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When ethical hackers track down computer criminals, do they risk prosecution themselves? Security researchers at this week's Usenix conference in Boston believe this is a danger, and that ethical hackers have to develop a uniform code of ethics for themselves before the federal government decides to take action on its own. One such researcher introduced himself by saying "Hi, I'm Dave Dittrich, and I'm a computer criminal." Dittrich, senior security engineer and researcher at the University of Washington's Information School, has not been unlucky enough to be prosecuted. But ten years ago, he took actions to disrupt distributed denial-of-service attacks which he says could have been construed as criminal, he says. Working within the University of Washington Network, Dittrich says he "copied files from one host in Canada that was caching malicious software and logs of compromised hosts," allowing him to gain a fuller understanding of the nascent distributed denial-of-service tools, and to inform the operators of infected Web sites that a problem existed.

BBC Click's tweet states that they took legal advice following comments on the potential violation of U.K's Computer Misuse Act. There's a slight chance that you may have unknowingly participated in a recent experiment conducted by the BBC. In a bit of an awkward and highly unnecessary move, a team at the BBC's technology program Click has purchased a botnet consisting of 22,000 malware infected PCs, self-spammed themselves on a Gmail account, and later on DDoS-ed a a backup site owned by security company Prevx (with prior agreement), all for the sake of proving that botnets in general do what they're supposed to - facilitate cybercrime. A video of the experiment is already available. Here are more details : Upon finishing the experiment, they claim to have shut down the botnet, and interestingly notified the affected users. Exposing cybercrime or exposing the obvious, the experiment raises a lot of ethical issues. For instance, how did they manage to contact the owners of the infected hosts given that according to the team they didn't access any personal information on them? It appears that they modified the desktop wallpapers of all the infected hosts to include a link notifying them that they've been part of the experiment. Thanks, but no thanks.

There were only two of us on the graveyard shift. "If it's not locked up," a colleague at my first newspaper declared as he snatched a folder of papers from our boss' desk and strode towards the office copying machine, "Xerox it." (Old-tongue for photocopy.) That was long before CDs, and USB drives and, certainly, iPods, but the lesson was the same. If you are stupid about protecting company information, shame on you. I guess that's the message behind the "revelation" released in a survey this week that the majority of people who leave their jobs, voluntarily or otherwise, are taking company information with them. Lots of it. My reaction was the same as when I watched my fellow journalist grab and copy whatever it was that had been so carelessly left in the open. I shrugged. (We are by nature an overly curious species, and that overrides our normally dominant ethics gene.) Data Loss Risks During Downsizing conducted by the Ponemon Institute and sponsored by Symantec, was apparently designed to test the hypothesis that in this dire economy (ominous music in background), former employees are going to take important company information out the door. And, in fact, the poll of 945 former employees who left their jobs or were dismissed in the last 12 months showed that 59% stole company data. What kind of data? Email lists, non-financial business information and customer information, including contact lists. Not the secret formula for Coke, not the clinical trial reports on a cure for cancer, no insider information on proposed mergers and acquisitions. Not even a few thousand credit card numbers. Hardly worthy of shock and dismay. This is what a lot of people do when they leave jobs. Are they supposed to? No. Is it wrong? Yeah, but it's sort of like cheating on taxes. Folks rationalize it in a variety of ways, or it just doesn't weigh heavily enough on their conscience to set off an internal alarm. Most of the people who took data - 79% â

Jan 15, 2009 There may be only a handful of days left in the Bush administration, but the brouhaha over White House e-mail retention policies promises to continue right up to the last day. A federal court yesterday extended a preservation order to ensure that the outgoing administration does everything it can to recover any missing White House e-mails. The White House IT staff now has five days to scour workstations for missing e-mail before administration data records are archived on Jan. 20. The ruling, by U.S. District Judge Henry Kennedy Jr., also orders staff of the Executive Office of the President (EOP) to relinquish any digital media that may contain e-mails from March 2003 and October 2005. The legal action is the latest resulting from a lawsuit filed in September 2007 by the National Security Archive against the EOP, seeking to preserve and restore White House e-mails it alleged were missing. "There is nothing like a deadline to clarify the issues," Tom Blanton, the National Security Archive's director, said in a statement. "The White House will complain about the last-minute challenge, but this is a records crisis of its own making." The Archive, an independent nongovernmental research institute based at George Washington University, is a repository of government records and does not receive U.S. government funding. The Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington (CREW), a left-wing public advocacy group, also filed suit, but its legal action was subsequently consolidated with the Archive's legal action, which is taking place in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Last May, the White House's top tech staffer acknowledged that three months of data were missing from backup tapes. In earlier testimony before a congressional committee, White House technical staff said millions of e-mails from the past eight years could potentially have been erased. Also yesterday, Magistrate Judge John M. Facciola held an emergency status con

It was only a matter of time! Auditor accuracy being examined in lawsuit may signal change in PCI and other compliance processes.

When CardSystems Solutions was hacked in 2004 in one of the largest credit card data breaches at the time, it reached for its security auditor's report. In theory, CardSystems should have been safe. The industry's primary security standard, known then as CISP, was touted as a sure way to protect data. And CardSystems' auditor, Savvis Inc, had just given them a clean bill of health three months before. Yet, despite those assurances, 263,000 card numbers were stolen from CardSystems, and nearly 40 million were compromised. More than four years later, Savvis is being pulled into court in a novel suit that legal experts say could force increased scrutiny on largely self-regulated credit card security practices. They say the case represents an evolution in data breach litigation and raises increasingly important questions about not only the liability of companies that handle card data but also the liability of third parties that audit and certify the trustworthiness of those companies. "We're at a critical juncture where we need to decide . . . whether [network security] auditing is voluntary or will have the force of law behind it," says Andrea Matwyshyn, a law and business ethics professor at the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School who specializes in information security issues. "For companies to be able to rely on audits . . . there needs to be mechanisms developed to hold auditors accountable for the accuracy of their audits." The case, which appears to be among the first of its kind against a security auditing firm, highlights flaws in the standards that were established by the financial industry to protect consumer bank data. It also exposes the ineffectiveness of an auditing system that was supposed to guarantee that card processors and other businesses complied with the standards. Credit card companies have touted the standards and the auditing process as evidence that financial transactions conducted under their purview are secur

Visit the Amazon.com site to buy a book online and your welcome page will include recommendations for other books you might enjoy, including the latest from your favorite authors, all based on your history of purchases. Most customers appreciate these suggestions, much the way they would recommendations by a local librarian. But, what if you visited an investment site, only to find advertising messages suggesting therapies for your recently diagnosed heart condition? Chances are that you would experience what Fran Maier calls the "creepiness" factor, a sense that someone has been snooping into a part of your life that should remain private. Maier is the Executive Director of TrustE, a nonprofit that sets guidelines for online privacy and awards a seal of approval to companies meeting those guidelines. She was a speaker at the recent Supernova conference, an annual technology event in San Francisco organized by Wharton legal studies and business ethics professor Kevin Werbach in collaboration with Wharton. Creepiness Factor The creepiness factor is a risk inherent in so-called behavioral targeting. This practice is based on marketers anonymously observing a user's behavior on the Internet and compiling a personal profile based on interests and behavior -- sites visited, searches conducted, articles read, even emails written and received. Based on their profiles, users receive advertising targeted specifically to them, regardless of where they travel on the web. Consumer advocates worry that online data collection and tracking is going too far. Marketing executives counter that consumers benefit from seeing advertising relevant to their interests and contend that relinquishing some personal data is a reasonable trade-off for free access to Internet content, much of it supported by advertising.

Personal profiles on Facebook and other social-networking sites are a trove of inappropriate and embarrassing photographs and discomfiting breaches of confidentiality. You might expect that from your friends and even some colleagues - but what about your doctor? A new survey of medical-school deans finds that unprofessional conduct on blogs and social-networking sites is common among medical students. Although med students fully understand patient-confidentiality laws and are indoctrinated in the high ethical standards to which their white-coated profession is held, many of them still use Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Flickr and other sites to depict and discuss lewd behavior and sexual misconduct, make discriminatory statements and discuss patient cases in violation of confidentiality laws, according to the survey, which was published this week in the Journal of the American Medical Association. Of the 80 medical-school deans questioned, 60% reported incidents involving unprofessional postings and 13% admitted to incidents that violated patient privacy. Some offenses led to expulsion from school.

To find out more about the survey, I asked Deloitte LLP chairman of the board Sharon Allen to provide some additional context. Given that my only risk-management concern early this week relates to thunderstorms off the coast of South Padre Island, I asked Sharon to step in as a guest blogger today. Here's what she sent me: When I was a high school student growing up in the small farming community of Kimberly, Idaho, little did I know that a song from that time could serve as an anthem for something happening in the workplace today. The Beatles' 1967 classic "Hello Goodbye" is a study in contrasts, as are the current attitudes about social media. Social media has arrived - and with it, employers and employees are singing very different songs about what constitutes appropriate social networking both on and off the job. Recently, I commissioned the third annual Deloitte LLP "Ethics & Workplace" survey. We polled 500 executives and 2,000 employees outside Deloitte. Our survey found that 60 percent of business executives believe they have a right to know how employees portray themselves and their organizations in online social networks. Perhaps because nearly three-fourths of the employees in our poll agreed that the use of social networks makes it easier to damage a company's reputation. However, more than half of employees polled say their social networking pages are not an employer's concern. That belief is especially true among younger workers, with nearly two-thirds of 18- to 34-year-old respondents stating that employers have no business monitoring their online activity.

Juggling parental concern with an adolescent patient's legal and ethical right to privacy opens up some tricky questions. The law varies state by state,

When the director of IT at a Boston-based, midsize pharmaceutical firm was first approached to participate in a data leakage audit, he was thrilled. He figured the audit would uncover a few weak spots in the company's data leak defenses and he would then be able to leverage the audit results into funding for additional security resources. "Data leakage is an area that doesn't get a lot of focus until something bad happens. Your biggest hope is that when you raise concerns about data vulnerability, someone will see the value in allowing you to move forward to protect it," the IT director says. But he got way more than he bargained for. The 15-day audit identified 11,000 potential leaks, and revealed gaping holes in the IT team's security practices. (Read a related story on the most common violations encountered.) The audit, conducted by Networks Unlimited in Hudson, Mass., examined outbound e-mail, FTP and Web communications. The targets were leaks of general financial information, corporate plans and strategies, employee and other personal identifiable information, intellectual property and proprietary processes. Networks Unlimited placed one tap between the corporate LAN and the firewall and a second tap between the external e-mail gateway and the firewall. Networks Unlimited used WebSense software on two servers to monitor unencrypted traffic. Then it analyzed the traffic with respect to company policy. Specifically, Networks Unlimited looked for violations of the pharmaceutical firm's internal confidentiality policy, corporate information security policy, Massachusetts Privacy Laws (which go into effect in 2010), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), and Security and Exchange Commission and Sarbanes-Oxley regulations. Auditor Jason Spinosa, senior engineer at Networks Unlimited, says that while he selected the criteria for this audit, he usually recommends that companies take time to determine their policy settings based on their risk