there is no way it can be solved for the simple reason that the abstractions conceal the real causes of the dispute.
  • Fortunately for Plasil, the Objectivist community is only a small sliver of society: there was a larger non-Objectivist community that she could appeal to for justice and support. But where would she have turned in a society dominated by Objectivists, where Objectivists ran the courts and administered justice?
  • Ponder that question and you will understand why most people do not want an Objectivist society and are in fact repelled by it.
  • Indeed, in such a society, everyone would be on their own and those who could not fend for themselves would be regarded with contempt, as Plasil is among Objectivists to this day. Who would want to live in such a world?
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    Another great Greg S. Nyquist piece. On June 21, 2010. Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature
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What Your Friends Don't Know About You - 0 views

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    "How often do you and your friends agree?" Less than you think. By Jeff at Cheap Talk on July 5, 2010. Hat tip to Cheep Talk (Similarity Illusions) at http://cheeptalk.wordpress.com/2010/07/05/similarity-illusions/
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Objectivism & Politics, Part 57 - 0 views

  • according to Rand, it is better to be consistent in a bad cause than inconsistent in a good one. This has it's basis in one of Rand's oddest prejudices—namely, that human beings are the mere pawns of the logical deductions of their most basic premises.
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Rational ignorance - 0 views

  • Rational ignorance occurs when the cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the potential benefit that the knowledge would provide.
  • Much of the empirical support for the idea of rational ignorance was drawn from studies of voter apathy, which reached particularly strong conclusions in the 1950s.[2] However, apathy appeared to decline sharply in the 1960s as concern about issues such as the Vietnam War mounted , and political polarization increased [3]. This suggests that voters' interest in political information increases with the importance of political choices. Additionally, rational ignorance is scrutinized for its broadening effect on the decisions that individuals make in different matters. The investment of time and energy on the specified subject has ramifications on other decision areas. Individuals sometimes forget to take this into account when unconsciously assessing the investment cost versus payout. The external benefits are therefore not adequately taken into account.
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    Definition: "Rational ignorance occurs when the cost of educating oneself on an issue exceeds the potential benefit that the knowledge would provide." I got a great pointer by Adam Gurri about this Wikipedia page.
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Objectivism & Politics, Part 58 - 0 views

  • If she had a clear, rational case against Libertarianism, wouldn’t she have presented such a case and left it at that? But she does no such thing. Instead, her arguments appear drenched in malice and petty resentment.
  • Now if Libertarianism really is as bad as Rand would have us believe, why did Rand have to resort to name calling and illogical guilt-by-association arguments? I have several conjectures on this score, as listed below.
  • Conjecture 1: Logical deduction from Rand’s basic premises.
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  • From Rand’s views of history and psychology, she concluded that bad arguments do more harm than outright opposition.
  • Conjecture 2: Vanity motive.
  • In short, even those who sympathized with Rand’s political ideals found her arguments unpersuasive. Imagine how galling that must have been to Rand that even people who shared her political convictions found her arguments unconvincing!
  • Conjecture 2: Jealousy.
  • Perhaps Rand simply resented that some defenders of freedom and capitalism had more success or were taken more seriously than she was.
  • she wrote, “[The Road to Serfdom] had no base, no moral base. This is why my book is needed.” [ibid, 104-105] This final boast suggests that Rand regarded Hayek as a rival, and that jealousy may have played a role in her overwrought denunciations of his book.
  • Conjecture 4: Resentment against excommunicated Objectivists.
  • Apologists for Rand might insist that conjectures two through four must be wrong, because Rand was incapable of vanity, jealousy, and resentment. This, however, is a rather implausible assertion difficult to find creditable. Vanity, jealousy, and resentment are emotions deep within the warp and woof of human nature.
  • Rand’s claim that she didn’t have these disagreeable emotions because, after all, she was a woman of self-made soul, is no more creditable than someone denying that his or her organism produces disagreeable body odors.
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    Why was Ayn Rand such a vociferous opponent of Libertarians - one of the few groups that didn't regard her with contempt? Another great post at Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature on July 12, 2010.
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Explaining the Monty Hall problem - 0 views

  • There are three doors with a car and two goats placed behind them at random. The game show host knows which is placed where.You must start off by choosing a door.The game show host opens one of the two doors which you did not choose, revealing a goat. (He or she will always open a door that will reveal a goat. He will never open a door which will reveal the car.)The host then offers you the chance to change your original pick.The question is whether it is better to change or stick with your original choice. The answer — which can be and regularly has been demonstrated by running the scenario over and over — is that you are more likely to win if you change. But many, if not most people simply can’t process this and insist that it cannot make any difference whether or not you switch and that your chances of winning are the same either way.
  • What is physically behind the doors never changes. That’s why you can’t apply mathematical “logic” after the reveal and call it a 50-50 chance. The prize goes behind one door at the start. Either it’s behind the door you choose first, or it isn’t. What happens with the reveal doesn’t physically change that by making it more or less likely.
  • To say the same thing a different way: Probability relates to random events, not to states. The random event in this situation is the placing of the car and goats. Selecting a door to open, whether that be by the contestant or the host, has no bearing on this event.
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    By JLister at Geeks are Sexy on May 28, 2010.
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The Very Angry Tea Party - 0 views

  • The seething anger that seems to be an indigenous aspect of the Tea Party movement arises, I think, at the very place where politics and metaphysics meet, where metaphysical sentiment becomes political belief.
  • When it comes to the Tea Party’s concrete policy proposals, things get fuzzier and more contradictory: keep the government out of health care, but leave Medicare alone; balance the budget, but don’t raise taxes; let individuals take care of themselves, but leave Social Security alone; and, of course, the paradoxical demand not to support Wall Street, to let the hard-working producers of wealth get on with it without regulation and government stimulus, but also to make sure the banks can lend to small businesses and responsible homeowners in a stable but growing economy. 
  • Mark Lilla argued that the hodge-podge list of animosities Tea party supporters mention fail to cohere into a body of political grievances in the conventional sense: they lack the connecting thread of achieving political power. 
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  • What Lilla cannot account for, and what no other commentator I have read can explain, is the passionate anger of the Tea Party movement, or, the flip-side of that anger, the ease with which it succumbs to the most egregious of fear-mongering falsehoods. 
  • My hypothesis is that what all the events precipitating the Tea Party movement share is that they demonstrated, emphatically and unconditionally, the depths of the absolute dependence of us all on government action, and in so doing they undermined the deeply held fiction of individual autonomy and self-sufficiency that are intrinsic parts of Americans’ collective self-understanding. 
  • they would be politically acceptable only to the degree to which they remained invisible
  • Tea Party anger is, at bottom, metaphysical, not political: what has been undone by the economic crisis is the belief that each individual is metaphysically self-sufficient, that  one’s very standing and being as a rational agent owes nothing to other individuals or institutions. 
  • Each of these social arrangements articulate and express the value and the authority of the individual; they give to the individual a standing she would not have without them.
  • If stated in enough detail, all these institutions and practices should be seen as together manufacturing, and even inventing, the idea of a sovereign individual who becomes, through them and by virtue of them, the ultimate source of authority. 
  • is individual autonomy an irreducible metaphysical given  or a social creation?
  • It is by recognizing one another as autonomous subjects through the institutions of family, civil society and the state that we become such subjects
  • Hegel’s thesis is that all social life is structurally akin to the conditions of love and friendship; we are all bound to one another as firmly as lovers are, with the terrible reminder that the ways of love are harsh, unpredictable and changeable. 
  • because you are the source of my being, when our love goes bad I am suddenly, absolutely dependent on someone for whom I no longer count and who I no longer know how to count; I am exposed, vulnerable, needy, unanchored and without resource. 
  • This is the rage and anger I hear in the Tea Party movement; it is the sound of jilted lovers furious that the other — the anonymous blob called simply “government” — has suddenly let them down, suddenly made clear that they are dependent and limited beings, suddenly revealed them as vulnerable.
  • All the rhetoric of self-sufficiency, all the grand talk of wanting to be left alone is just the hollow insistence of the bereft lover that she can and will survive without her beloved
  • About this imaginary, Mark Lilla was right: it corresponds to no political vision, no political reality.  The great and inspiring metaphysical fantasy of independence and freedom is simply a fantasy of destruction. 
  • In truth, there is nothing that the Tea Party movement wants; terrifyingly, it wants nothing.  Lilla calls the Tea Party “Jacobins”; I would urge that they are nihilists. 
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    By J.M. Bernstein (Opinionator Blog) at NYTimes.com on June 13, 2010.
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What is Cognitive Dissonance? - 0 views

  • Cognitive dissonance is a family of theories in psychology explaining how we grapple with contradictory thoughts.
  • It has many branches, but a prominent one and perhaps the earliest, suggests that we irrationally discard information that is in conflict with our preconceived ideas.
  • The “rational” (i.e. Bayesian) reaction is to weigh your prior belief in the alternatives.
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    "You firmly believe that the sun will rise every morning. Then one day you awake and the sun does not rise. What are you to believe now?" By Jeff at Cheap Talk on July 12, 2010.
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The Seen, the Unseen, War, and Peace - 0 views

  • If people judged war purely on the basis of its obvious, immediate consequences, then, pacifism would be almost universal.
  • To sell war, you've got to convince people that its non-obvious, distant consequences are positively fantastic.
    • anonymous
       
      This is where the fuzzy-promises of war fit into things. There may very well be a geopolitical rationale behind it (good or bad, right or wrong), but that is not how it is sold to the public. As irritating as that makes me, I believe that this citizenry lacks the analytical thinking - especially regarding economics and geopolitics - required to evaluate it on its merits. And then, as I think further, that sort of person is lible to decline engagement if it looks like a minor loss of "empire" could avoid those horrible examples of war's effect.
  • My best explanation is that Bastiat's seen/unseen fallacy is not a general psychological tendency.  Instead, it's an expression of anti-market bias: Since people dislike markets, they're quick to dismiss claims about their hidden benefits. 
    • anonymous
       
      As of this writing, I don't quite understand this.
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  • When it comes to the unseen benefits of war, there's actually a perfect storm of irrationality.
  • Not only do people like government, the institution responsible for running the war.  Support for war also neatly coheres with the public's anti-foreign bias.
    • anonymous
       
      But this "Us Vs. Them" mentality continues to erode in the slow moving churning of years. To half remember a TED lecture I watched - We've come a long way from thinking the people in the next village aren't human - but there's still so very much to go.
  •  
    By Bryan Caplan at EconLog (Library of Economics and Liberty) on June 21, 2010. Thanks to David Gottlieb for the find: http://www.google.com/buzz/dmgottlieb/PBNvVHN9CDr/The-Seen-the-Unseen-War-and-Peace-EconLog-Library
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Applied Bayes' Theorem: Reading People - 0 views

  • 1. Start with the person's most striking traits, and as you gather more information see if his other traits are consistent or inconsistent.
  • 2. Consider each characteristic in light of the circumstances, not in isolation.
  • 3. Look for extremes. The importance of a trait or characteristic may be a matter of degree.
  • ...3 more annotations...
  • 4. Identify deviations from the pattern.
  • 5. Ask yourself if what you're seeing reflects a temporary state of mind or a permanent quality.
  • 6. Distinguish between elective and nonelective traits. Some things you control; other things control you.
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    By Kaj Sotala at Less Wrong on June 30, 2010.
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Twelve Virtues of Rationality - 0 views

  • The first virtue is curiosity.
  • The second virtue is relinquishment.
  • The third virtue is lightness.
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  • The fourth virtue is evenness.
  • The fifth virtue is argument.
  • The sixth virtue is empiricism.
  • The seventh virtue is simplicity.
  • The eighth virtue is humility.
  • The ninth virtue is perfectionism.
  • The tenth virtue is precision.
  • The eleventh virtue is scholarship.
  • Every step of your reasoning must cut through to the correct answer in the same movement. More than anything, you must think of carrying your map through to reflecting the territory.
  • These then are twelve virtues of rationality: Curiosity, relinquishment, lightness, evenness, argument, empiricism, simplicity, humility, perfectionism, precision, scholarship, and the void.
  • How can you improve your conception of rationality? Not by saying to yourself, “It is my duty to be rational.” By this you only enshrine your mistaken conception. Perhaps your conception of rationality is that it is rational to believe the words of the Great Teacher, and the Great Teacher says, “The sky is green,” and you look up at the sky and see blue. If you think: “It may look like the sky is blue, but rationality is to believe the words of the Great Teacher,” you lose a chance to discover your mistake.
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    By Eliezer S. Yudkowsky in 2006.
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